Foreign Policy and European Integration

The Eastern Partnership enters its seventeenth year in 2026 at the confluence of several processes of fundamental importance for its future: the trajectories of the six partner states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – are diverging today more than ever – ranging from the opening of successive accession negotiation clusters, through new partnership frameworks, to the effective freezing of cooperation. Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to define the security conditions of the entire continent, while the erosion of the existing international order and the growing presence of China, Turkey and the Gulf states in the region are forcing the EU to revise its own approach to Eastern policy – an approach whose financial instruments will be defined in the ongoing negotiations, now entering a decisive phase, on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework for 2028–2034. The concept presented in the remainder of this document, together with recommendations for its implementation in the ongoing budget negotiations, is intended to enable the European Union to meet the challenges described above and to build with its Eastern neighbours a lasting partnership, based on mutual benefit and capable of strengthening the security of the whole continent.

During this year’s Warsaw Security Forum, taking place in Warsaw on 12–13 October, experts will discuss the evolving relationship between North Korea, China and Russia during the roundtable “The North Korea–China–Russia Axis: Myth or Reality?”

On 22nd September, in her speech at the United Nations General Assembly (UN GA) the Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi - as the first Japanese leader since 2005 - urged the removal of the ‘enemy state’ clause from the UN Charter. The provision was included in the UN's founding document to denote nations that fought against the Charter’s original signatories during World War II, specifically targeting Axis powers such as Germany, Italy and Japan. Although over eight decades have passed since the end of the conflict and the ‘enemy states’ are well-functioning democracies, the clause remains in its original form. Moreover, in 1995 the UN GA adopted a resolution stipulating it had ‘become obsolete’ and called for its erasure from the Charter.

According to Finnish media reports, the United Kingdom has proposed extending a nuclear umbrella over the members of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Apart from France and the United States, the UK is the only NATO member possessing its own nuclear capability. The initiative arose in response to declining faith in the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Poland's participation in the format would make sense if it were covered by the initiative's nuclear deterrence.

On 16 September, in her State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that she wanted to work on opening the way for Canada to become the first “associate member” of the European Union. Such a status is not provided for in the treaties, its content has yet to be worked out, and, according to media reports, the member states had not been informed of the idea beforehand.

The three-day Donald Trump–Xi Jinping summit, held on 23–25 September 2026, has been widely described as rich in ceremony but poor in substance. The leaders of the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) failed to achieve a breakthrough on any of the major international disputes currently at stake, nor did they announce any significant new initiatives.

On March 12, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) legislature adopted the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (民族团结进步促进法). The adoption of the law took place during the annual Lianghui, or (两会), meaning the “two sessions,” or the annual plenary meetings of China’s top legislative and political advisory bodies. These are the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The agreement concluded between the Kurds and the government of Ahmed al-Sharaa is very good news, creating an opportunity for Syria’s stabilization. Its key element is Mazlum Abdi’s announced dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a separate formation and the integration of their structures into the Syrian government forces in an organized manner, through the creation of five new brigades based on the SDF. The agreement is also in Europe’s interest, as its effective implementation would reduce the risk of migration pressure and an elevated terrorist threat.

The address of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was played from a recording, because his delegation had been denied US visas. Abbas spoke of a genocidal war in Gaza, warned that the very existence of the Palestinian people is now under threat, and appealed to Donald Trump to honour his commitment to prevent the annexation of Palestinian land.

The first day of the debate produced a shared diagnosis of a collapsing order. The second produced a dispute over whether the UN is worth repairing at all. Rwandan Prime Minister Justin Nsengiyumva said that the Organization is better at responding to crises than at preventing them, and that institutions earn legitimacy through results rather than promises.

The speeches on the first day of the general debate of the UN General Assembly produced a fairly coherent diagnosis, but no shared remedy. UN Secretary-General António Guterres spoke of four challenges linked to the exercise of power, namely war, inequality, climate change and artificial intelligence.

As the Pentagon reviews the US military presence in Europe and allied capitals assess its possible consequences, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her September State of the Union address to present two initiatives that go notably beyond the existing repertoire of EU external policy: an offer of associate member status to Canada and a proposal for a European Security Council.

On Sunday, September 13th, parliamentary, regional council, and municipal council elections were held in Sweden, with nearly 85% of eligible citizens taking part.

On 7 September 2026 an agreement was signed in Kabul that in ordinary circumstances would have been trade press news at most. The Saudi Delta group agreed with the Taliban Ministry of Mines and Petroleum to explore for oil and gas in the west of the country, in Herat province, on the border with Iran and Turkmenistan.

The Duma elections scheduled for September 18–20 are less a democratic exercise than an indirect indicator of the direction in which the Russian authoritarian regime is heading. The results of this quasi-electoral process will make it possible to assess how effectively the Kremlin can maintain a veneer of stability amidst mounting losses on the front lines, internal elite infighting over the seizure of assets, and a social contract that—since 2000—has been redefined three times and gradually stripped of any substance that might positively impact the lives of ordinary citizens.

Since 2022, Russia has systematically attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The first wave of strikes targeted substations, cutting off power distribution; the second hits generating capacity directly. According to data cited by BGK, Ukraine has lost around 70% of its pre-war generating capacity, while gas production fell by around 40% in 2025. The aim of this energy terrorism remains to paralyse the economy and break the will to resist – not only through the hardships caused by restricted access to electricity, water and heating, but through conditions that directly endanger civilians' lives, especially in winter.

On 1 September 2026 Bishkek hosted seventeen heads of state and government at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the twenty-sixth in its history, convened on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the organisation's founding. The host, Kyrgyzstan, which had just ended its year-long chairmanship, had a few weeks earlier been elected a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2027 and 2028, while in the same election Germany lost the seat reserved for the Western group.

A few days before the first summit of the Carpathian Integration Initiative, scheduled for September 2026 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, Warsaw still does not know whom it will send. Volodymyr Zelensky has invited representatives of seven states of the region to the summit, Poland among them, he is steering the project personally, some leaders have already confirmed their attendance and more than five hundred business representatives are expected on site, and yet Poland's decision on the level of its representation still has not been taken.

Iran emerges from the war with Israel and the US strengthened, regardless of the costs it has incurred. Unless a permanent collapse in negotiations occurs, it can recover its losses very quickly, and given its potential, it has a chance of becoming one of the world's largest economies within a few years. Crucial in this context is not the nuclear issue, but the high-stakes game over the Strait of Hormuz.

What do Poland and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have in common? Despite the distance between the two and the fact that they are representative of and stand as the most successful nations economically, politically and militarily in their respective regions of the world, despite the two nations being the products of two entirely different cultures, the answer to that question of what they have in common is “a great deal.”