Author: Dr Tomasz Smura & Dr Aleksander Olech

There is no doubt that Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in 2022 and Moscow’s aggressive policy towards its neighbours pose the greatest threat to the post-Cold War security system in Europe. This threat, combined with questions and doubts about the future approach of Donald Trump’s administration towards Europe and transatlantic relations, is giving new dynamics to European politics. Strong voices are emerging, arguing that Europe needs more strategic independence and that collective security within NATO should be supported by bilateral and regional relations. In this context, there is great potential in Polish-French cooperation, which on one hand can strengthen the capabilities of both countries, and on the other, inject energy into European cooperation in the field of defence.

Twists and Turns in Polish-French Relations

For centuries, France has been one of Poland’s most important allies and points of reference. Beginning with the first elective Polish king from the Valois dynasty, through the French faction in the 17th century, the Napoleonic era, and the support of the French for Polish national uprisings in the 19th century, to its significant role in the reconstruction of independent Poland after World War I, France has been strongly present in Polish history. Between the wars, France became, like for many other countries in the region, Poland’s most important ally and guarantor of security. The two countries were united by geopolitical interests (fear of powerful Germany) and a shared cultural closeness – Catholicism – with French eventually becoming the primary foreign language of the Polish elite, replacing Latin in this role. Both countries share national heroes, and Poles have made significant contributions to French cultural heritage. Even in more recent times, it is worth noting that Charles de Gaulle, a national hero of France and participant in the French military mission in Poland during the Polish-Soviet War, and the Battle of Warsaw (for which he was awarded the Virtuti Militari order), was the first Western leader to visit communist Poland.

After the end of the Cold War, Polish-French relations did not regain their pre-war dynamism. France, due to its U-turn in relations with Germany, lost interest in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, focusing more on the southern direction and maintaining influence in Africa. On the other hand, for Central European countries, the priority became political-economic transformation and joining Western structures – NATO and the EU, where key support came from the United States and Germany. In terms of security, for Poland – also due to the historical memory of France’s stance at the beginning of World War II – the alliance with the United States became crucial. This, in the face of traditional French attitudes towards greater European independence from the USA and some fascination with Russia among French elites, led to a divergence in positions between Warsaw and Paris. A symbol of this was the memorable statement by Jacques Chirac, saying that the Poles by their support for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 “lost the opportunity to keep quiet,” which was seen as an expression of French patronage towards the new members of Western structures, somewhat unworthy of caring for their national interests.

In the following years, political cooperation between Poland and France cautiously improved, as exemplified by the Steadfast Jazz exercises organised by Poland in 2013, where France provided the largest foreign contingent. However, the next breakdown occurred during the rule of the conservative government of the Law and Justice party, which decided to cancel a contract with the French Airbus for the delivery of 50 multi-role helicopters for the Polish Armed Forces, and its stance on the rule of law was openly criticized by Paris. Intense French-Russian contacts and President Emmanuel Macron’s dialogue-oriented approach towards the Kremlin did not help either.

However, a significant shift in Polish-French relations came with Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine in 2022. In response to Vladimir Putin’s stance and alarmed by Russia’s growing influence in Africa, acting through the Wagner Group, Macron decided to make a decisive shift in France’s policy towards Russia, which was positively received in Central and Eastern Europe. This, combined with the change of government in Poland and the assumption of power by the pro-European government of Donald Tusk, provided the impetus for a new opening in Polish-French relations.

French Engagement in Central and Eastern Europe

In recent years, France’s interest in Central and Eastern Europe and its support for the region’s security have grown significantly. The presence of French troops in Estonia and Romania has become the norm, and no one imagines Paris not being engaged on the eastern flank. The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative aims to deter potential undesirable actions and provide the countries in the region with the opportunity to collaborate closely with the strongest armed forces of the Alliance. This initiative was launched in 2016 in response to the increase in threats after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military activities along NATO’s eastern borders. For Estonia, a small Baltic State bordering Russia, France’s presence is a key proof of NATO’s commitment to collective defence in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty; for Romania, it is a signal that it is an important partner for Paris.

France is strengthening its military involvement in Romania through the “Aigle” mission and plans to intensify its activities in 2025 through the NATO exercise “Dacian Spring 2025.” Since 2022, France has maintained a significant presence in Cincu, including a multinational battalion equipped with Leclerc tanks, VBCI armoured vehicles, and the MAMBA air defense system. In May 2025, a French brigade consisting of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers from the 7th Armored Brigade, along with advanced equipment such as CAESAR howitzers, will be deployed to Romania for these exercises. The goal of these manoeuvres is to test the ability to rapidly deploy forces on NATO’s eastern flank, which is an important step in enhancing the interoperability of French and Romanian forces and strengthening NATO’s deterrence capabilities. Additionally, military cooperation between France and Romania includes the modernisation of local military infrastructure to accommodate these forces, reflecting France’s lasting commitment to collective security and stability in the region.

France also plays a key role in supporting Moldova politically and militarily, especially in the face of regional tensions exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war. In 2024, Paris and Chișinău signed a defence cooperation agreement aimed at strengthening Moldova’s military capabilities, with a particular focus on training the armed forces and modernising equipment. This support also includes assistance in securing key infrastructure and strengthening Moldova’s cyber defence capabilities. Politically, France actively supports Moldova’s European aspirations, helping to implement institutional reforms and aligning with European Union standards. Although Moldova, due to its constitutional neutrality, is not a NATO member, it closely cooperates with the Alliance in areas such as energy security and defence infrastructure modernisation. As a significant NATO member, France supports these initiatives, promoting a coordinated approach to stabilise the region while actively participating in bilateral projects aimed at ensuring Moldova’s security and resilience against external threats.

The relationship between Paris and Tallinn also reminds that “smaller friends” are not forgotten. This is demonstrated on many levels, including: the appointment of Kaia Kallas to a high position in the European Commission, which was lobbied for by Emmanuel Macron; Estonia’s inclusion in major military exercises that France conducts with Nordic countries; the sale of high-quality weaponry; France’s support for Estonia’s nomination as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; the involvement of Estonian troops in the Sahel supporting France, and assistance in building Estonia’s relationships with African countries; and openness to bilateral investments and joint projects, especially in the field of cybersecurity.

France’s participation in eFP is primarily reflected through the rotational deployment of contingents within the multinational NATO battlegroup (a total of 300 soldiers) stationed in Tapa, Estonia. Estonian Major General Indrek Sirel emphasised, “The French contribution to the NATO Battlegroup, as well as the supporting brigade from the United Kingdom, is very important for us. Additionally, French personnel train with our territorial defense units, learning our positioning relative to threats, while at the same time, our troops can learn from the best. Cooperation with the French Armed Forces is very intensive.”

The operational activity of the French military in Estonia goes beyond merely maintaining forces. Paris places a strong emphasis on interoperability and combat readiness. French soldiers regularly participate in joint exercises with the Estonian Armed Forces and other NATO allies. Manoeuvres such as Spring Storm and Winter Shield simulate large-scale defensive scenarios in challenging terrain and climatic conditions along the farthest points of NATO’s eastern flank. In the event of any conflict (including with Russia), the borders of Estonia and Finland will be key to halting an invasion and defending against attacks. France’s presence in exercises in the Baltic and Nordic countries only demonstrates their active interest in maintaining collective defence.

In addition to land forces, France contributes to the protection of airspace over the Baltic States as part of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission. This includes the deployment of fighter jets such as Rafale and Mirage 2000, which patrol the airspace and intercept unauthorised objects approaching NATO borders. Paris has sent its units repeatedly in 2007, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022 (twice), 2023, and will again do so in 2025.

In Poland, French-Polish cooperation is demonstrated through military exercises, the exchange of experiences, and symbolic actions, such as the participation of French soldiers in the military parade in Warsaw in August 2023, on the occasion of Poland’s Armed Forces Day. Since February 2022, Rafale fighter jets have carried out airspace protection missions over Poland, monitoring and securing its airspace. Additionally, France is involved in training Ukrainian soldiers in Poland as part of the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM), which aims to enhance the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the face of Russian aggression. These actions, combined with bilateral engagement and abovementioned air defence missions, reflect France’s determination to strengthen collective security on NATO’s eastern flank and to address regional challenges in cooperation with Baltic and Central European allies.

Paris’s engagement also reflects broader strategic interests in European security. As an advocate for defence initiatives in Europe and a key NATO member, France views its role in Estonia, Romania, and indirectly in other frontline countries as part of a dual effort: strengthening NATO’s transatlantic structure while promoting greater European defence capabilities. Furthermore, its military presence in Estonian military bases suggests a well-thought-out strategy that combines solidarity with other states and national interests. Paris seeks to be an important part of the new security infrastructure in Europe (also in light of the US elections), and its presence in Estonia, Romania, and significant support for Ukraine, including the idea of sending military instructors and training Ukrainians, enables this goal.

The Potential of Polish-French Relations in the Field of Security

The growing involvement of France on NATO’s eastern flank and President Macron’s shift in approach towards Russia and Central-Eastern Europe provide a solid foundation for strengthening Polish-French relations. Such a strengthened cooperation seems beneficial for both countries. From Warsaw’s perspective, relations with France and cooperation within the Weimar Triangle enhance Poland’s political significance in the European Union. The Weimar formula, connecting the perspectives of three key regions of the EU (southern Europe – France, northern Europe – Germany, and Central-Eastern Europe – Poland), has the potential to become a driving force in discussions about the future of the EU, and it also elevates Poland into the “European top league” as an equal partner to the most important EU states. Bilateral cooperation with France in the field of security would also strengthen the “European leg” of Poland’s security, balancing its strong ties with Washington, especially in the face of questions about the future stance of the new US administration towards Europe.

From France’s perspective, the Weimar cooperation and improved relations with Warsaw enhance France’s position towards Germany. Franco-German relations under Chancellor Scholz have been tense in recent years, particularly in regards to nuclear energy, support for Ukraine, and disputes over bilateral industrial projects like MGCS and FCAS. Currently, France seems to be politically closer to Warsaw than to Berlin. With the UK’s departure from the EU and the conservative government of Meloni in Italy, the number of potential political allies for France among major EU states has decreased, and Poland has emerged as one of the most important. In France, there has also been rapid recognition of Poland’s growing economic potential, as well as its ambitious defense program and substantial defense spending, which is approaching the French level.

At the political level, Polish-French relations are currently very good, as evidenced by frequent mutual visits and consultations at various levels, as well as both countries working on a new treaty regulating bilateral relations, modeled after the Élysée Treaty that governs Franco-German cooperation. However, in order for the new opening between Paris and Warsaw to remain sustained in the long term, it must be filled with concrete projects and initiatives.

Poland and France can cooperate to further support Ukraine and ensure the security of NATO’s eastern flank. The current French stance on Ukraine seems to align with Poland’s position. President Macron has emphasised that the stake of the Russian-Ukrainian war is higher than the dispute between these two countries and concern European security as a whole, so Russia cannot win this war. In Warsaw, President Macron’s words were positively received, particularly his assertion that the West should not impose red lines on itself and that no measures, including the consideration of sending soldiers to Ukraine, should be ruled out. In contrast to Germany, France decided to provide Ukraine with long-range cruise missiles and allowed their use for attacking targets in Russia. France, however, has a greater potential to support Ukraine.

French military aid to Ukraine in 2022-2023 amounted to approximately 3.8 billion euros, and in the current year, despite promises to provide an additional 3 billion euros in military aid, it will exceed 2 billion euros. By comparison, British military aid since the beginning of the war has exceeded 8 billion euros, and German aid has surpassed 10 billion euros. France also possesses one of the most advanced and versatile defence industries in Europe, capable of supplying almost all necessary capabilities. Poland, which also has considerable military and industrial potential, is interested in providing long-term support for Ukraine. The cooperation between Poland and France in this area could be significant, especially in light of uncertainties about the future scope of US support.

Both countries should aim to increase their own industrial production while jointly advocating for greater involvement from other European countries and the EU as a whole in supporting Ukraine. Poland supports the French-diplomacy-driven proposal for the issuance of European bonds to increase defence funding, and both countries should work together to ensure as broad support as possible for this idea. France and Poland can also collaborate to gain political approval for Ukraine’s membership in NATO after the war ends (with good relations with the USA being important here) and cooperate to prepare Ukrainian armed forces for NATO membership.

Another important area for the development of Polish-French relations is the defence industry. After Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Poland accelerated its military modernisation program, acquiring large quantities of military equipment. Its defence spending next year is expected to exceed 4.7% of GDP, the highest ratio in NATO. France also increased its defence spending, planning to allocate 413 billion euros for defence between 2024 and 2030, and plans a comprehensive increase in its military capabilities. The French defence industry, which is already supplying Poland with observation satellites, seems particularly interested in the Polish programme for acquiring new-generation submarines and filling gaps in Poland’s helicopter’s fleet. France’s involvement in the Polish modernisation process could also be an impetus for broader military cooperation (joint exercises, exchanges, etc.). In the longer term, Poland would likely be interested in joint projects for the research and development of entirely new weapon systems, which both countries could procure together in the future.

Finally, France and Poland could jointly play a significant role in the debate on the future of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. There is growing support for the idea that the EU must increase its defence capabilities. A consensus between France, traditionally advocating for European autonomy in defence, and Poland, which traditionally supports a pro-transatlantic stance, could push this debate towards more practical and effective solutions.

Authors: Dr. Tomasz Smura, Member of the Board, Director of the Security and Defense Program at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Dr. Aleksander Olech, Head of International Cooperation at Defence24; NATO Analyst.