Author: Margaret Czarnik

The war that started in 2014 and intensified since February 2022 has significantly damaged the Ukrainian energy system, posing a serious threat to the Ukrainians and, further, to Europeans and global security. This paper will describe and analyse the damage to the energy infrastructure, as well as how it influenced Ukrainians’ lives and decisions about escaping their homeland.

In January 2022, Ukraine had almost 40,000 operating energy generators and 3,000 occupied ones. In May 2024, following several months of war, only approximately 13,000 energy generators remained operational, with 5,000 sustaining damage, 17,000 under Russian occupation, and 8,000 undergoing destruction. These numbers show the terrifying situation of only ⅓ of energy generators being able to work now. Currently, Ukraine can produce at its peak around 12 GW (gigawatts) in summer, while before the war it was 16 GW. In winter, the situation is even worse, as the capability reaches only 16 GW, while before February 2022 it was 22 GW.[1]

The energy deficit is mostly covered by imported energy from the European Union. However, this import is not enough to cover the needs of the country fighting for its independence. Ukraine started applying regional power cuts, which usually cover half of the day, with the possibility of being prolonged to ⅔.

Figure 1: Sample Schedule of Planned Power Cuts.[2]

Left column: days of the week (Monday-Sunday)
Bottom row: white colour – there is electricity; grey colour, grey lightning – possible power cuts; grey colour, black lightning – no electricity

On weekdays in Figure 1, the darkest dots in the rows indicate scheduled power cuts; the grey ones indicate possible power cuts in the event of an overload in the power system; and the pairs of light dots show hours of guaranteed power supply. In practice, adherence to the schedule is infrequent.[3]

The lack of electric power affects not only telecommunications, transportation, and emergency services (hospitals, emergency call centres), but also nuclear power, which, when disconnected from the electricity, poses a serious threat to the citizens due to lack of cooling and thus the potential for uncontrolled radioactive release. Nevertheless, it is also worth considering the lack of telecommunication nowadays. The citizens’ inability to electronically communicate or simply be online poses a further threat to the stability of society[4].

As previously mentioned, approximately 13,000 energy generators in Ukraine have suffered damage or destruction. The repair work is close to impossible now. There is not only a high risk of further attacks during repairs, but also Ukrainian companies struggle with a lack of manpower because of mobilisation into the army and emigration. Moreover, there is also a lack of replacement parts. The estimated cost of the necessary repairs stands at 350 million USD.[5] Furthermore, the majority of CHPs (Combined Heat and Power) and TPPs (Thermal Power Plants) that would be able to continue operating are based on coal and left without this material because the mines are on occupied territory.[6]

Besides the above, there is also solar and wind energy. 60% of industrial solar power plants are located in areas of conflict, and according to preliminary data, 40% of them were destroyed. Hence, Ukrainian solar power has been reduced by ¼. When it comes to the privately owned solar power plants, as of March 2023, ¼ of them have also been destroyed by the war as well. Further, wind energy generators are mostly installed in the occupied territory; hence, ⅔ of wind generators are not working.[7]

The most terrifying fact is that Russia wants to cripple the Ukrainian energy system to such an extent that society’s will to fight would crumble and the country’s economy would become paralyzed, forcing the Ukrainian authorities to negotiate on Russian terms.[8]

As mentioned earlier, the devastated energy infrastructure in Ukraine poses a life-threat for its citizens, hence for lots of them it could be one of the main reasons to emigrate during the war. As Ukrainians might have felt the effects of the devastation the most in winter months, it is worth taking a look at the statistics, in order to see if indeed more of them decide to leave the country during winter time. Consequently, when it comes to the emigration of Ukrainian people to Poland, Figure 2 presents the number of people who crossed the Polish border from the war-stricken Ukraine from January 2022 to March 2024.

Figure 2: Number of people who crossed the Polish border from the war-stricken Ukraine from January 2022 to March 2024.[9]

The highest number of people crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border happened on March 6, 2022, when more than 142,000 people crossed the border. March 6 is almost 2 weeks after the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. The majority of Ukrainians who decided to flee likely spent several days gathering their family members, packing their belongings, and waiting for the transport. This explains why the entire process took several days. As the February 2022 invasion happened at the end of the winter and the beginning of March is usually the start of spring in Eastern Europe, there were no major peaks throughout the following months because of the warmer weather that made the devastated energy system more bearable for Ukrainians. The noticeable peak happened, though, on December 23, 2022, when more than 37,000 people crossed the border. Lower temperatures and the pessimistic state of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure at the time may have contributed to the peak, given that the astronomical winter in Eastern Europe begins on December 22. It is worth noting that a few days after the December 23, 2022, summit, more people than usual also crossed the border. The other noticeable peak happened almost one year later, on December 22, 2023, when more than 35,000 people came to Poland from Ukraine. There, the energy infrastructure has already suffered severe damage or destruction, and the energy cuts will leave the remaining citizens barely able to survive the winter. In the days following the peak, we observed a higher than average number of refugees, similar to the previous year.

Statistics show that the Ukrainian migration to Poland is not seasonal, rather permanent. From January 2024 to April 2024, only 361 Ukrainians crossed the border from Poland to Ukraine. 52% of them did it with the intention of short-term stay (meeting family, medical treatment), and only 30% of them (around 108 people) did it for long-term stay (which still does not mean coming back for permanent residence).[10] Moreover, research shows that currently 43% of surveyed Ukrainians residing in Poland say that it is currently difficult for them to decide whether to return to Ukraine. 19% say they plan to stay in Poland longer, at least until the end of the war.[11]

The increased migration of Ukrainians to Poland puts additional pressure on Polish housing infrastructure, especially in the border cities. Moreover, the influx of additional labour forces impacts the Polish economy, especially the seasonal job market. Last but not least, the situation could also impact the healthcare system, raising the demand for medical services, especially during the winter when seasonal illnesses are more common.

In conclusion, the Russian army’s attacks have severely damaged Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, leaving its citizens barely able to survive due to energy cuts and severely limited resources like running water. Mainly, because of this, many Ukrainians decided to emigrate to the West, to Poland, or to other European countries. We can observe the peaks in the number of migrants at the end of December each year, coinciding with the start of winter in Eastern Europe.

Sources:

[1] Zaniewicz, Maciej. (2024). Ukraine in Darkness: Preventing the Worst-Case Scenario for Its Energy System. www.forum-energii.eu/en/ukraine-destroyed-system

[2] ibid.

[3] Zubok, Vitalii & Davydiuk, Andrii. (2023). Analytical Review of the Resilience of Ukraine’s Critical Energy Infrastructure to Cyber Threats in Times of War. www.researchgate.net/publication/372401847_Analytical_review_of_the_resilience_of_Ukraine’s_critical_energy_infrastructure_to_cyber_threats_in_times_of_war

[4] ibid.

[5] Zaniewicz, Maciej. (2024). Ukraine in Darkness: Preventing the Worst-Case Scenario for Its Energy System. www.forum-energii.eu/en/ukraine-destroyed-system

[6] Tkach, D., & Tkach, D. (2023). The main losses of the Ukrainian energy system as a result of massive attacks by Russia. Economics, Finance and Management Review, (2), 51–59. doi.org/10.36690/2674- 5208-2023-2-51-59

[7] ibid.

[8] Zaniewicz, Maciej. (2024). Ukraine in Darkness: Preventing the Worst-Case Scenario for Its Energy System. www.forum-energii.eu/en/ukraine-destroyed-system

[9] Statista Search Department. (2024). Number of people who crossed the Polish border from the war-stricken Ukraine from January 2022 to March 2024, by date of report. www.statista.com/statistics/1293564/ukrainian-refugees-in-poland/

[10] International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2024). Ukrainian Nationals Crossing Back to Ukraine – January-March 2024. IOM, Poland.

[11] Money.pl. (2024). Ukraińcy w Polsce: Nagła Zmiana Planów. www.money.pl/gospodarka/ukraincy-w-polsce-nagla-zmiana-planow-7007546504194784a.html.