Vladimir_Putin_and_Kim_Jong-un_(2024-06-19)_11

Autor foto: Presidential Executive Office of Russia

Defence Cooperation Between the DPRK and Russia

Defence Cooperation Between the DPRK and Russia

June 30, 2025

Author: Reuben F. Johnson

Defence Cooperation Between the DPRK and Russia

Vladimir_Putin_and_Kim_Jong-un_(2024-06-19)_11

Autor foto: Presidential Executive Office of Russia

Defence Cooperation Between the DPRK and Russia

Author: Reuben F. Johnson

Published: June 30, 2025

Moscow and Pyongyang’s Expanding Relationship

After more than two and a half years of war, Putin’s military had been consuming artillery rounds and other materiel at a rate that was well above the normal production tempo of Russia’s domestic ammunition suppliers. Going back to close to a year after Moscow’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kim Jong-un and his munitions plants are what had saved the Russian President from the humiliation of having to retreat and admit his invasion of Ukraine was a failure.

Between August 2023 and February 2024, there had been 25 or more visits by cargo vessels to the DPRK port of Najin for the primary purpose of loading up munitions to be delivered to Russia. There were also movements by at least 19 of what are called “shadow vessels” or “dark vessels” – so named because their Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers had been switched off to avoid them from being tracked or geolocated. Subsequent to disabling their transponders, those ships visited Vostochny Port in Russia to both unload and load these containers. These deliveries from the DPRK are singularly responsible in compensating for those shortfalls and keeping the one-time KGB Lt. Col.’s war machine alive.

Almost any other nation would hesitate to provide Russia with this level of military assistance and engage in such defence trade. Any trade with Moscow of this nature guarantees being hit with secondary sanctions. But the DPRK is already so heavily sanctioned that it suffers few consequences for now becoming a major supplier to Moscow.

One of the consequences of supplying Russia with a steady stream of the implements of war is additional sanctions that can be imposed by the US and EU. But given the sanctions regime that the DPRK already lives under, this is of little to no concern to Kim. The DPRK is in the same situation as Iran, which is receiving large infusions of cash from Moscow in exchange for this weaponry. Tehran is also receiving some of its payment in the form of transfers of sophisticated defence technologies to support ballistic missile programmes, a complete satellite surveillance system and nuclear weapons research materials.

 

Author: Reuben F. Johnson 

Supported by the Korea Foundation