
IMG_3526
Autor foto: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego
Energy resilience as a core component of deterrence in the face of hybrid and geopolitical threats
Published: May 15, 2025


IMG_3526
Autor foto: Fundacja im. Kazimierza Pułaskiego
Energy resilience as a core component of deterrence in the face of hybrid and geopolitical threats
Opublikowano: May 15, 2025
On 13th May 2025 at the margins of the Informal Meeting of the Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Council held in Warsaw within the Polish Presidency in the European Council, Casimir Pulaski Foundation had the pleasure of hosting a roundtable with senior decision-makers and experts from the public, private sectors and from key think tanks. Taking into account Presidency priorities, the discussion concentrated on one of the most pressing strategic challenges: energy resilience as a core component of deterrence in the face of hybrid and geopolitical threats with particular focus on Moldova and Ukraine.
The event was attended by Minister Dorin Junghietu, Ministry of Energy of Moldova, Secretary of State Krzysztof Bolesta, Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment, Laurent Kueny Director for Energy, Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty of France and Adam Balogh, Head of Ukraine Support Task Force Unit, Energy Community.
The discussion brought some current issues such as:
- From infrastructure to operational resilience (LNG, interconnectors, storage)
- Lessons from Ukraine’s wartime energy resilience – what can be adopted regionally?
- Securing supply chains, mobile assets, and emergency planning
- The Baltic Resilience Initiative (BRI) – a systemic, cross-border approach to embedding resilience in the region
First, the traditional approaches to energy security— focused solely on physical infrastructure and interconnectivity—are insufficient in the face of modern hybrid threats. There needs to be a holistic approach that integrates infrastructure protection, cyber resilience, tackling disinformation and strategic foresight.
Current threats to our critical energy infrastructure are much more complex than they were just a decade ago. There are greater geopolitical and technological risks on the horizon. Therefore, we as decision-makers, industry, experts and technology providers have to be more proactive, anticipatory than just reactive.
Europe’s energy security should not depend only on legacy systems like the East-West gas corridors and current interconnectors. These need to be part of a more flexible and adaptive infrastructure strategy. We call for greater emphasis on the Baltic–Black Sea corridor to enhance our energy security and resilience. One way to conceptualise the potential of the Baltic-Black Sea corridor is through materialising initiatives like the Baltic Resilience Initiative – aims to boost coordination between national authorities, private entities and other interested parties (like regulators, think tanks, researchers) to bridge existing regulatory and governance gaps.
Finally, we need to put into action lessons learned from both Ukraine and Moldova, which have experienced unprecedented attacks and pressure on their energy systems in recent years.
On 13th May 2025 at the margins of the Informal Meeting of the Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Council held in Warsaw within the Polish Presidency in the European Council, Casimir Pulaski Foundation had the pleasure of hosting a roundtable with senior decision-makers and experts from the public, private sectors and from key think tanks. Taking into account Presidency priorities, the discussion concentrated on one of the most pressing strategic challenges: energy resilience as a core component of deterrence in the face of hybrid and geopolitical threats with particular focus on Moldova and Ukraine.
The event was attended by Minister Dorin Junghietu, Ministry of Energy of Moldova, Secretary of State Krzysztof Bolesta, Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment, Laurent Kueny Director for Energy, Ministry of Economics, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty of France and Adam Balogh, Head of Ukraine Support Task Force Unit, Energy Community.
The discussion brought some current issues such as:
- From infrastructure to operational resilience (LNG, interconnectors, storage)
- Lessons from Ukraine’s wartime energy resilience – what can be adopted regionally?
- Securing supply chains, mobile assets, and emergency planning
- The Baltic Resilience Initiative (BRI) – a systemic, cross-border approach to embedding resilience in the region
First, the traditional approaches to energy security— focused solely on physical infrastructure and interconnectivity—are insufficient in the face of modern hybrid threats. There needs to be a holistic approach that integrates infrastructure protection, cyber resilience, tackling disinformation and strategic foresight.
Current threats to our critical energy infrastructure are much more complex than they were just a decade ago. There are greater geopolitical and technological risks on the horizon. Therefore, we as decision-makers, industry, experts and technology providers have to be more proactive, anticipatory than just reactive.
Europe’s energy security should not depend only on legacy systems like the East-West gas corridors and current interconnectors. These need to be part of a more flexible and adaptive infrastructure strategy. We call for greater emphasis on the Baltic–Black Sea corridor to enhance our energy security and resilience. One way to conceptualise the potential of the Baltic-Black Sea corridor is through materialising initiatives like the Baltic Resilience Initiative – aims to boost coordination between national authorities, private entities and other interested parties (like regulators, think tanks, researchers) to bridge existing regulatory and governance gaps.
Finally, we need to put into action lessons learned from both Ukraine and Moldova, which have experienced unprecedented attacks and pressure on their energy systems in recent years.