12/28/2025

Author: Oleh Lazorenko

During his 2024 address to the Sejm, Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski asserted that Poland’s security rests on two non-contradictory pillars: transatlantic cooperation—independent of American electoral cycles—and European integration. He argued for a synergy where "good relations with the United States make Poland stronger in Europe," and EU leadership enhances our value to Washington. Yet, eighteen months later, the global security environment has deteriorated, and Poland has failed to become the driver of change its potential suggests. With the Trump administration being in charge for almost a year, continuing political turbulence in EU, and peace in Ukraine being further and further from being achievable by diplomacy, Poland risks being left out of global equation. And the two pillars Sikorski is referring to do not seem like a solid foundation the 20th biggest economy in the world can confidently stand on.

The most glaring symptom of this is the absence of Polish leadership—across both the executive and presidential branches—from the negotiating table regarding Ukraine. Despite being Ukraine’s primary logistical hub and closest EU partner, Warsaw has been sidelined from talks determining the region's future. The government of Prime Minister Tusk attributes this isolation to President Nawrocki, arguing that the head of state bears constitutional responsibility for representation. Conversely, the President’s chancellery accuses the government of ideologically distancing itself from the White House. With no party proposing a viable unified strategy, the status quo remains "about Poland—without Poland." For a state aspiring to regional power status, this relegation to the role of an observer is a strategic failure.

Furthermore, Poland is neglecting a critical asymmetric advantage: the collective weight of its smaller neighbors. The Visegrád Group (V4) was originally designed to amplify this voice, yet Warsaw failed to consolidate its position as a decisive regional leader. Divergent interests have fractured the format into a "V2+V2", effectively separating the Polish-Czech axis from the Hungarian-Slovak bloc. The popular designation of Poland as NATO’s "eastern flank" is also misleading; a flank implies an integrated element, whereas Poland currently risks becoming a static "guard post" - easier for adversaries to bypass than to engage. The failure to build cohesive regional alliances has left Warsaw in a limbo of "strategic solitude" - not quite isolated, but certainly not leading.

In this search for a new modus operandi, Warsaw should look to the United Kingdom. London demonstrates that being a core pillar of NATO does not interfere with the cultivation of an independent strategic architecture. By leveraging the Commonwealth as a political force multiplier and aggressively pursuing bilateral security treaties - such as its recent pacts with Kyiv and Stockholm - Britain projects power beyond the Alliance's baseline. This 'dual-track' strategy is instructive: true security requires being a loyal ally in Brussels and Washington D.C. while simultaneously building autonomous leverage on the side. Poland, lacking an imperial legacy but possessing a critical regional theater, must emulate this mechanism of diversifying its security portfolio.

However, Poland need not build new alliances from scratch. The optimal strategy is to leverage existing platforms by injecting them with new political impulse. The most prominent option for this is the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Originally conceived to bridge the infrastructural deficit inherited from the Soviet era - where pipelines and roads flowed almost exclusively East-to-West - the 3SI has successfully directed investment toward North-South connectivity. Yet, infrastructure alone is insufficient. The Initiative possesses the potential to transform from an economic forum into a geopolitical bloc, demonstrating Poland’s determination to secure the eastern front and framing Warsaw as a security provider rather than a consumer. To achieve this, three steps are essential:

1. Institutionalization: The current "summit-to-summit" format is inadequate for a serious alliance. The 3SI requires a permanent secretariat and a rotational presidency with decision-making power. Without bureaucratic institutionalization, the 3SI will remain a "talking shop" rather than a geopolitical actor.

2. Expansion of Competences: Coordination must extend beyond infrastructure into the security dimension. Most member states lie within the radius of potential Russian aggression; they share a threat perception that Western Europe does not fully comprehend. The 3SI must evolve into a cohesive logistical and organizational shield, reducing reliance on the reactive posture of Western allies.

3. Integration of Ukraine & Moldova: Even prior to EU accession, Kyiv and Chișinău must be elevated from "observing guests" to full participants. There is no secure Europe without a secure Ukraine, and Poland is the natural keystone of this defense. Only by locking arms with these frontline states can Poland generate the critical mass required to balance the Franco-German engine in the West.

For Warsaw to be heard globally, it must first speak for its region. Leadership is not a title claimed through ambition, but a status recognized through effectiveness. Without shifting from solitary ambition to collective action, Poland risks remaining an aspirant - a candidate for influence rather than a decisive stakeholder at the global table.