Author: Tomasz Smura

On 4 December 2025, a new United States National Security Strategy (NSS) was released. The document presents, in a more coherent and consolidated form, the approach to foreign and security policy previously articulated by the Trump administration. This approach is based on a strict focus on narrowly defined US national interests and a selective concentration on issues deemed to be of key importance to Washington, while deliberately limiting engagement in broader international security commitments.

The strategy put forward by the Trump administration appears to be strongly ideologically driven. It explicitly criticises the previous administration, as well as the governing elites to date, accusing them of having misdefined US interests. According to the strategy, these interests were wrongly reduced to the pursuit of global American dominance, rather than being focused on states that genuinely pose a threat to the United States. The document also criticises earlier global commitments, arguing that, when combined with excessive social spending and a misinterpreted concept of free trade, they undermined the American economy and public finances.

In Part II, entitled What the United States Should Want, the strategy seeks to more clearly define US national interests. In a classical formulation, it identifies interests related to survival, security, and development. In this context, the section emphasises the challenges of illegal migration and border protection, as well as the resilience of critical infrastructure. It also highlights the need for strong armed forces, credible nuclear deterrence, and a next-generation missile defence system referred to as the “Golden Dome”. The document further stresses the necessity of a strong and innovative economy as the foundation of American power, alongside an industrial base that serves as the backbone of the state’s military strength. In less easily quantifiable terms, it also refers to the maintenance of American “soft power” and the restoration of “American spiritual and cultural health”, language that points to ideological and cultural concerns. The administration additionally sets out expectations for external partners. Particular emphasis is placed on US interests in the Western Hemisphere; the document explicitly invokes the Monroe Doctrine and asserts that the region should be free from hostile external influences—implicitly, though not explicitly, China—and should not serve as a source of mass migration or drug-related crime. The strategy also calls for an end to actions perceived as harming the American economy and for the preservation of a free and open Indo-Pacific region, language that again appears to be directed primarily at China. From European allies, the administration demands greater responsibility for regional security, while also announcing efforts to prevent the domination of the Middle East by any single external power, coupled with a stated intention to avoid involvement in “endless” regional wars.

In subsequent chapters, the NSS defines the means available to the United States and sets out the core assumptions underpinning the new American strategy. In this context, it identifies the following principles:

• Focus on the national interest;
• Peace through strength;
• Non-interventionism, intended as a reference to early US traditions; however, the document stresses that, given the breadth of American interests, non-interventionism in a strict sense is not feasible;
• Flexible realism, understood as a willingness to cooperate with other states regardless of their political systems or ideological differences;
• Primacy of nations, emphasising the understanding of other states’ national interests and their precedence over international organisations;
• Sovereignty and respect;
• Balance of power, whereby US regional strategy seeks to prevent domination by any single power, including through coalition-building with other states;
• Fairness, referring to the pursuit of trade agreements more favourable to the United States and demands that allies increase defence spending;
• Competence and merit, relating, among other things, to social capital, education, and research and development.

The document then outlines a set of priorities, including:

• Ending mass migration to the United States;
• Protecting fundamental rights and liberties, largely framed in ideological terms;
• Burden-sharing and burden-shifting, once again calling on allies to make greater contributions to collective security and to assume primary responsibility for security in their respective regions, while the United States declares its support through more favourable trade arrangements and the provision of technology and weapons;
• Realignment through peace, involving diplomatic support for peace processes;
• Economic security, pursued through more favourable trade terms, access to raw materials, secure supply chains, reindustrialisation, and the strengthening of the industrial base.

Regional Strategies

Finally, the document outlines a new American approach to the regions of greatest strategic importance to the United States. First, it addresses the Western Hemisphere, where—alongside previously mentioned elements such as the announcement of an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine, understood as denying “non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere”—and cooperation with regional partners, the strategy declares an increased military presence in the region and a reduction of foreign economic influence in favour of American influence.

Second, Asia is addressed, with the United States expected to “lead from a position of strength”. The strategy identifies alleged errors in the policies of previous administrations, which it claims allowed China to expand its power at the expense of the United States. It announces measures to protect the American economy—implicitly against what are portrayed as China’s unfair trade practices—and calls for closer cooperation with regional states, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) with Australia, Japan, and India. The document further states that the United States, in cooperation with Asian and European partners, intends to regain markets in the Global South that are perceived as being dominated by Chinese trade. In the security domain, the strategy emphasises the strategic importance of Taiwan and explicitly declares the need to deter China from potential aggression against the island and across the so-called first island chain. This is to be achieved by maintaining military superiority and by demanding greater allied engagement in collective defence in the region, particularly from Japan and the Republic of Korea. The United States also seeks to prevent any single state from dominating the South China Sea, a region of critical importance due to major global trade routes.

Europe is listed as the third region of strategic focus. In addition to what it describes as persistently inadequate defence spending, the United States criticises Europe for economic stagnation, overregulation, and social challenges. These are framed in terms of an alleged “civilisational erasure”, said to be manifested in ineffective migration policies, censorship, low birth rates, and the erosion of national identities. The United States declares that it is in its interest to bring the Russian–Ukrainian war to an end and to ensure strategic stability on the European continent. At the same time, it expects European states to assume the primary responsibility for their own security, to open their markets more fully to American companies, and to bring to an end the policy of continual NATO enlargement.

The strategy further notes a reduced importance of the Middle East among US priorities, citing diversified energy sources and the gradual winding down of regional conflicts. At present, the principal US interest in the region is identified as preventing its domination by any major power. In Africa, meanwhile, the United States signals an intention to move away from policies centred on the promotion of liberal values and development assistance, instead prioritising the pursuit of reliable partners and the expansion of trade and investment.

Conclusions

The new US National Security Strategy represents an effort to consolidate the previously articulated America First approach, centred on narrowly defined US national interests. It signals a shift towards a more isolationist foreign policy—framed under the banner of non-interventionism—and a reduction in American international commitments in response to constrained resources and a growing range of domestic challenges. In this context, the Trump administration declares a focus on what it considers its most critical priorities: stability in the immediate neighbourhood, strategic competition with China, and the strengthening of the domestic economic base. At the same time, it seeks to limit engagement in the security of lower-priority regions, in conflict stabilisation efforts, and in the promotion of democratic values abroad. The strategy also indicates an adjustment of regional priorities. Greater importance is now attached to the Western Hemisphere, where the United States aims to expand military and economic engagement, while transferring the primary responsibility for security in other regions to allies. Within this framework, the United States is envisaged as an offshore balancer, with its principal interests in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East being to prevent any single power from dominating these regions and to secure preferential trade conditions for the United States. Overall, the strategy reflects a relative decline in the importance of the Middle East and Europe for Washington. In the case of Europe, it additionally highlights growing ideological divergences, a theme previously underscored during Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference.

Summary and Recommendations

1. The provisions of the new US National Security Strategy should not come as a surprise; they represent a consolidation of the previously announced policy of prioritising narrowly defined US national interests and adopting a more isolationist foreign policy.
2. The strategy signals changes in American priorities, including geographical ones, but does not constitute a complete departure from previous foreign policy approaches. The United States makes clear that it remains interested in maintaining and strengthening its existing network of alliances and in contributing to security in individual regions—at least to the extent necessary to prevent their domination by a hostile power—and that it intends to cooperate with and support friendly states in this regard.
3. European NATO members should be prepared for the possibility of even stronger US pressure to assume greater responsibility for their own security, alongside a gradual reduction in Washington’s engagement in regional challenges, including the Russian–Ukrainian war. European states should therefore seek to reduce their dependence on the United States in defence matters by increasing military spending and by acquiring—individually or jointly—capabilities in areas where reliance on the US Armed Forces is greatest. These include so-called strategic enablers, such as strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, satellite reconnaissance, and missile defence. Poland, in particular, should mitigate the potential impact of reduced US engagement in European security by further strengthening its own armed forces, diversifying sources of armaments, and deepening regional military cooperation. This could include closer collaboration with the Baltic and Scandinavian states—potentially expanded to include the United Kingdom—as well as Romania, alongside enhanced bilateral cooperation with France.

Author: Tomasz Smura, Member of the Management Board, Director of the International Security and Defence Programme, Casimir Pulaski Foundation