Author: Karolina Pawlik

Energy security in the Arctic constitutes a multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing a wide array of concerns, including political, security, socio-economic, technological and identity dimensions. It involves questions of land ownership, the rights of stakeholders, pristine nature, and re-industrialisation delineated through green technologies. Most critically, it demonstrates the continuous human presence and habitation in one of the most challenging and demanding landscapes on Earth. This succinct article will illustrate the intricacies of energy security in the Arctic by utilising one basic tenet of framing analysis, i.e. framing as a tool for organising and sorting reality. The geographical scope is limited to the European Arctic, sometimes referred to as the High North. 

Frame 1 – The long battle for Melkøya’s electrification

Norway’s only LNG terminal processes around 6.5 bcm per annum (to put it into a Polish reader’s perspective that is an equivalent of almost ⅓ of all the gas used in Poland annually). At the same time, this significant contribution to energy supply comes with a substantial environmental cost, as the facility on Melkøya, near Hammerfest, is Norway’s third-largest CO₂ emitter, responsible for 1.5–2% of the country’s total emissions. In order to cut emissions, the government decided to electrify the LNG terminal, which is currently powered by gas, hence the emissions. However, its location in the region of Finnmark, which has a sparse distribution of the transmission grid and a deficit of energy production, meant that both the grid connection and power generation had to be built. The power will come from new onshore wind projects. 

However, there is a strong anti-wind movement in Norway (known as motvind bevegelse), which is opposed to the construction of wind turbines. Seven out of 10 inhabitants of Finnmark (the outermost county of Norway) are against the electrification of Melkøya.  As researchers have argued, the main reasons for such a stark opposition to this type of renewable energy can be predominately motivated by environmental concerns and issues of distributional and procedural justice.  There has been an almost unequivocal opposition to the project from the indigenous people of the High North – the Sámi, who emphasise they have not been properly consulted on the project and its impact on their way of life.

The lack of agreement between onshore wind developers and local communities (including indigenous peoples) has resulted in an investment deadlock, threatening the economic prospects for Norway’s two outermost northern countries – Troms and Finnmark, which need both electricity production and transmission expansion as the current grid is insufficient to meet electricity demand at all times. The government’s strategic plans aim to attract new businesses by ensuring affordable energy access, thereby sustaining a substantial population in the High North, in response to recent years’ increasing southward migration driven primarily by better educational and employment opportunities.

At the end of January, the discussion about electrification of Melkøya took a dramatic turn, as one of the parties in parliament – Rødt (Red, a left-wing party) proposed to free the grid connection capacity reserved for Melkøya and release 350 MW in the grid  for other businesses in Finnmark. This proposal has garnered support across the political spectrum, including Frp, Sp, SV, MDG, and KrF parties, thereby creating a parliamentary majority in the Storting capable of obstructing the project. As an alternative to electrification, opposition parties advocated for investments in carbon capture and storage as well as offshore wind energy. 

This initiative has been strongly criticised by representatives of the business community, with the head of the employers’ association, NHO, arguing that it undermines trust in the state and could adversely affect the future of small and medium-sized enterprises in the High North that depend on contracts with the LNG facility. The primary rationale for pursuing electrification in the first place was to ensure the continued operation of Melkøya, which, under Norway’s climate targets, would otherwise be required to cease operations by 2030. The facility is an important element of Norway’s gas sector and an important employer in Finnmark, providing around 1400 jobs both directly and indirectly. As some researchers have argued, the continuity of the oil and gas sectors is perceived through the sovereignty lens; going as far as stating that sovereignty is a derivative of security and has an impact on the slower pace of energy transition.

The political controversy surrounding the project – an unusual development in the traditionally consensus-oriented landscape of Norwegian politics- has concluded in a surprising and abrupt manner, as the left-wing SV (Socialist Left) ultimately withdrew its support for the opposition’s proposal. The party has argued that voting against the project at this stage would not prevent the expansion of wind power developments; on the contrary it would  expand the reliance on gas to power the facility and ultimately risk sustaining or even increasing emissions.

To conclude, Melkøya epitomises the broader and highly complex debate surrounding energy security and the future of energy production in the High North. The case demonstrates that a single infrastructure project with far-reaching economic, societal and political implications cannot be assessed solely through a narrow economic cost–benefit framework; rather, it must also incorporate environmental considerations, the concerns of rightholders, and the expectations of local communities.

Frame 2 – Kiruna’s mining legacy continues in the world poised by resource rivalry

China currently occupies a dominant position in the global rare earth elements market and supply chains, leaving Europe heavily exposed, with dependence reaching approximately 98%. In an era in which economic interdependencies are increasingly weaponized and leveraged for geopolitical pressure, such reliance places the European Union in a structurally vulnerable position. Against this backdrop, the 2023 announcement by LKAB that it had discovered Europe’s largest known deposit of rare earth elements was widely perceived as a strategic breakthrough. Rare earth elements are indispensable for the development of key green industries, including electric vehicle production and wind turbine manufacturing, as well as for the defence sector. However, there are two obstacles, albeit each of different nature, that impede the project’s commercial launch.

First, the proposed mine would directly affect the Sámi reindeer-herding community of Gabna Sameby, which has already experienced significant pressure and disruption due to the long-standing iron ore mining operations in Kiruna. The new rare earth element deposit, known as Per Geijer deposit, would have irreversible consequences for reindeer herding by cutting the settlement from reindeer migration routes. Due to the lack of a compromise between the company and the Sami community, an agreement that has been in place between the two parties since 2013 came to an end in late 2025.

Second, the project must demonstrate economic viability. Although the current Swedish government has expressed its support, licensing and permitting procedures remain extensive and time-consuming. LKAB submitted its applications for the necessary permits in mid-2023 and continues to await regulatory decisions. Beyond these administrative hurdles, however, the long-term feasibility of the Per Geijer deposit depends on broader market and structural conditions.

At present, the extraction of rare earth elements is not economically viable at prevailing global prices, which are significantly influenced by China’s dominant-near-monopolistic position in the sector. The commercial logic of the project is therefore closely tied to the continued operation of the mine in Kiruna, as the co-extraction of phosphorus could improve overall profitability and reduce production costs. Moreover, maximising value from rare earth elements requires integration across the supply chain, including mining, refining, and metal production. In this context, LKAB has announced plans to establish an industrial park in Luleå to process both phosphorus and rare earth elements domestically, thereby capturing greater added value and strengthening Europe’s strategic position within critical raw materials supply chains. 

Frame 3 – Lapland: a future hub energy transition hub?

Finnish Lapland holds significant potential to emerge as a green energy hub, not only for Finland but also for neighbouring states. Owing to its low population density and relative abundance of available land, Finnish researchers argue that the region could assume a central role in large-scale wind power generation while also developing into a production centre for e-fuels and e-chemicals. Such a trajectory would likely attract investment from energy-intensive industries, including steelmaking and chemical production, seeking access to stable and competitively priced renewable energy.

At present, power generation in Lapland is predominantly based on hydropower and onshore wind. The region ranks as Finland’s second most active province in onshore wind development, both in terms of the number of projects and projected installed capacity. However, neither of the strategic documents of the Finnish government pertaining to either climate and energy or Arctic policy does explicitly mention Finland’s potential as an energy hub. The former document alludes to Finland’s increasing importance as a location for battery factories. Scholars contend that Finland’s Arctic policy would benefit from strategic coherence and a greater emphasis on renewable energy and energy system development. 

Thus far, policy attention and investment have focused on battery-related projects and digital infrastructure. These include the development of Finland’s first lithium mine in Kaustinen, in western Finland (south of the Finnish Arctic), and new data centres. Such investments are expected to contribute to reducing Europe’s dependence on China with regard to lithium supply and to support the broader expansion of battery and clean technology manufacturing within Europe.

Conclusion

A recurrent challenge that has meandered through all the frames concerns the salience of  public consultations surrounding large-scale and economically significant projects, particularly in relation to local rightholders and communities who will bear the disproportionate share of their consequences. Consultation and stakeholder engagement cannot be reduced to perfunctory or procedural exercises; they should lead to a meaningful and sustained dialogue. Circumventing procedures in thai regard, can have adverse outcomes for these investment projects, including delays, cancellations, and protracted appeals before national and European courts, including the European Court of Human Rights. As highlighted by experts during panel discussions at the Arctic Frontiers conference, greater emphasis should be placed on principles of restorative justice and on developing more inclusive and innovative forms of engagement. Solutions could include institutionalised consultative bodies, better coordination of investment priorities by local and national authorities and the involvement of scientists and academics who can provide evidence-based, non-biased information and expertise  leading to a less emotionally driven discussion. 

One aspect that has been absent from this paper and which is perhaps a reflection of the shortcomings of the wider discussion on energy security is the issue of climate change. At the Arctic Frontiers conference, the scientific community was adamant about limiting global temperature rise by every possible decimal of a degree, emphasising that even marginal reductions are consequential in a pristine yet fragile environment already undergoing profound transformation. Nevertheless, dominant narratives surrounding Arctic energy security continue to prioritise technological innovation and economic competitiveness, without properly considering  mitigation and adaptation measures. 

Disclaimer: The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Warsaw facilitated the study visit to the Arctic Frontiers Conference. 

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