Author: Agnieszka Grzegorzewska

One year ago, a small yellow brochure prepared by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap; from January 1.01.2026 – Swedish Defence and Resilience Agency, Myndigheten för civilt försvar) circulated widely across Western media and social networks. In Case of Crisis or War opens with a striking message:

“To all residents of Sweden,
We live in uncertain times. Armed conflicts are currently being waged in our corner of the world. Terrorism, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns are being used to undermine and influence us.
To resist these threats, we must stand united. If Sweden is attacked, everyone must do their part to defend Sweden’s independence – and our democracy.” [1]

A year later, an increasing number of states release their own versions of such brochures, which raises an important analytical question: does openly speaking about conflict generate fear, or is it a measure of a deliberate effort by the state to prepare society for crisis and war?

This question is not limited to Sweden. It reflects a broader transformation in how security is understood and practiced across the Baltic Sea basin. As the regional security environment deteriorates, governments are reassessing long standing assumptions about defence. While many states have expanded and modernised their armed forces, technological advancement and military size alone no longer guarantee security. Conventional, kinetic warfare is no longer the most likely form of confrontation. Instead, contemporary threats increasingly operate below the threshold of war and target societies directly through disinformation, cyber operations, sabotage, environmental pressure, and attacks on critical infrastructure. In this context, security must be reconceptualised as a whole of society endeavour, where resilience is as important as firepower.

Total defence as a framework for nationwide resilience

At the core of this reconceptualisation lies the concept of total defence. In its contemporary formulation, total defence refers to the integration of military and civil defence into a single, coherent national framework, in which all sectors of society contribute to deterrence, crisis management, and national survival. As defined by Jan Ångström and Kristin Ljungkvist (2023), total defence aims not only to protect the state during crises but also to prepare society for the possibility of armed conflict by ensuring continuity of governance, essential services, and public trust. [2]

Although the concept originated during the Cold War, it has experienced a pronounced revival in the twenty-first century, particularly among states bordering the Baltic Sea. [3] This revival reflects the changing character of threats, which increasingly blur the line between war and peace and transcend the traditional civil military divide. Hybrid threats combine physical disruption with cognitive operations, exploit civilian vulnerabilities, and seek to erode societal cohesion over time. As a result, military capability alone is insufficient. Effective defence requires resilient institutions, informed citizens, and mechanisms that enable societies to absorb shocks without losing functionality or legitimacy.

While historically associated with the Nordic states, the total defence approach has also been adopted and adapted by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. [4] Across the region, the concept has become a response to a shared strategic reality: contemporary conflict targets societies as systems, not only armed forces as instruments.

Sweden’s model of civil defence

Among Nordic states, Sweden represents one of the most comprehensive and institutionalised examples of total defence in practice. It was the first country to adopt the concept in the 1950s, integrating military and civil efforts within a unified defence policy. [5] Seven decades later, Sweden continues to update its total defence system in response to a deteriorating security environment and the lessons learned from hybrid operations in Europe.

At the national level, civil defence responsibilities are shared between the Minister for Civil Defence, operating within the Ministry of Defence, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). [6] The Minister is responsible for strategic direction, coordination, and funding, while MSB oversees emergency preparedness, crisis management, and societal resilience across sectors. Financing is provided through national budget allocations coordinated by the Ministry of Defence and direct funding to municipalities, which are legally required to maintain preparedness plans and crisis management capacities. County administrative boards act as intermediaries, ensuring coordination between national authorities and local governments. [7]

This institutional architecture reflects a core principle of Sweden’s approach: resilience must be built locally but coordinated nationally. Decentralisation is combined with clear legal obligations and central oversight, allowing for flexibility while preserving coherence. Importantly, this system positions citizens not as passive recipients of protection but as active participants in national defence.

Public engagement forms a central pillar of Sweden’s civil defence strategy. Nationwide initiatives such as Preparedness Week (Beredskapsveckan), organised annually by MSB in cooperation with Folk och Försvar, exemplify this all society approach. The 2025 edition, titled “You Are a Part of Sweden’s Total Defence”, focuses on educating citizens about their roles during crises through public events, discussions, and local exercises involving municipalities, voluntary organisations, schools, and private companies [8]. These activities serve not only to raise awareness but also to normalise preparedness and foster a shared sense of responsibility across society.

The reintroduction of the In Case of Crisis or War brochure reinforces this logic. Rather than inducing fear, the brochure provides practical guidance on self-reliance, continuity, and individual responsibility, signalling that preparedness is a civic duty and a deterrence asset. By strengthening household level resilience, the state reduces societal vulnerability to coercion and disruption.

Sweden’s approach also recognises the psychological dimension of defence. The Swedish Psychological Defence Agency focuses on countering disinformation while strengthening media literacy and public trust [9]. This reflects an understanding that resilience in the cognitive domain is as critical as physical preparedness, particularly in an era where influence operations seek to undermine democratic legitimacy from within.

Taken together, these measures demonstrate how Sweden embeds societal resilience within its national defence framework. Civil defence is not treated as an auxiliary function but as an integral component of deterrence, ensuring that society can withstand pressure, disruption, and uncertainty without strategic paralysis.

Civil resilience as a regional trend in the Baltic Sea basin

The revival of total defence is not unique to Sweden. Across Northern Europe, states are rediscovering the importance of societal preparedness as a core security function. Finland’s comprehensive security framework (kokonaisturvallisuus), which integrates public authorities, businesses, non governmental organisations, municipalities, and citizens, remains one of the most advanced examples globally. [10] The Nordic commitment to civil defence is also reflected in budgetary priorities. In 2024, Sweden announced plans to allocate an additional 35.7 billion SEK, approximately 3.4 billion euro, for civil defence through 2030, while Finland’s 2025 budget proposal includes additional funding for civil defence on top of planned allocations for the 2026 to 2029 period. [11]

The Baltic states have increasingly followed this trajectory. Since 2022, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have undertaken substantial reforms to modernise civil protection systems and strengthen whole of society resilience. [12] [13] Lithuania provides a particularly illustrative example, with investments aimed at enhancing individual defence capabilities through education and training. Schools and youth organisations now offer courses on crisis response and emerging technologies, including drone operation, to prepare younger generations for active participation in national defence. [14]

At the same time, not all states in the region are equally advanced in this transition. Despite being NATO’s highest defence spender relative to GDP, Poland’s civil defence system has suffered from long term neglect and institutional fragmentation. While Poland has significantly modernised its armed forces and invested in military capabilities, these efforts were not initially matched by comparable investments in civil preparedness. [15] Recent initiatives, such as voluntary military training programmes and government led campaigns against disinformation, signal a growing recognition of the problem. [16] [17] Poland can therefore be understood as a late adapter, now laying the foundations for a more comprehensive total defence system.

Conclusion

Across the Baltic Sea basin, the perception of security is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Military power remains essential, but it is no longer sufficient on its own. Societal resilience, public awareness, and the capacity of citizens to function under pressure have become central elements of deterrence and defence. In this emerging paradigm, civil defence is not a secondary policy domain but a strategic necessity.

The Swedish brochure that initially sparked controversy should therefore be understood not as an exercise in fear mongering, but as a manifestation of a broader strategic shift. States that succeed in embedding resilience across society enhance their ability to resist hybrid pressure, deter coercion, and preserve democratic stability in times of crisis. For countries in the Baltic Sea basin, where security challenges are increasingly complex and multidimensional, a prepared, informed, and cohesive society is becoming the most reliable foundation of national defence.

Endnotes:

[1] The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. In Case of Crisis or War. Karlstad, Sweden: The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, 2024. https://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/30874.pdf.

[32 Angstrom, Jan, and Kristin Ljungkvist. “Unpacking the Varying Strategic Logics of Total Defence.” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 4 (September 27, 2023): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2260958.

[3] Angstrom, Jan, and Kristin Ljungkvist. “Unpacking the Varying Strategic Logics of Total Defence.” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 4 (September 27, 2023): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2260958.

[4] Jordan, Józef Witold. “Evolution of the Concept of Total Defence in the Baltic States.” Rozprawy Społeczne 18, no. 1 (2024): 315–44. https://doi.org/10.29316/rs/188761.

[5] Regeringen och Regeringskansliet. “Total Defence.” Regeringskansliet, February 27, 2024. https://www.government.se/government-policy/total-defence/.

[6] Regeringen och Regeringskansliet. “Civil Defence.” Regeringskansliet, January 2, 2023. https://www.government.se/government-policy/civil-defence/.

[7] Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. “About MSB.” www.msb.se, n.d. https://www.msb.se/en/about-msb/.

[8] Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap. “Om Beredskapsveckan.” Www.msb.se, 2024. https://www.msb.se/sv/amnesomraden/krisberedskap–civilt-forsvar/risk–och-kriskommunikation/beredskapsveckan/beredskapsveckan/.

[9] Psychological Defence Agency. “Our Mission.” Mpf.se, 2024. https://mpf.se/psychological-defence-agency/about-us/our-mission.

[10] The Security Committee. “Comprehensive Security – Turvallisuuskomitea.” turvallisuuskomitea.fi, n.d. https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/comprehensive-security/.

[11] Posaner, Joshua. “Sweden Boosts Defense Spending to Handle a ‘Wartime Situation.’” POLITICO, October 15, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-nato-russia-ukraine-war-defense-budget-pal-jonson/.

[12] Ministry of the Interior. “The State Civil Protection Plan Is Updated.” Iem.gov.lv, 2024. https://www.iem.gov.lv/en/article/state-civil-protection-plan-updated.

[13] Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik. “Civil Defence System in Estonia | Institute of Central Europe.” Institute of Central Europe, August 2, 2024. https://ies.lublin.pl/en/comments/civil-defence-system-in-estonia/.

[14] O’Carroll, Lisa. “Lithuania to Give Children Drone Training to Counter Russia Threat.” the Guardian. The Guardian, August 13, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/13/lithuania-children-drone-training-russia-threat.

[15] NATO Press Release. “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025),” 2025. https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf.

[16] Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej. “Trenuj Z Wojskiem 7 – Szkolenia Dla Wszystkich Chętnych Już W Październiku – Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej – Portal Gov.pl.” Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 2025. https://www.gov.pl/web/obrona-narodowa/trenuj-z-wojskiem-7–szkolenia-dla-wszystkich-chetnych-juz-w-pazdzierniku.

[17] Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji. “Nowa Kampania Ministerstwa Cyfryzacji Przeciw Dezinformacji – Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji – Portal Gov.pl.” Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji, 2025. https://www.gov.pl/web/cyfryzacja/nowa-kampania-ministerstwa-cyfryzacji-przeciw-dezinformacji.