Author: Zuzanna Kowzan

On June 13, Yoon Suk Yeol, the former president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), was sentenced to two years in prison after being found ‌guilty of illegally receiving opinion polling services worth $179,800 for free from a political broker . Just four days earlier, on June 9, ROK Supreme Court upheld his seven-year prison ‌sentence for obstructing authorities’ attempts to arrest him over his short-lived imposition of martial law in 2024 . There was also a North Korean accent to this court drama. On June 12, Yoon was sentenced for 30 years in prison for ordering a military drones’ incursion over North Korea to create a pretext for the ⁠martial law declaration . While all these verdicts pale in comparison to life imprisonment that was handed down to Yoon in February 19 on charges of masterminding an insurrection ⁠tied to his martial law declaration, this is not the end of the court saga for the former president as he is expected to face several other trials . However, the current spree of court verdicts should not obscure who actually made the president accountable for his deeds first: the Korean citizens who protested in the streets of Korean cities not only on the night of the declaration of the martial law, but also later, until the politicians on the both sides of the isle took notice of the public opinion outrage.

It all began with a single decision made late in the evening on December 3, 2024. The then-president decided to declare martial law overnight. Yoon explained his decision as necessary to defend the state against “anti-state forces.” Critics saw it differently – in their view, martial law was primarily intended to break the political deadlock and salvage the president’s weakening position. The fact was, that on the evening December 3, armored personnel carriers took to the streets of Seoul and blocked the access to the parliament. In many countries, a similar crisis could have led to an eruption of violence or the military consolidating power. In the ROK, however, non-violent mass protests became a key element of the political crisis. Demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people first helped the parliamentarians to reach the House and to stop the martial law, and later put pressure on the MPs and influenced the public debate to eventually allow the legal action to be taken against the president (as initially, the ruling government intended to wait out the outrage). Only after several ruling party lawmakers distanced themselves from Yoon in response to growing public backlash did the National Assembly obtain the majority needed to vote on his impeachment . Ultimately, the conflict shifted from the streets to state institutions, and the Constitutional Court removed Yoon Suk Yeol from the office.

The most interesting part of the story is that Yoon’s case was not the first one in modern Korean history. In the 21st century, South Korea has already experienced three cases of impeachment: the most recent in 2025, the previous in 2016 and the first one in 2004. And in each case it was the public that pressured the eventual course of the events.

2016 was a very good example. Then president, Park Geun-hye, was the first woman in Korean history to be elected for this role. Some claim that Park owed her electoral success to her father, whose name helped to publicize her candidacy. But Park quickly proved that her strong character and ideas for the country’s development in troubled times contributed much more to her victory. Thanks to a successful election campaign, she won an absolute majority in the parliament. She was the first political leader to achieve such a feat since Korea’s democratization.

But then things started to fall apart. According to media accusations, which later turned into official charges, Park was responsible for abuse of power, bribery, and extortion. However, the balance in the parliament protected her from immediate impeachment. As in Yoon’s case, Park Geun-hye’s party colleagues initially tried to ride out the crisis and were reluctant to support impeachment. The public, however, was not willing to wait.

The protests that ultimately led to President Park’s downfall resembled family picnics more than street riots. As they often continued in the evenings, sometimes at night even, they were dubbed the Candlelight Protests, emphasizing their peaceful nature. There wasn’t a shred of violence despite the millions of participants. The demonstrations were even attended by families with children – what marked a phenomenon of democratic transformation of once authoritarian ROK. The numbers of protesters grew week by week, and public pressure led some lawmakers from the ruling party to vote in favor of removing the president from office. After the National Assembly’s decision, the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the impeachment. The experts point out that although the court formally made the decision, it is hard to imagine such a course of events without protests involving millions of people.

Such a significant influence of public opinion is partly embedded in the Constitution itself, which takes a rather vague and general approach to defining what is actually “impeachable” and what is not. Article 65 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea states that: “In case the President, […] violated the Constitution or other Acts in the performance of official duties, the National Assembly may pass motions for their impeachment.” It does not specify exactly what constitutes the said “violation”, thus leaving room for debate, both within political parties and between the public and the government. The whole process is divided into three stages, with the parliament being a key decision-maker in the early stages: first, a simple majority of the 300 members of the National Assembly votes to initiate the procedure; second, the motion must be approved by ta 2/3 majority of the Assembly. Finally, the Constitutional Court decides whether to uphold or reject the impeachment motion. Both in the Yoon and in the Park case, initially the opposition trying to impeach the president did not have enough votes to be effective. In both cases, the protests made some members of the presidential party change their minds in the end.

But the influence of public opinion on government decisions does not imply only negative consequences for politicians. The best, though little-known, example of this is the impeachment of President Roh Moo Hyun. Or rather the fact that it ultimately did not take place. In March 2004, the opposition accused President Roh, among other things, of violating laws regarding the state’s neutrality during the election campaign. The president openly encouraged voters to support the Uri Party, which had been formed following the election. He declared that he would do everything within the law to help the party. For his political opponents, both on the other side of an aisle and within his own party ranks, these were sufficient grounds to file an impeachment motion, which the National Assembly passed by a two-thirds majority. As a result, the president was suspended from office, and the case was referred to the Constitutional Court.

And here, the story takes an unexpected turn. Crowds took to the streets. But for the first time in history, the protesters were not demanding the president’s removal. They were demanding his return. Surveys conducted at the time showed that the public did not agree with the Assembly’s stance on the impeachment . After a thorough analysis of the charges (of which there were twenty-one in total), the Constitutional Court concluded that there were no grounds for impeachment. The Court ruled that the charges did not justify removing the president from office, and its decision was in line with the predominant public sentiment at the time. The Court, of course, condemned Roh’s actions, issuing warnings to him to remain apolitical even before the impeachment, but it found no grounds for the impeachment itself. The main arguments against impeachment were that the accusations against Roh were, by their nature, more political than legal, whereas the impeachment process should be legal, not political in nature. It was determined that President Roh’s actions did not disrupt the constitutional order and the impeachment itself would only plunge the country into chaos resulting from a sudden change in administration and early elections. Thus, it dismissed the impeachment motion and reinstated him to his position.

So, do the ROK presidents get removed by parliament? Formally, yes. Does the Constitutional Court make the final decision? Also yes. But the history of the last two decades shows that before lawmakers vote and judges issue a ruling, citizens often make their voices heard on the streets of Korean cities. In the Republic of Korea, citizens’ participation in democratic politics does not end on election day. Protests, demonstrations, and social mobilization have long been an important part of political life. That is why the answer to the question of who really decides the president’s fate is not as obvious as it might seem. Peaceful protests, democratic mobilization and demonstrations may have no legal power. And yet, the Republic of Korea’s history shows that they can change the course of the entire country’s politics.

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