Author: Tomasz smura

On July 7-8, 2026, a meeting of the North Atlantic Council took place at the level of heads of state and government (the so-called NATO summit). Expectations ahead of the summit appeared limited – it was expected to focus primarily on implementing the decisions of the previous NATO meeting at this level in The Hague. However, the more crucial objective was the need to overcome the mistrust that had emerged in transatlantic relations over the past months, which the Ankara summit was only partially able to address.

According to announcements by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the Ankara summit was to focus on three main topics: implementing the decisions from the Hague meeting regarding defence spending and translating additional resources into real combat capabilities, strengthening and increasing the production capacity of the defence industry of the member states, and continuing support for Ukraine.

Regarding the first area, as expected by the NATO Secretary General, leaders of the allied nations were to present concrete plans to achieve the defence spending targets declared in The Hague (at least 3.5% of GDP on defence and 1.5% of GDP on broader security and resilience annually in each member state within 10 years at the latest). This was particularly important for the American side, which pointed out to Europeans a lack of will and determination in fulfilling the previous military spending target adopted at the 2014 NATO Summit in Newport (2% of GDP on defence within 10 years). The US side holds strong arguments here: even in 2022 – the year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and two years before the declared implementation date of the Newport summit decisions – only 7 out of the 30 allies at the time had reached the promised spending level, and there was little indication that a large share of allies genuinely intended to fulfill their commitments. In the current context, the threat from the aggressive regime in Russia and strong pressure from the Trump administration appear to be yielding more tangible results. According to Alliance statistics, average defence spending in NATO in 2026 is projected to reach 2.86% of GDP, all allied nations will exceed the 2% GDP threshold, and 6 of them will reach or exceed the 3.5% GDP target set for 2035. Consequently, the summit’s final declaration included a strong statement that the Hague commitments are being fulfilled.

Currently, however, the key issue appears to be ensuring that rising expenditure translates into a genuine increase in the allies’ combat capabilities. This requires a strong and efficient defence industry, which was discussed during the NATO-Industry Forum held prior to the meeting of heads of state and government, where several new initiatives to support industrial cooperation were announced. On the sidelines of the summit, a number of agreements regarding specific capabilities worth a total of nearly €50 billion were concluded (including the acquisition of 10 Saab GlobalEye aircraft for NATO’s early warning fleet and five MQ-4C Triton UAVs), and the NATO’s Drone Edge initiative was launched, under which nearly $40 billion is to be invested in uncrewed systems. The Alliance also declared nearly $30 billion in logistics investments targeting fuel storage tanks and pipeline infrastructure, including the long-advocated (by Poland, among others) extension of the NATO Pipeline System (NPS) to the eastern flank, as well as the establishment of an initiative to create a joint cargo transport fleet.

Finally, regarding support for Ukraine, allies committed a total of €70 billion in military assistance and training for 2026, and aid of at least the same amount in 2027.

Ankara and Transatlantic Trust

However, for the vast majority of member states, the most important issue was reaffirming the cohesion of the Alliance and emerging from the period of uncertainty that had persisted almost since the start of Donald Trump’s second administration. Statements by the US President himself and members of his administration regarding the desire to compel Denmark to surrender sovereignty over Greenland, criticism and questioning of the rationale behind US NATO membership amid several allies’ (notably Spain’s) reluctance to support an unconsulted US-Israeli military operation against Iran, and direct negotiations conducted with Russia regarding the end of the war in Ukraine without European involvement sparked widespread concerns over the state of transatlantic relations and the future of the Alliance. For a long time, media outlets also questioned whether Donald Trump would attend the Ankara summit in person, which was seen as a bellwether of his continued interest in the organization. Ultimately, the final declaration adopted by all allied leaders – including Trump, who attended the summit – reaffirmed all nations’ full commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and reiterated that an attack on one ally will be considered an attack on all. Meanwhile, Russia was designated as a “long-term threat” to the transatlantic area. The final declaration also incorporated points important to the American side, such as a declaration that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons, that freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz must be maintained, and that allied states will strive to eliminate barriers in arms trade (appearing to reference certain EU restrictions under the SAFE mechanism).

Nevertheless, the summit’s outcomes do not resolve the more fundamental challenges in transatlantic relations. In its final declaration, the summit set a strategic direction toward a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO, with Europe and Canada assuming greater responsibility for the Alliance. Nonetheless, to ensure the organisation can continue to function effectively and to rebuild trust, an honest European-American dialogue will now be required regarding the support and capabilities Europeans can expect from the American side, and which capabilities – and over what timeframe – they must build themselves in light of changing US strategic priorities.