Wargaming and Simulations

The speeches on the first day of the general debate of the UN General Assembly produced a fairly coherent diagnosis, but no shared remedy. UN Secretary-General António Guterres spoke of four challenges linked to the exercise of power, namely war, inequality, climate change and artificial intelligence.

As the Pentagon reviews the US military presence in Europe and allied capitals assess its possible consequences, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her September State of the Union address to present two initiatives that go notably beyond the existing repertoire of EU external policy: an offer of associate member status to Canada and a proposal for a European Security Council.

On 7 September 2026 an agreement was signed in Kabul that in ordinary circumstances would have been trade press news at most. The Saudi Delta group agreed with the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum to explore for oil and gas in the west of the country, in Herat province, on the border with Iran and Turkmenistan.

The Duma elections scheduled for September 18–20 are less a democratic exercise than an indirect indicator of the direction in which the Russian authoritarian regime is heading. The results of this quasi-electoral process will make it possible to assess how effectively the Kremlin can maintain a veneer of stability amidst mounting losses on the front lines, internal elite infighting over the seizure of assets, and a social contract that—since 2000—has been redefined three times and gradually stripped of any substance that might positively impact the lives of ordinary citizens.

Since 2022, Russia has systematically attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The first wave of strikes targeted substations, cutting off power distribution; the second hits generating capacity directly. According to data cited by BGK, Ukraine has lost around 70% of its pre-war generating capacity, while gas production fell by around 40% in 2025. The aim of this energy terrorism remains to paralyse the economy and break the will to resist – not only through the hardships caused by restricted access to electricity, water and heating, but through conditions that directly endanger civilians' lives, especially in winter.

On 1 September 2026 Bishkek hosted seventeen heads of state and government at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the twenty-sixth in its history, convened on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the organisation's founding. The host, Kyrgyzstan, which had just ended its year-long chairmanship, had a few weeks earlier been elected a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2027 and 2028, while in the same election Germany lost the seat reserved for the Western group.

A few days before the first summit of the Carpathian Integration Initiative, scheduled for September 2026 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, Warsaw still does not know whom it will send. Volodymyr Zelensky has invited representatives of seven states of the region to the summit, Poland among them, he is steering the project personally, some leaders have already confirmed their attendance and more than five hundred business representatives are expected on site, and yet Poland's decision on the level of its representation still has not been taken.

Iran emerges from the war with Israel and the US strengthened, regardless of the costs it has incurred. Unless a permanent collapse in negotiations occurs, it can recover its losses very quickly, and given its potential, it has a chance of becoming one of the world's largest economies within a few years. Crucial in this context is not the nuclear issue, but the high-stakes game over the Strait of Hormuz.

What do Poland and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have in common? Despite the distance between the two and the fact that they are representative of and stand as the most successful nations economically, politically and militarily in their respective regions of the world, despite the two nations being the products of two entirely different cultures, the answer to that question of what they have in common is “a great deal.”

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism was created as a tool for fast, targeted assistance between neighbours in response to events that exceed a single state's capacity to respond – from fires, floods and earthquakes to industrial accidents, chemical contamination or man-made disasters. The last two decades, and especially the events of recent years – the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine – have tested it in ways its architects never anticipated: not as a single, closed-ended event, but as a prolonged, multidimensional crisis with no clear end point.

In late March 2026, a month after the outbreak of the war with Iran, Volodymyr Zelensky toured Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Amman in three days. With Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan he signed defence cooperation agreements providing for joint investment, joint production and the sharing of experience and solutions in defence against missiles and unmanned aircraft.

In recent months we have been witnessing a very significant shift in international relations. What is changing is the way states build their position in the international system. A growing number of middle powers no longer organise their entire strategy around a single centre, nor do they treat relations with competing great powers as mutually exclusive.

Few countries have reversed course on energy policy as decisively as Sweden. In the space of just a few years, the country has moved from planning the gradual phase-out of nuclear power to placing it at the centre of its long-term energy strategy.

The reality of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, rising defense spending across Europe, and the Benelux countries’ commitment to strengthening EU capabilities (particularly in the context of expanding the defense industrial base and scientific research, as well as cross-border military projects), have made these countries a valuable direction for Poland in the coming years for developing new forms of cooperation and investment, as well as a point of reference and an opportunity to mutually benefit from best practices and experience.

On June 13, Yoon Suk Yeol, the former president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), was sentenced to two years in prison after being found ‌guilty of illegally receiving opinion polling services worth $179,800 for free from a political broker. Just four days earlier, on June 9, ROK Supreme Court upheld his seven-year prison ‌sentence for obstructing authorities attempts to arrest him over his short-lived imposition of martial law in 2024.

The summit in Ankara will deliver contracts, memoranda, and letters of intent, yet it will not clarify what Europe lacks most acutely — its own answer to the question of the long-term direction of the transformation being undertaken. At the root of the contemporary identity crisis lies not a deficit of financial resources but the absence of a shared European strategic culture, which Ankara may throw into particularly sharp relief, proving that material rearmament is outpacing the ability to define directions for joint action.

The information space has become one of the key dimensions of contemporary political and geopolitical rivalry. States, political organizations, media, and non-state actors increasingly compete not only for control over territory, resources, or military capabilities, but also for the ability to shape public perception, the interpretation of events, and citizens' trust in public institutions. As a result, information, and subsequently narratives, have become an essential element of state security and resilience of democratic societies.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has become a key European defence partner – and has achieved success in this regard to a level that was perhaps previously not thought possible.

Around a decade ago at the Singapore Air Show the executive of a major US defence company told me more than once “my best sales agents are the Chinese. Every time they make a public show of steaming their aircraft carrier out for sea trials or commit another one of their violations of some nation’s territorial waters or build up another one of their artificial islands – that’s when my phone starts ringing. Other nations in the region suddenly want to know how soon they could have some US-made military hardware, especially if they are EDA [Excess Defence Articles].”