Author: Joanna Kulesza

On 4 August 2025, an international group of scientists, technologists, diplomats, and international law experts issued the Potsdam Call on Autonomous Weapon Systems [1]. It commemorates the 80th anniversary of the events in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Potsdam Conference, emphasizing the need for responsible development and use of artificial intelligence in military systems. The Call does not mandate a total ban on AWS but stresses the need to maintain meaningful human control over life-and-death decisions and to promote international regulatory dialogue. The document was formally submitted to the UN Secretary-General, signaling growing international concern about the legal, ethical, and strategic implications of AWS.

Historical Context

The Potsdam Call consciously refers to earlier international efforts to limit the destructive potential of new military technologies. It explicitly connects to the 1955 Russell–Einstein Manifesto, which urged world leaders to prioritize peace and prevent a nuclear arms race [2]. Then, nuclear weapons posed the existential threat; today, autonomous systems capable of making combat decisions without human oversight are the challenge.

Although AWS are not weapons of mass destruction, their speed, autonomy, scalability, and use across multiple operational environments pose real risks to international stability, the rule of law in armed conflicts, and compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) [3]. Historical parallels demonstrate that each highly destructive new tool requires ethical and regulatory boundaries before its uncontrolled proliferation.

Core Messages of the Call

The Call highlights three fundamental points:

1. Human control – AWS must not replace humans in decisions about force or life; lack of control increases risk of errors, IHL violations, and accountability issues [3].
2. Risk of escalation – autonomous systems can accelerate decision-making, lowering the threshold for conflict and increasing the likelihood of unintended clashes. In Ukraine, drones with autonomy components are already used in combat, reconnaissance, and targeting [4].
3. International dialogue and regulation – standards and rules must be established for development, use, and oversight of AWS, including in the UN, NATO, and European initiatives like the European Defence Agency (EDA) [5].

Strategic Significance of AWS

AWS can execute combat tasks with partial or full autonomy, fundamentally changing military dynamics. Their significance includes:

• Precision and scalability – enabling rapid, repeated attacks with limited friendly losses but potential civilian risks.
• Information and decision advantage – processing real-time data and acting faster than humans, affecting regional balance of power.
• Lowering threshold for force – machine-made life-or-death decisions can facilitate escalation in politically or legally ambiguous situations [3].

AWS remain difficult to classify under existing international law. Legal challenges include:

• Distinction – can systems reliably differentiate military and civilian targets?
• Proportionality – how to assess algorithmic decisions regarding collateral damage?
• Accountability and transparency – who is responsible: the state, commander, or technology provider?

Implications for Poland and the Region

Poland’s location near Ukraine makes AWS a practical national security concern. Autonomous systems and AI-enabled drones already influence tactics and operational planning [4]. Poland is developing AWS capabilities in its armed forces modernization and NATO integration.

Unregulated AWS use could:

• increase the risk of unintended clashes in the region,
• complicate NATO and EU obligations,
• undermine compliance with IHL [3].

Recommendations for Poland (continued):

1. Assessment and control of AWS – review existing and planned autonomous systems within the Polish Armed Forces, ensuring interoperability with NATO standards.
2. Legal and ethical frameworks – establish national standards in compliance with IHL and NATO obligations.
3. Active participation in international dialogue – shape AWS usage rules in UN forums, the European Defence Agency (EDA), and other international bodies.
4. Research and expertise development – promote interdisciplinary studies on technological, legal, and strategic implications of AWS.
5. Public awareness and civil society engagement – educate the public and encourage dialogue between government, academia, and NGOs.

Conclusions

The Potsdam Call demonstrates that emerging military technologies require the establishment of ethical and regulatory boundaries before their widespread deployment. For Poland, AWS represent both a defensive capability and a potential source of risk. Responsible engagement in international discussions, establishing standards, and monitoring domestic use of autonomous systems will be critical for national and regional security in the age of artificial intelligence.

References

[1] The Potsdam Call on Autonomous Weapon Systems – Potsdam, August 4, 2025. https://potsdamcall.dgdg.blog/; Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Learning from History: The Potsdam Call on Autonomous Weapon Systems, CircleID, August 11, 2025, https://circleid.com/posts/learning-from-history-the-potsdam-call-on-autonomous-weapon-systems.
[2] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – Russell–Einstein Manifesto, 1955. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/key-documents/russell-einstein-manifesto/
[3] ICRC Report Submission to UNSG on AI in military domain, April 2025. https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/ICRC_Report_Submission_to_UNSG_on_AI_in_military_domain.pdf
[4] Weapons of the War in Ukraine – Reuters
[5] European Defence Agency – EDA