Recent events in relation to Greenland struck a lot of controversy and provoked many reactions. The subject isn’t new as the first time Donald Trump publicly admitted that the US should try to acquire Greenland was 18th August 2019. That day, he confirmed he was considering an attempt to buy Greenland and added that it “would be strategically nice [for the USA to own]”. On January 10th 2026 the president told reporters that the US would acquire Greenland without ruling out the usage of force. That statement was followed by a chain of events. Right away Greenlandic party leaders rejected the annexation and affirmed independence. Denmark and other European allies sent small reconnaissance teams to Greenland to prepare the Danish‑led exercise “Arctic Endurance,” aimed at strengthening Arctic security under NATO frameworks. Consequently, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Denmark and European countries that decided to send their troops to Greenland. This decision was largely perceived in Europe as coercive economic pressure and a sign the current US administration might seriously consider a forceful takeover if diplomatic pressure fails. This perception translated into statements by certain EU leaders underlining that Greenlandic sovereignty is non‑negotiable and that an attack on Denmark would effectively mean the end of NATO as we know it. As of today, several European countries have signed a joint letter affirming sovereignty, territorial integrity and that “Greenland belongs to its people.” Overall, including joint and individual statements, there isn’t any NATO country that has said nothing on the matter. The weakest positions were taken by governments of Türkiye, Albania, Hungary, Slovakia or Czech Republic, that gave short or cautious public comments referring to welcoming talks, bilateral issue, or prioritising peaceful negotiation. Analytically, the Greenland episode matters not as much as a territorial dispute than as a moment of forced disclosure, in which European governments revealed how far they are willing to go to defend alliance norms when confronted with unilateral pressure from the United States.
From a strategic perspective, it is important to note that the Trump administration is not operating in a complete vacuum. For decades, US planners have seen Greenland as crucial for the defence of the North American continent, for missile warning and space surveillance, and for monitoring Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic. The island’s location in the GIUK gap and its potential in terms of critical raw materials all feed into a long‑standing American perception that Greenland is central to homeland security and long‑term economic resilience. In this sense, the current administration’s focus on Greenland continues a broader tradition of US strategic thinking, but uses more confrontational tools than previous administrations to pursue these interests.
The new US National Defense Strategy published on January 24th 2026 did not help to bring peace within the alliance. The strategy downgrades Europe as a priority and explicitly elevates Greenland, listing it alongside the Panama Canal as terrain the US must secure to protect homeland interests and pledging to guarantee US military and commercial access to key routes (amongst them Greenland), framed under a revived Monroe Doctrine logic. For many European observers, this document appeared to codify in official language the shift they already sensed from recent statements: a move toward a more unilateral, hemisphere‑centred vision of security in which European concerns risk becoming secondary.
The “Greenland fuss” can therefore be perceived as a shift of relations within the transatlantic alliance, possibly to the point of no easy return to what existed before. The trust between Europe and the current US administration has been visibly strained, with potential long‑term implications for the broader relationship. At the same time, experts often underline that actually taking control of Greenland is probably not the top operational priority for the United States as a whole: if it truly were, there exist many more traditional diplomatic and military means to try to advance such claim. What many Europeans may see as erratic or hard to interpret, can also be seen as a high‑risk attempt by the Trump administration to renegotiate the terms of US leadership in the alliance, to signal determination in dealing with Russia and China, and to press Europeans to shoulder more responsibility in their neighbourhood.
What the Greenland situation reveals particularly clearly is a three‑dimensional model of the current European approach to the United States. Certain countries spoke very vigorously against President Trump’s claims, some took a more moderate approach and the rest avoided a strong stand. The pioneers of the most rigid approach, one can find in Denmark, France, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain and Italy. Poland, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania expressed their support to Greenland but with less confrontational rhetoric. The most ambivalent and cautious approaches we can find in Albania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye. Czech PM Andrej Babiš says he could not say that Czechia stands behind Greenlandand Hungarian FM Péter Szijjártó calls Greenland a “bilateral issue” and argues the EU should not get involved. These reactions illustrate the current political sentiments towards the US or its interests, and they are clearly motivated not only by values but also by national calculations: about security dependence on the US, fear of exposure to American tariffs, or domestic public opinion.
Three sentiment profiles towards the United States
Various European reactions to the Greenland crisis can be read as three distinct sentiment profiles towards the United States as a security provider and political partner. They go beyond tactical comments on one dispute and reveal deeper orientations: resistance, reluctant dependence, and opportunistic accommodation.
Countries with the strongest, most confrontational stance: Denmark, France, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Italy, embody what can be called a defensive emancipation sentiment. Their rhetoric explicitly frames Trump’s Greenland policy as a violation of core principles (sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders) and as a direct challenge to the post‑1945 Euro‑Atlantic order. Mette Frederiksen’s warning that a US attack on Denmark would mean the effective end of NATO, Emmanuel Macron’s clear insistence that “we do prefer rule of law to brutality”, or Keir Starmer’s statement that Greenland’s future belongs solely to Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, all position these governments as actively pushing back against the idea that US strategic interests can overpower legal and political constraints. These states, and France is the strongest example, can afford such posture because they possess relatively advanced national defence industries, higher strategic depth, and greater political leverage within NATO and the EU, which reduces their immediate vulnerability to US military or economic pressure. They are not just disappointed with Trump, they interpret his behaviour as proof that Europe must prepare for a less predictable, more transactional American leadership, and they increasingly link the Greenland dispute with broader projects of EU strategic autonomy.
Second, a group of states such as Poland, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and others adopt a firm but more cautious line that can be described as strategic dependence with reservations. They support Denmark and Greenland’s right to self‑determination, join EU‑ or NATO‑level language, and do not question the illegitimacy of a forced annexation. At the same time, their public rhetoric is less theatrical and avoids strong personal attacks on Trump. In the Polish case, Prime Minister Donald Tusk signs a joint letter upholding Danish sovereignty, but also stresses the need to avoid fractures within NATO and to keep the US engaged on Ukraine. For the Netherlands, Mark Rutte’s role as NATO Secretary General is emblematic, as he quietly brokers a de‑escalation in Davos, while carefully preserving working relations with Washington. This caution illustrates structural dependence, as many of these states, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, rely heavily on US military presence, intelligence, defence procurement, and they lack the industrial or strategic capacity to fill those gaps. These countries notice an erosion of trust and recognise the danger of US coercion, yet they remain aware of their military dependence on US capabilities and of their own limited ability to substitute those guarantees in the short term. Their response is therefore to manage the crisis through institutions and soft balancing, not open confrontation. The US is seen as both indispensable and increasingly unpredictable.
Third, the most ambivalent and cautious reactions from Albania, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye illustrate a transactional alignment with Washington, where maintaining a close bilateral relationship with the US current administration can take precedence over visible alignment with Denmark. These governments either relativise the issue or reframe it as something that should not mobilise the EU or NATO collectively. Their positioning is enabled by looser embedding in the EU security frameworks, pronounced euroscepticism, or In Türkiye’s case, its status outside the EU, which shifts incentives away from collective European action, towards pragmatic, bilateral engagement with Washington. In these cases, the underlying sentiment is less about trust in the United States as a guardian of a rules‑based order and more about maximising room for manoeuvre with both Washington and Brussels. Ideological affinity with Trump’s criticism of the EU, expectations of bilateral benefits, or domestic political calculus make these governments reluctant to invest political capital in defending Greenland.
Taken together, these three profiles show that the Greenland crisis functions as a stress test of transatlantic trust: some states react by demanding clearer constraints on US power, others by hedging within existing institutions, and a third group by quietly aligning with Trump’s preferences even at the cost of European unity. This same pattern will later be mirrored in attitudes towards Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, which turns these sentiments into coherent responses.
Erosion and reconfiguration of trust in the United States
The Greenland episode functions as much more than a single diplomatic quarrel: it exposes a structural shift in how European allies understand and trust the United States as a security provider.
For the countries in the defensive‑emancipation group, the Greenland crisis confirms a deeper worry: that the American security guarantee is no longer based on a shared understanding of the rules, but increasingly in circumstantial preferences. When Frederiksen suggests that a US attack on Denmark would mean “the end of NATO,” he is effectively saying that Article 5 can no longer be taken for granted if the strongest ally questions the very sovereignty of another member. Trust is not broken overnight, but it is redefined: instead of a firm belief in US reliability, it becomes conditional and transactional, tied to constant efforts to hedge through EU defence initiatives, anti‑coercion tools and closer intra‑European coordination.
The strategic‑dependence group experiences a different kind of erosion. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania do not suddenly stop trusting the US militarily, as they know their own security still relies heavily on American capabilities. But the Greenland crisis forces them to start separating military potential from political leadership. The result is a more cautious, almost technocratic form of trust: they continue to rely on US hardware and nuclear guarantees, while investing in EU mechanisms, regional projects and diversification of partnerships in case the political relationship becomes more volatile.
The transactional‑alignment group, finally, illustrates how trust can shift from institutions towards more personalised or bilateral relationships. Albania, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye place relatively less emphasis in their public rhetoric on defending NATO or EU norms as such, and more on maintaining constructive ties with the current US administration. In this perspective, trust in the United States is less about the predictability of the alliance as a whole and more about sustaining a favourable relationship with the American administration. This does not mean these governments are naïve about US power, but rather, they appear willing to accept a degree of strain on NATO cohesion in exchange for what they see as additional leverage, protection or political support through close bilateral relations.
The “Board of Peace” as an instrument of selection and division
Trump’s proposed Board of Peace fits closely with the dynamics revealed by the Greenland issue. Its relevance here lies not in normative evaluation or long-term viability, but in how European governments respond to its invitation, framing, and institutional design. The early invitation and acceptance pattern broadly reflects the three profiles, even if it is not mechanically determined by them. France, one of the loudest critics of Trump’s approach to both Greenland and Gaza, has formally declined to join, arguing that the Board’s charter grants excessive powers to its chair and risks undermining the UN system. Türkiye, by contrast, has signed the charter and now presents the Board as a valuable vehicle for regional diplomacy. Poland sits uneasily in between: the president has been invited and attended the launch in Davos, the opposition calls for buying a permanent seat, while the current government and foreign minister publicly question the idea of sharing a table with Putin and insist that parliament would have to approve any such move.
These choices do not map one‑to‑one onto the three profiles, but they broadly confirm the underlying logic: states most committed to defending existing multilateral rules are the least willing to join the Board, those most comfortable with a transactional relationship with Washington are the quickest to sign up, and a middle group tries to keep the door open without fully committing.
In this perspective, aforementioned European sentiment profiles, become a kind of informal entrance exam for the Board. Countries that reacted the strongest to the Greenland issue, may appear as obstructionists, insisting on legal limits and EU instruments. They are indispensable militarily and economically, but politically awkward. In a Board of Peace logic they are more likely to be treated as problematic partners rather than welcomed allies.
States in the strategic‑dependence group are more ambiguous candidates. They support Denmark and Greenland in principle, but avoid escalating the confrontation and invest heavily in keeping the US engaged in Europe and Ukraine. Their governments signal that they are willing to live with a more transactional United States, as long as core security interests are preserved. For the Trump administration, this makes them potential swing players: not fully trusted, but open to persuasion, pressure or selective incentives such as invitations to participate in US‑led initiatives, promises of defence contracts, or symbolic inclusion in elite formats like the Board.
The third group is closest to what the Board of Peace is designed to attract. By treating Greenland as a “bilateral issue,” blocking stronger EU statements or declining to sign joint declarations, these governments show they are willing to prioritise bilateral favour with Washington over collective discipline. In the logic implied by the administration’s statements and invitations, such behaviour appears to be rewarded with closer inclusion : leaders who do not question the premise that the US can unilaterally define its security needs and expect allies to adapt. For them, Board membership would promise status, political backing and perhaps economic or security benefits in return for loyalty.
Conclusion: Greenland as a symptom, not an exception
The Greenland crisis shows how a single dispute can serve as an early stress test for bigger changes in the transatlantic relationship. Trump’s statements about acquiring Greenland, the tariff threats, and the new US defence strategy have not broken the alliance, but they have changed how Europeans think about American leadership. The three sentiment profiles capture different ways of adapting to a United States that is still militarily indispensable but perceived as more assertive and less predictable. Some governments respond by insisting more strongly on rules and autonomy, others by managing tensions through NATO and EU instruments, and a third group by prioritising close bilateral ties with Washington.
The debate around the Board of Peace reinforces these patterns. Choices on whether and how to engage with this new format largely mirror the attitudes revealed by the Greenland episode. Taken together, these developments suggest that transatlantic trust is no longer a given. It has become something that European states allocate differently, negotiate more actively, and in some cases deliberately condition. Greenland is therefore less an anomaly than an early stress test of a more complex, more differentiated phase of the US-Europe partnership.
Sources:
- Visit Greenland. “American Interest in Greenland.” Visit Greenland. https://visitgreenland.com/articles/american-interest-in-greenland/
- Miranda Bryant, “US Attack on Greenland Would Mean End of Nato, Says Danish PM,” The Guardian, January 5, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/trump-must-give-up-fantasies-about-annexation-says-greenland-pm
- Al Jazeera Staff and News Agencies, “European Leaders Hit Back at Trump’s US Takeover Designs on Greenland,” Al Jazeera, January 6, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/6/danish-pm-says-us-attack-on-greenland-would-be-the-end-of-nato
- French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. “France to Join Operation ‘Arctic Endurance’ in Greenland, Says Minister.” France Diplomacy. https://uk.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france-join-operation-arctic-endurance-greenland-minister
- Zoya Sheftalovich, “‘Our American Dream Is Dead’: EU Concedes Trump Is Not on Its Side,” Politico Europe, January 22, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-donald-trump-greenland-summit-davos-relief
- Jorge Liboreiro, “EU Leaders Demand Respect from Trump after Greenland Crisis Rattles Relationship,” Euronews, January 23, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/23/eu-leaders-demand-respect-from-trump-after-greenland-crisis-rattles-relationship
- Emmanuel Macron at Davos on bullying and rule of law:Aleksandar Brezar, “We Prefer Respect over Bullies, Macron Says at Davos as Trump Tensions Mount,” Euronews, January 20, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/20/we-do-prefer-respect-to-bullies-macron-says-at-davos-as-trump-tensions-mount
- Kevin Liptak, Kylie Atwood, and Tim Lister, “Trump’s Greenland Gambit Revives a Long, Complicated History between the US and Denmark,” CNN, January 7, 2026, https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/07/politics/us-greenland-trump-denmark-history-hnk
- US Department of Defense. 2026 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 23, 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jan/23/2003864773/-1/-1/0/2026-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY.PDF
- Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich (OSW). “USA–Dania–Grenlandia: Stan Gry i Scenariusze.” Analizy OSW, January 16, 2026, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2026-01-16/usa-dania-grenlandia-stan-gry-i-scenariusze
- Bryant, “US Attack on Greenland Would Mean End of Nato.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/trump-must-give-up-fantasies-about-annexation-says-greenland-pm
- Alice Tidey et al., “Relief for EU Leaders as Trump Drops Tariff Threat ahead of Emergency Talks – Follow Live,” Euronews, January 22–23, 2026, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/01/22/relief-for-eu-leaders-as-trump-drops-tariff-threat-ahead-of-emergency-talks-follow-live
- Frederiksen’s “end of NATO”:Miranda Bryant, “US Attack on Greenland Would Mean End of Nato, Says Danish PM,” The Guardian, January 5, 2026 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/trump-must-give-up-fantasies-about-annexation-says-greenland-pm
- Brezar, “We Prefer Respect over Bullies”
- European Newsroom. “Babiš Did Not Clearly Say That the Czech Republic Stands behind Greenland: He Prefers an Agreement within NATO.” European Newsroom, January 18, 2026, https://europeannewsroom.com/babis-did-not-clearly-say-that-the-czech-republic-stands-behind-greenland-he-prefers-an-agreement-within-nato-2/
- “Hungary Blocks EU Statement on Greenland as ‘Bilateral Issue’,” Hungarian Conservative, January 19, 2026, https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/greenland-hungary-viktor-orban-veto-eu-statement/
- Frederiksen’s “end of NATO”:Miranda Bryant, “US Attack on Greenland Would Mean End of Nato, Says Danish PM,” The Guardian, January 5, 2026 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jan/05/trump-must-give-up-fantasies-about-annexation-says-greenland-pm
- Brezar, “We Prefer Respect over Bullies.”
- “Greenland Belongs to Denmark and Greenland, Says Starmer,” BBC News, January 6, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy9yq8znq37o
- “EU–US Relations Are in Crisis, but Need to Be Protected – Tusk,” Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP), January 22, 2026, https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/eu-us-relations-are-crisis-need-be-protected-tusk
- Lara Jakes, Jim Tankersley, and Zolan Kanno‑Youngs, “Trump Says He Has Framework for Greenland Deal as NATO Mulls Idea of U.S. Sovereignty over Bases,” New York Times, January 21, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/21/us/politics/trump-greenland-threats-diplomacy-force.html
- Clea Caulcutt, “France Rejects Trump Gaza Peace Board Invite over Fears It Wants to Supplant UN,” Politico Europe, January 19, 2026, https://www.politico.eu/article/france-rejects-trump-gaza-peace-board-invite-over-fears-it-wants-to-supplant-un
- Türkiye Signs Trump’s ‘Board of Peace’ Charter,” Daily Sabah, January 20, 2026, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/turkiye-signs-trumps-board-of-peace-charter/news
- “Miliard dolarów za udział w Radzie Pokoju? Jarosław Kaczyński: Nie jesteśmy biedni,” Rzeczpospolita, January 21, 2026, https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art43692681-miliard-dolarow-za-udzial-w-radzie-pokoju-jaroslaw-kaczynski-nie-jestesmy-biedni
- “Karol Nawrocki w Radzie Pokoju? MSZ Przekazał Opinię,” RMF24, January 22, 2026, https://www.rmf24.pl/polityka/news-karol-nawrocki-w-radzie-pokoju-msz-przekazal-opinie,nId,8059412
Greenland
Autor foto: Public Domain
Greenland as a stress test of Transatlantic trust: European security sentiments in the Trump Era
January 30, 2026
Author: Jagoda Synowiec
Greenland
Autor foto: Public Domain
Greenland as a stress test of Transatlantic trust: European security sentiments in the Trump Era
Author: Jagoda Synowiec
Published: January 30, 2026
Recent events in relation to Greenland struck a lot of controversy and provoked many reactions. The subject isn’t new as the first time Donald Trump publicly admitted that the US should try to acquire Greenland was 18th August 2019. That day, he confirmed he was considering an attempt to buy Greenland and added that it “would be strategically nice [for the USA to own]”. On January 10th 2026 the president told reporters that the US would acquire Greenland without ruling out the usage of force. That statement was followed by a chain of events. Right away Greenlandic party leaders rejected the annexation and affirmed independence. Denmark and other European allies sent small reconnaissance teams to Greenland to prepare the Danish‑led exercise “Arctic Endurance,” aimed at strengthening Arctic security under NATO frameworks. Consequently, Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Denmark and European countries that decided to send their troops to Greenland. This decision was largely perceived in Europe as coercive economic pressure and a sign the current US administration might seriously consider a forceful takeover if diplomatic pressure fails. This perception translated into statements by certain EU leaders underlining that Greenlandic sovereignty is non‑negotiable and that an attack on Denmark would effectively mean the end of NATO as we know it. As of today, several European countries have signed a joint letter affirming sovereignty, territorial integrity and that “Greenland belongs to its people.” Overall, including joint and individual statements, there isn’t any NATO country that has said nothing on the matter. The weakest positions were taken by governments of Türkiye, Albania, Hungary, Slovakia or Czech Republic, that gave short or cautious public comments referring to welcoming talks, bilateral issue, or prioritising peaceful negotiation. Analytically, the Greenland episode matters not as much as a territorial dispute than as a moment of forced disclosure, in which European governments revealed how far they are willing to go to defend alliance norms when confronted with unilateral pressure from the United States.
From a strategic perspective, it is important to note that the Trump administration is not operating in a complete vacuum. For decades, US planners have seen Greenland as crucial for the defence of the North American continent, for missile warning and space surveillance, and for monitoring Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic. The island’s location in the GIUK gap and its potential in terms of critical raw materials all feed into a long‑standing American perception that Greenland is central to homeland security and long‑term economic resilience. In this sense, the current administration’s focus on Greenland continues a broader tradition of US strategic thinking, but uses more confrontational tools than previous administrations to pursue these interests.
The new US National Defense Strategy published on January 24th 2026 did not help to bring peace within the alliance. The strategy downgrades Europe as a priority and explicitly elevates Greenland, listing it alongside the Panama Canal as terrain the US must secure to protect homeland interests and pledging to guarantee US military and commercial access to key routes (amongst them Greenland), framed under a revived Monroe Doctrine logic. For many European observers, this document appeared to codify in official language the shift they already sensed from recent statements: a move toward a more unilateral, hemisphere‑centred vision of security in which European concerns risk becoming secondary.
The “Greenland fuss” can therefore be perceived as a shift of relations within the transatlantic alliance, possibly to the point of no easy return to what existed before. The trust between Europe and the current US administration has been visibly strained, with potential long‑term implications for the broader relationship. At the same time, experts often underline that actually taking control of Greenland is probably not the top operational priority for the United States as a whole: if it truly were, there exist many more traditional diplomatic and military means to try to advance such claim. What many Europeans may see as erratic or hard to interpret, can also be seen as a high‑risk attempt by the Trump administration to renegotiate the terms of US leadership in the alliance, to signal determination in dealing with Russia and China, and to press Europeans to shoulder more responsibility in their neighbourhood.
What the Greenland situation reveals particularly clearly is a three‑dimensional model of the current European approach to the United States. Certain countries spoke very vigorously against President Trump’s claims, some took a more moderate approach and the rest avoided a strong stand. The pioneers of the most rigid approach, one can find in Denmark, France, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain and Italy. Poland, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania expressed their support to Greenland but with less confrontational rhetoric. The most ambivalent and cautious approaches we can find in Albania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye. Czech PM Andrej Babiš says he could not say that Czechia stands behind Greenlandand Hungarian FM Péter Szijjártó calls Greenland a “bilateral issue” and argues the EU should not get involved. These reactions illustrate the current political sentiments towards the US or its interests, and they are clearly motivated not only by values but also by national calculations: about security dependence on the US, fear of exposure to American tariffs, or domestic public opinion.
Three sentiment profiles towards the United States
Various European reactions to the Greenland crisis can be read as three distinct sentiment profiles towards the United States as a security provider and political partner. They go beyond tactical comments on one dispute and reveal deeper orientations: resistance, reluctant dependence, and opportunistic accommodation.
Countries with the strongest, most confrontational stance: Denmark, France, Norway, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Italy, embody what can be called a defensive emancipation sentiment. Their rhetoric explicitly frames Trump’s Greenland policy as a violation of core principles (sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders) and as a direct challenge to the post‑1945 Euro‑Atlantic order. Mette Frederiksen’s warning that a US attack on Denmark would mean the effective end of NATO, Emmanuel Macron’s clear insistence that “we do prefer rule of law to brutality”, or Keir Starmer’s statement that Greenland’s future belongs solely to Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark, all position these governments as actively pushing back against the idea that US strategic interests can overpower legal and political constraints. These states, and France is the strongest example, can afford such posture because they possess relatively advanced national defence industries, higher strategic depth, and greater political leverage within NATO and the EU, which reduces their immediate vulnerability to US military or economic pressure. They are not just disappointed with Trump, they interpret his behaviour as proof that Europe must prepare for a less predictable, more transactional American leadership, and they increasingly link the Greenland dispute with broader projects of EU strategic autonomy.
Second, a group of states such as Poland, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and others adopt a firm but more cautious line that can be described as strategic dependence with reservations. They support Denmark and Greenland’s right to self‑determination, join EU‑ or NATO‑level language, and do not question the illegitimacy of a forced annexation. At the same time, their public rhetoric is less theatrical and avoids strong personal attacks on Trump. In the Polish case, Prime Minister Donald Tusk signs a joint letter upholding Danish sovereignty, but also stresses the need to avoid fractures within NATO and to keep the US engaged on Ukraine. For the Netherlands, Mark Rutte’s role as NATO Secretary General is emblematic, as he quietly brokers a de‑escalation in Davos, while carefully preserving working relations with Washington. This caution illustrates structural dependence, as many of these states, particularly on NATO’s eastern flank, rely heavily on US military presence, intelligence, defence procurement, and they lack the industrial or strategic capacity to fill those gaps. These countries notice an erosion of trust and recognise the danger of US coercion, yet they remain aware of their military dependence on US capabilities and of their own limited ability to substitute those guarantees in the short term. Their response is therefore to manage the crisis through institutions and soft balancing, not open confrontation. The US is seen as both indispensable and increasingly unpredictable.
Third, the most ambivalent and cautious reactions from Albania, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye illustrate a transactional alignment with Washington, where maintaining a close bilateral relationship with the US current administration can take precedence over visible alignment with Denmark. These governments either relativise the issue or reframe it as something that should not mobilise the EU or NATO collectively. Their positioning is enabled by looser embedding in the EU security frameworks, pronounced euroscepticism, or In Türkiye’s case, its status outside the EU, which shifts incentives away from collective European action, towards pragmatic, bilateral engagement with Washington. In these cases, the underlying sentiment is less about trust in the United States as a guardian of a rules‑based order and more about maximising room for manoeuvre with both Washington and Brussels. Ideological affinity with Trump’s criticism of the EU, expectations of bilateral benefits, or domestic political calculus make these governments reluctant to invest political capital in defending Greenland.
Taken together, these three profiles show that the Greenland crisis functions as a stress test of transatlantic trust: some states react by demanding clearer constraints on US power, others by hedging within existing institutions, and a third group by quietly aligning with Trump’s preferences even at the cost of European unity. This same pattern will later be mirrored in attitudes towards Trump’s proposed Board of Peace, which turns these sentiments into coherent responses.
Erosion and reconfiguration of trust in the United States
The Greenland episode functions as much more than a single diplomatic quarrel: it exposes a structural shift in how European allies understand and trust the United States as a security provider.
For the countries in the defensive‑emancipation group, the Greenland crisis confirms a deeper worry: that the American security guarantee is no longer based on a shared understanding of the rules, but increasingly in circumstantial preferences. When Frederiksen suggests that a US attack on Denmark would mean “the end of NATO,” he is effectively saying that Article 5 can no longer be taken for granted if the strongest ally questions the very sovereignty of another member. Trust is not broken overnight, but it is redefined: instead of a firm belief in US reliability, it becomes conditional and transactional, tied to constant efforts to hedge through EU defence initiatives, anti‑coercion tools and closer intra‑European coordination.
The strategic‑dependence group experiences a different kind of erosion. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Romania do not suddenly stop trusting the US militarily, as they know their own security still relies heavily on American capabilities. But the Greenland crisis forces them to start separating military potential from political leadership. The result is a more cautious, almost technocratic form of trust: they continue to rely on US hardware and nuclear guarantees, while investing in EU mechanisms, regional projects and diversification of partnerships in case the political relationship becomes more volatile.
The transactional‑alignment group, finally, illustrates how trust can shift from institutions towards more personalised or bilateral relationships. Albania, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Türkiye place relatively less emphasis in their public rhetoric on defending NATO or EU norms as such, and more on maintaining constructive ties with the current US administration. In this perspective, trust in the United States is less about the predictability of the alliance as a whole and more about sustaining a favourable relationship with the American administration. This does not mean these governments are naïve about US power, but rather, they appear willing to accept a degree of strain on NATO cohesion in exchange for what they see as additional leverage, protection or political support through close bilateral relations.
The “Board of Peace” as an instrument of selection and division
Trump’s proposed Board of Peace fits closely with the dynamics revealed by the Greenland issue. Its relevance here lies not in normative evaluation or long-term viability, but in how European governments respond to its invitation, framing, and institutional design. The early invitation and acceptance pattern broadly reflects the three profiles, even if it is not mechanically determined by them. France, one of the loudest critics of Trump’s approach to both Greenland and Gaza, has formally declined to join, arguing that the Board’s charter grants excessive powers to its chair and risks undermining the UN system. Türkiye, by contrast, has signed the charter and now presents the Board as a valuable vehicle for regional diplomacy. Poland sits uneasily in between: the president has been invited and attended the launch in Davos, the opposition calls for buying a permanent seat, while the current government and foreign minister publicly question the idea of sharing a table with Putin and insist that parliament would have to approve any such move.
These choices do not map one‑to‑one onto the three profiles, but they broadly confirm the underlying logic: states most committed to defending existing multilateral rules are the least willing to join the Board, those most comfortable with a transactional relationship with Washington are the quickest to sign up, and a middle group tries to keep the door open without fully committing.
In this perspective, aforementioned European sentiment profiles, become a kind of informal entrance exam for the Board. Countries that reacted the strongest to the Greenland issue, may appear as obstructionists, insisting on legal limits and EU instruments. They are indispensable militarily and economically, but politically awkward. In a Board of Peace logic they are more likely to be treated as problematic partners rather than welcomed allies.
States in the strategic‑dependence group are more ambiguous candidates. They support Denmark and Greenland in principle, but avoid escalating the confrontation and invest heavily in keeping the US engaged in Europe and Ukraine. Their governments signal that they are willing to live with a more transactional United States, as long as core security interests are preserved. For the Trump administration, this makes them potential swing players: not fully trusted, but open to persuasion, pressure or selective incentives such as invitations to participate in US‑led initiatives, promises of defence contracts, or symbolic inclusion in elite formats like the Board.
The third group is closest to what the Board of Peace is designed to attract. By treating Greenland as a “bilateral issue,” blocking stronger EU statements or declining to sign joint declarations, these governments show they are willing to prioritise bilateral favour with Washington over collective discipline. In the logic implied by the administration’s statements and invitations, such behaviour appears to be rewarded with closer inclusion : leaders who do not question the premise that the US can unilaterally define its security needs and expect allies to adapt. For them, Board membership would promise status, political backing and perhaps economic or security benefits in return for loyalty.
Conclusion: Greenland as a symptom, not an exception
The Greenland crisis shows how a single dispute can serve as an early stress test for bigger changes in the transatlantic relationship. Trump’s statements about acquiring Greenland, the tariff threats, and the new US defence strategy have not broken the alliance, but they have changed how Europeans think about American leadership. The three sentiment profiles capture different ways of adapting to a United States that is still militarily indispensable but perceived as more assertive and less predictable. Some governments respond by insisting more strongly on rules and autonomy, others by managing tensions through NATO and EU instruments, and a third group by prioritising close bilateral ties with Washington.
The debate around the Board of Peace reinforces these patterns. Choices on whether and how to engage with this new format largely mirror the attitudes revealed by the Greenland episode. Taken together, these developments suggest that transatlantic trust is no longer a given. It has become something that European states allocate differently, negotiate more actively, and in some cases deliberately condition. Greenland is therefore less an anomaly than an early stress test of a more complex, more differentiated phase of the US-Europe partnership.
Sources:
Related Posts
Between the Hegemon and the Revisionist: China’s Strategic Wedge in the Western Hemisphere
Beyond the False Choice. Trump’s Board of Peace as a Test of Rules and Power
Negotiating the Same War. Russia’s Continuum, America’s Cycles, and Why Momentum Still Isn’t Change?
Withdrawal as Doctrine: American Power Between Institutions and Precedent.
Central Asia’s Rising Strategic Weight and the G20 Moment: Why Poland Should Pay Attention?