The results of the first round in Romania’s last week presidential elections shocked Europe after the unexpected rise of Călin Georgescu, a far-right candidate with a blatant anti-Western discourse that appeared suddenly in the national political landscape.
Georgescu won the first round of the elections with 23% of the vote, outvoting the competitors of the two main political parties PSD (social-democrats) and PNL (national-liberals), without support from any political party and no declared funding for his campaign[i]. An absent figure from all the polls leading up to the election, and with no exposure on the traditional media (TV remains the primary source of information for the majority of Romanians[ii]), his surprising rise in voters’ favorability is due to an infrastructure of 5,000 Tik Tok accounts amplified in the last two weeks of the electoral campaign[iii]. It’s primarily the reason why, in the growing landscape of the radical right-wing politicians that rise to power in Europe, Georgescu is not a rose with any other name.
His astonishing increase would not have been possible without the algorithmic backing of Tik Tok, which prompted the Romanian authorities to urgently ask the European Commission to investigate the company’s actions and compliance under the Digital Services Act[iv]. Furthermore, the leader of the liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament summoned the Tik Tok CEO to be heard in the EU legislature on this matter[v]. Pavel Popescu, Vice-president of the National Authority for Management in Communications of Romania and former President of the Defence Committee in the Romanian Parliament called for the Tik Tok app to be banned from Romania’s territory until the investigations are finalized[vi], and the Romanian President called for an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for National Defense to discuss possible interference of state and non-state actors in the electoral process[vii]. The conclusions of the Supreme Council for National Defense reflect the fact that there were cyber-attacks aimed at influencing the fairness of the electoral process on the Romanian territory, but also the fact that the visibility of candidate Georgescu in relation to the other candidates was increased, which means that TikTok did not comply with the legal norms regulating the electoral process, with an impact on the final result[viii].
The second round of the presidential elections, scheduled for December 8, will be contested between Călin Georgescu and Elena Lasconi, president of the Union Save Romania (member of Renew Europe), a centrist liberal candidate. In an attempt to create a cordon sanitaire over Georgescu, several young people have protested in Romania’s major cities and center-right parties have announced their unequivocal support for Lasconi. This is currently the only guarantee that Romania will remain on its Euro-Atlantic trajectory, given that Georgescu’s proposals are deeply Eurosceptic, amplified by a mystical-religious and ultra-nationalist discourse. Georgescu went so far as to point out that Romania does not need to remain in NATO because it does not provide any security[ix]. Another statement by Georgescu indicates that he does not believe the war in Ukraine is really happening[x], as the independent candidate is an open admirer of Putin[xi].
Poised to elect a new parliament on December 1, which will be much more fragmented than the current one given the rise of the sovereigntist pole, Romania is about to make a presidential election in which its very stability as a Black Sea security actor hangs just a week after. However, the complexity of Georgescu’s rise exposes another problem, this time Euro-Atlantic: the dependence that our democracies have on a platform controlled by an actor with an opaque strategic agenda – China’s TikTok. The response to this complex interdependence must be a common, Euro-Atlantic one, but for now, it seems that discussions on TikTok as a national security issue are on standby on both sides of the Atlantic. In the shadow of this curtain left on an absolutely necessary discussion, TikTok becomes a laboratory for influencing our electoral processes, on whose integrity the very vitality of our democracies depends.
Author: Antonia-Laura Pup, Research Fellow, Casimir Pulaski Foundation
[i] Redacția, “Oficial: Călin Georgescu a raportat zero lei cheltuiți în campania electorală, în ciuda campaniei masive pe Tiktok și rețele sociale / Marcel Ciolacu a raportat cheltuieli electorale de aproape 57 de milioane de lei,” G4Media.ro, November 27, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/oficial-calin-georgescu-a-raportat-zero-lei-cheltuiti-in-campania-electorala-in-ciuda-campaniei-masive-pe-tiktok-si-retele-sociale-marcel-ciolacu-a-raportat-cheltuieli-electorale-de-aproape-57-de.html.
[ii] “Peste jumătate dintre români folosesc TV-ul ca principală sursă de informare. Ce cred despre dezinformare (sondaj INSCOP),” March 18, 2024, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/social/peste-jumatate-dintre-romani-folosesc-tv-ul-ca-principala-sursa-de-informare-sondaj-inscop-ce-cred-despre-dezinformare-2726237.
[iii] “Jurnalistă, Dezvăluiri Despre Călin Georgescu: O Infrastructură Uriaşă de 5.000 Conturi Tik Tok, Clanuri, Boţi, Finanţatori Anonimi,” accessed November 27, 2024, https://epochtimes-romania.com/news/jurnalista-dezvaluiri-despre-calin-georgescu-o-infrastructura-uriasa-de-5-000-conturi-tik-tok-clanuri-boti-finantatori-anonimi—363663.
[iv] “ANCOM sesizează Comisia Europeană cu privire la Tiktok după campania lui Călin Georgescu. „TikTok nu a acţionat cu celeritate la solicitarea autorităţii române”,” euronews.ro: Știri de ultimă oră, breaking news, #AllViews, November 27, 2024, https://www.euronews.ro/articole/ancom-a-sesizat-comisia-europeana-cu-privire-la-tiktok-dupa-campania-lui-calin-ge.
[v] “TikTok CEO Summoned to European Parliament over Role in Shock Romania Election,” POLITICO, November 26, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/elections-tiktok-ceo-eu-parliament-romania-election-fake-accounts-pro-russia-calin-georgescu-nato-shock-victory/.
[vi] “Vicepreședintele ANCOM Cere Suspendarea Platformei TikTok Pe Teritoriul României | Adevarul.Ro,” Adevarul.ro, November 27, 2024, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-interne/evenimente/vicepresedintele-ancom-cere-suspendarea-tiktok-pe-2404808.html.
[vii] Redacția, “BREAKING Iohannis convoacă CSAT pentru analiza unor posibile riscuri la adresa securității naționale generate de acțiunile unor actori cibernetici statali și non-statali asupra unor infrastructuri IT&C, suport pentru procesul electoral,” G4Media.ro, November 27, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/breaking-iohannis-convoaca-csat-pentru-analiza-unor-posibile-riscuri-la-adresa-securitatii-nationale-generate-de-actiunile-unor-actori-cibernetici-statali-si-non-statali-asupra-unor-infrastructuri-it.html.
[viii] Romanian Presidency, “Ședința Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării,” November 28, 2024, https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302.
[ix] “Călin Georgescu: „NATO Este Cea Mai Slabă Alianță de Pe Fața Pământului” – HotNews.Ro,” accessed November 28, 2024, https://hotnews.ro/calin-georgescu-nato-este-cea-mai-slaba-alianta-de-pe-fata-pamantului-1844915.
[x] “Călin Georgescu neagă că e război în Ucraina. „Ați fost acolo? Ați văzut cu ochii dumneavoastră?”,” November 26, 2024, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/calin-georgescu-neaga-ca-e-razboi-in-ucraina-ati-fost-acolo-ati-vazut-cu-ochii-dumneavoastra-3021691.
[xi] “VIDEO Momentul În Care Călin Georgescu Nu Se Poate Dezice de Putin Și Devine Irascibil Când Este Rugat Să Răspundă Cu ”Da” Sau ”Nu” Dacă Îl Admiră / Georgescu, După Invazia Rusiei În Ucraina: ”Putin Își Iubește Țara”,” November 25, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/video-momentul-in-care-calin-georgescu-nu-se-poate-dezice-de-putin-si-devine-irascibil-cand-este-rugat-sa-raspunda-cu-da-sau-nu-daca-il-admira-georgescu-dupa-inv.html.
Georgescu
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
Europe holds its breath, as ultra-nationalist Tik-Tok enabled Călin Georgescu wins the first round of Romanian presidential elections. What’s next?
December 3, 2024
Author: Antonia-Laura Pup
Georgescu
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
Europe holds its breath, as ultra-nationalist Tik-Tok enabled Călin Georgescu wins the first round of Romanian presidential elections. What’s next?
Author: Antonia-Laura Pup
Published: December 3, 2024
The results of the first round in Romania’s last week presidential elections shocked Europe after the unexpected rise of Călin Georgescu, a far-right candidate with a blatant anti-Western discourse that appeared suddenly in the national political landscape.
Georgescu won the first round of the elections with 23% of the vote, outvoting the competitors of the two main political parties PSD (social-democrats) and PNL (national-liberals), without support from any political party and no declared funding for his campaign[i]. An absent figure from all the polls leading up to the election, and with no exposure on the traditional media (TV remains the primary source of information for the majority of Romanians[ii]), his surprising rise in voters’ favorability is due to an infrastructure of 5,000 Tik Tok accounts amplified in the last two weeks of the electoral campaign[iii]. It’s primarily the reason why, in the growing landscape of the radical right-wing politicians that rise to power in Europe, Georgescu is not a rose with any other name.
His astonishing increase would not have been possible without the algorithmic backing of Tik Tok, which prompted the Romanian authorities to urgently ask the European Commission to investigate the company’s actions and compliance under the Digital Services Act[iv]. Furthermore, the leader of the liberal Renew Europe group in the European Parliament summoned the Tik Tok CEO to be heard in the EU legislature on this matter[v]. Pavel Popescu, Vice-president of the National Authority for Management in Communications of Romania and former President of the Defence Committee in the Romanian Parliament called for the Tik Tok app to be banned from Romania’s territory until the investigations are finalized[vi], and the Romanian President called for an emergency meeting of the Supreme Council for National Defense to discuss possible interference of state and non-state actors in the electoral process[vii]. The conclusions of the Supreme Council for National Defense reflect the fact that there were cyber-attacks aimed at influencing the fairness of the electoral process on the Romanian territory, but also the fact that the visibility of candidate Georgescu in relation to the other candidates was increased, which means that TikTok did not comply with the legal norms regulating the electoral process, with an impact on the final result[viii].
The second round of the presidential elections, scheduled for December 8, will be contested between Călin Georgescu and Elena Lasconi, president of the Union Save Romania (member of Renew Europe), a centrist liberal candidate. In an attempt to create a cordon sanitaire over Georgescu, several young people have protested in Romania’s major cities and center-right parties have announced their unequivocal support for Lasconi. This is currently the only guarantee that Romania will remain on its Euro-Atlantic trajectory, given that Georgescu’s proposals are deeply Eurosceptic, amplified by a mystical-religious and ultra-nationalist discourse. Georgescu went so far as to point out that Romania does not need to remain in NATO because it does not provide any security[ix]. Another statement by Georgescu indicates that he does not believe the war in Ukraine is really happening[x], as the independent candidate is an open admirer of Putin[xi].
Poised to elect a new parliament on December 1, which will be much more fragmented than the current one given the rise of the sovereigntist pole, Romania is about to make a presidential election in which its very stability as a Black Sea security actor hangs just a week after. However, the complexity of Georgescu’s rise exposes another problem, this time Euro-Atlantic: the dependence that our democracies have on a platform controlled by an actor with an opaque strategic agenda – China’s TikTok. The response to this complex interdependence must be a common, Euro-Atlantic one, but for now, it seems that discussions on TikTok as a national security issue are on standby on both sides of the Atlantic. In the shadow of this curtain left on an absolutely necessary discussion, TikTok becomes a laboratory for influencing our electoral processes, on whose integrity the very vitality of our democracies depends.
Author: Antonia-Laura Pup, Research Fellow, Casimir Pulaski Foundation
Antonia-Laura Pup is a Romanian Fulbright Student in the field of Security Studies at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, working as a teaching assistant at the Department for science, technology and international affairs (STIA). She is also completing her studies with a master’s degree in International Security at Sciences Po, where she is researching China’s geoeconomic influence in the Black Sea region. Antonia-Laura has been the policy advisor of the President of the Defense Committee in the Romanian Chamber of Deputies.
Sources:
[i] Redacția, “Oficial: Călin Georgescu a raportat zero lei cheltuiți în campania electorală, în ciuda campaniei masive pe Tiktok și rețele sociale / Marcel Ciolacu a raportat cheltuieli electorale de aproape 57 de milioane de lei,” G4Media.ro, November 27, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/oficial-calin-georgescu-a-raportat-zero-lei-cheltuiti-in-campania-electorala-in-ciuda-campaniei-masive-pe-tiktok-si-retele-sociale-marcel-ciolacu-a-raportat-cheltuieli-electorale-de-aproape-57-de.html.
[ii] “Peste jumătate dintre români folosesc TV-ul ca principală sursă de informare. Ce cred despre dezinformare (sondaj INSCOP),” March 18, 2024, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/social/peste-jumatate-dintre-romani-folosesc-tv-ul-ca-principala-sursa-de-informare-sondaj-inscop-ce-cred-despre-dezinformare-2726237.
[iii] “Jurnalistă, Dezvăluiri Despre Călin Georgescu: O Infrastructură Uriaşă de 5.000 Conturi Tik Tok, Clanuri, Boţi, Finanţatori Anonimi,” accessed November 27, 2024, https://epochtimes-romania.com/news/jurnalista-dezvaluiri-despre-calin-georgescu-o-infrastructura-uriasa-de-5-000-conturi-tik-tok-clanuri-boti-finantatori-anonimi—363663.
[iv] “ANCOM sesizează Comisia Europeană cu privire la Tiktok după campania lui Călin Georgescu. „TikTok nu a acţionat cu celeritate la solicitarea autorităţii române”,” euronews.ro: Știri de ultimă oră, breaking news, #AllViews, November 27, 2024, https://www.euronews.ro/articole/ancom-a-sesizat-comisia-europeana-cu-privire-la-tiktok-dupa-campania-lui-calin-ge.
[v] “TikTok CEO Summoned to European Parliament over Role in Shock Romania Election,” POLITICO, November 26, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/elections-tiktok-ceo-eu-parliament-romania-election-fake-accounts-pro-russia-calin-georgescu-nato-shock-victory/.
[vi] “Vicepreședintele ANCOM Cere Suspendarea Platformei TikTok Pe Teritoriul României | Adevarul.Ro,” Adevarul.ro, November 27, 2024, https://adevarul.ro/stiri-interne/evenimente/vicepresedintele-ancom-cere-suspendarea-tiktok-pe-2404808.html.
[vii] Redacția, “BREAKING Iohannis convoacă CSAT pentru analiza unor posibile riscuri la adresa securității naționale generate de acțiunile unor actori cibernetici statali și non-statali asupra unor infrastructuri IT&C, suport pentru procesul electoral,” G4Media.ro, November 27, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/breaking-iohannis-convoaca-csat-pentru-analiza-unor-posibile-riscuri-la-adresa-securitatii-nationale-generate-de-actiunile-unor-actori-cibernetici-statali-si-non-statali-asupra-unor-infrastructuri-it.html.
[viii] Romanian Presidency, “Ședința Consiliului Suprem de Apărare a Țării,” November 28, 2024, https://csat.presidency.ro/ro/comuni/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302/sedinta-consiliului-suprem-de-aparare-a-tarii1732806302.
[ix] “Călin Georgescu: „NATO Este Cea Mai Slabă Alianță de Pe Fața Pământului” – HotNews.Ro,” accessed November 28, 2024, https://hotnews.ro/calin-georgescu-nato-este-cea-mai-slaba-alianta-de-pe-fata-pamantului-1844915.
[x] “Călin Georgescu neagă că e război în Ucraina. „Ați fost acolo? Ați văzut cu ochii dumneavoastră?”,” November 26, 2024, https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/calin-georgescu-neaga-ca-e-razboi-in-ucraina-ati-fost-acolo-ati-vazut-cu-ochii-dumneavoastra-3021691.
[xi] “VIDEO Momentul În Care Călin Georgescu Nu Se Poate Dezice de Putin Și Devine Irascibil Când Este Rugat Să Răspundă Cu ”Da” Sau ”Nu” Dacă Îl Admiră / Georgescu, După Invazia Rusiei În Ucraina: ”Putin Își Iubește Țara”,” November 25, 2024, https://www.g4media.ro/video-momentul-in-care-calin-georgescu-nu-se-poate-dezice-de-putin-si-devine-irascibil-cand-este-rugat-sa-raspunda-cu-da-sau-nu-daca-il-admira-georgescu-dupa-inv.html.
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