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CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WEEKLY UPDATE: A war of attrition

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WEEKLY UPDATE: A war of attrition

5 grudnia, 2023

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WEEKLY UPDATE: A war of attrition

NATO MOD MM

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WEEKLY UPDATE: A war of attrition

Autor: Sebastian Czub

Opublikowano: 5 grudnia, 2023

With the war in Ukraine once again turning into a contest of attrition, Russia possesses a significant advantage. It is at this time that Ukraine has to marshal and husband its resources and look to the West for support in the hopes of being able to match Russia’s seemingly inexhaustible military-industrial capacity. However, not all looks bleak for Ukraine, as the NATO Ministerial meeting might prove to be a beacon of hope for the country’s future in the West.

 

 

War in Ukraine – A war of attrition

 

As the brutal fighting continues in Ukraine, with key battles being fought for Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the conflict turns once again into a contest of attrition. As this grinding type of warfare becomes the reality of the war, it is worthwhile to look into the capabilities of Ukraine and Russia. Russia has several key advantages over Ukraine in terms of the battle of attrition. Firstly, Russia has access to much more manpower as well as, and this is key, the theoretical potential to train it and shape it sufficiently quickly to keep up with the occurring losses. While the training of Russian troops differs wildly, depending on a plethora of factors, including their origin, assigned unit, and combat role, maintaining a stable supply of soldiers is a great advantage.

 

On the other hand, Ukraine has been struggling with training sufficient numbers of troops for a while. This is due to the fact that Ukraine lacks an adequate number of facilities within the country, and those that exist face the risk of potential Russian strikes. Ukrainian mobilisation of manpower is aided by the West via a number of different training programmes (like, for example, the Operation Interflex). However, those are also somewhat limited in their capacity (Operation Interflex has only trained around 30,000 soldiers since June 2022) and their ability to prepare the soldiers for the realities of Ukrainian battlefields fully.

 

Secondly, Russia has greater capabilities to better replace their equipment losses. It stems from two main reasons. The first is the greater industrial capacity of the Russian Federation referring both to the actual facilities needed to produce, repair and maintain the equipment as well as the personnel required to work in these facilities. Furthermore, Russia is profiting from its Soviet legacy, being able to not only produce new equipment but also refurbish older one from storages to more quickly replenish their losses. Just this year, the two major Russian producers – Uralvagonzavod and Omsktransmash- delivered around 500 tanks of different versions, ranging from refurbished ancient T-62s to modern, freshly produced T-90s).

 

Similarly, in terms of armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery pieces, Russia is estimated to have produced or refurbished 2000 units. It is also worth noting that Russian industrial capacity continues to increase further. While Russian sources boast of production increasing anywhere from two-fold to ten-fold, it is difficult to state precisely how much the production increased. While Ukraine had significant military-industrial capabilities, these greatly suffered in the wake of the Russian invasion. Many plants and factories had been destroyed or damaged in the initial stages of the invasion, severely hindering Ukrainian industrial capabilities. However, it is worth noting that since then, a portion of these had been restored, increasing industrial output. Another measure meant to meet the growing need for equipment was the Western aid, which saw thousands of pieces of equipment delivered to Ukraine. However, in late 2023, the rate of Western assistance drastically decreased, especially in terms of armoured vehicles. Thus, while Russian equipment losses might be higher, each loss is much more painful for the Ukrainians.

 

As the Ukrainians are fighting the war of attrition against Russia and struggling to replace their mounting losses, their situation is made even worse by the continued strike action on the borders of the war-torn country. Polish protesters were joined by their counterparts from Slovakia, further limiting the amount of aid and equipment being delivered to Ukraine. Furthermore, the strike actions are limiting the transport of Ukrainian products westward, which tightens the noose on Ukraine’s ability to maintain itself in a prolonged war of attrition. The westward transports are critical to Ukraine, as they sustain the Ukrainian economy, which the Russian invasion has already ravaged. Since Russia enacted the blockade of the country’s ports in the Black Sea, Ukrainian exports have become reliant on land routes through bordering countries. The blockade of the Ukrainian border by striking Polish and Slovakian lorry drivers and transport companies effectively not only limits the pace of delivery of Western equipment but also denies Ukraine the much-needed economic lifeline, which will prove crucial if Ukraine hopes to forge through the contest of attrition with Russia.

 

 

NATO Ministerial Meeting

 

On the 28th-29th of November 2023, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO member states attended a meeting at NATO Headquarters in Brussels headed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. The Western representatives were joined by the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba. The primary topic of conversation was the continued support of Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian invasion. The discussion was meant to ensure Ukraine of the Western commitment to the Ukrainian cause, as well as organise a coherent plan for supporting the war-torn country. In the wake of the meetings, Secretary General Stoltenberg announced that the Allies had agreed upon an extensive programme for 2024, focusing on energy security, innovation and interoperability. In the words of the Secretary General: “We are now transforming NATO’s comprehensive assistance package into a multi-year programme of assistance, helping Ukraine to transition from Soviet-era to NATO equipment and standards and make their forces fully interoperable with ours”.[i] While military modernisation of Ukrainian forces is vital, what is worth noting is the increased focus on energy security. The dedication of time to this topic heavily suggests the Ukrainian and Western preparation of Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the winter and the possible countermeasures to them. Last year’s strike campaign targeting the Ukrainian energy infrastructure has caused widespread destruction, with the country still feeling its effects. A second such campaign could potentially cripple or even collapse the Ukrainian energy grid, causing not only significant difficulties for the Ukrainian armed forces but also leading to a major humanitarian crisis, which could lead to another refugee wave from Ukraine. Thus, Ukrainian energy security is one of the primary focus points for both Ukraine and the West.

 

Another key focus of the ministerial meeting was the Ukrainian road to NATO. The Allied officials discussed Ukrainian progress and made further recommendations. The priority among the suggestions was the fight against corruption, which continues to be one of Ukraine’s major internal issues, strengthening the rule of law and supporting humanitarian and minority rights. These recommendations aim not only to prepare Ukraine to be a stable and steadfast member of the NATO alliance but also one that shares broader Western values. The Ukrainian resolve to adhere to these recommendations and values will most probably be gauged during the upcoming Ukrainian elections, which will be used as a milestone for the country’s progress. While Ukrainian improvement has been observed many times before, this trial might be one of the most important due to its proximity to the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington. The summit and preparations for it have been one of the key discussion points of the meeting in Brussels. Previously, the summit in Washington was suggested to be the date for a potential formal invitation of Ukraine to join the NATO alliance. It is possible that the considerations and recommendations made this week to Ukraine were a set of milestones – which, if completed, could result in the formal invitation being offered in Washington. While the invitation itself wouldn’t translate to an immediate accession to the organisation, it would highlight the Western commitment to Ukraine as a free, independent and democratic country and a part of the wider West.

 

 

Conclusion

 

The brutal contest of attrition between Ukraine and Russia, resulting from a lack of decisive military achievements, is unfavourable to Ukraine. With its vast military industry and the legacy of its Soviet past, Russia will gradually gain the upper hand over Ukraine, especially if the country continues to be hindered by its own allies. The resolution of the border strikes is crucial to the chances of Ukrainian victory, yet despite time pressure, the issue grows further rather than smaller. However, not all is bleak for Ukraine. The NATO meeting in Brussels is a glimmer of hope, offering not only the rejuvenation of military aid and confirmation of Western support but also suggesting the potential for Ukraine’s future in NATO. Should Ukraine follow the presented recommendations and receive a formal invitation to the alliance, it would be a powerful statement among the West and Ukraine but also to Russia, which would be forced to contend with a new strategic reality.

 

Author: Sebastian Czub, Analyst, Casimir Pulaski Foundation

[i] “Secretary General wraps up meeting of Foreign Ministers: “Ukraine is closer to NATO than ever before””, NATO, November 29, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_220659.htm.

November 30

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

The UN climate summit in Dubai: Global warming and decarbonisation among controversies

The UN climate summit in Dubai: Global warming and decarbonisation among controversies

4 grudnia, 2023

The UN climate summit in Dubai: Global warming and decarbonisation among controversies

November 30

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

The UN climate summit in Dubai: Global warming and decarbonisation among controversies

Autor: Karolina Olszowy

Opublikowano: 4 grudnia, 2023

On 30 November, the two-week COP28 climate summit began in Dubai. Leaders and diplomats from almost 200 countries have gathered to discuss preventing global warming, ways to divert from fossil fuels and financing their efforts. However, the conference has been accompanied by controversies, such as the choice of host as the fifth-largest oil producer and the appointment of Sultan Al-Jaber, a top fossil fuel executive, as head of the conference. All of this takes place in the hottest year on record. On top of that, geopolitical tensions are causing the inability to choose next year’s host.

COP stands for Conference of the Parties, and parties refer to the 197 countries that signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. Since the first conference in Berlin in 1995, country leaders, diplomats, and experts have met annually to discuss global warming. One of the most critical summits took place in 2015 in Paris, when more than 190 states signed the Paris Agreement, which aims to reduce global temperature rise by 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5. One year ago, in Sharm Al-Sheikh, Egypt, parties agreed to set up a fund to help poorer countries deal with the effects of climate disasters, but concrete results are not expected until this year.

One of the main issues addressed in Dubai is the Global Stocktake, which aims to align data measures on how much emissions countries are actually reducing. Participants are also expected to adopt a document with information on how their progress in reducing greenhouse gas emissions compares to the requirements of the Paris Agreement. To be determined is the question of which countries will actually participate in funding of the Loss and Damage Fund, aimed at compensating for the climate impacts suffered by countries in the Global South. The USA has tentatively pledged to contribute several million dollars, and the EU has promised a significant financial contribution. However, those still need more specific promises missing concrete action plans. An agreement among the countries participating in COP28 is required to determine the final shape of the fund.

Moreover, the UAE also hosts a methane summit during COP28. The rationale for this is that methane has 80 times the warming properties of CO2. Thus, reducing methane emissions should be the fastest way to limit the rise in global temperature.

Controversy over COP28

At least a few controversies surround this year’s summit, and they have swept the world before the conference even started. Firstly, COP28 is taking place in the United Arab Emirates, supported by the Asia-Pacific region, which was supposed to choose the host among its members. However, what raises eyebrows is the irony that the climate summit is organised in a country that owes its wealth to oil. Moreover, Sultan Al-Jaber, the CEO of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, was chosen to lead the event. When his appointment was announced earlier this year, more than 130 lawmakers from Europe and the US wrote to the UN, calling for a change in the decision. Moreover, the BBC recently published documents suggesting the UAE planned to use the summit to strike oil and gas deals with at least 15 countries[i].

The second major issue is the failure to implement the climate agenda. According to the Paris Agreement, countries were supposed to limit global warming by about 1.5 degrees Celsius; instead, a record was already broken when temperatures on November 17th exceeded 2C above pre-industrial averages. Also notable is the absence of two key leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, which may indicate that they do not expect any breakthroughs at the summit. Instead of the US president, US Vice President Kamala Harris addressed the event on Saturday, promising that „the United States of America will once again be a global leader in tackling the climate crisis”.[ii] Polish president Andrzej Duda also addressed the meeting on Saturday. He emphasised the future of nuclear energy and that it is indispensable to achieve climate policy goals. He also announced that „one of the priorities of the Polish presidency of the EU in the first half of 2025 will be a fair energy transition with a special focus on nuclear energy”[iii].

What about next year’s COP29?

Next year’s COP29 should take place in one of the Eastern European countries. However, geopolitical tensions have led to an impasse in determining the summit’s host. A decision has to be made by consensus at the end of COP28 at the latest, but this does not look likely to happen. Russia is blocking all EU countries, accusing them of being biased, but in practice, this is the result of EU countries blocking Russia over the war in Ukraine. Thus, despite significant support among European countries, Bulgaria’s bid will most likely be rejected. Armenia and Azerbaijan are also among the other countries that have put forward their candidature to host the climate summit, but being technically at war, they would block each other. The lack of a host is a severe problem, as it usually takes the lead in conducting climate negotiations ahead of the conference, and the targets for next year is immense. Countries at COP 29 will have to decide on a new financial target for climate financing in developing countries from 2025 onwards and present new climate commitments, including targets for reducing emissions by 2035.

With no breakthrough, three possible solutions can occur. Eastern Europe could swap with another group or a specific country, as happened in 2019 when Spain replaced Chile. Australia has already declared to be willing to take over the presidency in 2024. The countries could also try to agree to hold the pre-climate meetings in one country, the actual conference would take place in another, and a third country would take over the presidency. However, the group’s parties seem too conflicted for such an agreement. Finally, there is also an option to hold the summit in Bonn, the seat of the UN climate body. Germany, however, does not confirm such a possibility. If the parties fail to choose a COP29 host, the UAE will face an extended presidency, which would be highly controversial considering already significant criticism.

Conclusion

Despite its controversies, COP28 is a vital climate summit where significant agreements are negotiated on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, moving away from fossil fuels and decarbonisation, and creating an aid fund for countries in the Global South. So far, a commitment to triple the world’s renewable energy production by 2030 has already been signed by 118 countries. On Saturday, more than 20 countries signed a declaration to triple the power produced by nuclear power plants by 2050, with Poland among the signatories. Although geopolitical tensions make new agreements harder to reach, accelerating global warming will require parties to continue regular meetings and at least have minimal consultancy on climate issues.

Author: Karolina Olszowy, external contributor

[i] “UAE planned to use COP28 climate talks to make oil deals”, BBC News, November 27, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-67508331

[ii] “COP28: US touts climate leadership as oil and gas output hits record”, Reuters, December 2, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/cop28-us-touts-climate-leadership-oil-gas-output-hits-record-2023-12-02/

[iii] “Andrzej Duda na COP28: Atom jest przyszłością. Potrzebne są kolejne zdecydowane kroki”, Rzeczpospolita, December 2, 2023, https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art39506991-andrzej-duda-na-cop28-atom-jest-przyszloscia-potrzebne-sa-kolejne-zdecydowane-kroki

Debata Pułaskiego nt. priorytetów polskiej polityki obronnej nowego rządu

1 grudnia, 2023

Debata Pułaskiego nt. priorytetów polskiej polityki obronnej nowego rządu

Opublikowano: 1 grudnia, 2023

Warsaw Justice for Ukraine Conference

30 listopada, 2023

Warsaw Justice for Ukraine Conference

Opublikowano: 30 listopada, 2023

armenia flag

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Quo Vadis Armenia? And why the answer matters to others.

Quo Vadis Armenia? And why the answer matters to others.

29 listopada, 2023

Quo Vadis Armenia? And why the answer matters to others.

armenia flag

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Quo Vadis Armenia? And why the answer matters to others.

Autor: Robert Pszczel

Opublikowano: 29 listopada, 2023

One should not use Latin expressions excessively in modern communications, but it seems highly appropriate when it comes to a story about Armenia. After all, it is inhabited by the oldest Christian nation in the world. Its capital, Yerevan, predates Rome, the eternal city. And Armenia boasted an empire well before Julius Ceasar. Even today, all those historical facts are proudly advertised to foreign visitors (I could observe this fascination with history at first-hand when I visited Yerevan in November for a one-day conference inspired by the Polish Embassy in Armenia and hosted by the Armenian Research Center on Security Policy and the Polish Mieroszewski Centre).

But it is not only the long history and rich culture of Armenia that deserves a close look by the outside world – it is its current geopolitical plight that simply demands attention. To put it in dramatic terms, this small but proud country in the Caucasus faces a serious threat to its territorial integrity and independence.

 

Baku’s victory and Russian betrayal 

For decades, Armenia has been engaged in an international dispute with Azerbaijan over a Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Diplomatic and legal battles have been interspersed with periods of military confrontation, with both sides displaying a propensity to go for broke. One must observe that such an attitude was on display in Yerevan for many years, including in the first decade of the 21st century. For organisations such as the OSCE, two key Helsinki process principles were contested in this case: territorial integrity vs self-determination. The international community tried to avoid taking sides and kept hoping for a peaceful resolution (vide efforts of the so-called Minsk Group), and its hopes were not completely naïve. But once Azerbaijan used the money generated by profitable oil exports to invest in its military hardware, the writing was on the wall as the odds in any direct tussle turned fully in favour of Baku. And Azerbaijan, supported by its ally Turkey, decided that the time for debates was over and force was a preferred option. First came the intervention of 2020, and this year saw a decisive military action taken by Azerbaijan. As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh has been de facto incorporated into Azerbaijan, and almost all its indigenous Armenian inhabitants (more than 100,000 of them) were driven from the enclave in a process reminiscent of dramatic events in the Balkans in the 1990s (even if a number of direct fatalities is relatively small). 

Such a resounding victory of Baku was also made possible by Russia’s unwillingness and inability (due to its total focus on the barbaric war against Ukraine) to honour its pledges as Armenia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russian troops – both in their capacity as peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh since 2021 and in their role as bilateral defence mission implementors – have failed to act to defend Armenia. The feeling of betrayal in Yerevan is very strong and palpable. After all, Armenia has put all its security eggs into one basket: that of Russia. Not only has Moscow been allowed to keep (and even increase recently) a number of its military bases in Armenia, but it continues to control most of its borders (this includes – astonishingly – the presence of Russian officials at the international airport in Yerevan) and to manage large parts of its defence system. 

As many Armenian experts and officials have stressed – it is not Armenia that has turned its back on Russia but the other way around. Judging by the amount of vitriol used by Russian propagandists against Prime Minister Pashinyan, who came to power as a result of the 2018 revolution, it seems clear that political dislike of the current government in Yerevan has coloured Moscow’s actions (or inaction) to a large extent as well. Yes, Putin’s regime abhors vox populi. It was also aghast when its erstwhile ally decided to ratify the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (the same one that has formally turned Putin into an international pariah). But Yerevan took this action after Moscow had shown its indifference to Armenia’s security. For many years after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Armenia was still one of the few countries voting in the UN together with Russia on the issue of its aggression in Ukraine (only recently, Yerevan has started to abstain). Even today, Armenia plays a significant role in helping Moscow escape the effects of international sanctions.

 

International community’s efforts lacking effectiveness (until now)

In general, the fact that Baku has decided to choose force in its dispute with Yerevan owes a lot to an overall change in climate in European security architecture. Once rules, laws, principles, and agreements have begun to be challenged and violated with impunity, diplomacy has lost its effectiveness. At the time when such predators as Russia act without any concern for the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, force has become a more tempting tool of policy. OSCE is paralysed by a veto mechanism, and so is the UN’s Security Council. All the efforts of so-called special representatives (be it of the EU or NATO) for the region in question remain rather futile without goodwill from one or the other interested party. As a matter of policy, NATO has traditionally stayed outside disputes in the Caucasus (not least due to the partial position of Turkey as a member state). EU has tried to step in, primarily through mediating efforts of the President of the President of the European Council. But he has so far proven unable to even bring all the parties to a table (vide a no-show at the Granada meeting). On the good side, one concrete achievement has been the establishment at the end of 2022/beginning of 2023 of the EU civilian mission in Armenia to patrol the border with Azerbaijan (with a mandate to observe, report and support mediation if and when possible).

 

Coercive diplomacy in full flow

Even a quick victory in Nagorno-Karabakh has not quelched the desire of Azerbaijan for further claims on Armenia. The main element of coercive strategy practised by Baku centres on a demand for exterritorial status of the so-called Zangezur corridor that would link mainland Azerbaijan with the small Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhchivan, in the region of Armenia bordering Turkey and Iran. The issue is of great local and international significance. 

If met, Baku’s demands would obviously restrict Yerevan’s sovereignty. For Poles, the very concept of “exterritorial corridor” brings back tragic memories of the 1930s preceding the Second World War – after all, Warsaw’s categorical rejection of Hitler’s demand was used as a pretext for the September 1939 invasion by Nazi Germany. Moreover, according to the majority of observers, a Zangezur corridor outside Armenia’s control would provide a potential link between Iran and Turkey to Russia via Azerbaijan. One does not have to be a politico-economic expert to surmise that such a project would be a dream scenario for countries searching for optimum ways to avoid Western sanctions. The interests of Iran and Russia (even if they are also competitors in the region) obviously coincide here. In this context, one should not ignore a potential link to Putin’s statement of intent on an illegal Zaporizhzhia corridor project in Ukraine.

 

Peace offers from Armenia

Bearing in mind those threats (augmented by inflammatory rhetoric which sometimes describes Armenia as Western Azerbaijan) and the current weaknesses of the Armenian state, Yerevan is determined to sue for peace and a stable settlement that would confirm its territorial integrity and resolve frozen problems in relations with neighbours (e.g., still closed borders with Turkey). Hence, the Crossroads for Peace Initiative proposes an opening of transport routes in the whole region on the basis of national sovereignty, as well as a push for a broader peace agreement with Azerbaijan. In an urgent search for support Yerevan is not only cultivating good relations not only with other neighbours, first of all Georgia, but also with Iran.

 

Strategic reorientation in the making – the role of the international community

There is little doubt that Armenia must address the issue of its strategic orientation, including the cost-benefit analysis of its current security policy stand. There are clear signs that Yerevan has begun such a reorientation. It now refuses to participate in CSTO exercises (something that some other CSTO members are inclined towards as well) and has shown reluctance to participate even in political meetings of that Russia-dominated organisation.

Betrayed by Moscow, Armenia has recently commenced searching for new partnerships in the defence domain. Most dramatically, it has turned to India and France for key defence equipment supplies. External propaganda notwithstanding, it has every right to do it under Art.51 of the UN Charter (‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence’), bearing in mind actual and imminent threats to its fundamental security and territorial integrity. In this context, visits of high-ranking US military to Yerevan should not be raising any eyebrows. In the same vein, nobody should be surprised that it is dramatically increasing its own defence spending expenditure. Making itself less vulnerable in military terms is a current priority.

So is a need to highlight the plight of forced refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, who urgently require humanitarian assistance from abroad. It is coming (I was happy to note that Poland was one of the first EU countries stepping in here), especially as large donors such as Germany are now doing their bit.

But the most significant contribution from outside must contain two other elements. First, it is imperative to nurture an increased attention span. The world must show a more focused and direct interest in the situation in and around Armenia. It should not ignore it with a naïve view that ‘things will work out by themselves’. They won’t.

It is notable that one of the key spoilers in the region (Russia) is afraid of precisely an enhanced role of other actors. Moscow likes to talk about unwanted ‘extra-regional factors’ as if all internal actors were a positive force for security and stability in the region. The European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA), in particular, must follow up on a recently concluded agreement regulating its status with increased staffing and more transparent public reporting. EUMA now has six operating bases, has carried out more than 1000 patrols since February 2023 on the border with Azerbaijan, and the fact that its staff contains nationals from 23 EU nations all gives it a valuable standing and a foundation on which to build its much-needed work.

Politically, other countries should follow the French political lead and start acting more determinedly, acknowledging that the policy of equidistance (while perhaps justified in the past) is no longer a sensible option. It is evident that the energy supplier’s role gives Baku a strong hand in all dealings with the EU and other players. But such a dependency will not be a factor forever, and even now, buyers are not helpless in any power-driven ‘tug of war’. The economic potential of the region and that of Armenia as an independent state (particularly as a strategic transport route) should be strongly taken into account.

Second, a more long-term vision for the region must be agreed upon and offered to those who share an interest in peace, security, and stability and show an attachment to fundamental democratic and international legal norms. In this context,, one must commend the European Commission’s recent recommendationsion to offer a candidate status to Georgia. Yes, its government has justifiably earned itself a negative reputation, with its cavalier attitude to democratic freedoms and cynically friendly policy towards Russia (incomprehensible because of Russia’s continued occupation of part of Georgian territory). But the Commission’s move has shown a rare understanding of strategic wisdom by offering long-term integration prospects to the country and the nation, as opposed to the logic driven only by relations with the government of the day.

This decision (while it remains to be seen whether it receives the backing of EU governments in December) was, very tellingly, warmly welcomed in Armenia. These are early days, of course, but nothing decisive should preclude Armenia from perhaps following in Georgia’s footsteps in the future. Such a perspective in itself matters a lot. For small countries surrounded by difficult neighbours, the psychological comfort and reassurance that big and democratic players care about your problems and have something to offer for the future is immeasurable.

The good news is that, like the EU, Washington has started being vocal on the facilitation of a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the same time, the recent passing of the Armenia Protection Act of 2023 by the US Senate and a growing set of pronouncements by many American politicians suggest a waking up of key capitals on both sides of the Atlantic. Such engagement is a welcome push to secure a lasting settlement in the Caucasus. It also represents a much overdue recognition of the imperative of helping Yerevan to diversify its international policies.

 

Armenia’s sovereign choices

At the end of the day, there is much that the international community should and can do to help. Strong political, geopolitical, economic, and moral reasons exist for offering it. But it is equally true that Armenia must first help itself. Strategic decisions are for Armenians, and Armenians alone, to take. They should be taking a cue from a passionate speech of Prime Minister Pashinyan in the European Parliament on 17 October this year, when he said: ‘The Republic of Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible’. That is precisely the approach that should guide Armenia’s policies towards the broader democratic community of nations.  A litmus test will certainly involve its stance on the war against Ukraine and relations with rogue states. In today’s world, a proverbial ‘sitting on the fence’ is not likely to be a winning ticket for international success. And this realisation ought to be reciprocated by Armenia’s partners.

 

Author: Robert PszczelResident Fellow Casimir Pulaski Foundation

Winter war

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The time to act?

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The time to act?

28 listopada, 2023

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The time to act?

Winter war

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The time to act?

Autor: Author: Sebastian Czub

Opublikowano: 28 listopada, 2023

The onset of winter is beginning to strain both sides of the war in Ukraine, bringing to the battlefield not only the dangers of conventional arms but also those of sickness, supply shortages and the cold itself. Rising to meet these challenges head-on and continue the defence of their homeland, Ukrainians need the stalwart support of the West, which despite pleas for help continues to dwell on its internal issues with divisive questions threatening schisms. It is at times like these that decisive action is needed to ensure regional security and stability.

 

The War in Ukraine

As November is coming to a close and winter begins, the situation on the frontlines of Ukraine continues to deteriorate. Extensive rains, coupled with the first snowfalls and the changes in temperature, have transformed the Ukrainian battlefields into seas of freezing mud. This brings about the previously anticipated problems with the logistic capabilities of both sides of the war, also limiting their manoeuvrability. However, vehicles stuck in deep mud and country roads turned into quagmires are only the first issues faced by the soldiers in the trenches. The frontline troops covered positions, and the safety provided has now turned against them. Trenches are being flooded with freezing water and mud, with soldiers fighting to maintain their structural integrity so that they can continue providing cover against enemy fire. Working, living and fighting in such conditions, however, puts the soldiers at high risk of hypothermia, trenchfoot, and other illnesses caused by adverse environmental conditions. Coincidently, the situation of soldiers in the trenches will be made even worse by the previously mentioned logistical problems, as lack of supplies, especially food, medicine, and resources for keeping warm, will further increase casualties resulting from non-combat. This, combined with the continued battles in Avdiivka and Bakhmut, will most likely lead to significant casualties among the foot troops, and put an especially heavy burden on the medical corps of both sides.  

Such a critical situation of the medical forces has been accompanied for Ukraine with a sacking of the previous head of the Ukrainian medical forces, Major General Tetiana Ostachenko by Zelensky. Ostachenko’s dismissal has come as a result of major criticism and worsening capabilities of Ukrainian medics, who received less training and subpar equipment. Ostachenko has been replaced by Major General Anatoly Kazmirchuk. However, his appointment was met with mixed responses. The changes in the medical forces are, however, only a part of the new endeavours of the Ukrainian armed forces. As stated by Minister of Defence Umerov, one of the priorities now is better medical equipment, better training, digitisation, and better communication according to NATO standards. Training of new forces has been one of the key issues for Ukraine, as the country does not possess enough resources to train a sufficient number of troops. Such issues could result not only in a lack of manpower but potentially even in insufficiently trained soldiers. While the West has been conducting training programmes for Ukrainian troops, especially those who operate Western equipment, these have proven insufficient. The first problem is scale.

Simply put, not enough troops are trained abroad in the West. For example, Operation Interflex, the most ambitious foreign training programme led by the UK with trainers from nine countries, has trained only 23,000 soldiers since July 2022. Most recruits only receive 5-week-long basic training, with longer courses reserved for specialist soldiers and leadership roles. Some Western courses have also received criticism as being detached from the realities of Ukrainian battlefields – such as drones or trench fighting.

 

EU vote and the effect on CEE

Last week, the European Parliament voted in favour of the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, which recommends changing the Union treaties, focusing on 65 key areas and the transfer of competencies from the member state level to the EU relating to environmental protection and biodiversity, as well as enlargement of EU in the areas of foreign policy and security, border protection, public health, civil defence, industry, and education. The report proposes a change from the unanimity principle into a qualified majority voting rule, effectively meaning an end to member states veto powers. This change aims to avoid situations in which a single state could block critical decisions regarding the entirety of the Union, a problem quite evident since the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine and a tendency of certain EU member states to block critical decision-making processes. However, it is worth mentioning that the support of such changes by the European Parliament does not mean their implementation. The final decision to accept and implement these changes lies with the unanimous agreement of all heads of state of EU member states. 

While the transition to majority voting instead of the unanimity principle could lead to greater cohesion of EU foreign policy, especially in times of crisis, it could, according to some, also endanger the principles of democracy and equality. The Polish government has greatly criticised the outcome of the vote and the proposed changes to EU treaties. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki claimed that such a transition would be a threat to Polish sovereignty. While Morawiecki’s commentary was mainly used to inflame the anti-EU rhetoric, it points to some potential issues, maybe better presented by the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, who stated that such changes could be unfair to smaller and weaker states within the Union. Smaller states, especially those with different worldviews in Central Eastern Europe, could be dominated by Western states with more power in EU institutions. Nauseda argued for the need to create and maintain a level playing field within the EU where all member states could interact and decide on fairgrounds, especially highlighting the need for potential new EU members like Ukraine, who would only be entering the world of the EU institutions.

 

Poland – truck strikes blocking border 

As the war in Ukraine turns into a hellish image of trench warfare and freezing mud, its key ally Poland continues to be locked in its internal struggles. However, the farce and the status quo might soon reach its end, with Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stating that his chosen government will be presented on Monday, November 27. The new government will then have two weeks to present an application to the parliament for a vote of confidence for the new government. However, as Morawiecki’s political party and its allies do not have the majority in the parliament, the vote will not pass, meaning that a new prime minister will be chosen by the parliament, which will most probably select opposition leader Donald Tusk. This new government, composed of the liberal-progressive opposition parties (Civic Coalition, Third Way, and the Left), will only be able to create the new government and jumpstart Polish political activity already after the new year. 

While the political change in Poland might be imminent, its continuous delay and lack of effective action, especially regarding the war in Ukraine, is heavily problematic. While the difficulties posed by the Polish status quo have already been discussed in previous weeks’ analysis, a key issue has resurfaced. This week a strike action has targeted the Polish-Ukrainian border, with protesters blockading the passage of transport vehicles (lorries) between the two countries. The blockade of the Polish-Ukraine border has reduced traffic threefold. The strike has had a significant impact on Ukraine, which, since the blockade of its ports by Russian warships, has largely relied on the land routes to and through Poland. Most military supplies, equipment, and civilian commodities have been transported across the Polish border via railway or road-based transport. The crippling of these avenues at a critical time in the war could have significant consequences for Ukraine, already struggling to maintain its troops due to an adverse environment. The situation requires immediate attention. Otherwise, it risks crippling the Ukrainian war effort. However, the Polish political arena is at a standstill, and the lack of political will to resolve the issue by the acting officials from the Law and Justice party has only inflamed the issue. The situation is being made even worse by the fact that representatives of the Confederation party, who previously showed anti-Ukrainian sentiments, have supported the strike. Should this issue not be resolved quickly and effectively, the already strained relations between Poland and Ukraine might be crippled, with the only beneficiary of such an ending being Russia and its imperialistic ambitions.

 

Conclusion

With the coming of winter, harsh weather, and mud, the battlefields of Ukraine bring new threats and challenges. The soldiers are beset not only by conventional military threats but also by the environment and sickness, which, coupled with logistical problems, will most probably result in heavy casualties. At this time, Western support is much needed, not only to help supply Ukrainian troops with the equipment and supplies necessary to survive such hellish conditions but also to train new troops to replace those lost to either sickness or battle. It is in these conditions that exactly the opposite is happening. Instead of increasing aid, a noose has been tied to one of the main supply arteries to Ukraine from Poland. Should it remain in place this noose could very much strangle the Ukrainian war effort and finish the job for the Russians. And while vital Ukraine is, unfortunately, not the primary focus of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, which looks primarily at its internal struggles as well as a potential schism in EU relations resulting from the proposed abandonment of the principle of unanimity. It is at times like these that regional leaders should take responsibility and find a way through the storm. Could Poland, with a new progressive-liberal government, shoulder such a burden only remains to be seen, though one thing remains crystal clear: the time to act is now. 

Author: Sebastian Czub, Analyst, Casimir Pulaski Foundation

Mark Rutte

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A new era in Dutch politics? A snap parliamentary election in the Netherlands

A new era in Dutch politics? A snap parliamentary election in the Netherlands

21 listopada, 2023

A new era in Dutch politics? A snap parliamentary election in the Netherlands

Mark Rutte

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

A new era in Dutch politics? A snap parliamentary election in the Netherlands

Autor: Karolina Olszowy

Opublikowano: 21 listopada, 2023

As the Netherlands goes to the polls on November 22 for a snap parliamentary election, a new era will begin in Dutch politics. After 13 years as Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, the second longest ruling EU leader, has resigned. His position may be filled by the first female prime minister, Dilan Yeşilgöz. What’s more, the party taking the lead in the polls was formed just three months ago. The party landscape in the Netherlands is widely divided and there may be around 16 parties in the government. For Europe, these elections matter because the Netherlands often plays the role of intermediary when concluding agreements with the EU.

On 7 July 2023, the Dutch government collapsed after not being able to reach an agreement on tightening a migration policy. The idea was to reduce the number of family members who could join asylum seekers in the country and to introduce a two-year waiting period for reunification. Shortly afterwards, Rutte announced that he was stepping down from national politics, which meant that the Netherlands would get a new leader, but it is difficult to predict who it might be. Rutte, on the other hand, is being considered as the new Secretary General of NATO. According to the NOS website, he can count on the support of France, Germany and the UK[1], while sources of the biggest Dutch daily paper, De Telegraaf also report about the backing of both Joe Biden and Donald Trump[2].

According to the latest polls, three parties are fighting for the lead. Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) with its new frontrunner, Dilan Yeşilgöz, the current justice minister, has 18% support. The VVD is a liberal-conservative party that wants to implement a two-tier refugee programme, eliminate the right of permanent residence, allow citizenship only after 10 years, limit rents, increase the construction of private houses and strengthen the geopolitical role of the EU.

Pieter Omtzigt’s party, the New Social Contract (NSC), which is only three months old, enjoys similar support. Omtzigt is popular due to his role in exposing a scandal in 2019 when more than 20,000 families were wrongly found to be fraudsters and stripped of child benefits[3]. He wants to reduce migration to 50,000 people a year, abolish subsidies for electric cars and solar panels, which he says benefit the rich and improve financial security for low-income families thanks to tax system reform.

The third major party with around 16% support in the polls is the Green-Labour Alliance (GL/PvdA), led by Frans Timmermans, who resigned as EU climate commissioner for      campaign purposes. He promises to increase the minimum wage, raise taxes on large companies and high earners, support social housing and invest in clean energy.

Not to be neglected is the right-wing populist party, The Party for Freedom (PVV), which opposes immigration, Islam and the European Union. According to polls, it can count on around 13% of the vote. A government coalition could also feature some of the minor parties. These include the progressive-liberal party The Democrats 66, The Party for the Animals or the right-wing conservative party The Farmer-Citizen Movement. In total, there are 26 parties taking part in the elections, of which any party that gains 0.67% is guaranteed a seat in the 150-member government.

What are the main issues?

One of the main contentious issues is migration, on which disagreements have led to the collapse of the government. It is an area of significant concern because almost two-thirds of the Dutch want a reduction in the number of asylum seekers. This is linked to the second major issue, which is the housing deficit. The shortage has become so severe that there are as high as nine times as many house seekers as there are flats for sale. It also impacts soaring rents in major cities, which has even resulted in more than 100,000 people signing a petition calling for more affordable housing. On top of this is the problem of the ever-increasing cost of living, shopping and energy prices, which has put some 830,000 people below the poverty line. For 18-34 year-olds, it is money worries that have a  crucial influence when deciding who to vote for in the upcoming elections. For the Dutch, the rising cost of living also translates into rising healthcare costs. On average, basic care costs €141 per month, but 61% of people fear that they will soon no longer be able to afford it, hence the calls for nationalising healthcare. Last but not least, climate change issues are important, with tens of thousands of Dutch people calling for action on the climate crisis.

How will the new government’s foreign and defence policy change?

For the VVD, a strong NATO translates into Dutch security, hence the party’s emphasis on fulfilling the agreement to spend two per cent of GDP on defence. Protecting allies is also important. Therefore Dutch soldiers are stationed in Romania and Lithuania. The VVD wants to strengthen the role of the EU, as this is a way of promoting Dutch interests. The party identifies Russia and China as threats to the country’s security, and the key issue is to support Ukraine on its way to victory and to become less economically dependent on Beijing.

A similar approach is taken by the NSC, which sees the guarantee of security in NATO, but the national parliament should have the final word on military missions. The party promotes a career in the military by offering a year of service for those in high school and asking employers to allow people to combine a career with being a reservist. The NSC also calls for sanctions on Russia and support for Ukraine, which should be able to become a NATO member.

The Green-Labour alliance sees the need for a more social approach from the EU, which should regulate workers’ rights at the European level. In its view, Europe should also start pursuing a fairer climate policy. On defence and the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is the Netherlands that should take a leadership role in the EU and see to it that tasks are shared.

On the opposite side is the party of the far right. The PVV is betting on the independence of the Dutch armed forces while ruling out the issue of a merger with the German army, which has been raised in previous months. The party is also against sending defence equipment and money to Ukraine, which should be used to strengthen the Dutch military. Furthermore, the PVV wants Turkey to be expelled from NATO. However, the PVV’s slogans will remain just ideas, as the party will not enter the newly governing coalition.

Conclusion

The Dutch parties remain largely united on continuing to impose sanctions on Russia and supporting Ukraine on its way to victory. Help initiatives continue to enjoy strong, if somewhat waning, support from citizens. As the parties at the top of the polls have placed a strong emphasis on migration during campaigning, it can be expected that the debate on reducing migration will be raised by the new government within the EU. However, due to the high political fragmentation in the Netherlands, the exact composition of the new government is difficult to predict, and according to polls at least three parties will be needed to form a coalition.

Author: Karolina Olszowy, external contributor 

[1] “Wordt Mark Rutte de nieuwe NAVO-topman?” NOS Nieuws, November 4, 2023, https://nos.nl/artikel/2496569-wordt-mark-rutte-de-nieuwe-navo-topman

[2] “Rutte beschikbaar voor hoogste functie NAVO”, De Telegraaf, October 28, 2023, https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1356905370/rutte-beschikbaar-voor-hoogste-functie-navo

[3] “Dutch government resigns over child benefits scandal”, The Guardian, January 15, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/15/dutch-government-resigns-over-child-benefits-scandal

1st_school_of_Avdiivka_after_Russian_shelling_on_18_May_2022_(cropped)

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: Baltic Guidance

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: Baltic Guidance

17 listopada, 2023

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: Baltic Guidance

1st_school_of_Avdiivka_after_Russian_shelling_on_18_May_2022_(cropped)

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: Baltic Guidance

Autor: Sebastian Czub

Opublikowano: 17 listopada, 2023

With the war in Ukraine beginning to enter its second winter, both sides of the conflict maintain their offensive operations, despite heavy resistance and adverse environmental conditions. In the background of the heavy fighting, the European states are drawing their eyes away from Ukraine to focus on internal issues. Some however, continue to shine as the guiding examples of western values, advocating for the importance of aiding Ukraine and the spread of European values of security, stability and prosperity.

The War in Ukraine

As the weather turns and temperatures start falling below zero, the war in Ukraine continues. Both sides of the conflict maintain their offensive operations, despite heavy resistance and adverse environmental conditions. At this point the primary offensive focus of the Ukrainian armed forces has shifted to the Bakhmut area hoping to take control over the hills to the north and east of Klischiivka. Ukrainian control over this area would increasingly endanger the southern flank of the Russian held Bakhmut, as well as hinder Russian logistics by endangering the T0513 road. The crippling of Russian logistics especially with the imminent onset of winter would severely weaken the defence capabilities of the Russian garrison. The situation has been recognised by the Russian forces however, who continue launching counterattacks, hoping to stop the Ukrainian advance.

The primary focus of the Russian forces however, currently lies in Avdiivka. Despite heavy losses Russian troops continue to be poured into the battle. The maintained Russian commitment to the offensive operation against Avdiivka suggests that Moscow aims to capture the city rather than, as previously assumed, simply draw Ukrainian attention from other sections of the front and achieve minimal gains. Analysing the current situation in the area one can notice the similarity to the siege of Bakhmut which began in earnest roughly a year ago. Russian forces are relentlessly, though somewhat chaotically, trying to tie a noose around Avdiivka, slowly encircling the city as they did with Bakhmut. The capture of the railway line to the north has now left Ukrainian defenders with a single communication line running west through the settlement of Orlivka. As of now Russian forces are positioned only about 3 kilometres away from this vital route, attacking both from the south and north-east. The situation of Ukrainian defenders continues to be dire, despite the arrival of significant reinforcements.

Observing the intensity of this battle, it is vital to examine why Avdiivka is so important. Some sources have debated the importance of Avdiivka, stating that the city is becoming a second Bakhmut, with thousands of casualties suffered for only political rather than military objectives. While the similarity to Bakhmut is noticeable, in terms of the tactical situation, as well as increasingly difficult fighting conditions, the weather, time of year, and significant losses for both sides, Avdiivka holds also vital military importance. There are two main reasons for Avdiivka’s importance, firstly it is a major fortified position of Ukrainian forces, quite possibly the biggest one in eastern Ukraine, which managed to resist Russian assaults not only since the 2022 invasion but also saw significant fighting since 2014. Secondly, its position is important for both sides as it can facilitate offensive operations in the area. For Ukrainians Avdiivka in the staging ground and entryway into the city of Donetsk and wider Donbass. For Russians it is a major obstacle blocking their path into western Donetsk Oblast. Should the city fall, Russian forces could endanger and flank Ukrainian positions to the west, threatening Ukrainian positions in the Marinskyi region, to the north in the area of Toretsk and Konstiantynivka – which could cripple Ukrainian operations in Bakhmut, and finally to the north-west in the direction of Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. Each of these directions of attack would have significant effects on Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine, making the operational situation much more difficult.

Poland

While the war in Ukraine continues, Poland continues to be preoccupied with its internal matters. This week marked the first session of the new Polish parliament, which brought significant changes to the political arena. The Law and Justice party has lost its majority rule and the effects are clearly visible. Firstly the parliament chose a new marshal who oversees and supervises the work of the lower house of the parliament. The Law and Justice’s candidate has been rejected, with the opposition parties voting in Szymon Hołownia of the Third Way. Since Hołownia became the marshal, Law and Justice’s domination over the parliament came to an end. This defeat could be noticed not only in the frantic behaviours of Law and Justice’s representatives during sessions but also in the desperate search for allies that could support the new government of Prime Minister Morawiecki – so far unsuccessful. This week’s events observed in the Polish parliament seem to be indicative of a major transition in Polish politics, with the Law and Justice party slowly transitioning into opposition activities and the liberal-progressive parties slowly tightening their grip on power. A sign of this transition can also be noticed in the statements of some of the politicians, for example Tomasz Siemoniak, the former minister of defence from the Civic Coalition, began discussing the future of Polish military modernisation. Siemoniak stated that the future development and production of the Krab self-propelled howitzers should be located solely in Huta Stalowa Wola, instead of opening a new branch in the facilities of Bumar-Łabędy. This statement can also be indicative of the direction in which Polish military modernisation might go towards and who might be the likely candidate for the new minister of defence.

The Baltics

While Poland is distracted by its internal dealings, stalwart voices can be heard in the Baltic states, which continue their staunch pro-Ukrainian approach. In a recent interview Latvia’s new president Edgars Rinkēvičs has made some key statements on the war in Ukraine and the European approach to dealing with Russia. Rinkēvičs stated that Europe has a responsibility to stop Russia in order to stop its imperialistic ambitions. In the Latvian president’s words “it is important to actually fight for international peace, and peace in Europe, because if we stop Russia in Ukraine, then Russia is not going to be able to challenge other countries.”[i] Rinkēvičs also commented that his words are meant not only as an assurance of continued support to Ukraine but also to convince hesitant European states to commit to aiding the war-torn country. A similar point of view was presented by Gabrielus Landsbergis, Lithuania’s Foreign Minister who warned other countries against considering peace with Russia, arguing that the ceasement of hostilities will only be used by Russia to rearm and prepare for another war of conquest. In a similar fashion to the Latvian president, Landsbergis argued that supporting Ukraine is a unique chance to stop Russian imperialism once and for all, stating that if peace with Russia is pursued then “Our children will curse us in the trenches we are digging for them.”[ii]

While presenting a different focus, the Lithuanian president Gitanas Nausėda joined the Baltic chorus, advocating for the enlargement of the European Union. Nausėda argued that the admission of other states, like Ukraine, allows for the creation of a greater sphere of security, economic prosperity and respect for human rights.[iii] In Nausėda’s view a greater European Union would be able to bring unprecedented stability to an unstable world. The Lithuanian president also highlighted the need to create a level playing field for the smaller and weaker states, allowing them to interact with greater states on fair grounds.

Conclusion

As battle for Avdiivka continues it should be noticed that Russian incessant attacks might be indicative of a greater comprehensive effort to besiege and capture the city in a manner similar to Bakhmut. With Ukrainian troops in the city facing a dire situation Ukraine has to prepare for an intensive period of fighting during the late autumn and early winter months. In such times the western commitment to the Ukrainian cause is much needed, however many western states are preoccupied with their own issues. This situation is breached by the stalwart attempts of the Baltic states to remind Europe of the Russian threat and the importance of supporting Ukraine in its hour of need. The Baltic states and their leaders are shining examples of western ideals, hoping to spread them in the name of security and prosperity – an endeavour which just might rekindle common European and western efforts.

Author: Sebastian Czub, analyst Casimir Pulaski Foundation

[i] Edith M. Lederer, “Latvia’s president says West must arm Ukraine to keep Russia from future global adventures”, AP News, November 12, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/latvia-president-ukraine-russia-israel-hamas-weapons-cde2138165701ee9dbaf9823e761664c.

[ii] “Lithuania’s Foreign Minister on making peace with Russia: Our children will curse us in the trenches we are digging for them”, Ukrainska Pravda, November 4, 2023, https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/11/4/7427209/.

[iii] “Taking on new members is in EU’s interest – Lithuanian president”, The Baltic Times, November 14, 2023, https://www.baltictimes.com/taking_on_new_members_is_in_eu_s_interest___lithuanian_president/.

ZelenskyMeetingWithVonDerLeyen

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The Long Road Ahead

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The Long Road Ahead

10 listopada, 2023

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The Long Road Ahead

ZelenskyMeetingWithVonDerLeyen

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Central and Eastern Europe Weekly Update: The Long Road Ahead

Autor: Sebastian Czub

Opublikowano: 10 listopada, 2023

The War in Ukraine

In Ukraine both sides of the conflict continue to be stuck in a brutal attritional struggle, locked in positional trench warfare reminiscent of World War I. The major attempts to break this stalemate conducted by either side have so far brought no change.

The first takeaway based on the current situation in Ukraine is that both Russia and Ukraine seem to be preparing for the long haul. It seems that at this moment both sides are struggling to break through each others’ defensive positions in several key hotspots stretched along the over 1000 kilometre long frontline. While on a smaller scale than before Ukrainian forces are continuing their assaults on Russian positions both in southern Ukraine and in the Bakhmut area. At the same time Russian forces continue attacking Avdiivka, with Ukrainian sources stating that as many as 40,000 Russian troops operate in the area.[i] Despite this however, it seems that neither side is anticipating significant effects of these operations. The Russian attack most probably had two objectives. One, it aimed to capitalise on Ukrainian commitment to other areas of the frontline, hoping to achieve some gains and further deteriorate the situation in Avdiivka. Two, Russian wanted to destabilise Ukrainian offensive efforts by forcing it to relocate other units into the area and commit reserves. Russia achieved limited gains but succeeded in drawing out Ukrainian forces, however Russian forces paid and continue to pay a very heavy price. At the same time Russians are saving their stocks of ordnance, and aviation assets, hoping to increase the strike capabilities for winter 2023/2024, aiming to grind Ukraine down in a prolonged war of attrition. On the other hand, while Ukrainian offensive operations both in the south and Bakhmut achieved and continue to achieve limited successes it seems that the offensive is not considered as the major or primary operation by the command. Even President Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian armed forces are now preparing for a new campaign in 2024.[ii] The only conclusions that might be drawn at this time is that the war in Ukraine will last much longer, well into 2024 and possibly beyond, and that Ukraine will need more aid in order to not lose the battle of attrition against Russia.

Ukraine on the EU path

The so-called light at the end of the tunnel for Ukraine might be the country’s path to ascension to the EU. Ukraine’s road to the EU can be traced as far back as the 2014 Revolution of Dignity which saw the ousting from power of the repressive and pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych and change of direction towards integration and cooperation with the West, NATO, and the EU. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine has provided an additional boost to Ukrainian aspirations, solidifying not only European support for Ukraine but also commitment to a Ukrainian future safe from Moscow’s grasp and influence. The importance of these steps was covered however during wartime by the general focus on humanitarian and military, planning and working for the better future was important but the immediate issues of survival and resistance against Russian wanton aggression took the centre stage. It is however, this very work on Ukraine’s future that might ensure its survival and victory.

 

On Wednesday, November 8, the European Commission recommended inviting Ukraine to begin membership talks as soon as it meets the final necessary conditions, even as the defensive war against Russia continues. As of now Ukraine has fulfilled 4 of the 7 required conditions, with the rest nearing completion as well. One of the key obstacles still in Kyiv’s way is the elimination of corruption, an objective which the Ukrainian government, led by the efforts of President Zelensky himself, have been hard at work to achieve. Before anything happens however, the Commission’s recommendation has to be approved unanimously by the 27 leaders of European member states during a summit in mid-December. While the vast majority of European states, similarly to the majority of EU citizens, support Ukraine’s ascension to the EU there are unfortunately some outliers which might slow down or even prevent Kyiv’s aspirations. The first is Hungary, which might try to utilise the vote in December to achieve further concessions both from the EU and Ukraine, as it did on other similar occasions. A new potentially problematic actor might be Slovakia, who’s anti-Ukrainian ruling party led by Robert Fico might stand in the way of Ukraine’s road to EU. Though Slovakian opposition might be minimised, as in the previous interactions Fico conformed to the EUs pro-Ukrainian approach. Should the recommendation be accepted Ukraine will be able to begin official membership talks as soon as next year.

The membership talks, as important as they are on the path to the EU, will most probably take a significant amount of time to complete, potentially counting in years. While this might seem somewhat bleak when faced with the Ukrainian everyday reality of the continued war with Russia, this very talks might allow Ukraine to not only secure further support from EU member states but also in the long term end the war and secure a Ukrainian future as part of the West. Recently, the West has shifted focus away from Ukraine towards other challenges, both internal and external. The US has become occupied with managing the situation in the Middle East, trying to contain the Israeli – Hamas conflict from escalating into a full fledged regional conflict reminiscent of the most tumultuous years in the Israeli-Arab relations. EUs attention has similarly been occupied by the events in Israel and Gaza, and pacifying internal societal divisions caused in their wake. At the same time the EU, with mostly Italy, France, and Germany had to tackle the growing issue of immigration into the EU via illegal means, which caused the existing structures to collapse. Simultaneously Poland, a key Ukrainian ally, has been preoccupied by its internal matters, with the parliamentary election, the transition of power and an upcoming shift in the government. These events led to a temporary relegation of Ukraine to the background, which resulted in less support both in terms of material aid and political recognition and focus on the conflict. This situation might be however remedied by the European Commission’s recommendation and subsequent membership talks which will not only shift European attention back to Ukraine but also establish another channel of communication between the war torn country and its European partners.

The President’s Decision

The first session of the newly elected Polish parliament has been scheduled for Monday, November 13. Prior to this inaugural meeting the Polish President Andrzej Duda has to appoint the official candidate for the prime minister to form the new government. In accordance with tradition Duda selected primer minister Mateusz Morawiecki a representative of the party with the most seats in parliament – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – the Law and Justice party (further referred to as PiS) which also formed the last government. As mentioned previously, while usually appropriate, the selected candidate and his party have no chance of forming a majority government. This is because the opposition parties made up of Civic Coalition, the Third Way, and the Left have already established an agreement to form their own coalition government as together they hold the majority in the parliament. However, before they can do so Morawiecki’s new government will have to first be presented and then rejected in a vote of confidence. Most probably Morawiecki will try to forestall the vote as much as possible, hoping to, by some yet unknown way, convince enough elected representatives to vote his government into power. As already established the probability of this is extremely low due to the fact that these representatives would have to come from the ranks of the opposition parties. Thus, Morawiecki can only realistically delay the inevitable. The latest the vote of confidence can take place is December 11, thus for a period of almost a month the Polish government will be at a stalemate.[iii] Only after this date will the opposition have its chance to form the government.

While the upcoming transition of power from the populist conservative PiS government to the much more progressive and liberal government of the opposition coalition is indicative of the change of direction both in Poland’s foreign and internal affairs, it will also be a very important test for the new government and the values this government represents. For the last 8 years Poland has been governed by a populist option, and one that has captivated a significant portion of the Polish voters. This year’s election results confirm that PiS still holds a lot of sway over the Polish public, with the three opposition parties combined barely achieving the majority. Thus, now comes the time for the “opposition” to prove itself and convince the Polish people that they are their best choice for the future. Ambitions will now run high for the opposition parties to prove themselves to the Polish people and achieve tangible results. Should they fail to do so, the Law and Justice party and its populist agendas may once again captivate the hearts of the Polish voters. The opposition will be facing some very difficult challenges, the continued war in Ukraine, decoupling with China, cooperation with the new American administration after the 2024 election, restoring EU funds to Poland and many more. The most significant measure however, of the efficacy and popularity of the opposition government will be the 2025 presidential election in Poland. Should the opposition fail to secure a victory there, then its hopes for reelection and its ability to function will be bleak.

Conclusions

While it can be clearly seen that this is a very challenging time for Central and Eastern Europe it can also be opportunity for a new better future. Ukraine torn by war and heading into the second year of the full scale conflict is stalwartly trudging the path to the European Union bringing back the West’s popular and political attention, opening new lines of dialogue and hopefully more supply lines to support its population and defensive war effort. Furthermore, the Polish progressive-liberal option is now standing before a great challenge and should it be successful it could cement its hold on power and create great momentum for Poland as the mainstay power of the CEE. These achievements could further reinvigorate the CEE and strengthen its ties with the western part of the EU, though the road ahead will be long and hard.

Author: Sebastian Czub, Analyst, Casimir Pulaski Foundation

[i] “Avdiivka surrounded on three sides, Russians trying to ‘bait Ukrainian artillery’ into revealing locations”, The New Voice of Ukraine, November 8, 2023, https://english.nv.ua/nation/avdiivka-surrounded-on-three-sides-russians-trying-to-bait-ukrainian-artillery-50366707.html.

[ii] Alessandra Galloni, “Ukraine can still deliver battlefield results this year, Zelenskiy says”, Reuters, November 8, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/reuters-next-zelenskiy-says-ukraine-has-plan-continue-fighting-after-slow-2023-11-08/.

[iii]Kasia Bielecka, “Rząd będzie tymczasowy? Nieważne. Odprawa ministrom i tak się należy”, Wyborcza, November 8, 2023, https://wyborcza.biz/biznes/7,177151,30379757,rzad-bedzie-tymczasowy-niewazne-odprawa-i-tak-ie-nalezy.html?disableRedirects=true.

Debata Pułaskiego nt. priorytetów polityki zagranicznej nowego rządu

7 listopada, 2023

Debata Pułaskiego nt. priorytetów polityki zagranicznej nowego rządu

Opublikowano: 7 listopada, 2023

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