Author: Ewa Polak

On March 20 of this year, the U.S. Department of State established a new institution—the Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response (DHR). It will be headed by Ryan Shrum, who previously served as Chief of Staff for the new Office of the Under Secretary for Foreign Assistance, Humanitarian Aid, and Religious Freedom—an entity linked to Jeremy Lewin’s Department of Government Efficiency (DODGE).

Alongside the revision of cooperation with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the drive for reform within UN agencies, the establishment of the DHR is a key component of the overhaul of U.S. foreign policy. This process was initiated in January 2025 following the suspension of USAID, at which point the State Department temporarily assumed the agency’s residual functions. In contrast to its predecessor, the DHR is a compact unit characterized by a high degree of centralization and a strictly defined, narrow mandate. The narrative accompanying the DHR’s creation emphasizes the execution of interventions whose objectives are now to be strictly correlated with U.S. national interests. The Bureau is to avoid involvement in crises within states deemed hostile or in locations where aid does not yield direct strategic benefits for the United States or its key allies. The primary priorities have been narrowed to directly life-saving actions, excluding initiatives of a “social cause” nature, those related to climate policy, or those deemed “ideologically charged.”

Compared to its predecessor (the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance—BHA—within the USAID structure), the DHR has undergone a drastic reduction in resources. Staffing has been cut by approximately 80%, from over 1,000 to a planned 232 DHR employees, including: 113 civil service officers, 79 foreign service officers, and 40 contract specialists.

The operating budget for 2026 is $5.4 billion under the consolidated International Humanitarian Assistance account. For comparison, USAID operated with a budget of approximately $40 billion, of which nearly $10 billion was designated for humanitarian actions primarily implemented by the agency (certain programs implemented by the State Department could also be added to the total American humanitarian engagement).

According to the public organizational chart proposal, the DHR is divided into three key pillars, each managed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The first is the Disaster and Response Pillar, which includes two offices: the Office of International Disaster Response Programs, focusing on sudden natural disasters, and the Office of Humanitarian Response Programs, focused on responding to crises caused by conflict and mass displacement. The second is the Programs and Coordination Pillar, also divided into two offices—one with a mandate to manage relations with contractors and partners, and a second dealing with food security. The third pillar is responsible for technical and operational matters. It is also divided into two main cells—one managing logistics, search and rescue teams, and the coordination of civil-military cooperation; and another for substantive program control, monitoring, and technical support.

The DHR, headquartered in Washington, will operate through a network of 12 regional hubs located at key flashpoints or strategic logistical centers. These locations are: Bogota, Colombia; Miami, Florida; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Bangkok, Thailand; Manila, Philippines; Dakar, Senegal; Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Kyiv, Ukraine; Dhaka, Bangladesh; and Amman, Jordan. USAID functioned as a much more extensive structure encompassing thematic and regional offices as well as a broad network of field missions. USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) itself included an elaborate structure of internal units and a global operational network. Following the reform, the foreign aid system has thus been significantly centralized.

The plan to establish the DHR also entails the separation of humanitarian aid from migration-related programs, which until now remained under the jurisdiction of the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). This involves a necessary restructuring of that bureau, including the relocation of employees previously responsible for crisis response tasks handled by PRM. If the plan is approved in this form, the new PRM will focus exclusively on migration, repatriation, and deportation and readmission policy—it is therefore unclear to what extent its current field structure will be maintained. This is particularly significant from a Polish perspective; PRM provides financial support to humanitarian partners operating in Ukraine and countries in the region. In addition to a regional coordinator for activities in Ukraine affiliated with the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, two other regional refugee coordinators have been appointed to date—at the U.S. Embassies in Chisinau and Warsaw.

At the same time, the humanitarian aid implemented by the DHR represents only a portion of total U.S. foreign assistance under the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, with an approved 2026 budget totaling $50 billion. This is a 16% decrease compared to last year and approximately a 30% drop between 2023 (nearly $72 billion) and 2026, though this amount is $20 billion higher than President Trump requested. The Act formalizes the structural changes resulting from the dissolution of USAID, merging many existing accounts into new units, including the described Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response, international security assistance, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the international religious freedom program, and consolidated national security investment programs. The latter will likely take over the broad development and economic support portfolio—at least to the extent that it aligns with the new paradigm of American global engagement. This budget will also fund contributions to the UN ($1.4 billion plus an additional $1.23 billion for UN peacekeeping operations), development banks, and international organizations. In this context, it is worth noting as an aside that funding was maintained for the National Endowment for Democracy, which received $315 million. Simultaneously, discussions continue regarding the restructuring of the United Nations agency system and the so-called “humanitarian reset.” In December 2025, reports emerged of an agreement signed by Jeremy Lewin and Tom Fletcher—the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). It reportedly defines the conditions for spending American funds within UN activities, emphasizing operations directly related to saving lives, redirecting funding toward “pooled funds,” and increasing U.S. involvement in the monitoring and oversight of funds spent by OCHA.

The establishment of the DHR has direct significance for Poland and the Central and Eastern European region for several reasons.

First, the placement of Kyiv on the list of the 12 DHR regional hubs signals that the United States will maintain an operational presence in Ukraine, albeit in a narrowed capacity. For Poland—a key transit and refugee-hosting country—this implies the possibility of further coordination with the American partner. However, challenges will remain regarding limited U.S. resources and the currently unclear division of competencies between the Warsaw branch of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and the new DHR hub in Kyiv.

Second, the effective withdrawal of the U.S. from long-term development programs may shift the financial burden to the European Union and its member states, including Poland. This particularly concerns stabilization in Eastern Neighborhood countries, previously supported by USAID. As I indicated in my analysis regarding the reform of European development cooperation and new instruments within the MFF 2028–2034, Poland may view this situation as an opportunity. A favorable momentum is emerging to realistically influence the shape of the EU strategy toward regions of strategic importance to Warsaw, assuming a leadership role in determining its long-term directions.

Third, narrowing the DHR mandate to direct life-saving interventions—excluding development, stabilization, or institutional projects—will limit access to funding for non-governmental organizations (including Polish ones) that previously utilized USAID’s broader grant portfolio. Third-sector entities must prepare for a permanent change in the donor landscape. It can be assumed that the new bureau will prioritize specialized partners capable of rapid crisis response. Polish organizations present in Ukraine or other DHR hub regions should therefore verify their strategies in light of these redefined priorities.

The dissolution of USAID, the push for UN agency reform, and the creation of the DHR constitute a permanent structural change in the architecture of American aid that goes beyond temporary budget shifts. The reduction in resources and the narrowing of the mandate to crisis interventions mean that the new bureau will not fill the gap left by USAID—particularly in the area of development programs and the approach based on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus. In the long term, this may strengthen Europe’s mandate and credibility. The condition is finding the resources and determination for the consistent implementation of foreign policy in a world that, without action at the source of problems, will inevitably become less stable and more prone to crises. However, even increased EU engagement will not be a panacea for all global ills—and we will all eventually pay the price for the consequences of neglect, in one form or another.

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