Author: Dominik Mierzejewski, Joanna Nawrotkiewicz, Piotr Maciej Kaczyński

Conclusions and Recommendations for European Union Actions (Polish Presidency)

1. Within the structures of the European Union and its member states, there is a growing awareness that deepened cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and potential excessive interdependence on the Chinese economy carry political risks that could threaten the EU’s international position and its member states. The EU should strive to develop a coherent strategy towards China that takes into consideration both common economic goals and issues related to security and democratic values. Actions should focus on establishing a unified position on key issues such as trade policy and human rights to minimise the negative impact of Chinese actions that exploit differences in relations with individual member states.

2. Long-standing, unresolved disputes between the EU and China—such as restricted market access, the promotion of state capitalism by the PRC, the growing influence of the Communist Party of China on the economy linked to political centralisation, and China’s pursuit of greater economic self-sufficiency—necessitate a redefinition of EU and member state policies towards China.

3. From the perspective of Poland’s presidency in the Council of the European Union, key issues relate to Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the amplification of Russian narratives by Chinese media and activities in cyberspace.

4. To better understand the processes taking place in China, it is necessary to monitor and analyse the PRC’s internal regulations concerning standards in selected sectors, including pharmaceuticals and new technologies, at both the central and local levels.

5. Given China’s growing influence in the normative sphere, it is essential to monitor and analyse the internationalisation of Chinese regulations and standards—primarily through multilateral channels such as the FOCAC forum, China-CELAC, and BRICS—in selected sectors, including pharmaceuticals and new technologies. In the medium term, this will contribute to the creation of a parallel system to the organisations where the West plays a leading role while still allowing for Beijing’s participation in the existing global framework.

6. Given the experimental nature of China’s economic system and the significant role of horizontal competition among entities promoted by authorities at the local level, it is essential to monitor the implementation of various regulations at the local level, within free trade zones, and in so-called new areas such as the Shanghai Lingang New Area.

7. Despite growing tensions, efforts should be made to strengthen sectoral presence in China using existing frameworks, such as the European Chamber Pharmaceutical Working Group within the European Union Chamber of Commerce and the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA), while promoting solutions based on “healthy interdependence.”

8. European companies expect more significant economic incentives from the European Commission, which means that European structures must compete with China’s state capitalism, which offers financial benefits without the same constraints as those in Europe.

9. The relevant bodies of the European Union and its member states should monitor the activities of Chinese companies licensed to produce fentanyl, track illegal sales of synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl and e-cigarettes, and analyse this issue in the context of U.S.-China relations.

10. Strengthening and better coordination of existing European instruments in relations with China—both legal (e.g., Anti-Coercion) and political (e.g., mapping European investments in China, networks of European consulates and cultural centres)—to help improve the European side’s negotiating position (such as during the 2024 negotiations on the admission of electric vehicles).

11. The EU should refine and develop mechanisms to defend against Chinese disinformation efforts and influence over European elites, particularly in the European Parliament and other EU institutions. It is crucial to support existing departments countering disinformation, such as the Strategic Communications Division of the European External Action Service, especially the unit responsible for countering disinformation and hostile external influences (SG.STRAT.4). Actively promoting the EU’s own narrative, especially in Global South countries, is also essential. In this context, strengthening cooperation with international partners—including the U.S. and East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore—will be key to identifying and neutralising the adverse effects of China’s influence campaigns.