z dnia 20 października 2010r.

Specjalny wywiad z Januszem Bugajskim z Centre for Strategic and International Studies przeprowadzony przez Tomasza Pichóra z FKP.

Tomasz Pichór (The Casimir Pulaski Foundation): A couple of years ago, on the pages of “The National Interest”, you wrote that Putin as a President systematically tried to restore Russia as a global challenger of the United States. Do you still think the same after six years have passed?

Janusz Bugajski: Russia’s regime is still engaged in a strategic competition with the United States in which it has several long-range goals. These include restoring Russia’s global reach, undermining U.S. predominance, dividing the NATO alliance, neutralizing the European Union, preventing further NATO enlargement, and re-establishing zones of influence around Russia’s borders containing pliant governments dependent on Moscow.

Tomasz Pichór: Could you describe current Russian politics as “realistic”? I think about all those actions which remind us of the Cold War; not only war against Georgia two years ago, but also such aspects as the Russian bomber next to the British territory, or the Russian nuclear submarine which was hunting for a British SSBN “Vanguard”. Do such actions constitute new Russian international politics, or are only envisaged for domestic purposes?

Janusz Bugajski: Russia’s policies are intended for both internal and external consumption. Internally, neo-imperial moves are intended to demonstrate the patriotism and strength of the regime; externally they are intended to display Russia’s return as a strong power on the international arena. However, there is a growing discrepancy between Russia’s state ambitions and its actual capabilities, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crises and the falling price of hydrocarbons – Russia’s chief export and its major political weapon. Russia now faces growing internal vulnerabilities with an uncompetitive economy, a declining population, and growing separatist movements that could fracture the federation over the coming decade much like the Soviet Union twenty years ago.

Tomasz Pichór: What do you think about Dmitri Miedwiediew? Is he an independent politician, or – on the contrary – totally dependent on Putin?

Janusz Bugajski: Medvedev has limited room for maneuver and a restricted base of support. He is ultimately dependent on the “Cekistocracy” centered around current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. However, he is useful for Putin if he can attract foreign investment and improve Russia’s image among the major powers. The Medvedev phase of Russian foreign policy envisions improved relations with the EU and U.S. in order to gain technology transfers and Western investment and promote modernization and economic development so Russia can more effectively pursue its trans-regional ambitions.

Tomasz Pichór: Soviet’s Russia for decades was perceived as the main enemy of NATO. When the SU disappeared this fact weakened the whole organization. Maybe such a challenge, as I mention above, would be the cure for the revival of NATO? Maybe relations with Russia are still more an essential issue for the future of Alliance’s identity? More important than war in Afghanistan?

Janusz Bugajski: NATO’s relations with Russia have altered significantly in the last twenty years. NATO is no longer simply an organization of mutual defense against a single Soviet enemy, it has also evolved into a security body and an out-of-area operation dealing with regional crises that impact on the Allies. Despite its neo-imperial ambitions Russia is unlikely to emerge as a threat to NATO. However, in the years ahead NATO may be called upon to help secure border areas in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus resulting from Russia’s potential state fracture.

Tomasz Pichór: What should be the right balance between the article 5 commitments and the out-of-area operations? Should NATO react on conflict on broad post-Soviet space, for example, between Armenia and Azerbaijan?

Janusz Bugajski: NATO has to select its operations depending on the commitments of neighbors, U.S. leadership, and the importance of any crisis for Allied security interests. However, its first responsibility is credible Article 5 commitments to each ally. Hence, updated defense contingency plans for each NATO member, improved territorial defense capabilities, and a strong NATO deterrence all remain important for guaranteeing that mutual defense is NATO’s first priority.

Tomasz Pichór: Under the Lisbon Treaty the EU has gained quite powerful, at least theoretically, tools to enhance its position on the global scene. What do you think, is the EU able to create common and – what is more important – consistent policy toward Russia, and all other post-Soviet states?

Janusz Bugajski: Unfortunately, the EU is not a powerful player on the global security scene. It has strong economic and diplomatic instruments but possesses no serious military combat projection capabilities and even its soft power instruments appear to be waning. The EU is embroiled in its internal institutional, fiscal, and economic problems, it no longer possesses the caliber of leadership that it had in the 1990s, and the Lisbon Treaty seems to have created even more confusion as to a uniform foreign and security policy and the role of national governments. As a result, the EU’s approach toward Russia is centered primarily on trade, energy, and investment. It has little influence over internal reform in Russia or over Moscow’s policies toward its immediate neighbors. Additionally, the EU’s Eastern Partnership and other instruments toward the post-Soviet states appear to have limited mileage as the main component of the EU’s soft power – the prospect of Union membership – is not on the table.

Tomasz Pichór: One of the most important questions of Polish modern foreign policy is the policy towards post-Soviet states of East Europe. During the last 20 years it was rather quite simple, I think. We tried to create bonds between Ukraine and the West, and isolate Lukashenka’s Belarus on the international stage. Could you describe our Eastern politics as a successful one? Maybe we should change it?

Janusz Bugajski: Poland’s policy has been semi-successful as it has encouraged closer links between the EU and its eastern neighbors that may otherwise have veered more closely toward Russia. However, Poland cannot act alone and the EU as a whole is preoccupied with a host of other issues. Additionally, there are some capitals, such as Berlin, Paris, and Rome, who view Russia as a benign power and may prefer Russian hegemony over a chaotic Ukraine and an authoritarian Belarus rather than spend EU time and resources in transforming these countries. However, Poland cannot simply walk away from its “Eastern Question” as this will continue to challenge the country’s long-term security. Above all it will need to devise contingency plans for potential instability in neighboring countries, including Russia.

Tomasz Pichór: Could you tell us what consequences (if any) has the tragedy near Smolensk for Polish-Russian relations? Is it possible that after such an impulse our relationships will improve?

Janusz Bugajski: The Polish-Russian rapprochement is largely driven by strategic considerations as Moscow views Poland as a rising power within the EU. It is therefore offering closer business and energy connections between the two states to increase Russia’s influence within the Union. However, the bilateral thaw is not irreversible as a great deal depends on Russia’s internal developments and its external behavior during a period of outreach in pursuit of economic modernization. A crisis in Russia could quickly reverse the current thaw with Warsaw.

Tomasz Pichór: I would like to ask you about Kaliningrad’s Oblast. What do you think about the future of this region? Could it be some kind of a platform between “continental” Russia and Europe? Or rather a “black hole” on Europe’s map?

Janusz Bugajski: The best solution for Kaliningrad would be an independent Baltic state that will be open to reform and economic development without interference from Moscow and without the corrupt governors that the Kremlin installs in its federal units to ensure their loyalty. Neighboring states should promote direct economic, social, and other contacts with Kaliningraders to convince them of the benefits of sovereignty that could begin their road to eventual EU membership.

Do pobrania TUTAJ