CASIMIR PULASKI FOUNDATION



BRIDGING THE GAP: ENHANCING CEE-TAIWAN COLLABORATION IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR SECTOR

PULASKI POLICY PAPER

Co-funded by the European Union

G | M | F Transatlantic Foundation

Pulaski Policy Papers
Pulaski Foreign Affairs Commentary
ISSN 2080-8852 Warsaw, 20.11.2024

Author: Paulina Uznańska

Bridging the Gap: Enhancing CEE-Taiwan Collaboration in the Semiconductor Sector

Executive Summary

Taiwan, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing—fabricating over 60% of total semiconductors and over 90% of advanced chips—has become central to global supply chain security strategies. Given its geopolitical risks, any disruption in the Taiwan Strait would have severe global economic impacts.

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine have revealed critical vulnerabilities in global semiconductor chains, necessitating diversified production sources. Taiwan, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing—fabricating over 60% of total semiconductors and over 90% of advanced chips—has become central to global supply chain security strategies. Given its geopolitical risks, any disruption in the Taiwan Strait would have severe global economic impacts. For Taiwan, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) offers a strategic, like-minded platform to expand its reach into the EU market. Simultaneously, for CEE, partnerships with Taiwan present an opportunity to integrate into international semiconductor networks and support EU objectives for building a resilient chip ecosystem in Europe.

Forging a semiconductor partnership between Taiwan and CEE countries would not only help secure global supply chains by expanding Taiwan's EU footprint but would also position CEE as a valuable contributor to the EU's semiconductor revival. By leveraging Taiwan's expertise and CEE's strategic location, both parties can enhance supply chain resilience and advance their economic and technological goals. To achieve this, policymakers should take the following steps:

1. **Start from lower-level chip manufacturing:** Due to the limited pool of chip engineers and significant state aid from other European countries, CEE's ability to attract high-capacity manufacturing investments, like chip fabs, is restricted. However, investing in low-end chip manufacturing could strengthen CEE's role in the EU semiconductor supply chain, with Taiwan's involvement being especially

valuable. This approach would also serve as an initial step in advancing the region up the value chain over the coming years.

2. **Develop talent and expertise:** CEE should partner with Taiwan to develop a semiconductor talent pool through fully funded academic programs, on-the-ground training labs, and targeted workshops. Supporting joint research teams and boosting funding for applied research would help keep innovation at the forefront of the region's semiconductor industry.

3. **Align with the European Chips Act:** CEE countries should align their semiconductor strategies with the EU Chips Act to access EU funding and lobby for dedicated projects that include Taiwan's involvement. Emphasizing joint R&D efforts in design platforms and establishing national competence centers together with leading high-tech companies from Taiwan would drive regional semiconductor innovation.

4. **Analyze the geopolitical environment:** Partnering with Taiwan in the semiconductor sector could help the region position itself in the broader European and global high-tech ecosystems, and strengthen cooperation with other critical actors in the chip supply chains, such as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. Moreover, while China often responds aggressively to strengthening political relations with Taiwan, semiconductor cooperation with the region is generally seen as a business partnership and is less likely to bring diplomatic or economic repercussions.

Contents

Introduction

The growing global demand for semiconductors, coupled with the need for resilient supply chains, presents a unique opportunity for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Taiwan to forge a partnership. For CEE, potential investments in human capital and knowledge transfer in high-tech sectors could catalyze the economic and technological development of the region. They would also be aligned with the EU's strategic goal of reducing dependency in critical industries and revitalizing the European chip ecosystem, as stipulated in the EU AI Act. For Taiwan, the CEE countries represent more than just potential economic partners — they share a set of democratic values and a common historical experience of resisting authoritarianism. CEE countries may thus be more open to help Taiwan counter diplomatic isolation amid the PRC's pressure and raise the island's international visibility.

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the world's overwhelming dependence on Taiwan for semiconductors, with chip shortages hitting critical sectors like automotive, electronics, and telecommunications, halting production lines and driving up costs. The Russian invasion in Ukraine has added new urgency to this concern by demonstrating how regional conflicts can destabilize global supply chains, particularly for critical goods like energy, food, and technology. In the case of unrest in the Taiwan Strait – whether due to geopolitical tensions or military conflict with the PRC – the impact on the global economy could be even more severe.[1] Currently, the level of geographical concentration in chip manufacturing is extreme– as of 2022, around 64% of semiconductors overall were manufactured in Taiwan, while in the production of sub-7 nanometer (nm) high-end ICs[2] on the island reached more than 70% of global market share.[3]

After decades of taking a cautious approach to technology sharing, Taiwan has become more open to international cooperation in the semiconductor sector. While the island remains vigilant in protecting its core technological strengths to maintain what is often referred to as its "silicon shield,"[4] this new collaborative stance marks a strategic shift. Currently, key Taiwanese companies, including the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), plan to launch their first factory in Europe. By 2027, legacy chip production will begin in the German city of Dresden (12/16 nm and 22/28 nm), mainly for

the automotive and industrial sectors.[5] CEE countries should seize this opportunity to position themselves within the developing European supply chain.

This paper aims to explore how cooperation between CEE and Taiwan could advance the strategic interests of both sides. Research on this topic is warranted for at least two reasons: enhancing the resilience of global semiconductor supply chains and ensuring geopolitical stability. The study draws on case studies of cooperation between Taiwan and Czechia and Lithuania in the semiconductor industry. These countries were selected due to their strong political ties with Taiwan. While most CEE and broader EU states remain cautious about pursuing cooperation with Taiwan, largely due to concerns over potential retaliation from the PRC, Czechia and Lithuania have emerged at the forefront of forging strong relations with the island despite potential diplomatic and economic repercussions. Both Vilnius and Prague have been notably proactive in engaging with Taiwan, as demonstrated by a growing number of bilateral visits, diplomatic exchanges, and their development of Indo-Pacific strategies aimed at strengthening relations with democratic partners in Asia, including Taiwan.

Czechia: A Vital EU Partner for Taiwan

Czechia has emerged as a prominent European partner to Taiwan, with political relationship between the two intensifying in recent years. This warming of ties began in 2020, when Czech Senate President Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan and delivered a historic speech at the Legislative Yuan, a bold move that signaled deeper engagement. This visit laid the foundation for subsequent high-level diplomatic exchanges, including a 2022 delegation led by Senator Jiří Drahoš and a major 2023 delegation spearheaded by Markéta Pekarová Adamová, Speaker of the Czech Chamber of Deputies. A notable milestone in this evolving relationship was a direct phone call between Czech President-elect Petr Pavel and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in 2023, making Pavel the first European head of state to engage in direct communication with Taiwan's leadership.[6] Alongside these political gestures, Czechia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally reinforced this approach with the publication of its Indo-Pacific Strategy, which highlights the importance of strengthening ties with Taiwan, particularly in trade, technology, and strategic cooperation.[7]

From Prague's perspective, business relations were intended to be central to its warming political ties with Taiwan. As Czechia aimed to diversify its economic partnerships and

reduce dependency on China, Taiwan emerged as a key partner, particularly in high-tech sectors, like semiconductors and innovation-driven industries. For Taiwan, given its diplomatic isolation, strengthening ties with a like-minded partner like Czechia presented an opportunity to expand diplomatic and economic presence in Europe. In this way, Taiwan, as a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing, and Czechia, with its strong industrial base and a desire to attract high-tech investment, found common ground in this partnership.

Czechia has demonstrated strong ambitions to solidify its presence in the European semiconductor industry, recognizing the sector's strategic importance for the EU's economic growth and technological resilience. As reflected in the *National Semiconductor Strategy* issued by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic in 2024, Prague plans to allocate approximately EUR 1 billion to triple the size of its semiconductor sector by 2029.[8] While Czechia faces a significant challenge due to a shortage of skilled engineers, it already has a solid foundation with existing manufacturing plants and chip design centers operated by major international semiconductor companies. For example, U.S.-owned Onsemi, Swiss-owned STMicroelectronics, and Japan-owned Renesas Electronics have established facilities within the country. Additionally, some Czech companies are already integrated into global semiconductor supply chains. For instance SVCS, which provides high-tech furnaces used in advanced semiconductor production, serves clients around the world, including Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI).[9]

While political ties between Czechia and Taiwan have grown significantly in recent years, economic and technological cooperation, particularly in the semiconductor sector, remains in its early stages. The flagship project is the Advanced Chip Design Research Center in Brno, launched in June 2024 through collaboration between the Cybersecurity Hub of the Czech Republic and Taiwan's NARLabs (the National Applied Research Laboratories).[10] This project will soon be complemented by a chip design training center of the Taiwan Semiconductor Research Institute (TSRI) in Prague. Moreover, existing partnerships between Czechia and Taiwan include government-backed initiatives aimed at addressing the country's shortage of engineers and semiconductor experts. Notable among these are the Taiwan Semiconductor Scholarship Program and the Supply Chain Resilience Program at Charles University in Prague both designed to cultivate local talent in critical areas of the semiconductor industry. The Taiwan Semiconductor Scholarship Program offers fully

funded educational opportunities for Czech students to pursue advanced degrees in semiconductor-related fields in Taiwan. Similarly, the Supply Chain Resilience Program focuses on enhancing collaboration between academia and industry, and supporting research and development in cutting-edge technologies.

Given unfulfilled hopes for Chinese investments after Beijing joined the "16+1" platform, Prague expected its ties with Taiwan to bring tangible economic benefits. However, instead of becoming the heart of the semiconductor value chain in Europe, Czechia is more likely to act as a convenient location for sub-investments under Taiwan's major European projects, namely the European Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (ESMC). The ESMC is a €10 billion joint venture between Taiwan's TSMC, Germany's Robert Bosch GmbH, Infineon Technologies AG, and Dutch NXP Semiconductors N.V., with TSMC holding a 70% stake and each European partner holding 10%. The facility will be based in Dresden, which boasts an established semiconductor ecosystem.[11] Given Dresden's proximity to Prague, Czechia is well-placed to attract sub-investments related to this larger venture.

These Taiwanese investments are likely to focus on lower-tier activities within the semiconductor supply chain, such as assembly, testing, packaging, logistics, warehousing, and chip encapsulation. Czechia's strong industrial base, geographic proximity, and relatively competitive labor costs make it an attractive option for such supporting activities. While these sub-investments may not represent the core semiconductor production facilities that Prague sought, they still offer potential for economic growth and deeper involvement in the European semiconductor ecosystem. However, this development will require time. Currently, Taiwanese authorities are encouraging their companies to establish offices and preliminary facilities in Czechia before ramping up operations, as the Dresden ESMC fab is not expected to begin production until 2027. Consequently, Czechia's role in the European semiconductor landscape will initially center on supporting activities, while the country continues building capacity for more advanced operations in the future.[12]

Lithuania: At the Forefront of Strengthening European Ties with Taiwan

Similar to the semiconductor cooperation between Czechia and Taiwan, the foundation for Taiwan-Lithuania collaboration in this field was built upon deepening political ties and highlighting shared democratic values. In 2021, Lithuania took a significant step by becoming the first country in the Central and Eastern Europe region to leave the "17+1"

platform—a group established by China to foster cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. This pivotal move signaled Lithuania's intent to strengthen relations with Taiwan. One of the most notable actions resulting from this shift was Lithuania's agreement with Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name "Taiwan" (not "Taipei"). This decision sparked a harsh reaction from Beijing, showcasing China's increasingly aggressive diplomatic tactics against countries that strengthen ties with the island. In retaliation, the PRC downgraded diplomatic relations with Lithuania and imposed unprecedented economic coercion, threatening foreign investors and local companies operating in the Baltic state. According to data from the Lithuanian National Bank, China's economic coercion had tangible effects on Lithuania's economy. Lithuania experienced a GDP growth reduction of 0.1% to 0.5% in 2022 and 0.3% to 1.3% in 2023, with the lower numbers representing the impact of ceasing direct trade with China and the higher numbers representing indirect effects on investments.[13] Despite these economic challenges, Lithuanian officials expected that the losses incurred would be offset by new opportunities arising from strengthened cooperation with Taiwan, especially in the semiconductor sector. This optimism was underscored by the *Indo-Pacific Strategy* released by Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2023. The document articulated the strategic importance of deepening economic relations with Taiwan, particularly in advanced technologies and research.[14]

The deepening bilateral economic relations between Lithuania and Taiwan are anchored on three key pillars: semiconductors, photovoltaics, and innovative startups, particularly in the fields of biomedicine and lasers.[15] Among these sectors, semiconductor cooperation stands out as a critical area for technological advancement. The most significant investment to date in the semiconductor sector is the $14 million deal focused on technology sharing between Teltonika, Lithuania's leading Internet of Things company, and Taiwan's ITRI. This partnership, announced in 2023, marks a step in Lithuania's ambitions to establish domestic semiconductor production capability and integrate into the emerging European semiconductor supply chains. The core of this joint initiative involves technology transfer from ITRI to Teltonika, enabling Lithuania to produce its own semiconductors, enhancing local manufacturing capabilities and reducing dependency on imports. As part of the agreement, Teltonika was granted licenses for essential technologies and hardware required for semiconductor manufacturing. Additionally, the partnership includes engineering training opportunities for Teltonika's employees,

fostering local expertise in semiconductor production.[16] Domestic semiconductor production using ITRI-provided technology is slated to launch in 2027.[17] In addition to the semiconductor technology-sharing deal between Teltonika and Taiwan's ITRI, Lithuania has also opened a laser laboratory in Taiwan. This initiative aims to foster joint research projects and promote the use of Lithuanian products by Taiwanese companies, as stipulated in Lithuania's Indo-Pacific Strategy.[18]

The overall landscape of Lithuanian-Taiwanese cooperation can be characterized as a bittersweet experience. On the one hand, in the semiconductor sector, the technology transfer agreement between ITRI and Teltonika stands out as the most comprehensive collaboration between the Taiwanese institute and a foreign state.[19] On the other hand, the broader economic gains for Lithuania have been limited. Despite the strengthening of political ties with Taiwan, the country has not been a focal point for TSMC's expansion in Europe. Taiwanese officials, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Joseph Wu, have made efforts to manage the expectations of their Lithuanian counterparts, emphasizing that the process of establishing joint projects in such a technologically advanced field requires patience.[20] These officials have conveyed that, while immediate outcomes may not be visible, Lithuania still has the potential to play a critical role in the emerging European supply chain linked to the Dresden factory.[21] This prospect offers a glimmer of hope, but it has not alleviated the disappointment expressed by Lithuanian authorities regarding the current situation. They had anticipated that their proactive diplomatic stance would yield more substantial economic returns, and the lack of immediate results has led to frustration within the government. In the face of unprecedented economic pressure from the PRC, Vilnius had hoped that Taiwan could step in to replace China as both an export market and a source of investment. However, the reality has been starkly different– bilateral economic ties with Taiwan have proven weaker than initially anticipated, failing to compensate for the loss of agricultural exports to China, and bilateral trade has even declined in recent years.[22] Moreover, the implications of deepening ties with Taiwan have become a contentious issue in Lithuanian domestic politics. As Lithuania entered election season this year, the future trajectory of the country's approach to Taiwan may be influenced by its shifting political landscape.[23]

Conclusions and Recommendations

Focus on lower-end semiconductor manufacturing. The cooperation between Czechia/Lithuania and Taiwan highlights the significant challenges that the CEE region faces in attracting core investments from Taiwanese semiconductor companies, particularly in high-capacity manufacturing facilities like chip fabs. Despite the strong political ties and mutual interest between Czechia, Lithuania and Taiwan, the decision by TSMC to establish its first European fab in Germany underscores several critical factors that hinder the CEE's attractiveness for such investments. Firstly, the primary barrier for CEE countries is the lack of a skilled workforce. Taiwanese authorities have indicated that the region does not guarantee sufficient access to qualified personnel needed for high-tech semiconductor manufacturing. Secondly, access to critical infrastructure, including reliable water and energy resources, is crucial for the establishment and operation of semiconductor fabs. The CEE region faces limitations in these areas compared to more developed markets like Germany. Thirdly, the role of state support in attracting Taiwanese investments is evident in TSMC's business decisions. The company has received significant subsidies for its fabs in various locations, including $4.86 billion from the Japanese government for its facility in Kumamoto, $6.6 billion from the U.S. under the CHIPS Act for its plant in Arizona, and $5.5 billion from the German government for its fab in Dresden. Given the EU's relaxation of state aid rules, CEE countries are not well positioned to attract main Taiwanese investments, as more developed economies gain competitive advantage through substantial financial incentives for Taiwanese partners. All in all, while attracting core investments from Taiwanese companies, such as chip fabs, may be challenging, CEE countries can position themselves to attract investments in lower-end semiconductor manufacturing and assembly operations. These segments require less capital investment and specialized workers, making them more feasible for CEE regions to develop.

Invest in human capital. Building a skilled workforce in the semiconductor industry is a strategic pathway for enhancing cooperation between Taiwan and the CEE. Firstly, Taiwan is offering fully funded 2-year Master's degrees and 4-year PhD programs in semiconductor-related fields for students from CEE countries. This initiative aims to build a community of skilled professionals who can contribute to the semiconductor industry in their home countries. To mitigate the risk of potential brain drain while enhancing collaboration with Taiwan, it is crucial for CEE nations to actively engage in crafting joint educational and research programs, to make sure that talents stay in the region. Secondly,

Taiwan plans to launch semiconductor laboratories at universities and research institutes in the CEE, such as those envisioned for Slovakia. These labs will facilitate hands-on training and research opportunities for students and professionals. Thirdly, organizing workshops and short-term training programs conducted by Taiwanese experts in semiconductor technology can provide immediate knowledge transfer and good practices sharing.

Leverage the European Chips Act. CEE countries should position themselves within the broader European supply chain by aligning national efforts with the EU Chips Act. They should lobby for dedicated funding and projects that support Taiwan's involvement in Europe's semiconductor ecosystem and provide mutual learning opportunities, for example by jointly setting design platforms and competence centers. Collaborative R&D projects, incentivized by EU funding mechanisms, will be key to driving innovation and attracting Taiwanese semiconductor firms to invest in CEE countries.

Mind geopolitical landscape. The experiences of Czechia and Lithuania reveal that closer political engagement with Taiwan does not guarantee instant investments or trade improvements. Instead of expecting quick wins, CEE nations should be prepared for a long-term commitment to building relationships in the semiconductor sector. Moreover, CEE countries should understand how their cooperation with Taiwan might influence their relationships with other actors. China's response to strengthening diplomatic or political relations with Taiwan is typically aggressive, as seen in its reactions to high-level bilateral visits and official engagements between Taiwanese, Lithuanian, and Czech officials. In contrast, semiconductor cooperation between the region and Taiwan is framed as a business partnership and so far has not sparked backlash from Beijing. Furthermore, by engaging with Taiwan in semiconductors, CEE nations can position themselves as key players in the global technology ecosystem. Such partnerships will not only enhance their technological capabilities but also strengthen ties with major allies such as the U.S., which considers Taiwan essential for securing critical supply chains. Additionally, this cooperation opens doors for CEE's deeper engagement with other vital tech powerhouses, including South Korea and Japan.

Author: Paulina Uznańska

An analyst in the China Team working on modern technologies and EU-China relations. Paulina Uznańska is also pursuing a PhD in law at the University of Warsaw's Doctoral

School of Social Sciences. Her dissertation on China's Internet governance is supervised by Professor Rogier Creemers from Leiden University. She graduated with honours from Peking University (China Studies: Economics and Management) and the University of Warsaw (Chinese Studies), as well as from the Warsaw School of Economics (Global Business, Finance and Governance). She was a visiting scholar at Leiden University, University of Cologne and National Chengchi University. Paulina is a co-founder of the Polish Research Centre for Law and Economy of China at the University of Warsaw and a fellow of the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange. She co-edits monographs in Chinese ("New Technologies and Law 新科技与法律", Scholar 2022) and translates from Mandarin ("China-Central and Eastern Europe. A History of Literary Interactions," Dialog 2020).

Endnotes:

[1] Jakub Jakóbowski, Maciej Kalwasiński, *Co z gospodarką gdy wybuchnie konflikt o Tajwan? Scenariusze dla świata i Polski (youtube.com),* Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 14.12.2024

[2] These chips are crucial for the development of cutting-edge sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), 5G networks, cloud computing, electric and autonomous vehicles, and clean energy technologies.

[3] Chen-Yuan Tung, *Taiwan and the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain,* Taipei Representative Office in Singapore, 02.2024

[4] This concept highlights how Taiwan's dominance in producing the most advanced chips creates a significant strategic interest for the U.S. and other Western countries. As long as the majority of high-end semiconductor production remains concentrated in Taiwan, these nations are more likely to defend the island against any disruptive actions from the People's Republic of China (PRC).

[5] Paulina Uznańska, Lidia Gibadło, *TSMC will build a factory in Germany,* Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 09.08.2023

[6] Daniel McVicar, *How the Czech Republic Became One of Taiwan's Closest European Partners and What It Means for EU-China Relations,* Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org), 24.04.2023

[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic, *The Czech Republic's Strategy For Cooperation With The Indo-Pacific: Closer Than We Think*, 10.2022

[8] Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, *Narodni Polovodicova Strategie 2029*, October 2024

[9] Michaela Zbrojová, *Why Czechia's Dream of a TSMC Semiconductor Factory Never Materialized,* CHOICE China Observers for Central and Eastern Europe, 01.02.2024

[10] Science and Technology Division Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Czech Republic, *Taiwan is launching the first international chip center in Prague. He will soon open two more in the Czech Republic*, 17.04.2024

[11] Pan Tzu-yu, Frances Huang, *Taiwan to step up cooperation with Czechia on semiconductors,* Focus Taiwan, 09.09.2024

[12] Pan Tzu-yu, Frances Huang, *Taiwan to step up cooperation with Czechia on semiconductors,* Focus Taiwan, 09.09.2024

[13] Jonas Deveikis, *China sanctions vs Taiwan investments – Lithuania's central bank weighs economic impact*, LRT English, 21.01.2022

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, *For a Secure, Resilient and Prosperous Future: Lithuania's Indo-Pacific Strategy*, 2023

[15] In the area of photovoltaic technology, Lithuanian-Taiwanese cooperation is exemplified by SoliTek, a Lithuanian manufacturer of photovoltaic systems, which secured an €8 million line of credit from the Bank of Taiwan. This marks a significant boost for Lithuania's clean energy sector, reflecting Taiwan's commitment to fostering renewable energy cooperation. On the startup front, a joint initiative is focusing on innovative Lithuanian companies such as Oxipit, a biotech startup; Litilit, a laser technology firm; and TransferGo, a financial technology company. These firms have collectively benefited from approximately €3.5 million in investments each, under the auspices of Taiwania Capital, a $200-million venture capital fund established by Taiwan's National Development Fund and private enterprises. Further underscoring the growing collaboration between the two nations, they have also pledged to enhance scientific cooperation with an initial allocation of €2 million until 2026, funding up to 10 joint research projects annually in areas such as health, biotechnology, new materials, and processes. An additional €1 million will be earmarked in 2027 to support further advancements in these fields.

[16] Joanna Hyndle-Hussein, *Taiwan steps up capital involvement in Lithuania's high-tech sector*, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 20.01.2023

[17] Giedrius Gaidamavičius, *Lithuania and Taiwan sign deal on semiconductor technology sharing*, LRT, 18.01.2023

[18] Ministry of the Economy and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, *Aušrinė Armonaitė: Lithuanian Laser Laboratory in Taiwan will give impetus to the fast-growing laser sector*, 13.09.2023

[19] Giedrius Gaidamavičius, *Lithuania and Taiwan sign deal on semiconductor technology sharing*, LRT, 18.01.2023

[20] Andrius Balčiūnas, *Taiwanese representative on declining trade with Lithuania: 'Don't look only at dollars*', LRT, 11.04.2024

[21] Žygymantas Šilobritas, *Taiwan's Minister of Foreign Affairs: Lithuania will be an important part of the semiconductor production chain in Europe, but not its center,* MadeinVilnius, 10.11.2023

[22] Marcin Jerzewski, *Lithuania-Taiwan Relations: A Temperature Check,* CHOICE China Observers for Central and Eastern Europe, 09.01.2024

[23] Marcin Jerzewski, *Lithuania-Taiwan Relations: A Temperature Check,* CHOICE China Observers for Central and Eastern Europe, 09.01.2024

CASIMIR PULASKI FOUNDATION

Warsaw
20.11.2024

Paulina Uznańska