Author: Ewa Polak

This is not the first time Western countries have turned their attention to Central Asia – the region was already the focus of external attention in the 19th century as the theatre of the Great Game, then following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a further wave of interest arose after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. On each occasion, the countries of the region remained the object of others’ strategies, rather than their subjects. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 brought about a qualitative change: it undermined the post-Cold War security architecture, sealed the end of the post-Soviet era and set in motion a process that cannot be reduced merely to yet another redistribution of influence among the great powers. The C5 states – Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and formally, from November 2025, in the expanded C6 format, Azerbaijan as well[1] – have ceased to be viewed solely as a theatre of operations for external powers, increasingly functioning as empowered partners, and as a bloc – as an independent actor in international relations.

The attack on Ukrainian statehood carried with it a threat directed squarely at the leaders of the Central Asian republics – both at the normative level and through direct, hostile gestures in the form of statements by Kremlin representatives questioning the sovereignty and historical legitimacy of these states, the most glaring example of which remains the remarks directed at Kazakhstan[2]. The C5 leaders concluded that Russia’s imperial appetite has not been sated, and that the Kremlin’s entanglement in a war of aggression – which has weakened its capabilities in other theatres of foreign policy – has created the conditions for a recalibration of external relations. The consequence is a pragmatic, albeit cautious, shift towards more balanced partnerships: within the region, where long-standing border conflicts and disputes over water resources are gradually being resolved, and externally, where the C5 increasingly acts as a block representing a common interest. The aim is to reduce strategic dependence on Russia – without exposing themselves to retaliation from the Kremlin. From the perspective of the European Union, as well as Poland itself, this reorientation of the Central Asian states signifies a genuine convergence of interests – albeit with significant caveats and limitations. Transforming this dynamic into a lasting framework for relations, however, requires conscious political decisions; merely recognising a community of interests does not in itself make these relations a strategic partnership.

The institutional architecture of EU–C5 relations

The European Union’s increased interest in Central Asia is part of the logic of the geopolitical shock caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine – an event that shifted the eastern focus of EU foreign policy and forced a fundamental rethinking of security. In relations with the C5, the invasion acted as a catalyst for processes that had begun even before 2022. As early as 2019, the EU developed a new strategy for the region, replacing the outdated framework set out in the previous strategic document from 2007[3]. This strategy expressed a commitment to developing cooperation in the areas of resilience, prosperity and regional cooperation, pledging to build connectivity and support economic growth and investment. In October 2023, the EU and the Central Asian states adopted a Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, which – by operationalising the strategy’s objectives – identified five key areas and 79 action points[4]. These documents provided a conceptual framework for a new type of relationship. However, they lacked a geopolitical catalyst – this emerged in February 2022 and simultaneously altered the motivations of both sides.
At the same time, the individual C5 states were conducting independent negotiations on Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCA), which form the legal basis for strengthening bilateral relations with the EU. Of the countries in the region, the EPCA has so far been signed by Kazakhstan (in force since 2020), Kyrgyzstan (signed in 2024) and Uzbekistan (2025). In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the European Parliament adopted a resolution strongly criticising the deteriorating human rights situation, signalling that the continued functioning of the partnership or its suspension would depend on improvements in this area[5]. As part of the Global Gateway initiative, the European Commission is also implementing cooperation projects with the Central Asian republics concerning critical raw materials (CRM). The EU and Kazakhstan have signed Memorandum of Understanding on a strategic partnership in the field of critical raw materials and adopted action plans focusing on the sustainable exploration, extraction and integration of Kazakh rare earth metals into European value chains. Similar agreements and action plans have been concluded with Uzbekistan. Supplies of critical raw materials are intended to support Europe’s green and digital transition, whilst strengthening Europe’s position vis-à-vis China by building alternative supply chains. In parallel, as part of the Team Europe initiative, measures are being taken to promote digital connectivity, with the aim of overcoming technological barriers in the five republics of the region. This project combines regulatory reforms and skills development with infrastructure expansion, including satellite and fibre-optic networks.

All these actions constituted further steps leading up to the culmination, which – now within a new geopolitical context – was the Samarkand Summit in April 2025. For the first time, the C5 states appeared as a unified block, represented at presidential level – previously, after 2022, C5–EU meetings had taken place at ministerial level. Mutual relations were formally elevated from the level of a ‘non-exclusive partnership’, as set out in the 2019 strategy, to that of a ‘strategic partnership’, confirmed in the official declaration concluding the summit[6]. However, the change was not merely symbolic: the European Union declared that it would allocate €12 billion under the Global Gateway programme, and the European Investment Bank signed four memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with partners in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, covering financing of up to €365 million, which is expected to attract a total of around €1 billion in investment in projects in the fields of transport, water management and climate change adaptation[7]. The EIB’s operational presence in the region was further strengthened by the signing of an agreement to establish a regional office of the bank in Uzbekistan. The summit was also attended by representatives of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – a key financial institution jointly responsible for implementing the EU’s investment programme under the Global Gateway.

The summit in Samarkand provided an opportunity to formulate policy objectives and make concrete financial commitments. Whether these commitments will be given a lasting institutional foundation will depend on the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034 and the design of the Global Europe Instrument.[8] The key question is whether blended finance mechanisms will prove sufficient to mobilise private capital in a region still perceived by investors as a high-risk area. It is these budgetary decisions, among others, that will determine whether the momentum from April 2025 will be institutionalised or squandered.

EU strategic objectives

The institutional framework described above is a response to specific strategic objectives. The first is supply chain and energy security. This is to be achieved through investment in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR), known as the Middle Corridor – an alternative to the Northern Corridor running through Russia and Belarus. The Middle Corridor currently operates below its intended level of ambition due to infrastructure bottlenecks and customs barriers, making it uncompetitive compared to maritime routes. From a Polish perspective, the war in Ukraine poses an additional complication, preventing the development of a branch line between Odesa and the hub in Sławków. EU investments aim to bridge this gap and diversify transport routes – and with them, to open up new opportunities for trade and energy cooperation, covering both hydrocarbons and critical raw materials essential for the green transition.

A goal less frequently articulated explicitly, yet clearly embedded in the logic of European engagement, is to work towards geopolitical diversification in the face of the risk of Chinese dominance in the region. China – thanks to its geographical proximity, consistent investment and the absence of normative conditionality – holds the position of leading trading partner in relations with most countries in the region; the exception is Kazakhstan, where the European Union remains the primary trading partner with a 29.7% share of trade turnover[9] . It is in the interests of both Europe and Central Asia itself to prevent a situation in which the structural dependence of the C5 states reaches a level that restricts access to local resources or makes it dependent on decisions taken in Beijing.

The EU’s policy towards the region has undergone a significant shift in its underlying principles – primarily regarding the separation of issues of democratisation and human rights from dialogue in other areas. These issues remain formally present in strategic documents, yet progress on values has taken a back seat, without blocking opportunities for cooperation in other fields. The case of Kyrgyzstan – where the European Parliament made the continued operation of the EPCA conditional on improvements in the human rights situation – also shows that normative conditionality has not disappeared from the EU’s toolkit, but is applied selectively and with varying intensity towards individual countries in the region. Nevertheless, strengthening local institutions based on the rule of law, professionalising the administration and combating corruption should represent – in the vital interest of both the EU and the Central Asian states themselves – areas of sustained engagement. Cooperation on institutional capacity-building covers areas such as border security, combating drug trafficking and the professionalisation of customs services, but may also extend to others. For what distinguishes the European offer from those of China and Russia is the architecture of the proposed solutions: institutional quality and the regulations underpinning it, create the conditions for sustainable growth, rather than fostering long-term dependency. Access to European markets, mutual interest in cooperation in the areas of energy, critical raw materials and supply chains, and the offer of development investments are based on a partnership model that does not turn Central Asian states into client states. From the perspective of the C5 capitals, faced with the question of the depth of their structural dependence on Chinese supply chains or the Russian security umbrella (which is a double-edged sword), the proposal for relations based on transparent rules and free from geopolitical coercion may appear to be a genuinely attractive alternative.

Poland’s strategic objectives

Full-scale war in Ukraine has confirmed the relevance of Poland’s eastern policy based on the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine and shown that Russian imperialism remains a direct existential threat – not only to Ukraine, but for the entire order based on Western values, which is today being put to an additional test by China’s new role and the redefinition of US foreign policy. Operational objectives follow directly from this assessment: strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, building the EU’s resilience, and forging closer alliances with like-minded states and those with converging interests.

Poland’s engagement in Central Asia should be viewed in the same light – as an integral part of its Eastern policy. Securing European supply chains, limiting Russia’s ability to influence the supply of energy and critical raw materials, and strengthening the sovereignty of states south of the Russian border are directly in line with Poland’s strategic objectives. Poland also has a specific comparative advantage that no other large EU country possesses to the same extent: the experience of political transformation, the long-standing achievements of the Eastern Partnership, and the tools of transformational diplomacy it has developed. It is precisely these resources that justify Warsaw’s active role and lend it particular credibility as a partner in institution-building and reform.

Poland should actively promote EU programmes supporting the development of state institutions in the region – in the areas of the rule of law, the fight against corruption and the professionalisation of public administration – and, in negotiations on the MFF 2028–2034 and the Global Europe Instrument, seek funding for development support on a scale commensurate with the declared ‘strategic partnership’. In the bilateral sphere, people-to-people contacts remain an underutilised resource: in 2025, Uzbeks were the sixth largest group applying for temporary residence in Poland[10]. Supporting academic partnerships, NAWA scholarships, the involvement of Polish non-governmental organisations, trade missions and expanding the presence of Polish Investment and Trade Agency in the region – including the planned office in Uzbekistan – is the right direction, requiring consistent implementation.

Window of opportunity – conditions and limits of a strategic partnership

The new opening between the EU and the C5 bloc is based on a community of interests that outweighs the differences – yet the challenges that have marked relations to date have not disappeared with the change in rhetoric.

The regional pivot is not an unambiguous orientation towards Europe, but an attempt to build a multi-vector foreign policy in which various influences are actively leveraged to maximise autonomy and bargaining power. The EU remains one of several key players – alongside China as a trade leader and Russia as a benchmark on security issues – both at the state level and from the perspective of elites and specific interest groups within local power structures. Nor should one lose sight of the other players: Turkey, which is gaining in importance, India, the Gulf states and the US, which have intensified their engagement in the region, as evidenced by the summit in Washington in 2025. Moreover, the C5 states are grappling with serious internal problems, remaining regimes that severely restrict civil liberties and human rights. This is a contradiction that European policy – which declares a strategic partnership based on selective normative conditionality, whilst at the same time seeking to maintain credibility on values and democratic standards – will have to address more systematically.

Policy towards Central Asia will be a test of the EU’s ability to function as a strategic actor: consistent in its long-term goals, not merely reactive in moments of crisis. The task and opportunity for Europe – and for Poland – is to provide the C5 states with a credible alternative to dependence on Moscow and Beijing. The window of opportunity remains open, but delaying too long in taking action to give these relations a truly strategic character will mean a loss of relevance that neither the EU nor Poland can afford in their eastern policy.

Endnotes:
[1] Despite this change within the region itself, the EU has not yet incorporated Azerbaijan’s participation in this capacity into its formal institutional framework – hence the reference to C5 in the text.
[2] Rhetoric questioning Kazakhstan’s national distinctiveness and sovereignty, alongside statements by V. Putin, has been developed by, among others, D. Medvedev and Russian journalists and politicians linked to the Kremlin. Cf.: V. Putin, On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians, July 2021; M. Domańska, Putin: Ukrainians are Russians, Ukraine is ‘anti-Russia’, OSW, 2021.
[3] EU Strategy on Central Asia, Council of the European Union, 2019.
[4] Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia, 2023.
[5] Non-legislative resolution of the European Parliament of 9 September 2025 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States and the Kyrgyz Republic, 2025; see also: European Parliament resolution of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, and in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov.
[6] Final Declaration of the EU–C5 Summit in Samarkand, April 2025.
[7] Data from the European Investment Bank’s press release following the Samarkand Summit, April 2025.
[8] See E. Polak, Development cooperation in an era of geopolitical fractures: new instruments, new challenges, Poland’s new role, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, 2026
[9] M. Popławski, own analysis based on data from the national statistical offices of Central Asian countries for 2023, Crisis as an Opportunity. A New Stage in EU-Central Asia Relations, OSW, 2024
[10] Data: Office for Foreigners, 2025