Pulaski Policy Paper no 24, November 04 2022

Press reports, circulating in October 2022, about the Russian use of weapons obtained from Iran were, on the one hand, perceived as a sensation and a surprise. There are good reasons for this – Iran has so far avoided getting involved in conflicts and disputes outside the Middle East, and its weapons have not been used in Europe before. Moreover, some observers were surprised that Russia – with a powerful (at least from a quantitative perspective) armed forces and an extensive arms industry, needed an assistance from a state, which has been under sanctions for over forty years and whose domestic military industry focuses primarily on satisfying the needs of own armed forces. Until now, the situation was the opposite – it was Russia that provided Iran with weapons and technological know-how.

On the other hand, reports of forthcoming deliveries of drones from Iran appeared as early as in July. Moreover, the arms transfer is a logical continuation of a relatively close political and military cooperation between Russia and the Islamic Republic (bilateral ties, forged in the 1990s, were strengthened after 2015, along with the intensification of cooperation in Syria, where their military forces began to coordinate their actions). Although in the Ukrainian-Russian War diplomatically Iran has been trying to pose as a non-aligned state calling for the end of a bloodshed, in reality Tehran has sided with Russia. Iranian president Raisi unequivocally expressed his support for Russia’s claims and blamed NATO, especially the United States for the outbreak of the armed conflict.

Current arms deliveries

The available information clearly shows that Iran supplied Russia with the Shahed-136 UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) that have already been used in combat, including in the attack on the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. They were also used to strike civil infrastructure in at least 16 cities across Ukraine. Both Moscow and Tehran denied that any Iranian weapons were used in Ukraine, but available video evidence is unambiguous. These drones, locally known as Geran-2, do not – contrary to numerous media reports – belong to a category known as loitering munition (which can wait airborne around a target and wait for a proper moment to strike). They are either remotely controlled or most likely pre-programmed to attack ground-based targets. Hence, they can be compared to the German V-1 missiles from World War II rather than modern cruise missiles. They have a wingspan of 2.5 meters, while their weight is approximately 200 kg. They are armed with a 40-kg warhead and can fly at a cruise speed of 120 km/h. Although a warhead is relatively small, these drones can operate in groups, which increases their lethality.

Iran, which belongs to a relatively narrow groups of states with indigenous defence industry, has also delivered its Mohajer-6 armed drones. This type was revealed by the Iranian MODAFL (Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics) in 2016 and – according to Tehran – its mass production was launched two years later. In 2021 they were displayed by the PMF (People’s Mobilisation Forces, Al Hashd Ash-Sha’bi), which is a large, state-sponsored, and pro-Iranian political and military organisation in Iraq. According to available sources, Mohajer-6 is 5.7 meters long and has a maximum speed of 200 km/h. It can be armed with light TV-guided bombs, known as Qaem, with a 1.7 kg warhead (they are also used by Iran’s Hamaseh tactical reconnaissance drones).

In late October 2022 the White House stated that the Iranian troops were “directly engaged on the ground” in Crimea supporting drone operations. Such reports seem true – all new equipment requires training, which means a direct presence of instructors, and support in terms of both logistics and operational use. A few days later it was reported that Iran enlists former Afghan security forces for deployment in the Russian military.

Earlier, in April 2022, the press – including “The Guardian” – reported that Russia had been receiving munitions and weapons, including anti-tank systems, from Iran via Iraq. The list included Iranian-made Bavar 373 air defence missile system and at least two Brazilian-designed Astros II ground—to-ground rocket launcher systems, which were reportedly handed over by the PMF and transferred first to Iran and then to Russia. The latter can fire rockets of various calibres (between 127 mm and 450 mm) and was sold by Brazil to Iraq in the 1980s. Some were built locally under license (known as Sajil-60).

Bavar 373 is an air defence, mobile, wheeled (8×8) system, which is similar to Russian S-300. One battery is composed of six launchers, one command-and-control unit, one engagement radar and one detect-track radar. The first variant was presented by Iran in 2011 and commissioned in 2019. It uses the Sayyad-4 missiles, which are most likely based on the Russian-made 48N6E missiles of the S-300 system. According to official Iranian information, the Bavar 373 can detect and neutralise up to six targets simultaneously (aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and even cruise missiles), regardless of weather conditions within a range between 5 and 200 km (or even 300 km according to some sources) and an altitude between 100 m and 27 km. Its export designation is AD-200. Such name was used during the International Exhibition of Naval Defence in Qatar in March 2022, when Iran presented a scale model of such system.

Main factors

Any assessment of both actual and potential Iranian arms transfer to Russia has to consider some major factors. First of all, this includes a legal factor, although it is not a decisive one – Iran has a rich track record of ignoring international rules and of illicit activities, including smuggling. Second factor is related to needs of the Russian military and actual offer of the Iranian defence industry, which is relatively limited. Thirdly, it has to be remembered that a production capacity of the Iranian military industry is also small. This includes a relatively modest industrial base, lack of new technologies and advanced materials, as well as insufficient funds.

Regarding a legal dimension, in October 2020 a decade-long United Nations’ arms embargo on Iran expired. That gave Iran a green light both to buy and sell military hardware. Back then President Hassan Rouhani openly said that Iran expected to sell more arms than it procured. Nevertheless, the United States, France and the United Kingdom now claim that transfers to Russia breach a Resolution 2231, which was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council in 2015 (according to them, Iran is not allowed to export weaponry until October 2023). These three states have already called for a United Nations investigation. Their appeal was rejected by Iran.

In fact, it has to be honestly stated that our knowledge about all capabilities and products offered by the Iranian industry is very modest. Iranian military companies usually do not attend major international defence exhibitions. They also do not invite foreign journalists to see their products and facilities. Moreover, Iran has a very limited track record of arms export. Nevertheless, it is believed that Iran can produce various systems domestically as well as it is able, to some extent, to modernise and at least partially copy (by reverse engineering) even more advanced sub-components, such as engines, electronics and most likely also older types of avionics. It also has the capacity to produce about 50 types of ammunition and artillery shells, including tank ammunition and missiles of various calibres. Iran produces the majority of its own light weapons, including pistols, rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars, anti-ship missiles, air-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles of different ranges.

Iran’s industrial portfolio – as presented below – is limited and in most cases does not include more complex weapon systems, such as aircraft (both fixed wing and helicopters), tanks and armoured vehicles. Iran’s industry is able, first of all, to overhaul its equipment. Its modernisation proposals clearly suggest that the capacity to design and then to manufacture new solutions is limited. For instance, the “new tank” Tiam, revealed in 2016 is a combination of a chassis from the M47 tank (a 1950s design) with the turret of an only slightly newer Chinese Type 59/69 tank. It is equipped with the M68 105-mm gun, which was fielded by the West in the late 1950s. The Owj engine, proudly revealed in 2016 as the “first indigenous turbojet engine”, is nothing more than a modified copy of the General Electric J85-GE-21 single-shaft turbojet engine, which was designed in the 1950s. Some systems (of Western origins from the Cold War) offered by Iran would not be attractive to the Kremlin. Moreover, Iran might be reluctant to share some of its most advanced technologies with Russia since it could pose a risk if they were later indirectly acquired by the United States; This would enable Iran’s enemies to counter them more effectively.

Regarding details of Iran’s industrial offer, Tehran has reportedly delivered to Syria communication systems, short-range multiple rocket launchers (the Type 63/Fajr-1 107-mm system), anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles (copies of the M40 106-mm rifles), and sniper rifles (such as the Sayyad rifles produced in Iran without a license – a copy of the Austrian Steyr HS .50 BMG anti-materiel rifles). Iran has also delivered locally produced Safir 4×4 multipurpose light vehicles to Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shia militia in Iraq. Iran reportedly has also exported to Syria the Bavar-373 and Khordad-3 air defence systems. According to some sources, Iranian ammunition has been found in at least nine African countries. Iran has sold Rakhsh (4×4) armoured personal carriers, Boragh vehicles, and an unspecified number of Ababil-3 and Mohajer UAVs to Sudan. Other weapons transferred to the region include light arms, such as G-3 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, mortars (60-mm and 82-mm), rocket artillery, and landmines. Light arms and ammunition have also been delivered to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as to Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. Yemen’s Houthi rebels were supplied—most likely by Iran—with Qasef-1 suicide drones and light arms. Some of these items could be offered also to Russia.

Potential future transfers

Among military items that Russia could acquire from Iran are items such as personal gear, medical equipment, Safir tactical and Kaviran 3.4-ton tactical vehicles, Neynava all-terrain general purpose 4×4 military trucks, light arms, including mortars, the Shaher 14.5-mm anti-materiel sniper rifle, and machineguns, like a modified 12.7×108-mm DshK. The list also includes ammunition of various calibers, including for light arms. Iranian industry could offer an unspecified quantity of artillery shells for both towed and self-propelled guns (122 mm and 152 mm).

The Iranian defence industry could also offer services, such as maintenance, repairs, and some spare parts (for instance, for the T-72 tanks and the BMP-family armoured infantry tracked vehicles). In the past Iran was involved in some helicopter overhauls in Zimbabwe and planned to open a centre for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of helicopters in that country. However, also in this case details are unknown. However, a potential obstacle is that Iran has no land connection with Russia, which makes such cooperation very problematic.

Other potential transfer could cover some anti-tank systems, both guided missiles (ATGMs) and RPGs. For instance, in the past Hezbollah was equipped by Iran with the BGM-71/Toophan and 9M113 Kornet/Dehlavie anti-tank guided missiles. Iran might be also able to offer the RPG-29, which has been used in Iraq and in Lebanon, or the Misagh system, which is a local version of the Chinese QW-1 man-portable air-defence system (MANPADS). The latter has been transferred to Shia militias in Iraq and most likely to militias in Syria.

It is very likely that Iran could supply Russia with its multiple-rocket artillery systems (MLRS), such as the Fajr, which has already been seen in various locations across the Middle East. Fajr-3 (240-mm), Fajr-5 (333-mm), Falaq-1 (240-mm) and Falaq-2 (333-mm) have been delivered to Hezbollah and Syria (Falaq rockets have also been spotted in Sudan). One of its variants, Fajr 5C (333 mm), was used to attack the headquarters & training camp of Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) near Erbil in Iraq in September 2022.

Iran could also offer its radar technologies. In recent years Iran unveiled numerous types of radars, but their parameters for obvious reasons cannot be verified. One of such development was announced in 2015, when Tehran unveiled the Ghadir phased-array radar, which is – according to official statements – designed to detect aircraft at 600 km and a ballistic missile at 1,100 km. However, it is highly doubtful whether Iran has sufficient knowledge and technological capacity in fields such as electronics to design and manufacture advanced radars, capable of detecting and tracking not only advanced fighter jets but also ballistic and cruise missiles. Iran’s capacity to produce radars in large quantities is also doubtful.

Additional deliveries of drones are the most plausible scenario. Russia is interested in UAVs with combat (strike) capabilities. Future deals could cover the Arash-2 system. In September 2022 Iran allegedly refused a request by President Vladimir Putin to deliver them, but in late October it was reported by various sources – including by Ukraine’s General Staff – that the Kremlin was finally allowed to acquire them, and that Iran was already training Russian operators. Arash-2, also known as Ki’an-2, is believed to be used for strike operations, but without a loiter capability. It has a widespan of approximately 4 meters. Its range is believed to be roughly 1,000 km but can be even longer. It cannot be confirmed, but some sources claim that Arash-2 can be equipped with a passive homing radar and might be used to neutralise radar stations.

Iran has also other strike-capable drones, such as the Qasef 1 and Qasef 2 loitering munition systems (based on the Ababil-2 UAV) with a 30-kg warhead. These have been used by Yemeni Houthis to attack radar systems of the Patriot air defence. Another system is a recently revealed Meraj-521 tube-launched loitering munition (which looks very similar to US-made Switchblade 300 QPS-equipped tactical drones). Ababil-3, which debuted in 2010, can be used both for aerial recoinnesanse and combat duties – for the latter it can be armed with Qaem bombs (a new variant is known as Atlas). They have already been used outside Iran, including in Syria. It has a landing gear and uses airways to take off and land. Kaman-12 UAV can carry a payload of up to 100 kg. Other interesting projects of multirole UAVs (including for combat duties) are named Raad, Nazir and Karrar, as well as Hazem with “bombing capability”.

Another category of weapons that Russia is the most likely to be interested in are ballistic missiles. Tehran now has the largest and the most diverse ballistic missile forces in the Middle East. Iran’s capabilities include both short and medium-range missiles. Potential transfers to Russia could include the Fateh-110 and the Zulfaqar-family missiles. The attractiveness of Iranian missiles is increased by the fact that they have been used several times and have proved their usefulness. Fateh-110 is a mobile (on a wheeled platform) single-stage surface-to-surface missile, which was test-fired in 2012 (the first generation of this class was presented for the first time in 2001). It has a range of 300-500 km.

In February this year Iran unveiled an improved version of the Fateh-110 missile. New system, known as Kheibar Shekan, has a declared range of 1,450 km, while a previous variant – Dezful (presented in February 2019) has a claimed range of 1,000 km. The Zolfaqar missile is believed to be based on the Fateh-110 class and has a declared range of 700 km. This missile was used to strike Jihadi forces in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate in 2017.

Conclusions

1. Iran is the most likely and reliable partner Russia can have in current circumstances. Both states have close political and political cooperation. However, it should be remembered that Russia and Iran are not allies, but rather tactical partners (“marriage of convenience”). Economically – including energy – they are competitors.
2. Iran’s arms deliveries to Russia may be considered surprising – in the past, Russia was the supplier of arms to Iran and Russian industrial capacity is much higher – but they are logical from the point of view of Iranian interests. Thanks to these deliveries, Tehran will receive some benefits, probably including supplies of Russian weapons (most likely aircraft). The authorities in Tehran should not be expected to officially confirm their materiel support for the Russians.
3. Capacity of Iran’s arms industry is largely unknown, but it is very plausible that it faces serious problems (lack of funds and technologies, small industrial base). This means that large (mass) shipments of weapons from Iran to Russia are unlikely. Combat drones might be an exception, since these are rather technologically simple systems.
4. Legal restrictions – currently raised by the United States, the United Kingdom and France – do not and will not be an obstacle to possible further arms deliveries.
5. Large shipments of heavy weaponry, such as tanks or armorer vehicles, might be difficult do to an absence of a border connection between Russia and Iran. Using transit routes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan would be a political challenge. Shipments would have to be carried out through the Caspian Sea, where Russian Caspian Fleet in Astrakhan is located. It has some transport capabilities.
6. Items the Iranian defence industry offers are from time to time impressive, but in general they do not meet criteria of a modern warfare. However, this does not constitute an obstacle for Russia, whose armed forces are of a low technical level.
7. The most likely transfers of weapons from Iran to Russia include tools that Russia lacks. These are mainly ammunition, including tank and mainly artillery, but also combat drones and ballistic missiles. The latter are a substitute for conventional air forces and would allow Russia to continue its terror campaign against Ukraine without having to operate on its territory. Moreover, countering ballistic missiles remains difficult and costly, which further increases the attractiveness of such systems.
8. Further deliveries of Iran’s drones and ballistic missiles will increase Russian destructive capabilities. They will allow Russia to escalate its attacks on Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure in order to degrade Ukraine’s industrial base and to terrorise its population.

Author: Dr Robert Czulda, Reaserch Fellow of the International Security Programme at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation

The Paper was prepared in cooperation with International Centre for Ukrainian Victory

Pulaski Policy Paper no 23, October 19 2022

Since its commencement in February 2022, the Russo-Ukrainian war has posed what some deem the most severe challenge to Europe since the Yugoslav War of the 1990s. Alongside diminishing security levels, Europe has seen the onset of a humanitarian disaster which continues to disproportionately affect Ukrainian women and girls. The response provided by the European Union to women, both those living in and leaving Ukraine, will inevitably determine the direction of European feminism and gender politics.

Based on UN Women’s 2022 “Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine” and the provided answers from Ukrainian female respondents the following are seen as the ways in which women have been most affected due to the war, and therefore the most pressing humanitarian needs for women at present.

Healthcare

At the time of release access to healthcare, both physical (24%) and mental (21%), proved to be the priority for Ukrainian women. Prior to the war, 84% of all healthcare staff in Ukraine were women, who actively continue to engage as front-line respondents in both military and civilian cases. However, the number of medical professionals leaving Ukraine has left shortages in staff, affecting chiefly war-ravaged areas that have known little peace even prior to 2022.

The Russian army’s targeting of densely populated targets in civilian areas has, in the healthcare sector, profoundly impacted pregnant women and the children they carry. Hospitals, particularly maternity hospitals, have been shelled without regard as was the case during the bombing of Mariupol. Simultaneously, such actions have increased both civilian fatalities and the number of pregnant women forced to give birth in dire and unsuitable conditions, increasing birth-related infant and female mortalities, as well as the number of stress-related premature births and miscarriages. Estimates suggested that from May onwards, over 80 000 Ukrainian women who were due to deliver would not be able to do so safely, or in an adequately medically equipped and sanitised environment. In many cities facing maternity ward destruction, new-borns are being received and treated in underground ICU’s, serving also as air raid shelters.
Access to medicine has also become challenging, particularly for the elderly, those with disabilities, and those suffering from chronic illness. Respondents noted often and specifically the lack of specific treatment and support for the elderly, of whom two-thirds over the age of 65 are women. The vulnerability of this group is increased when residing in smaller towns and villages, cut off from access to humanitarian convoys by Russian troops and reliant on medical aid from larger cities, which in present circumstance often cannot come.

Safety – Gender Based Violence (GBV)

The second largest concern was lack of protection – 40% of women surveyed agreed that they live in constant fear for the safety of themselves and their families. Experts have reported a spike in GBV (Gender Based Violence) since the onset of the conflict, especially domestic violence and human trafficking. Although lacking complex data at present, the war has seen shutdowns of many GBV-targeting services for women and girls, such as shelters. In some cases, police have stopped responding to calls regarding GBV due to resource shortage. This impacts most severely those cities which prior to wartime were dependent on their regional capitals, for example Mariupol in the Donetsk Oblast, or Zaporizhzhia in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
The war has seen the Russian army use rape as a strategic weapon for two key reasons. Firstly, it is used as an intimidation tactic through which a perceived ‘superiority’ of the enemy is entrenched, driving psychological fear into civilians, and encouraging their flight from the area. Secondly, rape is used as a torture tactic intended to humiliate and punish the enemy, questioning the strength of their ability to protect ‘their own.’ Evidence supports these theories. Prosecutor General Venediktova has heard accounts from all over Ukraine (Bucha, where Russian soldiers raped women and girls, some only 14, in a cellar; of women held as sex slaves, being raped in front of their husbands; of elderly, women being raped and murdered).
As mental health provisions are insufficient across Ukraine, GBV victims, who tend to be women and minors, often have little to none access to psychological support. Due to rape being under-reported during wartime, it is very likely that many victims will never get to hold their abusers accountable.

Food and shelter

The war has exacerbated resource scarcity, with access to food becoming a priority for 13% of female respondents. Women in Ukraine have long faced increased food insecurity in comparison to men, as the issue touched 37,5% of female-headed households in conflict-affected areas since 2014. These figures have only risen with the enlargement of the conflict-area. Food insecurity is felt especially in cases where specific nutrition is required, as is the case for pregnant and breastfeeding women. Women lacking sufficient nutrition to produce breastmilk for infants turn to baby formula, currently a premium product alongside baby food. The risk of malnutrition amplifies for women and girls when considering the tendency of both to undereat in crisis situations, with mothers particularly prioritising the well-being of their children and dependents. Starvation has also been used as a war weapon by the Russian army (in Chernihiv, a line of 10 civilians queuing for groceries were shot at, some fatally, a repetitive incident in many occupied cities; the siege of Mariupol saw the induction of famine intentionally to starve civilians to death as a means of breaking resistance).

Women also express lack of safe shelter (21%) and reliable information regarding aid and their eligibility to obtain it (4%). Displaced women must often rely on unvetted advice regarding shelter, posing a security risk when considering the perceived vulnerability of women travelling without a male companion. Even the displaced who do settle often can find themselves in predatory situations; Female refugees undertaking paid employment within their country of refuge can also face significant financial discrimination concerning fair pay. Reports include underpayment, or an outright refusal of employers to pay due wage for what often is hard, physical labour.

Lack of women in formal decision-making

Over 22% of surveyed women declared that they have gained influence in decision-making from the start of the war. At the household level women have, by default, become the predominant decision-makers. The same applies to informal community level decision-making, with women engaging in volunteers, leading the humanitarian response, organising social media campaigns. On the national level, women have become leaders in diplomacy due to the ban on leaving the country for men aged 18-60. Many women in governmental positions have become crucial, vocal participants in decision-making, notably Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk.

However, 71% of women surveyed claim they have not noticed change in their decision-making influence. Women have been displaced into communities previously alien to them, while the militarisation of society has meant that decisions are undertaken rapidly, in a military fashion, often with lack of consultation and consideration of the impact they may have on women, their dependents, or minorities. For example, the lack of Roma women in decision-making means that the women and children in the 400 000 strong Roma community will not have their needs appropriately met; consequently, discrimination in access to food, shelter, and migration policy due to documentation continues for the community. It is therefore evident, that women’s participation in formal decision-making is restrictive, determined by age, socioeconomic status, disability, caregiving responsibilities, education level, making it selective and largely exclusionary.
From a feminist security perspective, this lack of women in formal decision-making thoroughly contributes to the perception of women as defenceless victims rather than individuals with full agency, capable of providing valid, constructive advice able to improve the well-being of their communities. In the long term, this setback for women may reduce the current progress towards gender equality in Ukraine.

Engaging the European Union

The EU has long focused on providing Gender Equality within its member states; the Council of Europe encompasses a Gender Equality Commission, and the EU actively undertakes the fulfilment of its 2020-2025 Gender Equality Strategy. One must consider, with the above in mind, that as of June 2022, the EU has named Ukraine an ‘accession candidate.’ The EU has already provided significant humanitarian aid to Ukraine, €243 million overall and €1,5 million for dedicated projects supporting the UN Population Fund in assisting women and girls. Aid alone is, however, not sufficient as the EU’s gender equality commitments must equally apply to Ukraine, which in wartime especially requires the mobilisation of targeted, intersectional aid for all women and their specific needs, providing a platform for women’s participation.

The EU’s partnership to NATO also means that it is due to recognise its commitment to NATO principles concerning gender equality, namely the “Women, Peace and Security” programme, enacted by NATO in 2000. Focusing on the inclusion of gender perspectives during both conflict and peacetime, in the case of Ukraine the EU should focus on devising methods of female-inclusive conflict management, as well as cooperative security provisions. A failure on behalf of the EU to successfully respond to Ukrainian women’s needs at present will signify a lack of permanent conviction to gender equality for all women, potentially encouraging a backslide in the progress made towards the advancement of women since its 1991 independence.

Conclusions

1. Women and girls have felt the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War much more severely than men due to the anti-civilian nature of the Russian offensive.
2. Ukrainian women consider access to healthcare, the safety of their families, and access to food and shelter as priorities.
3. Humanitarian aid should focus on supporting Ukraine’s main healthcare actors, supplying medicines for those with chronic illnesses, and ensuring access to mental health and psychosocial support both online and offline.
4. Actors should provide GBV services complementary to government ones, or fill the gaps left by the war. Services must be accessible and non-discriminatory. Respondents should receive training in recognising signs of GBV and know referral procedures. Displaced persons must be informed of the risks of human trafficking, to better protect themselves.
5. Food assistance should be tailored to meet specific needs, especially those of mothers with young children, pregnant and breastfeeding women, individuals with chronic illnesses, and the elderly. At shelters, breastfeeding should be given access to pumps and formula.
6. Internally displaced persons and those unable to evacuate must be provided with safe and accessible shelter, where accommodation should be sex or family segregated. Child-friendly spaces should be established where childcare and child mental support is provided.
7. Women must be empowered to engage in decision-making in an inclusive and non-discriminatory war; this is particularly important as to better provide for the needs of Roma and trans women, as well as those in the LGBTQ+ community. Female CSOs, community leaders and politicians must be involved.
8. As the response to Ukrainian women’s needs must involve female actors in all elements of the response chain, the EU should actively provide a gender-specific response for Ukraine in line with its Gender Equality Strategy.

Author: Gabriela Rudnik, external contributor

[1] Gender Analysis of the Situation in Ukraine, NGO Working Group On Women, Peace And Security,   accessed October 19 , 2022, https://www.womenpeacesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/Gender-Analysis-of-the-Situation-in-Ukraine-April-2022.pdf

[1] Dorothy Q. Thomas, Ralph E. Regan E, “Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of Impunity”, SAIS Review (Vol) 1994, accessed October 19 , 2022, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/women/docs/rapeinwar.htm

[1] Ukraine: EU is stepping up support to sexual and gender-based violence survivors, accessed October 19 , 2022,   https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/news-stories/news/ukraine-eu-stepping-support-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-survivors-2022-05-13_en

Pulaski Policy Paper no 22, October 14 2022

The recent ceremony at the Kremlin when V. Putin announced annexation of four Ukrainian regions was as futile as it was emblematic of the current state of affairs in Moscow. Its importance lies not in Russia announcing another success in 'reunifying’ ancient Russian lands with a blatant violation of international norms, but in admitting the failure of initial goals of invasion of Ukraine and the bankruptcy of Kremlin’s foreign policy. Together with grotesque mobilisation and occasional nuclear threats, it confirms how vulnerable and feeble the equilibrium among the Russian political elite is becoming. This trend will only gain on strength in the upcoming months.

What is there beyond Kremlin’s fog of war

Putin’s speech on September 24 was probably one of the weakest, most repetitive ones we have heard during his presidency. It was deprived of the usual justification of Russia’s actions, wrapped in a quasi-legalist and a quasi-academic packaging. He used old slogans without even trying to pretend he believed in them. The same goes for the guests of the ceremony. The Great Hall was full of bored personas, such as Valentina Matviyenko and Ramzan Kadyrov, deprived of their usual fake attentiveness and seriousness. They were there because they were told to but they did not care to show enthusiasm anymore.

These theatricals matter for over the last decade the Russian power vertical has become untransparent much in the Chinese or sometimes even North Korean style. This time there is a number of events that, if linked together, can give us an interesting overview of the current state of affairs in Russia despite the fog of war surrounding the Kremlin.

Reports of Russian occupational forces preparing a referendum, in its form and essence similar to the one carried out in 1939 in eastern Poland, were surfacing already in mid-summer. They were supposed to take place in four regions of Ukraine when the Russian army would take full control of them. They, however, coincided with successful Ukrainian counteroffensive on both northern and southern axis. The latter affected Kremlin’s plans so much that the preparations intensified and finally came to fruition in late September.

Its organisation came across as a sign of Russia’s strategic defeat in the war which had been supposed to be a blitzkrieg, overthrowing Ukrainian authorities and installing a puppet government or even some form of annexation of the country. Not only did this plan fail, but it turned out to be phantasmagoria due to the catastrophic state of the Russian army, low morale, mistakes made by the supreme command and inferior technologies used in the battlefield. Russian soldiers seemed to have been more busy stealing cars, electronic and underwear than liberating Malorossiya and Novorossiya from a “Western-installed Nazi regime in Kyiv.”

Because of the losses and mistakes made during the invasion, Putin announced the so-called partial mobilisation. Its main result has been the outflux of hundreds of thousands young Russian men unwilling to die for the fatherland. The announcement also revealed the scope of corruption among Russian drafting commissions and police forces. It has been yet another loose cog in the kleptocratic wheel. This time, however, its malfunctioning has uncovered growing cracks in the Russian power vertical that became visible thanks to other events accompanying and following the referendum.

Blackmail via destruction

The reports of gas leaks close to the Danish island of Bornholm and the coastline of mainland Sweden came about very unexpected although there had been reports indicating such possibility. Apart from the damage’s short- and long-term environmental impact, it brought many questions of geopolitical nature such as:  was the leakage done or orchestrated by Russia; what would it gain by making pipelines it constructed at such a high cost inoperable; is it a sign of Kremlin’s désintéressement about trading gas with Europe?

For one, with a high degree of likelihood we can assume it was an attempt to show the EU and NATO states that Russia is capable of targeting critical energy infrastructure on the Baltic Sea close to their territorial waters. More importantly, it happened right before the symbolic launch of the Baltic Pipe by Danish and Polish prime ministers, critical for diversification of gas supplies in the region. For the other, the damage occurred just two days before the referendum in the occupied parts of Ukraine.

It is hard not to link the two events given the Russian political culture and the scope of challenges the Kremlin is facing. While sending the threatening message in the Baltic Sea, Russia tried to show it is still ready for dialogue albeit specifically understood. This message was likely sent to all those in Western Europe, in particular in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, that in the face of skyrocketing gas prices it would be wise to come back to some form of business (almost) as usual. All those countries had been benefitting from Nord Stream 1 thanks to the interconnectors. Even after the leaks they would be able to use the fourth, untouched strand. The message was thus clear: there is still time to back off, but only on Russian terms.

At the same time, the Kremlin sought to leave some field for negotiations over the future status of Ukraine in the view of the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and the failure of initial goals of the ‘special military operation.’ While Russian president announced the annexation of the four regions on Thursday, September 29, the parliament was to approve it only on Monday, October 3. During this time, the Kremlin apparently expected some Western governments or political forces in certain countries to consider striking a deal over some sort of territorial division of Ukraine that would end the military phase of the conflict. Again, on Moscow’s terms.

Cracks under and on the surface

Such a proposal, albeit might seem unrealistic, points to the scale of problems Russia is facing after over 7 months of war. With apparent political pressure on military commandment, malfunctioning supply chains and low morale of the army, Kremlin’s field of manoeuvre has greatly decreased both in international and domestic policies. Many events back this hypothesis, such as Ramzan Kadyrov’s and Igor Girkin’s growing criticism of Sergei Shoigu and high rank officers or, previously unheard, ambiguous comments made by members of the political elite. The alleged unity of the inner circle, although it has never been there, now has publicly showed significant cracks.

Unless Russian forces start resisting Ukrainian attacks, Vladimir Putin and his acolytes need a way to stop the hot phase of the conflict in order to prevent the total degringolade of Russian military, which would have devastating effects on the system of power created in the last 22 years and is often referred to as Putinism. Yet it is not a fully accurate term. Russian president is the product of a compromise struck by the elites that at some point came to a conclusion that it would serve them best to end the Hobbesian war of all against all. Putin is merely a referee who, although built his own position over time, is not irreplaceable. In this sense, the decision to annex the four Ukrainian regions is a sign of weakness, not strength.

What is next in the pipeline?

By likely damaging (or making them unrepairable) the Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as annexing parts of Ukrainian territory, Russia attempted to achieve de-escalation by escalation. Now the Kremlin has opened new possible points of confrontation and it has put additional pressure on itself.

The message stemming from the pipelines is clear: Russia will remain a destructive actor in an otherwise successfully integrating Baltic Sea Region. With Finland and Sweden about to join NATO and Denmark having dropped the opt-out clause on the EU defence cooperation, it is likely that the Baltic will turn into a basin where Russian will perform its usual provocative actions with at a higher intensity than ever before. The ports of Baltiysk and Kaliningrad are already serving military and domestic cargo needs. The former is believed to have had a role in the Nord Stream destructive operation (unit no. 45707). The latter is required to secure the flow of supplies to the semi-exclave although it will not be achieved without substantial (and not very likely to happen) investments.

Russian authorities will also apply pressure on Belarus to improve their ability to perform attacks on central and western parts of Ukraine. As gains stemming from the recently announced mobilisation are doubtful, it will be tempting for the Kremlin to make use of the Belarusian army. For Alexandr Lukashenka, it will be a decisive moment that could deprive him of power one or another. If he succumbs, he will become fully vassalized by Moscow. If he objects, the latter can use a web of influence it has been carefully crafting for the last two decades either to replace Lukashenka or to attempt to annex Belarus.

The second scenario should not be rejected a priori because of its apparent propaganda dimension. There are few people in Russia that consider Belarusians as a separate nation. To them, Belarus is a Saisonstaat with weak institutions and high degree of Russification of the population. Such a step, if it does not trigger reaction from NATO states, would lead to yet another ground-breaking change of security environment in Europe, exposing the Baltic states and Poland, as well as NATO and the EU as a whole, to new types of hybrid and classic threats.

Conclusion

1. Linkages between damaging the Nord Stream pipelines, partial mobilisation, quasi-referendums, the bizarre ceremony at the Kremlin and the time gap between announcing the annexation and approving it by the rubber stamp parliament point to one crucial trend: Russia is weakening at a high pace. Its situation will be further deteriorating as the Western sanctions will be even more painful and the support for Ukraine will widen the technological gap between Ukrainian and Russian armed forces.

2. In the perspective of a few months, it can lead to the erosion of the current personal and institutional setting among the Russian verkhushka. Putin, like any other leader, is not irreplaceable. Russia’s history is full of both violent and velvet coups d’état. Should this happen, however, it will not necessarily mean to pulling back from Ukraine and concluding peace. After all, ‘the collective Putin’ can easily change into ‘the collective Dyumin’ (Aleksey Dyumin is the governor of Tula Oblast, and is believed by many to be one of possible successors of Putin).

3. Those who can take control of Russia might want to gain public support and eliminate internal opposition by going over the top. It might not lead to the use of nuclear weapons but an even stronger push to use the country’s economic and human resources to reverse the course of action on the front. As much as such a plan is bound to fail, it will prolong the conflict and will increase the probability of things going out of control.

4. It seems the indolence of Russian military and state apparatus under his rule shows no signs of change for the better. As long as the West keeps a unified stance towards Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and the Western societies manage to make it through the winter without much discontent, chances are Russia will be unable to fight a similar war in the years to come and the mobilisation announced by Putin could not be repeated in a foreseeable future. Paradoxically, for now Putin is the West’s tactical ally.

Author: Miłosz J. Cordes is a post-doc researcher at Lund University, Sweden, a fellow researcher at the Danish Foreign Policy Society, and a lecturer at DIS – Study Abroad in Scandinavia (DIS Copenhagen). He holds a PhD in Cultural Studies. His research interests cover identity politics in the Baltic Sea Region and in Central and Eastern Europe. Until 2021, he was a career diplomat in the Polish foreign service, having been posted to Brussels (EU), Malta, and Russia. He has published in numerous European and US academic journals on matters related to the history and contemporariness of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any institution the author is affiliated with.

Pulaski Policy Paper no 21, October 14 2022

Recent expansion of terrorism and the political-military destabilisation indicate a breakdown in the security structure of the Sahel region, even though we can hardly name it a structure. Since decolonisation, this area has witnessed multiple coups d’états, political exclusion, underdevelopment, and – after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime – an intensified (though not new) spread of armed fundamentalism. All these phenomena are currently accumulating to create a political and military landscape that escalates towards more and more destabilisation, and nobody seems to have any idea of ​​solving this challenging situation. What’s more, after almost the decade, France is withdrawing its troops from Mali and claims that its fight against terrorism during that period cannot be called a failure, even if statistics may say something different.

Political and military landscape

In his speech on February 17th, while announcing the withdrawal of troops from Mali after nearly a decade, Emmanuel Macron said that the context of the French presence in the region has changed and help is no longer welcome there. The reason for this is the undisguised reluctance on the part of the military junta, which is supposed to hinder France’s actions and use the fight against terrorism to strengthen its influence. This decision was made after the already strong anti-French sentiment in the country began to deepen, which was reflected in the expulsion of the French ambassador at the end of January this year. Then one could observe the cutting off of the French media and accusations of the West of trying to interfere with the change of the Malian government. These actions were preceded by two military coups in Mali (in August 2022 and May 2021), as the situation in the entire Sahel region is getting more complicated.  The two coup d’état also took place in early 2022 in Burkina Faso, while in Chad (which until recently was considered a stabilising force in the region) power was taken over against the democratic rule, by the son of Idriss Déby Itno,[i] , who does not enjoy the same respect among citizens as his father. Thus, a vast area, already consumed by political destabilisation, armed fundamentalism, climate change, corruption, the resource curse and the lack of development with all its consequences, enters the path of further turbulence.

So far, the French military presence in Mali has been related to the separatist uprising of the Tuareg minority in 2012, which coincided with the collapse of the Gaddafi government in Libya, which in turn (although regime-based) was responsible for the regional security system. With the collapse of the old structure, many weapons spilled out of the Libyan arsenals, rearming fundamentalist groups. The factions of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Daesh) then found safe heavens in the hardly accessible Sahara territories. For this reason, in 2013 Operation Serval began, which turned into the counter-terrorist operation Barkhane in 2014. As an additional security effort in the region, the G5 Sahel (G5S) group was established in 2014, supported by the former metropolis. Until recently, as the name suggests, it included 5 countries – Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, but the first of them limited the participation of their troops and the last one announced its withdrawal from the organisation. The EU Takuba Task Force, established in 2020, has also been withdrawn from Mali. Thus, one chapter of external interventions was closed, and other potential were put into question.

“War on terror” Sahel edition

Most often and willingly, terrorism is being indicated as the main cause of destabilisation in the Sahel region, thus wrongly presenting the effect as a cause. This approach makes it easier to misuse the idea of fighting terrorism to pursue political interests. After analysing the postulates accompanying subsequent external interventions and internal military coups, it can be concluded that, paradoxically, the more actors fight against terrorism, the stronger the terrorism and armed fundamentalism are. Everyone – regardless of whether they are former colonies, international missions, military juntas or Russian private armies – explains their interventions with the ineffectiveness of others in combating terrorism. Everyone claims that they will take better care of it and – for now – everyone contributes to its development.

There are also other factors standing in the way of successfully fighting terrorism. In its actions, France focused primarily on the military aspect, while putting political and social issues to the background. Meanwhile, although not all anti-terrorist operations carried out in the Sahel turned out to be a failure, single military successes could not guarantee stabilisation in the long run. Killing local leaders turned out to be as effective as fighting the mythical Hydra – in place of one head, there are several new. In addition, they compete with each other, leading to an even greater escalation of violence. Broken cells very often, instead of disappearing once and for all, go into sleep mode to be reborn after a while, when the situation is more favourable for them. They establish cooperation with local leaders and immerse themselves in the local population. The example of Mali shows well what the resilience of armed fundamentalism is. In areas where state institutions practically do not function, they took over their functions. Paradoxically, black flags brought a sense of security, which is a scarce commodity in the mentioned area. In return for help and support, they offered protection and livelihood for civilians, and the fighters themselves began to marry into local families, thus growing roots in local communities permanently. These forms of linkage make it necessary to rethink how we fight terrorism.

Another factor influencing effectiveness is the specificity of the image of terrorism created after the security paradigm shift that followed the 2001 World Trade Center attacks, according to which all fundamentalist armed groups are seen as the same, without focusing to understand the dynamics and context of each of them separately. Unlike Islamic State and its caliphate-reaching ambitions, a large part of the armed fundamentalist groups in the Sahel is focused on local conflicts. Affiliations with globally recognised organisations serve them mainly as a source of funding and armaments. Within this dynamic, Al-Qaeda or Daesh can build a narrative about their expansion and growing strength, while smaller, local groups can feel stronger. The complexity and diversity within these groups manifests itself in constant divisions and mutual conflicts. The ideology is at least secondary in this case.

Russia’s interests

Russia has also eagerly used the slogan of fighting terrorism. As a country with no colonial history in Africa, it enjoys much more sympathy than countries like France. By taking advantage of these favourable circumstances, in which it is Russia, which suggests who is the enemy of (under)developing countries, Moscow make money from their destabilisation. Just as other imperial policies have used it in their past, the Russians create a narrative about the threat to security and offer their benevolent help in exchange for certain privileges. The anti-colonial rhetoric is supported by the fact that Russia, at the formal level, does not maintain any form of involvement in regional affairs. Instead, they use a private army known as the Wagner Group, whose link to the Kremlin is an open secret.

Russia’s main interest in Africa is access to natural resources on preferential terms. It is possible thanks to the activities of private armies that provide their services in exchange for (among others) gold, which, although flowing undocumented, is monetised in the Gulf and strengthens the Russian currency. For Russia, which is currently burdened with the costs of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, this is a favourable situation, which it will probably try to develop. However, the media and experts on Africa express the hope that the sympathy for Russian presence in the Sahel may begin to decline due to the increasing frequency of crimes committed by Russian mercenaries. The symbol of it is the Moura massacre that took place in March 2022. Many civilians were murdered under the pretext of fighting terrorists. According to witnesses, despite the fact that the Wagner group members presented themselves only as trainers, the Russian soldiers were seen taking part in direct military operations. Nevertheless, the current situation in the Sahel, and especially anti-Western sentiments, make the costs of Russian involvement there low and the profits high. Thus, maintaining influence there in the future may be something that the Russians will try to achieve regardless of the will and beliefs of civilians. Even if Russia unveils itself as the new coloniser, it may be too late to resist.

The shift of regional partners isn’t enough

So far, the practice has shown that external military interventions are not effective enough as the tool in the long-term fight against terrorism. Looking at Mali, other Sahel’s countries may feel worried about sharing the same fate. Meanwhile, the current withdrawal of France from this country does not mean giving up on – what is called – the security architecture of the Sahel. Macron emphasised that the situation in Africa was still in the hands of the former metropolis and that France will still support local counter-terrorism efforts. Recently Niger has emerged as a new hope as a regional partner. The authorities there are sympathetic to France and enthusiastically agreed to transfer the French military operation to their territory. The question remains, however, to what extent this favour reflects the public sentiments, that in post-colonial countries often diverges from the narrative of those in power, and the decision-making centres are located far beyond the reach of ordinary people. Until now, France has shown its support for the governments in the region even if they have not respected the principles of democracy, as long as they were willing to cooperate with it. This legitimation is also expressed in the support for the G5S group, composed of regional armies. In the context of anti-Western sentiments, shifting some of the responsibility for military actions to regional forces seemed justified back in time, the more so as this way the West was able to reduce some of the costs of its operations. The problem is that, very often, in countries where democracy has been more imposed than developed and the institutions are very weak, the rulers use the army as private security to defend their interests. They also use money that comes from the West through various missions and operations (such as MINUSMA) to strengthen their power. When one looks at the statistics, it turns out that there are more victims of the government’s armies aggression  than the victims of armed fundamentalism. Moreover, funding of the national armies by the western countries increases the possibility of coups d’état – the stronger the military sector feels, the more courage it has to seize power.

Playing the migration card

There is no indication that the situation in the Sahel will start to improve in the nearest future. Year by year, climate changes are becoming more and more noticeable, as well as – recently – the influence of the war in Ukraine on the situation in Africa. In these circumstances (which Russia benefits), it is necessary on the part of Western decision-makers to act for dialogue and a real understanding of the dynamics of local conflicts. One of the reasons why France became militarily involved in the Sahel area was fear of an increased movement of migrants fleeing terrorism and thus the internal destabilisation of the European country. The threat has only increased along with its African activities in recent years. For the European Union, and even more so for Poland, the situation in the Sahel may seem too distant to be given more attention. However, as the migration of people (deprived of a sense of security and conditions for a dignified life by the conflict) increases, the effects will be felt for all. Meanwhile, the lack of a coherent migration policy of EU countries and internal problems of Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency)[ii] may indicate a lack of preparation for such a scenario. This should be borne in mind, all the more so as last year Russia played the refugee card very openly, fuelling xenophobic movements that began to awaken the spectre of nationalism in the EU. Although at the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine Europe may seemed united, the time of unconditional generosity is slowly passing, followed by a critical moment of fatigue. In such circumstances, it is easy to forget that human lives are at stake, and should be the subject rather than the object of the security system.

Summary and conclusions

1. Recently, we have observed a significant increase of anti-Western sentiment in the Sahel countries, and individual states (to a greater or lesser extent) are moving away from military cooperation with the West in combating terrorism. It is the biggest such movement since France (which is the most active Western country there) began its anti-terrorist operations in Mali almost a decade ago.

2. Thus, the current leadership in the fight against terrorism in this region is undergoing changes – the former regional leaders have been ousted, and Niger, acting as an intermediary with the West, is trying to replace them. However, there is no indication that he is strong and respected enough to control the situation in the region. At the same time the Wagner Group, pursuing Russian interests, enters the security vacuum left after the French withdrawal.

3. Political and military destabilisation in the Sahel enables Russia to access regional natural resources (such as gold) on preferential terms, which allows it to strengthen its currency. That is the reason why for Russia it is useful to uphold the political chaos (including military coups), thanks to which it is difficult to supervise the extraction, transport and sale of resources (which are after monetised in the Gulf countries). From the perspective of global security, this is doubly dangerous, because it both strengthens Russia economically and increases destabilisation in the Sahel.

4. Russia, as a country without a colonial history in Africa, has a narrative advantage over former western metropolises, and especially – over France. In order for France to become a reliable ally in the Sahel, the country must meet certain conditions that go beyond only military activities. First of all, it should take into account not only the sympathy of regional governments, but also civil society and the opposition, because in post-colonial countries governments very often represent the interests of only a narrow group.

5. It should be remembered that also supporting governments acting undemocratically (although pursuing the interests of the West) undermines the credibility of France as an ally and defender of the proclaimed values. An important element of counter-terrorism is also to conduct operations in a much more transparent manner in order to limit the possibility of narrative manipulation by actors such as the military junta or Russia.

6. When deciding to cooperate with regional armies, it should be borne in mind that in post-colonial countries, the army very often has different functions and less social legitimacy than in countries with a more developed institutional system. Unlike in Western democracies, it is not always considered the be the protector of the nation.

7. It is also crucial to instil in the minds of decision-makers that blaming the terrorists, although indicating the enemy, is by itself far from solving the problem, and may even create a misleading image. In security studies, one should move away from the black and white division into good and bad and focus to a greater extent on a multidimensional view of the processes that create fertile ground for radicalisation.

8. For Europe, the most noticeable effect of the current situation in the Sahel will be increased migration, which in recent years has started to be used as a weapon in itself by (among others) Turkey, Russia and Belarus. In the face of this challenge, it is necessary to develop new, effective, but also humanitarian, solutions for the reception system that will immunise Western countries against blackmail from authoritarian regimes.

Author: Dominika Kulig,  Casimir Pulaski Foundation

[i] Idriss Déby Itno was the president of Chad from 1990 to 2021. His presidency was described as a stabilising force in the region, but his nepotic rule also faced internal rebellions. France helped him survive the coup attempts and was largely responsible for maintaining Déby’s position. With his son’s seizure of power after the death of the leader (who died during fights with Chadian rebels), the constitution was suspended and the military council took power.

[ii] In May (2022), as a result of two investigations – OLAF (European Anti-fraud Office) investigation and journalistic consortium report on human rights violations, the head of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, had to step down. Among other things, it has been proven that the push-back method was used repeatedly, which is against international law (and – In the long run – ineffective). Such solutions may indicate the lack of other ideas for solving the problem of increased migration to Europe. Investigations also found that the system to improve Frontex’s performance proved to be largely superficial and EU funds are being disposed improperly.

Pulaski Policy Paper no 20, October 10 2022

Latest clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan are part of the protracted conflict between these two countries. Though the main reason of it is the status of Artsakh, it also concerns Syunik province and never demarcated border between these two countries. Artsakh, known also as Nagorno Karabakh, is an Armenian populated territory, which during the Soviet times was made part of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as an autonomous oblast. In 1988 representatives of Nagorno Karabakh demanded unification of this oblast with Armenian SSR, what was rejected by Soviet Union authorities. This had led to ethnic cleansings and massacres and finally referendum organised in Nagorno Karabakh on independence, shortly before Soviet Union collapsed and Azerbaijan itself declared independence. The full scale war that began afterwards between Azerbaijan and Armenia was won by the later and the ceasefire was agreed in 1994. The non-recognised Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, that later changed its name to Artsakh, controlled not only most of the territory of former autonomous oblast (excluding the Shaumyan region) but also adjacent territories including Kalbejar and Lachin corridor securing Nagorno Karabakh to have connection with Armenia.

Due to the Soviet principle of “divide and rule” the borders of various administrative units of Soviet Union were drawn with a purpose to cause territorial conflicts in case of separation.  It was also a case with Azerbaijan – Armenia SSR border however territorial conflict has deeper historical roots here. When Soviets conquered South Caucasus in 1920 it was agreed between them and Turkey, with whom they were allied at that time, that Nakhichevan and Syunik (called at the time Zangezur) will become part of Azerbaijan SSR. However Soviets couldn’t quell an Armenian rebellion in Zangezur so they conceded to the demand to make Zangezur part of Armenian SSR. Nakhichevan, which half of the population was at the time Armenian, became an Azerbaijan SSR exclave. Moreover, to complicate things Soviets decided to draw some other Armenian and Azerbaijan exclaves respectively on the territories of each other. After Soviet Union collapsed and the war erupted they were annexed by both countries, however this was not recognised by neither of them nor by any other country, so it still gives the basis to territorial claims.

44 days war

Moreover, during Soviet times there was no need to demarcate the border as it was only an administrative and non -state border.  Additionally Soviets constructed roads and railways in such a way that they crossed the territory of neighbouring republics. Until the “”44 days war” in 2020 it didn’t cause any problem for Armenia, which controlled all adjacent territories. Azerbaijan in its turn had to use transit road through Iran for transport from and to Nakhichevan. Armenia however lost the “44 days war” and Azerbaijan reconquered all the territories that didn’t belong to Nagorno Karabakh in Soviet times as well as parts of former Nagorno Karabakh oblast. The rest of this territory fell under control of Russian so called “peace forces”. But Azerbaijan disputed also the state border, especially in Syunik, moving it deeper into Armenian territory and taking under its control parts of the Goris-Kapan road, which is part of a strategic route connecting Iran with Yerevan and leading further North through Georgia to Russia.

While Artsakh in fact has no strategic but just emotional significance and its population after 2020 has shrunk to just about 100 thousand people, Syunik plays a formidable geopolitical role. Population of this mountainous province is also small, just about 150 thousand, but it links Iran with Armenia and separates Turkey and Nakhichevan from Azerbaijan and, through Caspian Sea, other Turkic countries (members of Turkey lead Organization of Turkic States – OTS). Meanwhile Turkey is promoting the slogan “one nation, two states” with regard to Azerbaijan and trying to strengthen cooperation in the OTS format and thus gain more influence in post-Soviet Central Asia. Surely, this contradicts Russian interest, however, contrary to the popular opinion, the “44 day war” was not a proxy conflict between Russia and Turkey. There’s lot of evidence suggesting that Azerbaijan beforehand got Russian approval to militarily regain control over those territories.

This strengthened Azerbaijan – Russian relations  enabled Russia to deploy its forces in Artsakh, thus not only taking control over this disputed area but also gaining leverage against both Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Armenia is nominally an ally of Russia in CSTO, in fact relations with Azerbaijan were always more important for Kremlin. Moscow treats Armenia more as a hostage than an ally, assuming that Yerevan has no geopolitical alternative. In this sense frequent Azerbaijani attacks on Armenia serve Russian interest as a reminder that if Armenia was not loyal to Moscow and start cooperation with the West (USA and Europe) it’s security and territorial integrity would be compromised. Russian influence was also supposed to be strengthened through the control over transit routes: from Armenia to Artsakh and from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, which was also agreed in the ceasefire agreement after “44 days war.”

Russia is also unhappy with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power after mass protests in 2018 that ended the rule of pro-Russian “Karabakh clan” accused of ruining the country with overwhelming corruption and  represented by former presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan. Pashinyan never crossed a red line in his dealing with Moscow, nevertheless he tried to balance international relations of Armenia with developing relations with European Union and USA. In this context Russian purpose of “44 days war” was to “discipline” him and weaken his position as a leader, who lost the war and bowed to enemy’s territorial demands. In fact, after “44 days war” pro-Russian opposition organised mass protests, however in snap parliamentary elections in June 2021 Pashinyan’s party won and retained absolute majority. Among large part of Armenian population there was also growing sense of Russian betrayal. On the other hand neither Europe nor USA provided any assistance to Armenia despite some pro-Armenian statements, especially from French president Emanuel Macron and some American politicians including Joe Biden (who was not president at the time). It was clear that Artsakh became an instrument to blackmail Armenia.

Armenia and Russian aggression against Ukraine

Russian invasion of Ukraine had significant impact on the situation in South Caucasus. Armenia, beware of its precarious situation, couldn’t stand against Russia but also didn’t support it. Some critics pointed that Armenia didn’t vote against the war in UN General Assembly but they overlooked that Azerbaijan position was the same despite it was not under such national security pressure as  Armenia. Moreover, at the very first day of the war Azerbaijan leader Ilham Aliyev visited Moscow to sign the agreement on strategic alliance with Russia. In the following months EU organised series of negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan but to no avail. At the same time Nikol Pashinyan made an effort to normalise Armenia-Turkey relations and in July there was a phone conversation between him and Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However it was clear that no normalisation is possible without giving up Artsakh to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan doesn’t agree on any special status of Artsakh and even if it did, the local Armenian population would not trust it. It means that if Artsakh is ceded to Azerbaijan, Armenian exodus from there should be expected.

Azerbaijan’s control over parts of the route from Iran to Yerevan caused tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan as there were cases of harassment of Iranian truck drivers and later Azerbaijan started to collect high toll for pass.  It also led to the construction of a new road bypassing the stretch controlled by Azerbaijan. Interestingly it was also shelled during last clashes. In late August Azerbaijan took over the Lachin corridor – the only road connecting Armenia with Artsakh, while according to the ceasefire agreement from 2020 it should happen only in 2024. Armenia uses now a temporary road as a bypass. On the other hand transit route through Syunik, linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan, that was also agreed upon in 2020 ceasefire agreement, so far has not been established.

Undoubtedly it was not a coincidence that the last escalation happened shortly after Ukrainian counterstrike on Russian forces in Kharkiv frontline. While there’s little doubt that so far Azerbaijan attacks on Armenian forces served Russian interest, this time it was rather an attempt to profit from Russian weakness. Azerbaijan rightly assumed that the change in the balance in Turkish-Russian relations, in Turkish favour as Russia needs Turkish support with regard to sanctions and NATO enlargement, meant that no Russian or CTSO intervention is probable. The only conundrum is a potential Iranian military intervention if Azerbaijan decided to capture Syunik. While Iran’s reaction to the classes was not very strong it upheld its position that it will not let for any geopolitical changes in the region. In this context it must be remembered that present day Armenia and Azerbaijan belonged to Persian Empire before it was conquered by Russia in early XIX century. Moreover, unification of Azerbaijan and Turkey would pose a serious security threat for Iran’s territorial integrity as there are two provinces named Azerbaijan in Iran. Iran has also strong historical relations with Armenia, while Azerbaijan has close security cooperation with Israel.

Recommendations and conclusions

1. Artsakh remains the main (but not the only one) problem in Azerbaijan – Armenia relations. Azerbaijan lack of flexibility on its status makes any peace agreement almost impossible. At the same time Russia took de facto control over Artsakh.

2. Azerbaijan’s attempt to take over Syunik with military means cannot be excluded. Regardless Russian position it can lead to a big international conflict as this region plays huge geopolitical role, especially with regard to Iranian vital interests.

3. Nikol Pashinyan is trying to normalise relations with all Armenia neighbours, prioritising Armenia territorial integrity and sovereignty over Artsakh. Pashinyan is aware that Artsakh conflict makes Armenia hostage to Russian policy. Such normalisation does not serve Russian interest, thus Russia is inspiring antigovernmental protests and accusations of treason against Pashinyan.

4. Russia is not an ally to Armenia and regards its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan as much more important issue. Last escalation showed also that CSTO lost any significance.

5. Joe Biden administration and Democratic Party majority in Congress are much more sceptic towards Turkey, which has impact on American-Armenian relations.

6. Both EU and USA should not allow the future of South Caucasus to be decided in Turkish-Russian bargaining process. Thus stronger pressure should be exerted on Azerbaijan to stop military provocations against Armenia and any war crimes or crimes against humanity should be strongly condemned. Efforts for finding a peaceful solution to Artsakh conflict, that will not lead to Armenian exodus, should be increased.

7. Armenia status as a hostage of Russian policy should be challenged through stronger USA and EU support and cooperation in security field. Armenia should be assured that Russia is not the only guarantor of its territorial integrity. In this context the recent visit of US delegation with Nancy Pelosi to Armenia is a very good development.

8. Armenia and Georgia are the only democracies in the region, so it is very important to work on improvement of relations between them. Strategic alliance between these 2 countries would give Armenia connection to Europe through Black Sea and open an alternative route from Europe to Iran, which is rich in energy resources, thus changing the geopolitical map. Poland can play a positive role in this process as its relations with both Armenia and Georgia are based on a long tradition of friendship.

9. Democracy in South Caucasus should be strengthened through various civic initiatives and Russian influence should be challenged. Any antigovernmental protests should be assessed by the links of their organisers to Russia.

Author: Witold Repetowicz, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Programme of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation