Author: Mateusz Chudziak

The conflict between Israel and the United States against Iran unfolds amid a deepening crisis of the international liberal order established after World War II. This war highlights a series of shocks that undermine the legitimacy of the existing axiological framework. The involvement of formally democratic states alongside a theocratic dictatorship signals the onset of a new, post-liberal world.

A key element is the lack of a democratic agenda justifying the attack on Iran, coupled with the rise of a new authoritarian opposition movement led by Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah. Despite its secular stance, this movement resembles a “political religion.” Analysing this situation reveals broader political implications.

Structural Crisis

The international liberal order is undergoing a structural crisis. Its institutions and normative categories are insufficient to address the challenges of late capitalism, such as deindustrialization and the growth of the financial sector. Moreover, climate change, political instability in regions surrounding Europe and North America, and social upheavals like mass migration are accelerating the erosion of this order, intensifying social tensions and, consequently, political instability.

Existential instability and unprecedented technological development are deepening the atomization and erosion of community life. This is occurring against a political status quo that remained largely unshaken until recently. Political elites, once exercising cultural hegemony, are mentally trapped in the era between the end of the Cold War and the 2008 financial crisis, losing their ability to respond effectively to new challenges.

Trumpism, along with right-wing opposition movements in Western Europe, has emerged as a reaction to the tensions in Western political reality, adeptly capitalising on the weaknesses of other political alternatives—particularly the social democratic left. The State of Israel holds a unique position in this process of post-liberalism’s emergence. The grand ideological project of post-war liberalism, at its axiological level, was founded on the lessons of the Holocaust, vowing that mass violence fueled by political particularism and ethnonationalism should never be repeated. Following World War II, Israel became the primary repository of Holocaust memory. However, since its independence in 1948, it has grappled with a profound ambivalence between maintaining its democratic character and upholding its ethno-national identity, often resorting to violence for self-preservation. Despite this, Israel has held a significant symbolic place in the political imagination of the liberal West, yet it too has eroded due to the international perception of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the growing accusations of a genocide.[1]

Both Israel and the U.S. are elevating local tensions to the global stage, where the post-war order has long been contested by Russia, China, and other regimes, such as Venezuela and Iran currently under attack. These actors skillfully exploit the crisis of the entire order for their own propaganda purposes. Under Trump, the U.S. began dismantling the institutional framework of the previous order, signaling the dawn of a new era. Consequently, while American hegemony persists and unipolarity is upheld, it now operates under new principles: there is a lack of an effective structure based on international law governing state relations; the use of force is decisive; and the legitimacy and validity of actions are negotiated on an ad hoc basis.[2] 

It is within this international climate that the Israeli-American attack on the Islamic Republic occurs. Iran is a dysfunctional and oppressive state, as evidenced by the bloody suppression of protests in January 2026. However, motivations for military action do not include a genuine commitment to democratisation. The policy of regime change driven by humanitarian concerns was discredited during the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet the absence of such justifications reflects the symptomatic nature of international politics amid a structural crisis.

Equally indicative is the political alternative to Iran centred around Reza Pahlavi. Although he has failed to establish an effective political organisation or demonstrate significant political talent, and is largely overlooked by the White House, his movement serves as a useful case study. It embodies the authoritarian tendencies of theocratic Iran and the globally expanding post-liberalism, while simultaneously leveraging new communication technologies that provide polarising fuel, thus becoming a lens through which the ills of an eroding system are concentrated.

The Islamic Republic as a Prelude

The theocratic authoritarianism and oppression of the Islamic Republic of Iran have created ideal conditions for the emergence of a movement that contests its very foundation. A fundamental challenge is the inability to forge a coherent political movement that can present a realistic alternative and even a hypothetical pathway toward democratic transformation amid the system’s eroding legitimacy. 

Since the 1980s, the Islamic Republic has systematically suppressed any political movement that deviates from the model of Velayat-e Faqih (“the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist”), as developed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. According to him, the system should be grounded in Muslim revelation, with the most eminent scholar of Islamic law (faqih) serving as the supreme interpreter. Only such an individual could govern in accordance with Islam on God’s behalf, in the absence of the Hidden Imam—the twelfth descendant of the Prophet—who is expected to return at the end of time in Shiite eschatology. In this context, any alternative political project is viewed as incompatible with Islam and is actively suppressed. Consequently, the Islamic Republic has effectively dismantled all organised leftist, liberal and nationalist opposition and stifled grassroots democratic movements at their inception.

This system, compounded by economic inefficiency and corruption, and exacerbated by international sanctions, has led to a progressive erosion of legitimacy. Notably, the Islamic Republic, despite its oppressive nature, consistently invested in education at all levels. While maintaining a formally closed character, it gradually educated the population. As a theocracy, it permitted various safety valves, such as universal internet access and satellite television (which, although formally banned, saw selective enforcement of the antenna ban). This exposure to global trends fostered new lifestyle patterns and aspirations, generating additional tension and resulting in rapid secularisation.

Secularisation in Iran cannot be understood merely as a negation of theocracy. Politicised Shiism has transposed religion into the temporal realm, with Khomeinism—the regime’s ideological foundation—playing a paradoxical role in this process. Traditionally, Shiite Islam was characterised by centuries of clergy quietism, promoting a pious life focused on “otherworldly” matters. It was Khomeini who crafted a politically applicable religious project, but this was not “fundamentalism” aimed at recreating an idealised primordial Muslim community. Instead, it was a populist revolutionary ideology mobilising the masses around a political goal, borrowing extensively from secular traditions like Marxism and various strands of the anti-imperialist left.[3]

Consequently, the Islamic Republic became a mediator between religious ideals and modernity, yet it ultimately failed to meet the challenges posed by the latter. It did not deliver on promises of social justice, egalitarianism, or basic public services. Instead, it fostered a kleptocratic and opaque political order, perceived by a significant portion of the deeply religious society as a betrayal that struck at the core of Iranian sensibilities. This disillusionment sparked a violent reaction.

The processes of secularisation in Iran unfold not like those in Western Europe or, more recently, in neighbouring Turkey, which saw a gradual loss of faith. In contrast, Iranian secularisation is tumultuous, with Islam being outright rejected as alien and invasive to Persian culture, reduced to associations with fanaticism, the oppression of women, and irrational violence. This phenomenon carries a powerful emotional charge, creating fertile ground for the emergence of a new political mythology.

Toward a Political Religion

Pahlavism, once a minority faction within the Iranian opposition, primarily associated with exiled old elites and the upper middle class, now presents itself—at least in its performative and media form—as the sole alternative to the Islamic Republic. While it is difficult to ascertain how many Iranians actually support the restoration of the monarchy (reliable research is nearly impossible), it can be confidently assumed that Pahlavism has transcended mere political folklore.[4] The idea of restoring the monarchy is promoted by the émigré television channels Manoto and Iran International, which broadcast from London but are funded by Saudi Arabia, and according to numerous suspicions, also from Israel.[5] These channels have long been promoting an idealised image of the former monarchy and relentlessly attacking the regime, while simultaneously maintaining a pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian editorial line. They reach audiences both in the country and in the diaspora, actively shaping social moods. This movement capitalises on the organisational weaknesses and divisions within the opposition, both domestically and in the diaspora, alongside the desperation of a society that has lost faith in reforming the system from within.

Although Reza Pahlavi’s movement lacks a coherent and credible vision for transformation—making it intellectually impoverished—since 2022, following the wave of mass protests triggered by the death of Jina Mahsa Amini, it has systematically positioned itself as the only viable solution. This strategy has helped it gain supporters both abroad and, as various reports from the January protests have indicated, within Iran itself. Pahlavi’s cooperation with Israel has significantly contributed to this visibility; in 2023, he visited Israel to promote the idea of friendship between the two “ancient nations,” referencing the Achaemenid Shah Cyrus the Great, who is mentioned in the Old Testament.[6] Additionally, the movement’s growth has been bolstered by Israeli-led social media campaigns that promote Pahlavism through fake accounts.[7]

Various elements of this ideology—such as the rejection of Islam in favour of Persian ethnonationalism, the assertion of Iranian descent from the Aryans, and the mythologisation of an ancient past—combine to form a political myth. This narrative often includes ahistorical claims that characterise Islam solely as the religion of Arab “invaders.” Additionally, emotional responses such as anti-Arab racism, unrestrained joy in the fate of Palestinians, and fervent support for Israel further enrich this mixture. The ideology skillfully employs modern technologies to disseminate its message, enhancing its reach and influence.[8]

Political Religion

This myth does not emerge in a cultural vacuum. While rejecting Islam, it remains within its orbit. Despite its fundamentally secular nature, it operates within the codes and categories established by Shiite Islam. This dynamic is reminiscent of Spanish anarchism, which, while opposing Catholicism, retained certain established forms.[10] This turn against religion does not eliminate the metaphysical hunger that persists within society. Consequently, such a myth creates a portrayal of political reality that is resistant to discussion or negotiation. What it asserts is not merely a narrative but a revelation; its truths become dominating.[11]

In the context of the Islamic Republic’s failure, a movement arises as a political alternative, adopting a fundamentally authoritarian character akin to 20th-century ideologies often described as “political religions.”[12] A notable example of this is the behaviour of Pahlavi’s supporters, who aggressively target Iranians that do not back him, accusing them of supporting the current regime. In more extreme instances, they resort to making open death threats or conducting mass intimidation campaigns.[13]

Pahlavism exhibits striking similarities to Shiite Islam. Reza Pahlavi is envisioned as the Shah who will return to Iran to establish just rule, paralleling the belief in Shiite eschatology that the Hidden Imam, the Mahdi, will return at the end of time. He is positioned in opposition to the Islamic Republic’s government, deemed a “usurper,”[14] much like the Sunni Caliph Yazid, who is viewed as a “usurper” for having slain Imam Hossein, the Prophet’s rightful successor, at the Battle of Karbala in 680. This event is commemorated during Ashura, the most significant holiday in Shiite Islam.

The concept of martyrdom, central to Shiite beliefs, finds a secular counterpart in the veneration of protesters murdered by the regime.[15] Funerals transform into occasions for celebration, shifting the mood from mourning to a lasting cult of martyrdom. This phenomenon is rooted in Shiite psychology, where similar reverence is accorded to those who perished at Karbala and, more recently, to martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War. Protesters gather at the graves of the deceased 40 days after their deaths, mirroring the religious gatherings that honoured those killed by the Shah’s forces on the eve of the Islamic Revolution.

As we can see, the formulas and psychology of the political movement remain deeply rooted in Iran’s Shiite heritage, which persists even amidst violent secularisation processes. In this context, religious content is increasingly supplanted by Persian nationalism. Pahlavists contrast national identity with religious identity, suggesting that the latter becomes an ersatz form of Islam. They assert that their Aryan descent places them in a different, superior racial category, distinguishing them from Semitic Arabs and Central Asian Turks.

While Iran boasts an ancient history, this narrative is often dominated not by historical facts but by mythical thinking. Little is definitively known about the Aryans, and figures like Shah Cyrus the Great were largely unknown to Iranians until the 19th century. The exploration of the Aryan thread in Iranian history emerged only with the rise of a modern nation, influenced by European racial theories.[16] 

Furthermore, the attempt to dismiss Iran’s 1,400-year Muslim heritage as something imposed by force is a historically flawed endeavour. It overlooks the fact that the categories of modernity cannot simply be applied to the events of the medieval past. Islam represents a legitimate layer within Iran’s civilisational heritage, with figures from this period forging connections to the pre-Muslim legacy—illustrated, for example, by the epic poem Shahnameh, written by the Muslim author Ferdowsi. A nuanced approach to the history of Iran’s civilisational heritage requires intellectual distance, which mythical thinking inherently lacks.

Conclusions

The conflict between Israel, the U.S., and the Islamic Republic of Iran represents not only a political upheaval with significant social and economic repercussions but also signals the disintegration of the post-war order in its most fundamental aspects. The political movement emerging as an alternative must be viewed as a reflection of contemporary times. Its authoritarian nature, infused with a political mythology reminiscent of 20th-century totalitarian regimes, is particularly telling. 

Today, elements that echo these past ideologies are being covertly or overtly rehabilitated. This includes references to rituals and slogans associated with Nazism, which have been observed at political rallies within the Iranian diaspora, as well as explicit nods to Aryan mythology.[17] The diaspora itself adopts a selective approach to Western modernity, advocating for secularism in a Jacobin sense and promoting gender equality while simultaneously exhibiting disdain for egalitarianism, freedom of speech and religion, and universalism.

Israel and the U.S. lack a genuine democratic agenda, a reality underscored by the complete failure of previous interventions. Notably, within the media-visible segment of the Iranian diaspora, there is little visible aspiration to establish a democratic order following the potential collapse of the oppressive Islamic Republic. Disbelief in democracy is spreading, particularly through new technologies like social media, where radical and anti-intellectual voices gain significant traction. This proliferation of extreme sentiments fosters an environment ripe for affective political phenomena.

The dynamics at play are driven as much by algorithms as by the active political promotion of similar voices, often at the expense of those who oppose both Pahlavi and the Islamic Republic. The monarchist Iranian diaspora not only actively combats its adversaries but also finds support from social media platforms. Consequently, this entire phenomenon reflects a global trend of democratic erosion, transcending local political movements and revealing a fundamentally systemic issue.

Sources:

[1] See the commentaries of intellectuals dealing with the issues of Jewish heritage in Europe and the memory of the Holocaust – Agata Bielik-Robson and Adam Lipszyc: “Raport o stanie świata”, November 1, 2025, https://raportostanieswiata.pl/odcinki/raport-o-stanie-swiata-1-listopada-2025/, and: M. Matusiak, Gaza – katalizator końca epoki. I zapowiedź nowej, “Kultura Liberalna”, No. 874 (40/2025) October 7, 2025, https://kulturaliberalna.pl/2025/10/07/gaza-matusiak-katalizator-konca-epok/.

[2] M. Dachowski, Withdrawal as a Doctrine: American Power between Institutions and Precedent, „Pulaski Commentary”, January 8, 2026, https://pulaski.pl/en/withdrawal-as-doctrine-american-power-between-institutions-and-precedent/

[3] E. Abrahamian, Khomeinism. Essays on the Islamic Republic, University of California Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1993, pp. 13-39.

[4] H. Majd, Would-Be Iran Monarch Reza Pahlavi Declares a Civil War in Iran, “The Intercept,” January 12, 2026, https://theintercept.com/2026/01/13/iran-reza-pahlavi-protests-israel/

[5] M. Emami, Reactionary Politics in the Iranian Diaspora and the Crisis of International Solidarity, “Jadaliyya”, February 26, 2026 r., https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/47199

[6] M. Chudziak, Izrael i Iran łączyła wielowiekowa przyjaźń. Historia może powtórzyć się jako farsa, “NEW-Online”, July 22, 2025, https://new.org.pl/5288,monarchisci_iranscy.html

[7] G. Megiddo, O. Benjakob, The Israeli Influence Operation Aiming to Install Reza Pahlavi as Shah of Iran, „Haaretz”, October 3, 2025, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2025-10-03/ty-article-magazine/.premium/the-israeli-influence-operation-in-iran-pushing-to-reinstate-the-shah-monarchy/00000199-9f12-df33-a5dd-9f770d7a0000

[8] See: E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, Yale University Press, New Haven 1946, pp. 280-282.

[9] Just as Christianity shapes the civilisational identity of Europe, irrespective of whether its inhabitants are still believers, so too does Shiism influence Iranian identity. See: F. Braudel, A History of Civilisations, transl. R. Mayne, Penguin Books, New York 1993, pp. 333-334.

[10] M. Delgado Ruiz, La Ira Sagrada. Anticlericalismo, iconoclastia y antirritualismo en la España contemporánea, RBA Libros, Barcelona 2012.

[11] See: M. Eliade, Sacrum, mit, historia, transl. A. Tatarkiewicz, PIW, Warszawa 1993, p. 110.

[12] E. Gentile, Politics as Religion, transl. G. Staunton, Princeton-Oxford 2006, s. XIV-XVIII.

[13] E. Baker, Iranian diaspora says they face threats and intimidation in Australia, ABC News, February 22, 2026, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-02-23/nsw-iranian-diaspora-fear-speaking-out-amid-regime-protests/106364660, N. Maliqzada, T. Filseth, What’s Wrong with Iran’s Opposition?, “The National Interest”, January 27, 2026, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/whats-wrong-with-irans-opposition.

[14] It earns this name because, according to the Aryan ideology replacing Islam, it is alien to Iran. This is because it is Islamic, and therefore imposed by Arab invaders. R. Zia-Ebrahimi, In Pursuit of Whiteness: Why Iranian Monarchists Cheer Israel’s Genocide, “Jadaliyya”, September 22, 2025. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/46906/In-Pursuit-of-Whiteness-Why-Iranian-Monarchists-Cheer-Israel%E2%80%99s-Genocide.

[15] See the post on the X platform of actress Nazanin Boniadi: https://x.com/NazaninBoniadi/status/2025158919325192647.

[16] E. Polsue, Being Aryan, a Myth Many Iranians Choose to Believe, “IranWire”, August 7, 2023, https://iranwire.com/en/society/119259-being-aryan-a-myth-many-iranians-choose-to-believe/.

[17] For example, making gestures similar to the Roman salute: https://x.com/Smohyeddin/status/2030458368381309378  or calling “One Homeland, One Flag, One Leader!” (Yek Mihān, Yek Parchām, Yek Rahbar!): https://www.instagram.com/reels/DUyKKjbDIMO/.