Author: Maciej Dachowski

As public debate in Poland increasingly focuses on the fact that Warsaw has been invited to participate in the G20 summit in 2026, an essential part of the context risks being overlooked. Poland is not the only non-member state invited to the table. In parallel, the United States has formally extended invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the same summit as guests, following direct contacts between President Donald Trump and the leaders of both countries.[1] This simultaneity is not incidental. It is central to understanding the logic behind the 2026 G20 outreach.

Rather than viewing the G20 primarily as a marker of national success, it is analytically more accurate to see it as an instrument of selection. The current U.S. approach suggests a shift away from status and formal membership toward functional relevance, defined by economic scale, political reliability and strategic utility within an increasingly fragmented global system.[2] Read this way, Poland’s invitation gains meaning not in isolation, but through comparison.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not symbolic additions to the G20 guest list. Both countries occupy a pivotal position in Eurasian connectivity, energy transit and access to critical raw materials, and both play an increasingly important role in the geopolitical balance across the space linking East Asia and Europe. From a Polish perspective, these are states that should be located within the closest circle of strategic interest, independently of the prestige associated with the G20 format itself.

Seen in this light, the key question is not simply what participation in the G20 means for Poland. It is why Poland has been grouped together with these specific Central Asian states, and what this constellation reveals about the evolving criteria of relevance in global governance. The invitations extended by President Trump to the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should therefore be read not as gestures of regional diplomacy, but as indicators of a broader recalibration in how systemic importance is assessed.[1]

What gives this moment its particular weight is the convergence of these invitations. This reflects a deeper structural shift in global governance, in which states that contribute to resilience, connectivity and security are selectively included even if they remain outside formal membership. In this configuration, the G20 functions less as a club of status and more as a mechanism for identifying actors with functional importance in an increasingly fragmented international system.

From Strategic Hinterland to Geopolitical Interface

The transformation of Central Asia should not be understood as a sudden “return” to global politics. For much of the past two decades, the region was already present in international strategic calculations, most notably after 2001, when it became a critical logistical and operational rear area for U.S. and NATO activities in Afghanistan. Its importance, however, was largely instrumental. Central Asia functioned as a support space for external strategies rather than as an actor with independent systemic weight.

In the post–Cold War period, the region’s international relevance was primarily derivative. Its position was shaped by relations with Moscow and, increasingly over time, with Beijing. Western engagement tended to be episodic and reactive, driven by specific security agendas rather than by a coherent long-term vision of Central Asia’s role in the international system.[3] This perception is now changing, and the change is structural rather than cyclical.

What distinguishes the current phase is a gradual shift from the logic of “rear area” to that of “connector” and “intermediary”. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan increasingly operate as linking nodes between economic and political systems that no longer fully trust one another. The region is no longer merely a corridor through which external interests pass. It is becoming a space where those interests must be balanced, negotiated, and reconciled.

In practical terms, this means the growing relevance of routes connecting China and Europe while bypassing Russia, the integration of resource-producing regions with industrial markets under conditions of strategic uncertainty, and the provision of alternatives in a global system that is rapidly losing redundancy. This is not a tactical adjustment. It represents a durable redefinition of Central Asia’s function within Eurasia. The region is no longer just a transit zone. Increasingly, it is a zone of negotiation.

Three forces underpin this shift. First, the disruption of global supply chains following the COVID-19 pandemic and the intensification of geopolitical rivalry have elevated diversification from a commercial preference to a strategic necessity. Alternative Eurasian corridors, most notably the Trans-Caspian route linking Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Turkey, and the European Union, have moved from technical discussion into the core of strategic planning.[4]

Second, accelerated competition for critical raw materials such as rare earth elements, uranium, and lithium has placed Central Asia firmly on the radar of Western, Asian, and Middle Eastern capitals, beyond its traditional role as an energy transit space.[5]

Third, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has constrained Moscow’s ability to function as the uncontested security and economic reference point for the region. This does not imply the disappearance of Russian influence, but it has created additional room for manoeuvre, greater autonomy, and more explicitly multi-vector foreign policies among Central Asian states.[6]

As a result, Central Asia is no longer merely an extension of external strategic designs. It is increasingly a region whose significance derives from its own position within global networks of trade, resources, and security.

External Powers and the New Geometry of Influence

The rising strategic weight of Central Asia is reflected in the proliferation of multilateral engagement formats involving external powers. China, Russia, the United States and the European Union have all moved to institutionalise relations with the region, though with different priorities and instruments. Taken together, these formats reveal not a struggle for dominance, but a new geometry of influence.

China has moved fastest and most decisively. The China–Central Asia format known as CA5 was inaugurated at the first ever leaders’ summit in Xi’an in May 2023 and consolidated at the second summit in Astana in June 2025.[7] What began as Belt and Road–adjacent diplomacy has evolved into a standing mechanism for political coordination, infrastructure planning and economic security. For Beijing, Central Asia is no longer merely a corridor to Europe. It has become an integral component of China’s broader economic security architecture, linking access to energy and minerals with stable overland routes and long-term political influence.

Russia continues to treat Central Asia as a core interest, but under increasingly constrained conditions. Through the Russia–Central Asia Five format, most recently convened at a leaders’ meeting in Dushanbe in 2025, Moscow has sought to reaffirm cooperation on trade, labour migration and security.[8] Yet the strategic meaning of this engagement has changed. Russia remains present, but it is no longer singular. Sanctions, military commitments and diplomatic overstretch have reduced its capacity to dominate regional agendas, while Central Asian states have become more assertive in diversifying partnerships.[9]

The United States has adopted a different approach. Its primary vehicle for engagement, the C5+1 format launched in 2015, gained renewed prominence with a leader-level meeting at the White House in November 2025.[10] Rather than seeking dominance, Washington has focused on political recognition and selective engagement, framing Central Asia as relevant to discussions on supply-chain resilience, critical minerals and energy security, without committing to a heavy regional footprint.[11]

The European Union has also elevated its engagement. The first EU–Central Asia Summit took place in Samarkand in Uzbekistan on 3–4 April 2025.[12] The summit marked a qualitative shift from ministerial dialogue toward leader-level political signalling and framed Central Asia as a strategic partner region for the EU. At the same time, it exposed a persistent EU challenge. While the Union offers regulatory power and investment instruments, it often struggles to match the political visibility and strategic coherence of other external actors.[13]

Taken together, these formats do not integrate Central Asia into a single order. They anchor it simultaneously in several overlapping orders that increasingly hedge against one another. Central Asia is no longer being absorbed. It is being courted.

The G20 Moment and the Era of Middle Powers

Against this backdrop, the invitation of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Poland to the 2026 G20 summit should be understood primarily as political selection rather than as a policy pivot. Inviting non-member states has long been part of G20 practice, but its function has evolved. Outreach increasingly serves to recognise actors whose systemic relevance exceeds their formal institutional status.[14]

The selective nature of this process is further underscored by the reported absence of South Africa, a formal G20 member, from the 2026 summit. According to public statements by the U.S. administration, Pretoria is not expected to receive an invitation to Miami. This would mark the first such case in the history of the G20 and has already generated diplomatic friction. The significance of this precedent goes beyond bilateral tensions. It signals that even formal membership no longer guarantees participation, reinforcing the shift from status-based inclusion toward political and functional selection.[15]

For the Global South more broadly, the case of South Africa also highlights a wider tension. As a leading member of BRICS, Pretoria’s reported exclusion illustrates how alternative platforms increasingly operate in parallel to, rather than within, Western-led governance forums. This reflects a fragmentation in which middle powers navigate multiple, partially overlapping orders rather than a single, universal system.[16]

Central Asia’s growing visibility fits squarely within this logic. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are positioning themselves as indispensable nodes rather than passive objects. Poland’s elevation follows the same logic.

Europe, Poland and Strategic Responsibility

Europe still often operates on the assumption that its international position is secured by institutions, procedures and shared declarations. In practice, however, influence in many regions is shaped less by formal alignment and more by the ability to act under pressure: to provide security, keep trade routes functioning and ensure access to critical resources during periods of disruption. Where effectiveness matters more than affiliation, traditional European modes of engagement are increasingly misaligned with the realities on the ground.

In this context, Poland’s role should be understood not as a challenge to the European Union, but as a possible extension of its capacity to act. Since 2022, Poland has operated under conditions of direct geopolitical exposure. Energy shocks, security risks and the rapid reorientation of trade and logistics have not been abstract policy debates, but concrete strategic constraints. This experience has created a set of capabilities and instincts that are directly relevant to how influence is exercised in today’s fragmented international environment.

These conditions help explain why Poland should approach Central Asia not as a distant development arena, but as part of a broader Eurasian space in which disruptions travel quickly and insulation is often illusory. Transport corridors, critical raw materials and energy security are not secondary policy issues in the region, but central elements of statecraft with immediate implications for Europe as well.

Such a perspective points to a more substantive Polish role within European policy. This would not involve substituting for the European Union, but operating alongside it by translating shared priorities into practical engagement and by feeding a more grounded assessment of regional dynamics back into Brussels. In this sense, Poland’s value lies less in representation and more in operational relevance.

Against this backdrop, the G20 summit in Miami should be seen not as a diplomatic endpoint, but as a moment of selection and expectation. The presence of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at the G20 table confirms Central Asia’s shift from being primarily an object of external strategies to becoming a participant in global economic and security discussions. Poland’s inclusion follows the same logic and carries similar expectations.

For Poland, this implies a change in the nature of its international presence: from recognition expressed through access to prestigious forums to responsibility for contributing to stability and outcomes. In a global order without automatic guarantees and without a single centre willing or able to enforce rules, influence accrues to states capable of connecting systems, absorbing shocks and stabilising their surroundings through their own actions. The period leading up to the G20 summit should therefore be treated as an opportunity to define how Poland intends to fulfil this role in practice. The question is no longer whether Poland will be present at the table, but whether it will use that presence to establish a durable and recognisable political role.

Endnotes

[1] Reuters, Trump says he invited Kazakh, Uzbek leaders to G20 summit next year, 23 December 2025.
https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-says-he-invited-kazakh-uzbek-leaders-g20-summit-next-year-2025-12-23/

[2] Notes from Poland, US invites Poland to take its “rightful place” at next year’s G20 summit, 4 December 2025.
https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/12/04/us-invites-poland-to-take-its-rightful-place-at-next-years-g20-summit/

[3] Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, Oxford University Press, 2019.

[4] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, 2023.

[5] International Energy Agency, Critical Minerals Market Review, 2024.

[6] Mark Galeotti, Russia’s Wars and the Limits of Power, Foreign Affairs, 2023.

[7] Xinhua, China and Central Asia Leaders Hold First Summit in Xi’an, 19 May 2023.

[8] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia–Central Asia Five Meeting in Dushanbe, 2025.

[9] Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Russia and Central Asia after Ukraine, 2024.

[10] The Diplomat, Washington Hosts Central Asian Leaders in C5+1 Format, November 2025.

[11] Centre for Strategic and International Studies, United States Central Asia Policy Update, 2025.

[12] European Council, First EU–Central Asia Summit, Samarkand, 3–4 April 2025.

[13] European Commission, EU–Central Asia Joint Declaration, 4 April 2025.

[14] John Kirton, G20 Governance and Outreach, Global Policy Journal, 2021.

[15] The Guardian, South Africa hits back after Trump signals exclusion from G20, 27 November 2025.

[16] Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders, Yale University Press, 2017.