12/28/2025

Author: Petsukevich Aliaksandra

In early December, the White House released the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (November 2025). This important document outlines the guiding principles and priorities that the incumbent administration plans to follow in its interactions with Russia, Ukraine, Europe, NATO countries, and the rest of the world.

It is important to note that a national security strategy is not a completely finalized plan of action or a mandatory roadmap. It is the president’s vision of the key challenges that the White House considers to be facing the American people, including the priorities for addressing them. The President submits this document to Congress, which then decides which areas to prioritize for funding. However, the strategy is primarily a message to allies and adversaries. Each new administration adopts this document at the beginning of its term, enabling other countries’ policymakers to determine their expectations of the United States in the next few years and make adjustments to their own plans in response.

The 29-page document is written in Trumpian style. The preface is signed by Donald Trump and outlines his foreign policy achievements: ‘eight raging conflicts’ and diplomatic successes (p. i), all of which the U.S. president regularly mentions in his public speeches.

From the first lines, the document strongly criticizes all previous American administrations since the end of the Cold War. According to the text, ‘our elites badly miscalculated America’s willingness to shoulder forever global burdens to which the American people saw no connection to the national interest.’ (p. 1) By promoting the globalist agenda, allowing allies to ‘offload the cost of their defense onto the American people,’ (p. 1) and thus undermining the economic backbone of America’s power, they ended up weakening the U.S. In this context, Donald Trump’s two administrations are presented as a welcome exception. According to the authors, only under his leadership will America ‘make the right choices’ (p. 2).

In the section on U.S. relations with Europe, the authors heavily criticize America’s main allies. The document stresses that Europe’s share of global GDP is consistently declining; however, this is not the main concern. The main challenge is that, according to the NSS, Europe’s ‘real and more stark prospect of civilizational erasure’ (p. 25). Transnational structures such as the European Union are undermining the sovereignty of states. If this trend persists, within twenty years the continent will be ‘unrecognizable’ (p. 25). Furthermore, the document questions Europe’s ability to remain a reliable ally of the United States.

All of this, according to the document, results in Europe’s ‘lack of self-confidence’ (p. 25), which leads to its view of Russia as an existential threat. The logic of this conclusion is not explained in the 2025 NSS, but this thesis represents a fundamental difference between the new strategy and all previous ones, including the 2017 NSS authored by the first Trump administration. That document listed Russia, alongside China, Iran, and North Korea, as America’s major adversary and a ‘revisionist power’ (p. 25) trying to erode the status quo in the post-Soviet space.

Now the outlook has changed. Responsibility for the war in Ukraine is shifted onto Europe. The 2025 NSS argues that the conflict remains unresolved because Europe’s ‘unstable minority governments’ (p. 26) have unrealistic expectations, while the majority of EU citizens allegedly want peace. The swift ending of the Ukraine war is declared to be a key U.S. interest; in the authors’ view, this is what will help stabilize European economies and prevent escalation.

It is important to note that the strategy does not criticize Russia for starting the ongoing war. Furthermore, the improvement of relations with Moscow is actually given the same importance as maintaining relations with Europe. Naturally, the publication of this NSS has sent shockwaves through Europe. The official release of such documents could have significant destabilizing consequences. As German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated in his speech after the announcement of the 2025 NSS: ‘Probably, we will understand the fullness of what we are experiencing in the world only after many years. It’s not the ebb and flow of a good relationship. It’s almost a tectonic shift. We have been lagging behind for more than a decade. Decades of Pax Americana are over for us. Nostalgia won’t help. This is a fact! The Americans are now very aggressively defending their interests. And that’s why we now have to defend our own.

The Kremlin takes such statements quite seriously. The message is clear: the U.S. has no intention of defending Europe. Moreover, Europe is perceived as a burden, and the values that underpin the transatlantic alliance are seen as a source of irritation. The only factor that can prevent Putin from attacking Europe is the fear of defeat. Any signals that the United States will not aid its allies serve as a powerful incentive for him to escalate. It is particularly concerning that the 2025 NSS directly refers to support for far-right political parties in Europe, which, in general, oppose resistance to acts of external aggression, thereby benefiting Putin.

This is essentially a declaration of the end of the post-Cold War order, in both manner and content. Furthermore, it has been published at the worst possible moment. The Trump administration is practically proposing that Europe should negotiate with Putin on ‘strategic stability’ (p. 27), which in real terms means the capitulation not only of Ukraine, but of Europe as well. While the Americans are pondering the ideas of a domestic right-wing resurgence and processing their societal issues and political controversies, Putin is presented with a document that can be interpreted as a proposal to divide the world and a tacit agreement to the redivision of Europe. Previous patterns of Russian strategic behavior suggest that Vladimir Putin will pursue his agenda to the full extent of his capabilities. The 2025 NSS creates the impression that Russia is permitted to take any action in Europe.

To conclude, these strategies, like the NSS, are not intended as provocations. Their primary focus is on a domestic audience, and the external circumstances are often ignored. Nevertheless, in the context of war and instability, the 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States of America objectively becomes a form of provocation.