Author: dr Olena Babakova

Summary

• The topic of Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the situation of Ukrainian migrants and refugees is addressed in the Polish public space far more than in other EU countries. However, during the 2023 election campaign and in the first months of Donald Tusk’s new government, the word Ukraine faded into the background, with it rarely appearing in party programs except for the Left’s. Moreover, no party that participated in the campaign had invited migrants from Ukraine with Polish citizenship to their lists.
• The turning points of the campaign on Ukrainian issues were: April 2023 – when the embargo on Ukrainian agricultural products was announced; End of July 2023 – an interview of presidential minister Marcin Przydacz, where he mentioned “ungrateful Ukrainians”; and February 2024, when the new government began to play the “Russian agents” card, and anti-Russian threads obscured the anti-Ukrainian narrative in public debate.
• The Polish political mainstream correctly communicated to voters the importance of aid to Ukraine for the security of Poland itself. Still, when reporting on the “grain crisis,” even centrist politicians preferred to repeat fake news about “poisoned Ukrainian food” to raise the farmers’ votes. The Polish embargo on Ukrainian agricultural production and farmers’ protests on the border with Ukraine were the central issues for disinformation campaigns. Even if the campaigns were not invented in Russia, Moscow undoubtedly used them to demobilize Polish support for Ukrainian resistance.
• The topic of the Volhynian massacre did not lead the campaign. Still, Law and Justice politicians called the lack of changes in Ukrainian memory policy “ungrateful” and “an obstacle to integration with the EU.” The slogan about “ungrateful Ukrainians” not only cooled relations between Kyiv and Warsaw but also worsened the attitude of Poles towards Ukrainian refugees. The far-right Confederation campaigned for “limiting aid for refugees from Ukraine”, which costs the Polish budget less than tax revenues from Ukrainian workers.
• Although the policy of intensive military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine Mateusz Morawiecki’s government began, and the government of Donald Tusk continues, on the other hand, both Law and Justice and the October 15 Coalition members are playing on anti-Ukrainian sentiments. As Poland is going through a long electoral cycle that will end only in the summer of 2025, and Polish society’s fatigue with the war in Ukraine is growing, populist moves may hit Ukrainian migrants and refugees in Poland. Tension between Poles and Ukrainians living nearby could weaken social resistance to information and hybrid threats.

The project has been funded by the Open Information Partnership