Operacja Vivaldi

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Operation Vivaldi – Operational and Strategic Significance

Operation Vivaldi – Operational and Strategic Significance

November 16, 2026

Author: Jan Starosta

Operation Vivaldi – Operational and Strategic Significance

Operacja Vivaldi

Autor foto: Domena publiczna

Operation Vivaldi – Operational and Strategic Significance

Author: Jan Starosta

Published: November 16, 2026

The Russian attempt to pincer Sloviansk and Kramatorsk along with the Ukrainian fortress belt was aimed at capturing Donbas, thereby exposing the center of the country to a potential offensive. The Ukrainian counteroffensive—known as “Vivaldi”—eliminated the front-line salient north of Lyman. This represents an operational-level success with potential strategic consequences, demonstrating that the Ukrainians remain capable of conducting offensive operations in operational depth. However, it does not signify a seizure of the initiative by the Ukrainian side or a fundamental shift in the strategic situation.

Operational and Strategic Situation

In 2026, Russian offensive operations noticeably slowed compared to previous years. In the first six months of 2026, Russian troops captured or entered a gray zone covering approximately 623 square kilometers. In the same period in 2025, that figure was roughly 2,190 square kilometers. Thus, the Russians gained less than one-third of the territory captured in the first half of the previous year.[1] Moscow reiterates that the current goal of its war effort is to complete the conquest of Donbas; to achieve this, it needs to capture two major cities held by Ukrainian forces—Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. For many months, Russian forces have conducted operations aimed at trapping these cities in a massive pocket. Military objectives are accompanied by political ones—capturing the cities would conclude the conquest of Donbas, allowing the Russian side to declare victory. Ukrainian forces are determined to hold these cities because they are the key to the fortified terrain belt and represent the best defensive position protecting Kyiv and Dnipro. The loss of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk could lead to a return of operational-level maneuver warfare and another offensive toward Kyiv. The Russian forces executing the encirclement were intended to link up in the town of Barvinkove in Kharkiv Oblast.

Operationally, capturing Lyman was crucial for the Russian side to secure a starting area for an assault on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk and to support the enveloping maneuver from the north. The Russians had been advancing toward Lyman since 2025, when the 20th Combined Arms Army crossed the Chornyi Zherebets River. Since then, the 20th and 25th Armies have attempted to enter Lyman from the north and east. In the summer of 2026, an unsuccessful storming of the city was carried out; the 20th Army reached as far as the Oskil River, while the 25th Army became bogged down in heavy urban fighting.[2] At this point, Operation Vivaldi began, led by the Ukrainian 3rd Corps. By the end of July, the Russians had been almost completely pushed out of Lyman.

Operation Vivaldi

The primary objective of Operation Vivaldi was to eliminate the threat of encirclement around Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. The operation began in late May and lasted until nearly the end of October. The Ukrainian offensive was spearheaded by the 3rd Assault Brigade and the 66th Mechanized Brigade.[3] The assault was supported by two experienced drone brigades: the 20th Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Brigade “K2” and the 429th USF Brigade “Achilles.”

Ukrainian troops succeeded in seizing control of the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway. Pressure toward Lyman forced the redeployment of elements from the elite 1st Guards Tank Army, thereby relieving pressure on Kupiansk.[4] The Ukrainian push north of Lyman toward the village of Nove consisted of a main strike and a supporting attack designed to draw away Russian reserves.[5] As a result of the offensive, the Zelena Dolyna area was captured. Ukrainian forces advanced along the Ridkodub–Nove–Novomykhailivka line in the north and the Yarova–Drobysheve–Stavky line in the south, collapsing the Russian wedge that threatened Sloviansk from the northeast and forcing Russian units onto the defensive. They managed to halt the advance on Sviatohirsk, cross the Nitrius River, and push the Russians 15–17 km eastward. This weakened the Russian bridgehead on the left bank of the river, though without eliminating it entirely; Ivanivka remained under Russian control on the left bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River.

A key element of Operation Vivaldi was the interdiction of Russian logistics using medium-range loitering munitions. This interdiction was divided into two zones: the first up to 50 km from the front line, and the second from 50 to 120 km from the front line. These strikes led to the shutdown of a pipeline supplying fuel to Luhansk Oblast and forced the Russians to disperse their logistics and rear units.[6] Russian command posts, hubs, and communications were also targeted with artillery.[7] The process of attriting enemy forces through drone preparation can last from a week to a month. Paralysis in the Russian rear was further compounded by intensified Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) operations. Logistical disruptions prevented the Russians from mounting local counterattacks and laying down artillery barrages. Subsequently, assaults were launched against isolated strongpoints weakened by prior strikes.

At the end of September, Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi announced the conclusion of the third phase of Operation “Vivaldi.” As a result, the Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps captured settlements including Nove, Ridkodub, Katerynivka, Karpivka, and Novomykhailivka. Since the start of the counteroffensive, this amounted to a total of 176 square kilometers of liberated territory. The Russians attempted counterattacks, but conducted half-heartedly, they were quickly repelled. Later, on October 14, General Biletskyi stated that the 3rd Corps had already liberated 277 square kilometers entering the fourth phase of Operation Vivaldi. Estimates of the total territory reclaimed by the counteroffensive range from 150 to 277 square kilometers. Following Operation Vivaldi, the Ukrainians launched an offensive in the south, reclaiming 627 square kilometers of territory and driving the Russians out of most of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Interestingly, while storming Russian positions, the Ukrainians utilized Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)—a BTR-80 converted into a mobile demolition vehicle to blow up fortifications, reminiscent of the German World War II Goliath.[8] The vehicle was successfully guided right up to Russian fortifications, indicating that the drone threat had been neutralized or that no drones were present in the vicinity.

The success of Operation Vivaldi was heavily influenced by Ukrainian operational maskirovka (deception). Concealing the movements of an entire corps is difficult, which is why feint attacks are employed in such situations. In the case of Operation Vivaldi, such a feint was an attack launched from the direction of the village of Shandryholove. The Russians redeployed their reserves to that sector, while the actual main thrusts occurred in the north near Ridkodub and in the south near Drobysheve. According to Russian sources, to stabilize the front, the Russians threw rear-echelon personnel and “Rubikon” subunits into combat, which proved vulnerable to casualties.[9] This partly explains Ukrainian drone dominance in the air. The best way to achieve local UAV superiority is to eliminate enemy drone command-and-control posts along with their logistics. The success of the trap was also aided by the reporting culture within the Russian command, which avoids submitting negative or problematic reports.

The Role of the Corps System in the Ukrainian Victory

While serving as Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov recognized that Ukraine needed to return to conducting operations in operational depth. Consequently, Fedorov prioritized transitioning military structures to a higher echelon—moving from brigades to a corps system. This allowed Ukraine to operate at greater depth and enabled a shift from tactical, attrition-based fighting to operational-level warfare.[10]

The Importance of Donbas and the Fortress Belt to the War Effort

The Russian plan to encircle Sloviansk and Kramatorsk was overly optimistic and unrealistic from the outset. The Ukrainian counterstrike significantly delayed any future offensive against Sloviansk. The Russian tendency to draft operational plans detached from reality stems from a reporting culture skewed toward overwhelmingly positive information rather than the actual battlefield situation.[11]

Preventing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from completing the conquest of Donbas is of paramount importance. Completing the conquest or otherwise obtaining Donbas is currently one of Russia’s primary war aims and key peace conditions. If Russia were to gain control over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, holding Kharkiv Oblast—surrounded on three sides—would become an exceedingly difficult task. Furthermore, between Kyiv and Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts, there are no major terrain obstacles on which to anchor a defense. Putin is acutely aware of this, which is why capturing Donbas by political or military means is crucial for maintaining pressure on Ukraine’s decision-making and economic centers.

Conclusions

A Ukrainian defeat is not predetermined, nor has it ever been. History has seen smaller nations achieve victory defined by the defense of their independence (Finland against the Soviet Union in 1940, Afghanistan against the Soviet Union from 1980–1988, and Israel’s wars against Arab states). All of these examples, along with Ukraine, share one common trait: a smaller state is capable of fighting and succeeding when backed by sustained foreign support encompassing military equipment, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and financial-economic aid.

Operation Vivaldi succeeded in relieving pressure and thwarting the attempted encirclement of the Ukrainian fortress belt in the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area. Had the Russians captured these cities by first encircling them (a goal they had steadily pursued for months), it would have collapsed the defense of the last remaining part of Donetsk Oblast under Ukrainian control. Strategically, this would have had catastrophic consequences due to the lack of favorable defensive positions all the way to the Dnipro River and Kyiv. The Ukrainian success is best characterized as tactical-operational in scope (penetrating over a dozen kilometers deep into enemy-held territory and eliminating a front-line salient) with operational-strategic effects (relieving pressure on the fortress belt in Ukrainian-held Donbas and foiling Russian plans to close the pocket). Rather than a strategic shift of the initiative, the Ukrainian achievement is a local operational success designed to bolster the strategic defense along the Donetsk and Luhansk axes.

 

Bibliography

  1. Institute for the Study of War, The Myth of Inevitable Russian Victory over Ukraine. Special Report, October 23, 2026, link: https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-myth-of-inevitable-russian-victory/ [accessed: 10.11.2026]
  2. Meduza, Ukraine’s ‘Operation Vivaldi’ pushed Russian forces back around Lyman in the Donbas. Now both armies are massing troops for the next battles farther south, September 18, 2026, link: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/09/18/ukraine-s-operation-vivaldi-pushed-russian-forces-back-around-lyman-in-the-donbas-now-both-armies-are-massing-troops-for-the-next-battles-farther-south [accessed: 10.11.2026]
  3. Kyiv Post, Official Update / Battlefield Report (Post 84222), 2026, link: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/84222 [accessed: 08.11.2026]
  4. Visit Ukraine, Operation Vivaldi: results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Donbas, 2026, link: https://visitukraine.today/blog/9767/operation-vivaldi-results-of-the-ukrainian-counteroffensive-in-donbas?srsltid=AYCX9vJAyKO2GE_VadzIqfyMgeE7ow1oK2PJgP6kEmh5ItOpQUMF5iIB#how-did-the-counteroffensive-near-lyman-affect-the-defence-of-donbas [accessed: 05.11.2026]
  5. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2026, September 28, 2026, link: https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ [accessed: 05.11.2026].
  6. Critical Threats Project, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 15, 2026, September 15, 2026, link: https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026 [accessed: 04.11.2026].
  7. Interia Wydarzenia, Ukraińska kontrofensywa. Rosjanie wyparci dziesiątki kilometrów [Ukrainian counteroffensive. Russians pushed back dozens of kilometers], 2026, link: https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/ukraina-rosja/news-ukrainska-kontrofensywa-rosjanie-wyparci-dziesiatki-kilometr,nId,23546465 [accessed: 09.11.2026]
  8. Institute for the Study of War, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 28, 2026, September 28, 2026, link: https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ [accessed: 09.11.2026]
  9. Topcor.ru / Репортер. Украинский капкан “Вивальди” надо превратить в русскую удавку [The Ukrainian “Vivaldi” trap must be turned into a Russian noose], 2026, link: https://topcor.ru/75427-ukrainskij-kapkan-vivaldi-nado-prevratit-v-russkuju-udavku.html [accessed: 10.11.2026]
  10. Rose, Robert G. An Overture to Victory: Operation Vivaldi and Ukraine’s Path to Battlefield Decision. Modern War Institute at West Point, September 24, 2026, link: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/an-overture-to-victory-operation-vivaldi-and-ukraines-path-to-battlefield-decision/ [accessed: 07.11.2026].
  11. Ibidem.