Author: Wojciech Dzięgiel & Karolina Pawlik

The fight against climate disinformation has been recognised by the Ministry of Climate and Environment as one of the priorities of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. This topic will be discussed during the meeting of the EU Environment Council (ENVI), which will take place on April 28–29.

Disinformation—across all topics, not just climate—was ranked in the Global Risks Report 2024 as one of the most significant short-term threats to the international community. [i]This is the first time since the report’s inception in 2006 that disinformation has been ranked so highly. The threat posed by disinformation continues to grow, increasingly targeting the EU, NATO, and their member states.

Disinformation is often used as a tool of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), which refers to patterns of behavior intended to undermine values, procedures, or political processes. FIMI content is designed to manipulate, mislead, and spread falsehoods. These activities are typically driven by state actors, with non-state actors playing a smaller role. A 2023 report by the European External Action Service (EEAS) identified Russia and China as the primary sources of FIMI campaigns targeting EU member states. [ii] In Poland, the main sources of disinformation and FIMI are Russia and Belarus, [iii] with narratives focusing on migration, climate, and the election process.

This commentary aims to shed light on the issue of climate disinformation and highlight several key points:

• Climate disinformation is intensifying both within EU and in Poland and is linked to hostile state activities.
• The current set of tools used by the EU and NATO to counter disinformation is insufficient.
• There is a pressing need for more integrated efforts at both the EU and national levels, as well as stronger synergy between EU and NATO initiatives.1.

1. The Rising Threat of Climate Disinformation in EU and Poland

Climate disinformation has been growing steadily in EU for several years. Its acceleration coincided with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the EU’s subsequent shift to alternative energy sources. Various research [iv] clearly shows that disinformation campaigns—especially those concerning climate—intensify around elections and in the aftermath of natural disasters.

Climate disinformation targets not only EU member states but also NATO. Its aim is to weaken NATO’s capacity for swift response to climate-related crises in the short term and to undermine long-term operational planning and combat readiness. The Polish Disinformation Team (part of the Commission for Investigating Russian and Belarusian Influence on the Internal Security and Interests of the Republic of Poland) has explicitly linked the growing spread of climate-related disinformation to efforts to weaken the Alliance’s military infrastructure.[v]

Climate disinformation also poses a major threat to EU climate policy. It undermines public trust in EU institutions, member states’ governments, and the scientific community. It delays the implementation of climate initiatives and reduces public willingness to take meaningful action.

As a result, the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment has made fighting climate disinformation a core priority of Poland’s EU Council presidency. [vi] This priority has also been endorsed by the upcoming Danish and Cypriot presidencies, signaling the urgent need for coordinated efforts to tackle climate disinformation at both the EU and national levels.

In recent months, climate disinformation in Poland has been heavily intertwined with emotionally charged criticism and false narratives about the EU. According to a report by Alliance4Europe, [vii] EU climate policy is frequently portrayed as the primary cause of rising energy prices in Poland, and EU regulations are depicted as obstacles to the development of Polish businesses and agriculture. The purpose of such narratives is to undermine the EU’s credibility, question the rationale behind decarbonisation efforts, and ultimately increase support for climate-skeptic or openly anti-EU positions.

Delaying or abandoning the energy transition would be far more costly for the Polish economy than the transition itself—although debates continue among experts and policymakers about the optimal technologies and pathways. According to estimates from the Ministry of Climate and Environment, Poland incurred economic losses of PLN 266 billion in 2023 alone due to inaction on the energy transition.[viii] For both Poland and the EU, the energy transition is a development opportunity that can reduce dependency on fossil fuel imports and enhance energy security.

The energy transition remains a politically and socially sensitive topic in Poland, creating fertile ground for disinformation. It is easy to identify on Polish social media a wide array of climate disinformation narratives, from conspiracy theories (“a plot by elites to control society”) and climate denialism (“human impact on climate is minimal” or “the climate has always changed”) to climate delayism (e.g., “the transition is too expensive,” “wait for cheaper technologies,” or “let’s keep using fossil fuels”).

As aforementioned, the Ministry of Climate and Environment has made combating climate disinformation a priority of Poland’s EU presidency. The Ministry aims to raise public awareness and promote understanding of climate change through educational campaigns and public consultations. These initiatives are intended both for domestic audiences and to spark broader EU discussions on effective tools for countering climate disinformation. However, it is worth noting that no such public campaign had been implemented during the first four months of Poland’s presidency.

2. The current set of tools used by the EU and NATO to counter disinformation is insufficient.

The European Commission has been addressing climate disinformation since 2015. Its actions fall into three main categories:

• Legal frameworks, which place responsibilities and restrictions on social media platforms—one of the main channels for climate disinformation. Key initiatives include:
  • The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (2018, updated in 2022)
  • The Action Plan Against Disinformation
  • The Digital Services Act (2022)
• Strategic communications and educational campaigns, including tools like the Climate Pact Toolkit and publications such as Addressing Rampant Climate Disinformation, which promote both pre-bunking and debunking techniques.
• Support for fact-checking and media monitoring, through both EU institutions (e.g. EU vs Disinfo) and independent initiatives such as the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) and EU DisinfoLab.

However, much of this content is available only in English (except for the Polish version of EU vs Disinfo), limiting its accessibility in Poland. Moreover, the EU’s approach relies heavily on soft instruments, with few enforcement mechanisms—such as financial penalties—against those who create or disseminate disinformation online.

The Issue of Climate Disinformation Has Also Been Recognized by the North Atlantic Alliance. In its third Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment, NATO identified climate disinformation as one of the challenges to the Alliance’s stability. [ix] This form of disinformation undermines NATO’s ability to respond swiftly to climate-induced events in the short term and weakens its long-term operational planning and military readiness. As previously noted, this threat was also explicitly recognized in the report of the Commission for the Investigation of Russian and Belarusian Influence on the Internal Security and Interests of the Republic of Poland (2004–2024).

NATO’s response to disinformation, in general, is multifaceted, encompassing short-, medium-, and long-term actions, with a strong emphasis on proactive measures. A key pillar of its strategy is the preemptive dissemination of accurate and reliable information. The Alliance prioritizes open, transparent, and clear communication, exemplified by the work of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE), which provides analysis and strategic support to NATO and its member states.

To effectively counter hostile narratives and limit their spread, NATO relies on standardized analytical processes and advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning. It applies the ABCDE analytical framework, which considers the Actor, Behaviour, Content, Degree, and Effect of disinformation. In 2019, NATO adopted an updated and systematic set of goals and tools to address disinformation threats.

However, in the specific context of climate disinformation, NATO’s third climate security report clearly emphasizes the essential and irreplaceable role of member states in effectively countering this growing threat

3. The Need for Better EU–NATO Coordination

Both NATO and the EU recognize disinformation as a major threat. They collaborate on information-sharing and best practices. Joint efforts include the EU–NATO Task Force on Critical Infrastructure Resilience and institutional cooperation through the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE). However, the Centre has yet to address climate disinformation specifically. At present, the responsibility for combating climate disinformation rests largely with individual member states.

Recommendations

• In the case of Poland, increase the availability of European Commission materials on climate disinformation in Polish to allow better dissemination of knowledge to a wider audience.

• Expand public knowledge about climate change impacts and the benefits of the energy transition. Messaging should highlight the benefits not just the costs of climate action.
• Strengthen enforcement tools—both at the member state level and within the European Commission—to target actors who create or amplify climate disinformation, including the use of sanctions.
• Improve EU–NATO synergy, for example, through workshops and experience-sharing among climate disinformation experts.

This commentary is intended as a starting point for a broader discussion on climate disinformation. Acknowledging the importance of this issue, the Casimir Pulaski Foundation plans to continue its analytical work on climate-related disinformation.

 

 [i]  World Economic Forum (2024) The Global Risks Report 2024. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2024.pdf (access 23.04.2025)

[ii] Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych (2023) 1st EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. Threats: Towards a Framework for Networked Defence. EEAS. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/EEAS-DataTeam-ThreatReport-2023..pdf (access 23.04.2025)

[iii] Komisja do spraw badania wpływów rosyjskich i białoruskich na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne i interesy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 2004–2024 (2025). Raport Zespołu ds. Dezinformacji (s. 69), Warszawa.

[iv] Jean Mclean (2024) Disinformation in the year of elections https://www.greeneconomycoalition.org/news-and-resources/disinformation-in-the-year-of-elections (access 23.04.2025)

[v] Komisja do spraw badania wpływów rosyjskich i białoruskich na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne i interesy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 2004–2024. (2025). Raport Zespołu ds. Dezinformacji (s. 69), Warszawa.

[vi] Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska (2024) Priorytety Ministerstwa Klimatu i Środowiska podczas polskiej prezydencji w Radzie UE https://www.gov.pl/web/klimat/priorytety-ministerstwa-klimatu-i-srodowiska-podczas-polskiej-prezydencji-w-radzie-ue (access 24.04.2025)

[vii] Saman Nazari, Pavlo Kryvenko and Maria Voltsichna (2025) Illegal Doppelganger Operation: Targeting the Polish Elections https://alliance4europe.eu/doppelganger-poland-elections (access 24.04.2025)

[viii] Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska (2025) Odpowiedź na interpelację poselską Pana Dariusza Mateckiego oraz grupy Posłów w sprawie walki z tzw. dezinformacją klimatyczną i jej wpływu na wolność słowa, znak: K10INT7442.

[ix] NATO (2024) NATO Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/240709-Climate-Security-Impact.pdf (access 24.04.2025)