Author: Tomasz Smura

From July 9 to 11, 2024, the North Atlantic Council met at the level of heads of state and government (the so-called NATO summit) in Washington. While the agenda included symbolic elements related to the anniversary of the North Atlantic Alliance’s founding, it was dominated by the issue of maintaining military support for Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia, particularly in light of the upcoming US presidential elections.

This year’s NATO summit had significant symbolic value: it took place in the year marking the 75th anniversary of NATO’s founding, in the city where the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. For the first time, newly-admitted Sweden participated as a full-fledged member of the Organisation, and Norwegian politician Jens Stoltenberg bid farewell after 10 years as NATO Secretary General, having guided the Alliance through one of the most challenging periods in its history (former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte will succeed him in early October). Despite these celebratory elements, the heads of state and government faced a complex agenda, with the primary focus on securing stable support for Ukraine.

This issue is closely tied to the upcoming US presidential elections as current polls suggest that Republican candidate Donald Trump, who has made controversial statements about his willingness to quickly end the Russia-Ukraine war – an outcome that seems impossible without significant concessions to Russia – could win. Trump’s approach has so far only led to the antagonisation of Ukraine and Alliance’s European members. Furthermore, at the turn of 2023 and 2024, there were issues with passing the Ukraine Security Supplemental Appropriations Act 2024, which secures funds for direct military aid (and through programs such as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative and the Foreign Military Financing Program) and replenishes the US Armed Forces’ equipment stocks, which were caused by political struggles between the Democrats and the Republicans, who delayed the process in the House of Representatives. According to the US administration, the problem with American aid negatively impacted the frontlines (Ukraine has been contesting a renewed Russian offensive and was forced to withdraw from their long-held positions in Avdiivka during this period), which highlighted the need to avoid such situations in the future.

Thus, in early spring NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg proposed establishing a special NATO fund for Ukraine worth $100 billion, with NATO taking over leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group from the US. Although this initiative was met with moderate enthusiasm by some allies, including the US, it was eventually accepted in a compromised and limited form at the NATO Summit. Thus, the coordination of aid for Ukraine will now be handled by a special command in Wiesbaden, Germany (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine – NSATU), with a staff of about 700 people. Allies committed to providing Ukraine with at least Euro 40 billion in various forms of aid, proportional to their GDP. This commitment increases pressure on individual Allies (they are now obliged not only to Ukraine through bilateral agreements but also to each other) and shares the responsibility (if one Ally cannot deliver aid, others must fill the gap).

Regarding Ukraine’s future NATO membership, the summit did not advance beyond the agreements made at the previous summit in Vilnius. While it was declared that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO,” and its path to the alliance is “irreversible,” with appreciation for the progress in aligning its armed forces and state structures with NATO standards, it was maintained that Ukraine will receive an invitation to membership “when Allies agree and conditions are met.” The topic of Ukraine’s NATO membership was also broached by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who stated that the presented support packages build “a very clear, strong, robust, well-lit bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine”.

In other significant matters, the summit communiqué did not deviate substantially from the Vilnius agreements. It upheld a stern assessment of Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security” and maintained the existing formula for defence spending, stating that “in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed,” without imposing new requirements. It was noted, however, that the majority of allies had reached the defence spending level agreed upon in Newport.

The final communiqué, likely influenced by the US administration, harshly criticised China’s role, stating that China’s support for Russia enables the continuation of the war in Ukraine, which cannot go without negatively impacting the PRC’s “reputation and interests.” It also emphasised that China’s ambitions and assertive policies undermine the interests, values, and security of the Allies, and its strategic cooperation with Russia and joint attempts to challenge the existing order are a source of “profound concern.” The communiqué also highlighted the need for greater cooperation and importance of security in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in relation to Australia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea whose representatives participated in the summit.

Conclusions

The Washington summit, following a series of “historic” summits after 2014 and 2022, where Allies had to confront a new security situation in Europe, largely upheld previous agreements. This is not insignificant considering the war fatigue in Western societies and the growing coordination challenges among transatlantic countries regarding i.e. Russia. The transfer of aid coordination for Ukraine to NATO and the adoption of specific joint commitments by the allies are certainly also positive developments.

Author: Dr. Tomasz Smura, Member of the Board, Director of the International Security and Defense Program, Casimir Pulaski Foundation