Author: Karolina Pawlik

Away from the deadlines reporting on the US-Israeli war with Iran (now in a hiatus phase), another, concurrent armed conflict has been taking place, expanding in both geographic scope and intensity, namely the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah launched projectiles on 1st  March into Haifa (all of which were intercepted) as revenge for the killing of  Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The Israeli responded with a rocket barrage ultimately targeting 50 villages south of the Litani River and southern Beirut (evacuation orders were sent last minute to the Lebanese civilian population), followed by a ground assault. [1] This event marked the outbreak of the seventh armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon since the establishment of the State of Israel. [2]

Once again, Lebanon has been drawn into a conflict – to quote UN Secretary-General António Guterres – “The Lebanese people did not choose this war. They were dragged into it.”, [3] with no easy exit strategy. The Lebanese government has prohibited any security or military activity by Hezbollah and confined the armed group’s role solely to political work. The Lebanese PM Nawaf Salam declared that no military operations should be launched from Lebanese territory, unless sanctioned by the government. In practice neither the government, nor the Lebanese army (LAF) can enforce the ban on Hezbollah. [4]

Since the onset of the conflict, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has accelerated its war playbook targeting not only Hezbollah’s weapon depots, hide outs, but has focused on extensively hitting civilian infrastructure. [5] This is part of the infamous Dahiya Doctrine, [6] which implies a disproportionate use of force aimed at inflicting severe casualties and material damage to deter attacks by non-state groups. [7] In other words, it means that retaliation for any attack on Israel will be met with far greater force and more disastrous consequences, especially for the civilian population. Moreover, the Israeli army is exacerbating sectarian tensions by implying that Christian and Druze areas will be targeted if they offer refuge to the displaced Shia from the south. [8]

Unlike the 2024 war, where Israel was somewhat constrained by the Biden administration’s opposition to a full-scale war in Lebanon [9] and focused on significantly weakening Hezbollah, this time the Israeli government has doubled down on showing the full spectrum of its military might. In the first few days of Israeli rocket attacks, over 1 million of Lebanese, predominately, but not exclusively Shia, were forced to escape northwards. [10] Israeli Minister of Defence Israel Katz reaffirmed that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will continue to occupy southern Lebanon, even after the armed conflict ends. He also stated that the displaced Lebanese “will not be allowed to return”. [11] This statement occurred after the destruction of seven main bridges on the Litani river, de facto disconnecting southern Lebanon (including the city of Tyre, the largest urban centre in southern Lebanon) from the rest of the country.

Some Lebanese and international analysts argue that, based on the public statements made  by Israeli cabinet members, the aim of Israel in Lebanon is not merely the disarmament of Hezbollah, but long-term occupation and even annexation of southern Lebanon. [12] Any occupation or annexation would not render the goal of disarming Hezbollah any more plausible, on the contrary it would only bolster the armed-group, reaffirming its “raison d’état” and bringing credibility to its membership in the Iranian “Axis of Resistance”. Israeli analysts likewise gauge that this would be the likely outcome of occupation. [13] Hence, one of the Israeli government’s short-term aims i.e. bringing stability to its northern border – where still many inhabitants have not returned [14] –  would not be realised. Occupation would only breed resistance and lead to further  attacks on Israeli northern villages and towns.

Hezbollah’s decision to attack Israel has been ill-received in Lebanon and has placed the government of Nawaf Salam between a rock and a hard place. The government, appointed in February 2025 by newly elected President Joseph Aoun, pledged to restore long-sought stability to Lebanon following what the World Bank has described as the third-worst economic and financial crisis of the past 150 years. [15] Lebanon has been marred in a conflagration of crises since 2019, when the financial bubble or as some called it the Ponzi scheme of the Lebanese Central Bank burst. [16] For the first time in years, both the population and experts have agreed that Lebanon has had a window of opportunity to resolve some of its structural problems and improve the living conditions of the Lebanese ( of whom 80% have been living below the poverty line; a direct result of the financial crisis and rampant inflation). [17]

One illustration of the government’s efforts to address Lebanon’s chronic and systemic problems was the decision from 7th August to accept the US plan to disarm Hezbollah (despite concerns that moving too quickly with the plan could lead to violent clashes with Hezbollah), followed by an adoption of the LAF’s plan to impose a state monopoly on weapons. [18] Disarming all armed groups located in Lebanon was part of the ceasefire agreement from 24th November brokered by the US and France. [19] In January 2025, LAF reported that it disarmed Hezbollah south of the Litani River. [20]  The rockets  – fired by Hezbollah on 1st  March – were long-range rockets launched north of the Litani. [21]

The historic, in the sense, that they are the first direct negotiations in more than 30 years between Israel and Lebanon in Washington D.C. have yielded a 10 day ceasefire. [22]  However, at this point it is difficult to gauge how sustainable and enforceable this truce will be, given past experience, it seems unlikely that the ceasefire will not be breached as was the case after the 2024 cessation of hostilities. [23] The concern is that a long-term ceasefire will not be plausible due to on the one hand the domestic politics in Israel ahead of the general election and, on the other, Hezbollah’s unwillingness to comply. This war could turn into a protracted conflict of varying intensity, which would prevent the Lebanese government from focusing on its reform agenda and diminishing its credibility among the Lebanese population (i.e. as the guarantor of stability) and among foreign donors. The government cannot fully contain Hezbollah without risking violent resistance. Neither can the Israeli government disarm Hezbollah entirely through military means. [24] Again, an observation confirmed by Israeli analysts. [25]

A number of countries (among them France, Canada, Ireland) have called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, but the engagement of the international community has been tacit at best, non-existent at worst. During the visit to the region at the beginning of January 2026, designed to be a new opening with the Middle East, Ursula von der Leyen pledged support for Lebanon’s reform agenda and its army. [26] This should be the time for the EU to engage. It has limited leverage over Israel and has also suffered a significant erosion of credibility in the Arab world due to its complicit stance regarding the Israeli military campaign in Gaza. [27]  Nevertheless, it remains the only major international actor consistently committed to the multilateral system. Moreover, given that the EU would not be insulated from the broader consequences of an Israeli occupation of Lebanon, it has a strategic interest in contributing to conflict resolution.

The US has not been perceived as an honest broker. [28] On the contrary the relationship between the current US President, his son-in-law and one of the chief negotiators Jared Kushner and Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has been closer and more amicable than with previous US presidents. [29] This relationship has allowed the Israeli PM to conduct more abrasive military operations further afield from home (see reporting on PM Netahyahu’s role in initiating the latest war with Iran). [30] However, US and Israeli foreign policy interests are not synonymous and when these interests divert, President Trump can force PM Netanyahu’s hand and demand actions that are deemed unpopular in Israel, like the short ceasefire with Lebanon.

Neither can  Gulf states – some of which traditionally have supported the Sunni communities in Lebanon – become more involved diplomatically given their current post-Iranian attacks internal situation. Thus the EU is the only international actor that could and should engage in aiding Lebanon. The EU should work with the Lebanese government in a constructive manner on fostering structural reforms in Lebanon. However, the EU and its member states should not make financial support for reconstruction contingent on the adoption of all reforms, as the latter could be difficult or even impossible to deliver in a constant armed conflict scenario. Financial aid should be allocated for restoring hospitals, schools – public services that are much needed by the Lebanese. Simultaneously, the EU should rigorously monitor how funds are spent to avoid graft. Finally, the EU and its member states should continue to financially support civil society and think tanks, who can critically review and evaluate the government’s reform endeavours. Lebanon needs the international community to prevent a government collapse, and now is the time for international actors like the EU to act.

Endnotes:

[1] Middle East Eye (2026) “Israel launches ground assault in southern Lebanon“, Middle East Eye, 3.03.2026, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-begins-ground-assault-southern-lebanon (accessed 15.04.2026)
[2] Suleiman J. (2024) Israel’s Wars on Lebanon, 1978–2024: A Comparative Approach, Policy Paper issue 119, Institute for Palestine Studies, November 2024, https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/1656406 (accessed 15.04.2026), p. 2
[3] UN News (2026) “In Beirut, Guterres demands end to Middle East war: Civilians ‘deserve to live without fear’, UN News, https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/03/1167134 (accessed 15.04.2026)
[4] Ibrahim A. (2026) “This Is a Moment for Sovereignty, Not Labels”, Daraj Media, 02.03.2026 https://daraj.media/en/this-is-a-moment-for-sovereignty-not-labels/ (accessed 15.04.2026)
[5] Human Rights Watch (2026) “ Lebanon: Israeli Strikes Kill Hundreds, Damage Vital Bridge”, Human Rights Watch, 10.04.2016 https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/04/10/lebanon-israeli-strikes-kill-hundreds-damage-vital-bridge (accessed 15.04.2026)
[6] The doctrine is named after Dahiyeh, a Shia’a inhabited southern neighbourhood of Beirut, a Hezbollah stronghold, which was leveled during the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese War.
[7] Frankel R.D. (2013) The Dahiyeh Doctrine: The Conditions under which States can establish Asymmetric Deterrence, Ph.D. thesis, Georgetown University, https://scispace.com/pdf/the-dahiyeh-doctrine-the-conditions-under-which-states-can-7rit925s92.pdf (accessed 15.04.2026), p. 178
[8] Goldbaum C. (2026) “Israel’s Message to a Broad Swath of Lebanon: Shiites Must Go”, New York Times, 01.04.2016 https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/01/world/middleeast/lebanon-shiite-israel-evacuation.html#:~:text=In%20private%20calls%20to%20local%20leaders%20across,make%20up%20the%20majority%20of%20southern%20Lebanon (accessed 15.04.2026)
[9] Sayigh Y. (2026) What Is Israel’s Plan in Lebanon?” Carnegie Middle East Center, 06.03.2026 “https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/03/what-is-israels-plan-in-lebanon (accessed 16.04.2026)
Although it should be noted that the IDF did not refrain from targeting civilian infrastructure, hitting densely populated areas and leading to the internal displacement of 1.2-1.3 million Lebanese (UNHCR data) destroying archaeological and heritage sites, and farm lands in the south.
[10] UNHCR (2026) “LEBANON EMERGENCY”, UNHCR, https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/lebanon/ (accessed 16.04.2026)
[11] L’Orient Today (2026) “Katz says Israel will occupy part of southern Lebanon after the war: Recap”, L’Orient Today, 31.03.2026, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1501604/israeli-soldiers-killed-in-southern-lebanon-hezbollah-fighter-captured-by-israel-wrap-up-.html (accessed 16.04.2026)
[12] On the analysis, see Yahya M. (2026) “Lebanon’s Coming Collapse”, Foreign Affairs, 03.03.2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/lebanon/lebanons-coming-collapse (accessed 16.04.2024) and Houry N. (2026) “Washington Is Backing the Wrong Lebanon Strategy”, Just Security, 02.04.2026,
https://www.justsecurity.org/135340/washington-is-backing-the-wrong-lebanon-strategy/?trk=feed_main-feed-card_reshare_feed-article-content (accessed 16.04.2026)
On the statement see Middle East Eye (2026) “Israel’s far-right minister Smotrich says Beirut’s Dahiyeh ‘will look like Khan Younis’, Middle East Eye – Youtube channel, 6.03.2026 https://www.youtube.com/shorts/m8vbEQ4pzsc (accessed 16.04.2026)
[13] Mizrahi O. (2025) An Opportunity to Shape a New Reality with Lebanon, Policy Paper, The Institute for National Security Studies, 8.09.2025 https://www.inss.org.il/publication/israel-lebanon-policy-2025/ (accessed 16.04.2026)
[14] Hashmonai A. (2026) “ ‘Nothing Will Be Left of Kiryat Shmona’: Northern Israel on Edge as Hezbollah Enters War” Haaretz, 03.03.2026 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-03-03/ty-article-magazine/.premium/nothing-will-be-left-northern-israel-on-edge-as-hezbollah-enters-war/0000019c-af9b-d3a1-a9fe-bfbf4f220000 (accessed 16.04.2026)
[15] World Bank (2021) “Lebanon Sinking into One of the Most Severe Global Crises Episodes, amidst Deliberate Inaction” Wold Bank, 01.06.2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/05/01/lebanon-sinking-into-one-of-the-most-severe-global-crises-episodes (accessed 16.04.2026)
[16] For a detailed explanation of the sources of the financial crisis, see Snaije B. (2022) LEBANON: Financial crisis or national collapse?, CIDOB notes internacionales issue 275, Barcelona Center for International Affairs CIDOB, June 2022, https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/lebanon-financial-crisis-or-national-collapse (accessed 16.04.2026)
[17] op.cit. Yahya M. (2026)
[18] Bassam L. (2025) “Exclusive: US plan sees Hezbollah disarmed by year-end, Israeli withdrawal”, Reuters, 07.08.2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/ (accessed 17.04.2026)
op. cit. Houry N. (2026)
[19] No author (2024) Announcement of a Cessation of Hostilities and Related Commitments on Enhanced Security Arrangements and Towards the Implementation of UNSCR 1701
[20] Yahya M. (2026b) “The Iran War and the Middle East” Carnegie Middle East Center, 27.03.2026
https://carnegieendowment.org/events/2026/03/the-iran-war-and-the-middle-east (accessed 17.04.2026)
[21] Ibid. Yahya M. (2026b)
[22] Trump D. (2026) Post on True Social, 16.04.2026, https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116415190299043508 (accessed 17.04.2026)
[23] UNFIL (2025) Post on X, 20.11. 2025 https://x.com/UNIFIL_/status/1991515033457815985?s=20 (accessed 17.04.2026)
[24] op.cit Houry N. (2026)
[25] Mizrahi O., Dekel U. and Guterman O. (2026) The Long Road to Disarming Hezbollah- A DDR Model for Lebanon, Special Publication, The Institute for National Security Studies, 15.04.2026, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/lebanon-ddr/ (accessed 17.04.2026)
[26] von der Leyen U. (2026) “ Statement by President von der Leyen with President Costa in Lebanon” European Commission, 09.01.2026, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/da/statement_26_65 (accessed 17.04.2026)
[27] Gerges F. (2025) The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East ,Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 275
[28] Ibid. Gerges F. (2025) p. 271
[29] Roth A. (2025) “The ‘enormous conflict of interest’ at centre of Jared Kushner’s Gaza ceasefire deal”, The Guardian, 19.10.2025 https://www.theguardian.com/news/ng-interactive/2025/oct/19/the-enormous-conflict-of-interest-at-centre-of-jared-kushners-gaza-ceasefire-deal (accessed 17.04.2026)
[30] Swan J. and Haberman M. (2026) “How Trump took the US to war with Iran”, The New York Times, 07.04.2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/07/us/politics/trump-iran-war.html (accessed 17.04.2026)