

Sweden After the Elections: Analysis of Sweden's Political Landscape in 2026



Photo 1 – The Swedish Parliament (Riksdag), by Melker Dahlstrand/Riksdag

On Sunday, September 13th, parliamentary, regional council, and municipal council elections were held in Sweden, with nearly 85% of eligible citizens taking part¹. Foreign media were quick to announce the victory of the center-left opposition and the return of Social Democrats leader Magdalena Andersson to the position of prime minister. However, the situation in reality remains far more complex. Although the hitherto governing center-right Tidö coalition fell two seats short of a parliamentary majority, it is difficult to speak of a victory for the internally divided opposition, and the leaders of all parliamentary parties are likely facing lengthy coalition negotiations. This policy paper provides an extended commentary on the elections, analysing the key aspects of the campaign and potential coalition scenarios.

¹ Valmyndigheten. (2026). *Val till riksdagen – Slutligt valresultat*. <https://resultat.val.se/val2026/RD?r=S>
<https://valresultat.svt.se/2026/>

Election Results

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Elections to the 349-seat Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) take place in Sweden once every four years based on proportional representation with a four-percent electoral threshold. By Scandinavian standards, this year's campaign turned out to be exceptionally polarising, yet the elections themselves did not bring drastic reshuffles in parliament. It will once again be composed of the eight hitherto incumbent parties, most of which will retain a seat count very similar to their previous one.




Chart 1 – Results of the parliamentary elections in Sweden, Source: SVT

The hitherto governing right-wing Tidö block received a total of 48.84% of the vote, which translated into 173 seats. The Moderates (M), the moderately conservative party of incumbent Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, won 19.85% of the vote and 70 seats, the Christian Democrats (KD) took 6.17% and 22 seats, and the Liberals (L) secured 5.34% and 19 seats. The Sweden Democrats (SD) turned out to be the biggest losers of the election; they had been part of the previous parliamentary majority, supporting Kristersson's government without holding any ministerial portfolios themselves. Isolated for years on the Swedish political scene and described as a far-right party, SD proved to be the largest party on the right in the previous election, and went into this year's election with commitments from coalition partners guaranteeing them positions in the future government. Ultimately, SD received 17.48% and 62 seats—a result noticeably worse than the 20.54% and 73 seats obtained in 2022, and well below the expectations of party leader Jimmie Åkesson.




Chart 2 – Distribution of seats in parliament and changes compared to the previous term, Source: SVT

The opposition center-left block, commonly referred to as the red-green block, ultimately won 49.57% of the vote, resulting in a narrow majority of 176 seats. However, the leaders of the opposition parties have little reason for triumphalism, as deep policy and ideological

differences among their parties practically rule out the scenario of forming a joint government. Magdalena Andersson's Social Democrats (S) will remain the largest party in parliament, having won 28.02% of the vote and 99 seats. This is both the Social Democrats' worst percentage result in Sweden's post-war history and, in terms of seat count, their worst result since 1911—the first fully democratic election to the Swedish parliament. The Left Party (V) recorded a significant increase in support, gaining 8.40% of the vote and 30 seats, making it the fourth-largest force in parliament. The free-market Centre Party (C) received 7.03% and 25 seats, while the Green Party (MP) won 6.12% of the vote and 22 seats. Policy differences, particularly the Centre Party's reluctance to enter into a direct coalition with the post-communist Left Party, referred to by a large section of the Swedish establishment as a far-left party, mean that the red-green block can hardly be treated as a cohesive coalition block in reality.

Campaign

Ulf Kristersson (M, Moderaterna), Prime Minister of Sweden, entered the election campaign with good approval ratings for his government. In the regular government approval barometer, more than half of Swedes assessed the government positively.² The economic situation and the fight against crime were appreciated the most, while the government's efforts on climate policy and social policy received lower marks. Despite an 11.7% increase in the cost of living compared to 2022,³ Swedes appreciated the reduction of VAT from 12% to 6% until the end of 2027, as well as the reduction in electricity and petrol prices (the government's response to the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz).⁴

The Tidö government pursued a tax policy based on the so-called incentive system (*incitamentspolitik*).⁵ The focus was placed on lower taxation of labor and savings. The tax burden was reduced from 48.5% to around 40%.⁶ An earned income tax credit (*jobbskatteavdraget*) was introduced. At the same time, the government lowered taxes for

² Svenska Dagbladet. (2026). *Valet 2026: Sverige live – senaste nytt*. Svenska Dagbladet. <https://www.svd.se/a/Op33IG/valet-2026-sverige-live-senaste-nytt?pinnedEntry=76729>

³ Österlund, V. (2026). Mandatperiodens vinnare och förlorare. Arena Idé. <https://arenaide.se/rapporter/mandatperiodens-vinnare-och-forlorare/>, str. 2

⁴ Regeringskansliet. (2026). *Energiläget i tider av geopolitisk oro*. Regeringen.se. <https://www.regeringen.se/regeringens-politik/energi/energilaget-i-tider-av-geopolitisk-oro/>

⁵ *ibid*, str. 9

⁶ Nilson, P.M.. (2026). *Valet 2026 handlade om ekonomisk frihet*. Timbro Smedjan. <https://timbro.se/smedjan/valet-2026-handlade-om-ekonomisk-frihet/>

high earners, small business owners, and venture capital fund managers.⁷ Those relying on the social security system lost out on these tax changes. As calculated by the left-wing think tank Arena Idé, a person on unemployment benefits, receiving 80% of their last salary for the first hundred days and 60% after a year of unemployment, lost a total of 2,200 SEK (approx. 200 EUR) compared to the system prior to the Tidö government.⁸

S leader Magdalena Andersson, who served as prime minister in 2021–2022, accused the incumbent prime minister during the campaign of departing from the fundamental tenets of the welfare state. In her view, current economic policy insufficiently protects the least affluent social groups.⁹ She argued that the cost of living for the "average Svensson" (the Swedish equivalent of the "Average Joe") had risen, while high-income households benefited the most. High unemployment remains one of the key problems of the Swedish economy, standing at 8.7%¹⁰ compared to 7.5% in 2022.¹¹ In absolute terms, the number of unemployed individuals increased from 414,000 to 503,000.

During the election campaign, the parties offered a wide range of proposals, focusing on income tax cuts, raising the tax-free allowance for savings under the ISK (*Investeringssparkonto*), a special type of investment savings account (proposals by L, M), introducing a tax credit for parents, and lowering the capital gains tax on property sales (KD).¹² Opposition parties prioritized doubling child benefits and student grants, abolishing the deduction from wages for the first day of sick leave (*karensavdraget*) (proposals by S), reducing public transport ticket prices (MP), and introducing an annual minimum tax of 2% for individuals with assets exceeding 1 billion SEK (MP, V).

⁷ Statistically, to be among the top 10% of earners in Sweden, one must have a gross monthly income of more than 67,000 SEK (approx 5930 EUR)

⁸ op cit. Österlund, V. (2026). no page numbers, summary page

⁹ Sveriges Television. (2026, 9 września). *Partiledarna anländer* [Program telewizyjny]. SVT Play. <https://www.svtplay.se/video/jmL95WY/val-2026-statsministermotet/partiledarna-anlander?video=visa&position=520>

¹⁰ Statistikmyndigheten Statistiska centralbyrån. (b.d.). *Arbetskraftsundersökningarna (AKU)*. [https://www.scb.se/AM0401Arbetskraftsundersökningarna-\(AKU\)](https://www.scb.se/AM0401Arbetskraftsundersökningarna-(AKU)); the data take into account seasonal fluctuations in employment.

¹¹ Statistiska centralbyrån. (2023). AKU 2022. https://www.scb.se/contentassets/1636d5957d344d21b5047624c6d1d775/am0401_2022a01_am12sm2301.pdf, str.16

¹² Nyberg, M. (2026). *Här är partiernas plånboksförslag*. TV4. <https://www.tv4.se/artikel/4zDGRI8yncuaNjIKbkBWZ/lista-haer-aer-partiernas-planboksfoerslag>

Economists were skeptical about some of the election promises, particularly those concerning tax cuts, pointing to growing state debt and high public expenditure.¹³ Increasing defense spending, justified by the current geopolitical situation, remains a significant burden on the budget.

The state of public services (mainly education and healthcare) was an important topic in the election campaign. The quality of education in Swedish schools has deteriorated significantly, as evidenced, among other things, by the PISA test results.¹⁴ Average scores in Sweden in 2025 were lower than in the previous study in mathematics and reading comprehension. In their election proposals, many parties highlighted the need to increase funding for education and addressed the issue of growing stratification between public and private schools.

Climate and energy issues, as well as the fight against crime, were discussed to a lesser extent. Crime had been a key focus of the election campaign four years ago, when Sweden was going through a peak in firearm-related homicides and escalating drug gang wars. In 2022, there were 116 fatalities compared to 84 in 2025.¹⁵ The Swedish government introduced a series of reforms that were described as a "paradigm shift" in Swedish penal policy.¹⁶ Firstly, penalties for a number of offenses were toughened, the principle of consecutive sentencing / consecutive penalties was introduced (previously, individual offenses were not summed up for a person convicted of multiple acts; instead, the sentence was based on the most serious crime), penalties for juveniles were increased, and the most controversial proposal was introduced—imprisoning juveniles (starting as young as 13 years old).¹⁷ Criminologists and penal policy experts viewed this last legal change i.e. lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 13, as an overly far-reaching and

¹³ Cervenka, A. (2026). *Nu skingras vallöftena som konfetti i höstvinden*. Aftonbladet.

<https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/j02x9q/nu-skingras-valloftena-som-konfetti-i-hostvinden>

¹⁴ Utbildningsdepartementet. (2026). *Försämrade Pisa-resultat visar att regeringens skolsatsningar är nödvändiga*. Regeringen.se.

<https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2026/09/forsamrade-pisa-resultat-visar-att-regeringens-skolsatsningar-ar-nodvandiga/>

OECD. (2026). *PISA 2025 results (Volume I): Country notes – Sweden*. OECD Publishing.

https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/pisa-2025-results-volume-i-country-notes_2d4ff9ea-en/sweden_a502fd30-en.html

¹⁵ Brottsförebyggande rådet. (b.d.). *Dödligt våld*. <https://bra.se/amnen/dodligt-vald>

¹⁶ Tham, H. (2026). *Tidöregeringens kriminalpolitik – en utvärdering*. Tidskrift för Kriminalvård.

<https://www.tfkriminalvard.se/debatt/tidoregeringens-kriminalpolitik-en-utvardering/>

¹⁷ SVT (2026,). *Tidöpar. tierna vill skärpa straff för nästan 50 brott*. SVT Nyheter.

<https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/tidopartierna-vill-skarpa-straft-for-nastan-50-brott>

Tubylewicz, K. (2026). *Cele dla 14-latków. Szwecja wysyła dzieci za kratki. Zamiast śrubokręta chcą użyć młotka*. Tygodnik Polityka.

at times excessively punitive legal measure.¹⁸ Although a drop in selected crime indicators was noted, including incidents involving firearms and bladed weapons, no corresponding improvement was observed regarding other forms of crime, particularly bombings involving explosives and the level of recruitment into organised crime groups.¹⁹

In their electoral proposals, the governing parties emphasised expanding the powers of law enforcement services, amendments to procedural law, and allowing the use of facial recognition technology.²⁰ The opposition parties have more divergent policy proposals regarding crime prevention. S largely adopts tough-on-crime rhetoric similar to that of the governing parties (anti-mafia laws, abolishing sentence reductions, electronic surveillance). V and MP advocate for prevention, including increased funding for education and social care, improving conditions in youth detention and rehabilitation facilities, and implementing reintegration programs for individuals leaving gangs.²¹ C wants to rebuild the police station network by reactivating closed facilities and opening new ones.

In energy and climate policy, the Tidö parties adopted several significant changes. Firstly, in 2023, the government changed the goal of Swedish energy policy from 100% renewable to 100% fossil-free, thereby paving the way for the development of nuclear power.²² Secondly, in 2024, a decision was made to cancel 13 offshore wind farm projects, arguing that due to security and defense reasons, these projects could not be implemented. SD in particular is opposed to renewable energy sources, arguing that they are unreliable and weather-dependent. Such a clear shift in energy policy priorities, combined with the municipal veto on new energy investments and the abandonment of the offshore grid expansion, led to a slowdown in investments in new generating capacity. There is a justified concern that if this downward trend persists, it will make it impossible to meet the growing demand for electricity.²³

Considerable attention was devoted to the future of nuclear energy during this year's election campaign. SD and KD clearly stated that if the opposition wins and V and/or MP

¹⁸ op. cit. Tham, H. (2026).

¹⁹ Polismyndigheten. (2025). *Fortsatt lika många gängkriminella*.
<https://polisen.se/aktuellt/nyheter/nationell/2025/november/fortsatt-lika-manga-gangkriminella/>

²⁰ Aftonbladet. (2026). *Så vill partierna stoppa brottsligheten*.
<https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/n1b36x/sa-vill-partierna-stoppa-brottsligheten>

²¹ Ibid. Aftonbladet. (2026)

²² Green Power Sweden. (2023). *Nytt energipolitiskt mål: Sikta på hela energisystemet*.
<https://greenpowersweden.se/nytt-energi-politiskt-mal-sikta-pa-hela-energisystemet/>

²³ Green Power Sweden. (2026). *Trendbrott för investeringar i förnybar energi*.
<https://greenpowersweden.se/trendbrott-for-investeringar-i-fornybar-energi/>

enter government, it will mean a complete departure from the development of nuclear power. Compared to the Tidö parties, the opposition parties do not hold such a unified vision for Sweden's energy development (V and MP oppose new nuclear power plants) and favor greater parity in state support for low-emission sources.²⁴ The government, on the other hand, explicitly advocates for the development of nuclear power, at times at the expense of investments in other low-emission generation sources. Regarding climate policy, the opposition parties want Sweden to adopt a more ambitious climate policy than the European Union. One of the reasons includes the visible effects of climate change, such as the disappearing snow cover in the Scandinavian Mountains and warnings from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (*Naturvårdsverket*) that despite lower emissions in 2025, Sweden will not reach its national climate goal, achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045 at the latest.²⁵

Finally, it is worth noting an area with a broader consensus between the government and the opposition, namely security and support for Ukraine. All parties except V²⁶ want to continue strengthening Sweden within NATO structures. Assistance to Ukraine enjoys cross-party support.

However, a number of commentators emphasised that this election campaign lacked substance and was rather barren.²⁷ One feature of this year's campaign was scaremongering voters about extreme parties, V and SD (located at opposite poles of the Swedish political spectrum), entering government and securing ministerial portfolios. This would mark a breach of a long-standing precedent in Swedish politics, as neither the (post-)communist V nor the far-right SD (which historically had ties to neo-Nazi movements) have ever co-governed (though they supported governments, as SD did over the past four years).²⁸

²⁴ SVT (2026). *Slutdebatten* [Video]. SVT Play.

<https://www.svtplay.se/video/jmL9mAZ/val-2026-slutdebatten/slutdebatten?video=visa&position=2515>, od 42 minuty

²⁵ Naturvårdsverket. (2026). *Sveriges klimatutsläpp minskade 2025 – men avståndet till klimatmålen ökar*.

<https://www.naturvardsverket.se/om-oss/aktuellt/nyheter-och-pressmeddelanden/2026/juni/sveriges-kli-matutslapp-minskade-2025-men-avstanden-till-klimatmalen-okar/>

²⁶ Vänsterpartiet. (b.d.). *Nato: Frågor och svar*.

<https://www.vansterpartiet.se/var-politik/politik-a-o/nato/fragor-svar/>

²⁷ SVT. (2026). *Smutsigt slutspel* (Sezon 11, Odcinek 10) [Video]. SVT Play.

<https://www.svtplay.se/video/eakYZqE/politikbyran/smutsigt-slutspel?video=visa&position=1202>, od 20 minuty

²⁸ SVT. (2026). *Historien om Sverigedemokraterna* (Sezon 1, Odcinek 8) [Video].. SVT Play.

<https://www.svtplay.se/video/e3dbdqo/historien-om-partierna/8-historien-om-sverigedemokraterna>

Furthermore, the recent campaign was not short of scandals involving these two parties. In the case of V, it emerged that members of the party praised or expressed support for Hamas. After the newspaper Expressen revealed this information, the party removed thirteen candidates from its municipal electoral lists.²⁹ Meanwhile, within SD's ranks, an employee at their parliamentary office with Russian roots was found spreading pro-Russian content and Russian disinformation.³⁰ SD leader Jimmie Åkesson seemed to play down the situation, indicating there was no cause for concern. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson took a different stance, advocating for severe consequences to be drawn.³¹

Until now, Sweden has not been a primary target of Russian disinformation campaigns on a scale similar to the Baltic states, Moldova, or Poland. However, during this election, SVT journalists uncovered a network of pro-Russian trolls spreading lies about voter fraud in Sweden and posting polarising opinions.³² Thousands of accounts were registered in West African countries, generating polarising messages and comments under the profiles of genuine Swedish social media users by impersonating Swedes, stealing real photos, and using Swedish-sounding names. Experts concluded that the accounts are part of a Russian influence operation aimed at deepening social divisions.

²⁹Hamdan, I. (2026). *Firade terrorattacken – nu kandiderar de för V*. Expressen.

<https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/politik/firade-terrorattacken-nu-kandiderar-de-for-v/>

³⁰ SVT. (2026). *SD-tjänsteman i riksdagen sprider proryska budskap*. SVT Nyheter.

<https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/sd-tjansteman-i-riksdagen-sprider-proryska-budskap>

³¹ Ibid. SVT. (2026). *SD-tjänsteman i riksdagen sprider proryska budskap*.

³² SVT (2026). *Proryskt trollnätverk riktar in sig på svenska valet*. SVT Nyheter.

<https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/proryskt-trollnatverk-riktar-in-sig-pa-svenska-valet>

SVT. (2026). *Tusentals afrikanska trollkonton tar sikte mot Sverige inför valet*. SVT Nyheter.

<https://www.svt.se/nyheter/utrikes/tusentals-afrikanska-trollkonton-tar-sikte-mot-sverige-infor-valet>

Further Perspectives After the Elections

Swedish political culture is deeply rooted in the tradition of minority cabinets and the construction of so-called "tolerance agreements" (*toleransavtal*), in which parties remaining outside the government support it in key parliamentary votes. Suffice it to say that the center-right Reinfeldt government (M, C, L, KD), which served from 2006 to 2010, was the only classically understood majority government in Sweden since 1981. In the Swedish system, described by political scientists as an example of negative parliamentarism, a prime ministerial candidate does not need an absolute majority of votes in favour of forming a government, but merely the absence of a majority voting against.³³

On September 18, Magdalena Andersson was tasked by Speaker of the Riksdag Andreas Norlén with forming a government.³⁴ This means she will be the first to have the opportunity to present a government proposal for a vote in the Riksdag, no earlier than September 29. If Magdalena Andersson fails to secure a majority, Ulf Kristersson may also be given the chance to form a new government.³⁵ Due to the growing polarisation of Swedish public debate and the firmly declared "red lines" by party leaders explicitly ruling out specific coalition scenarios, the process of forming a new majority after this year's elections may turn out to be exceptionally long and require far-reaching compromises.

The most significant obstacle to creating a majority red-green government (thus encompassing all former opposition parties: S, V, C, MP) is the aforementioned reluctance of the Centre Party (Centerpartiet) to cooperate with the post-communist left from V, which has traditionally been isolated in parliament and was repeatedly accused during the recent campaign of antisemitism and supporting Hamas terrorists. However, V leader Nooshi Dadgostar emphasised during the campaign that her party would not support a minority government in which it does not receive ministerial portfolios itself.

Even if negotiating positions soften and readiness for coalition talks emerges, policy differences remain a challenge for the hitherto opposition. V and MP placed strong

³³ Wallner, M. (2014). Podziały i typologie systemów parlamentarnych...: zagadnienia metodologiczne. *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia*, 21(2). <https://doi.org/10.1515/curie-2015-0005>

³⁴ Sveriges Radio. (2026). *Talmannen: Magdalena Andersson får uppdraget att bilda regering* <https://www.sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/talmannen-magdalena-andersson-far-uppdraget-att-bilda-regering>

³⁵ Sveriges Radio. (2026). *Nu ska partierna försöka bilda en ny regering*. <https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/nu-ska-partierna-forsoka-bilda-en-ny-regering>

emphasis during the campaign on redistribution and tax reform issues that lie at the foundation of the Swedish welfare state - in particular, the proposal for a so-called "billionaire tax" (*miljardärsskatt*), inspired by a proposal formulated by French economist Gabriel Zucman for an annual two-percent wealth tax, which has gained international popularity on the left. In the version proposed by MP, it would apply to all individuals whose wealth exceeds one billion Swedish kronor (approx. 88,5 million EUR).³⁶ Social Democratic leader Magdalena Andersson explicitly rejected the idea, advocating for other forms of capital gains taxation instead of a tax on wealth itself.³⁷ C also rejected the proposal, being traditionally opposed to measures they view as deeper state intervention in the free market. C also rejects other social proposals from S, V, and MP, including working time reduction, the abolition of the wage deduction for the first day of sick leave (*karensavdraget*), and a ban on generating profits in private education.

The energy system - specifically the further expansion of nuclear power, which became one of the flagship projects of the outgoing coalition - also constitutes a flashpoint. S supports a strategy based on all zero-emission sources, favoring the expansion of nuclear energy while rejecting the financing model introduced by the right and demanding support for the development of offshore wind energy. C likewise opposes state subsidies and credit guarantees for the nuclear sector, stressing the necessity of free-market competition among individual technology providers. We discussed this topic in greater detail in August in a policy paper titled "Swedish Nuclear Energy Renaissance".³⁸

Despite the outlined differences and Dadgostar's categorical statements that she will not support a government without ministerial portfolios for V, a minority government scenario of S or S–MP under Magdalena Andersson's leadership currently appears to be the most likely option. According to leaks appearing in the Swedish media, C figures consider both supporting an S–MP–C–V government and a minority government of the Social Democrats alone.³⁹ At the same time, everyone in the party is said to be aware of V's strong bargaining position, which will undoubtedly influence the policies of the future

³⁶ Svenska Dagbladet. (2026). *MP och Gabriel Zucman: En skatt för miljardärer är inte radikal*. <https://www.svd.se/a/m0pGzg/mp-och-gabriel-zucman-en-skatt-for-miljardarer-ar-inte-radikal>

³⁷ Larsson L.. (2026). *S-ledaren avvisar förslag om miljardärsskatt*. Aftonbladet. <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/k0XRML/s-ledaren-avvisar-forslag-om-miljardarsskatt>

³⁸ Pawlik, K., & Żyłka, A. (2026). *Swedish Nuclear Energy Renaissance*. Casimir Pulaski Foundation. [Swedish Nuclear Energy Renaissance – Casimir Pulaski Foundation](https://www.pulaski.pl)

³⁹ Aftonbladet. (2026). *C-källa pekar ut två regeringsalternativ: V kommer få inflytande*. <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/GxRk2x/c-kalla-pek-ut-tva-regeringsalternativ-v-kommer-fa-inflytande>

government. Bargaining hard, V will certainly demand significant concessions in social policy, including healthcare and education reform, and in the absence of ministerial posts, at least influence over appointments at the state secretary level. According to leaks shared with the media by the Social Democrats, V can count on administrative positions and policy influence without official ministerial portfolios.⁴⁰

Reactivating the right-wing majority through tacit support or even active entry into the Tidö government by the Centre Party remains a possible scenario to break a potential negotiating deadlock. For C's new leader, Elisabeth Thand Ringqvist, any form of cooperation with SD would be a politically high-risk move, constituting a breach of her campaign promise to keep the far-right from influencing the government. On the other hand, C could condition its support for the Tidö government on the removal of SD's most radical migration and penal proposals from the existing agreement, although these have already gained broad support among the electorates and MPs of the remaining Tidö parties over the past four years. C politicians emphasize in the media that Swedish voters expressed opposition to the presence of SD ministers in government through their ballots, and express readiness to cooperate with all parties except V and SD, which they consider extreme.⁴¹

For SD's leadership, which loudly demanded the normalisation of its position and formal entry into government during the campaign, the priority remains preventing Magdalena Andersson's return to power and blocking the left's influence on the state, even at the cost of renouncing their pursuit of ministerial portfolios. SD declares no rigid "red lines" and full readiness to support a government formed by M–KD–L–C—a formula already well known to Swedes from the days of the Reinfeldt (2006–2014) and Bildt (1991–1994) governments.⁴²

Before the elections, Swedish media also analysed a scenario involving a breakup of the right-wing block by pulling the Liberals or the Christian Democrats over to Magdalena Andersson's side to create a center-left government without the involvement of the Left

⁴⁰ Omni. (2026). S-planen för maktskiftet: Ska hålla V utanför med tjänstemän. <https://omni.se/s-planen-for-maktskiftet-ska-halla-v-utanfor-med-tjansteman/a/5pKdgm>

⁴¹ Aftonbladet. (2026). *Sverige har sagt nej till SD-ministrar*. <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/WvMpjg/sverige-har-sagt-nej-till-sd-ministrar>

⁴² Kvartal. (2026). *SD: "Vi har inga röda linjer"*. <https://kvartal.se/nyheter/artiklar/sd-vi-har-inga-roda-linjer/cG9zdDoyMDI4MjM>

Party. At present, however, this scenario appears purely hypothetical. V's better-than-pollled result means that bypassing V would require a very broad S–MP–C–L–KD coalition. Immediately after the election results were announced, Liberal leader Simona Mohamsson and Christian Democrat leader Ebba Busch categorically ruled out any possibility of entering into talks with the Social Democrats, vowing to vote unequivocally against Magdalena Andersson's candidacy for prime minister.

From Poland's perspective, a potential change of government in Stockholm should not bring significant adjustments either to bilateral relations or to the broader regional security architecture. Although Sweden remained a neutral country for over two hundred years, Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 led to a lasting reassessment of the state's strategic doctrine. Both the outgoing Tidö block and all parties of the red-green block consistently advocate for military and economic support for Ukraine, further integration into NATO structures, and active participation in strengthening the Alliance's eastern flank.⁴³ The only party distancing itself from NATO membership remains V, but its potential role as support for a minority government will certainly not translate into a shift in the state's strategic defense course.⁴⁴ The Greens, who also opposed Sweden joining NATO in 2023, have accepted membership as a *fait accompli* and are focusing on setting conditions, such as a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons and permanent foreign military bases on Swedish territory.⁴⁵ Regardless of the ultimate balance of power in the new cabinet, Poland can expect continuity in Swedish foreign policy, the maintenance of existing priorities regarding deterrence in the Baltic Sea region, and the further deepening of Polish-Swedish strategic cooperation.

⁴³ Utrikesdepartementet. (2024). *Utrikesdeklarationen 2024*. Regeringskansliet. <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/bc4f020074f64d0ea2d2fbcfc47939a4/utrikesdeklarationen-2024.pdf>

Sveriges riksdag. (2026). Beslut: Sveriges militära stöd till Ukraina (Betänkande 2025/26:FöU17) [Video]. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/webb-tv/video/beslut/beslut-sveriges-militara-stod-till-ukraina_hdc320260603f%C3%B6u17/

⁴⁴ Vänsterpartiet. (2023). Vänsterpartiet röstar nej till Nato. <https://www.vansterpartiet.se/nyheter/vansterpartiet-rostar-nej-till-nato/>

⁴⁵ Lind, A., Helldén, D. i Berginger, E. (2024). MP: Därför röstar vi nej till DCA-avtalet. Miljöpartiet de gröna. <https://www.mp.se/just-nu/mp-darfor-rostar-vi-nej-till-dca-avtalet/>

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