12/28/2025

Author: Yaroslav Snisarenko

On 5th December 2025, the Bundestag passed a reform on the new military service, pursuing the current trends that support the return of military drafts across Europe. In response to the scalating threat from Russia in Eastern Europe, the deteriorating position of Kyiv on the battlefield, and the United States’ gradual withdrawal from the European security sphere, the coalition government of Germany has implemented significant changes in its approach to the sensitive issue of military conscription. In doing so, the federal government of Germany demonstrated its firm commitment to the advancement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s defence and security efforts. Nevertheless, it also left behind numerous puzzles, including the SPD's seamless approval and lack of resistance while being one of the most prominent pacifist party in Europe. Since Kurt Schumacher's tenure, the SPD has historically emphasized military non-proliferation and critically seen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as from of servitude for allies, rather than Germany’s own political interest. Therefore, this article will investigate the nature of the SPD’s endorsement of the new military reform and its further implications for the security of Eastern Europe and NATO, with a reference to the latest Chancellor Merz speech on the end of the Pax- Americana epoch in Europe.

Mystery behind Military Draft Adoption

As previously stated, SPD's identity is intricately defined by its perception of the North Atlantic Treaty organization and the general topic of militarization of Germany as a longstanding domestic concern. Despite the magnitude surrounded by the reform of volunteer draft, it is important to understand the junior partner's rhetorical shift in another Große Koalition which provides a much more thorough assessment of the fundamental changes within the SPD and the future of the party system in Germany itself. The CDU/СSU, despite their similar pacifist rhetoric, were more inclined to cooperate with the Western multilateral community, a trait that was not present in the SPD during the Cold War. For example, during the vote for the European Defence Community, the majority of SPD members categorically opposed the decision to join the community despite the overall confidence for it (Kanter, 1970). Similar to other European Community members, the SPD, following the conclusion of the Cold War, expressed strong opposition to the war in Iraq and the very idea of deployment of German soldiers in Afghanistan as part of the NATO mission (Hooper, 2002; Dunham, 2010).

The manifesto of several prominent SPD figures, which was entirely at odds with the CDU/CSU coalition agreement, was likely the most significant aspect of debate over military reforms and garnered significant attention within Germany public and political circles. Boris Pistorius, the Defence Minister and a SPD member, was particularly affected by this unexpected blow, as he is responsible for the coalition's trust relationships (Hebestreit, 2025).

The manifesto itself touches upon the danger of a potential arms race in Europe, as well as the negative consequences of rearmament and the need for a resumption of dialogue with the Russian Federation (Stegner, 2025). The final voting outcome was largely unaffected by the manifesto, which was authored by influential SPD members and former active supporters, despite the outrage it elicited. This suggests that over 90% of the MPs voted in favour of the reform with final result 323 to 272 with one abstention (Connolly, 2025). This may suggest a fundamental change within the new SPD and further fragmentation of the left-wing electorate in Germany. In response to the failures under the Scholz Chancellorship, Boris Pistorius has likely taken steps to assume command of the party and establish a strong foundation for it new design, with additional compromises between the new SPD and the CDU/CSU. Another perspective was expressed by Hans Kundnani (2025) who claimed that despite sceptics over the strength of this Coalition, both parties fear that they will do worse in next elections and this keeps them together on sensitive issues. These two factors establish the groundwork for novel perspectives on SPD security involvement, as leftist parties with young electorate such as Die Linke, Die Grünen and BSW vehemently opposed reform and militarization efforts.

Security in Europe and End of Pax Americana

With the presidency of Donald Trump, the alliance’s increasingly important role in defending its eastern flank is in the fate of being passed on to Germany. Friedrich Merz emphasized this in his recent remarkable speech about the end of Pax Americana and the Atlantic alliance that was in the past (Zdanowski, 2025). Although negotiations are ongoing, it is exceedingly challenging to evaluate the efficacy of providing Baltic States and Finland with compensation for the United States’; military presence in exchange for German investments in the military industry and armed forces in the East as well as the role of Poland in new updated scheme, which involves close cooperation with Germany on information that is available (Tilles, 2025). It would be premature to assume that the Bundestag’s current measures will be sufficient to fulfill such a comprehensive mission, as it is impossible to do so without the involvement of other partners, given the current state of Germany. This also applies to the opposition of other partners, such as Portugal and Spain, which have already received criticism from Trump for not adhering to NATO's budgetary commitments and military draft neglect.

Furthermore, despite the general tendency to see Europe, especially Central and Eastern Europe, as part of the proclaimed Merz Doctrine, like any doctrine, it should have its further imprint on the country’s foreign policy in the future (Cliffe and Puglierin, 2024). The current political struggle is not in favour of either the CDU or the JPD when it comes to preserving anything at stake in NATO’s survival. The world is undergoing a radical and dynamic transformation unparalleled in its history. The final determination will be made over the next three years whether the recent revisions to the SPD and CDU represent a new paradigm for the preservation of peace and security in Europe, or is it was a strategy of failure from the very beginning.