Author: Agnieszka Grzegorzewska

On 9 January 2024, the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) approved the proposal of opening parts of the Norwegian sea to mineral activities, marking the beginning of the exploratory stage of deep sea mining (DSM) on the Norwegian continental shelf [1]. Eleven months later, however, the operations were abruptly stopped, as the Socialist Left Party of Norway (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) threatened the refusal of the government budget for 2025 [2]. This seemingly minor event triggered a larger, albeit not necessarily well-publicised conversation: what actually is deep sea mining, and why does it matter?

Critical Minerals, Deep Sea Mining and Green Transition

Critical minerals, such as lithium, nickel or cobalt, are crucial in the production of “green” technologies, or technologies used in green transition, like batteries, solar panels or wind turbines [3]. A stable supply of them is therefore needed to sustain the energy transition. However, their presence is geographically limited to states such as Australia, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, or Russia [4], creating complex supply chains for the greatest importers, which include the European Union and China. Furthermore, extraction of critical minerals poses environmental, as well as ethical dilemmas concerning unsustainable mining practices, as well as violations of workers’ rights, including reported incidents of child labour in cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo [5].

At the same time, there exists an alternative to critical minerals mining. Certain critical minerals, for instance copper, manganese, cobalt or nickel can be found on the deep seabed in the form of polymetallic nodules and sulphides, as well as ferromanganese crusts [6]. Norway possesses both polymetallic sulphides and the ferromanganese crusts, with metals such as cobalt, nickel, manganese, copper, zinc, and most importantly- lithium and scandium, which are the most important “green” metals [7]. However, deep sea mining has a number of important disadvantages, one of them being its environmental impact on the marine ecosystems.

Norwegian Reality

“We have a right to utilise our own continental shelf” said Terje Aasland, Norwegian Minister of Energy when asked about the developments in Norwegian deep sea mining industry [8] [9]. This statement is technically true, as Article 55 and Article 56 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea clearly define the states’ rights and privileges in their exclusive economic zones (extending 200 nautical miles beyond their territorial seas) [10]. The area was supposed to be located in the Barents and North Sea, off the coast of Nordland to Finmark in the Arctic Circle [11]. The plan covered both exploration and possible future exploitation zones, amounting to roughly 281 thousand square kilometres, a little more than the surface area of Great Britain.

The initiative polarised Norwegian Parliament and society alike, and was met with international criticism. Proponents of the initiative, consisting of the social democratic Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet), the Center Party (Senterpartiet), the Conservative Party (Høyre), and the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet), as well as the oil and gas industry, perceive it as a part of the broader geoeconomic strategy of Norway. Enabling private actors to explore and gather data on the resources in the deep sea was perceived as an important step toward meeting Europe’s future demand for critical minerals in Europe, while simultaneously securing Norway’s place in the supply chain [12] [13] [14]. The politicians in favour of the proposition underlined its domestic job creation potential, framing the narrative around DSM as an imperative for the state’s economic growth. However, it has to be emphasised that the environmental impact of deep sea mining was not completely disregarded by its proponents- the activities were to be heavily regulated both in terms of criteria for companies (with special focus on state security), as well as environmental monitoring [15] [16].

On the other hand, smaller parties of the Storting, namely Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstrepartiet), the socialist Red Party (Rødt), the Liberal Party (Venstre), Green Party (Miljøpartiet De Grønne) and Christian Democratic Party (Kristelig Folkepartiet), together with environmental organisations and activists called for complete halt of the project, claiming that the current knowledge is insufficient to foresee the impacts on the frail marine ecosystems in the Arctic [17] [18]. Interestingly, when asked about the growing demand for critical minerals, they emphasised the need to shift the focus from developing new technologies to upgrading the existing ones in such a way as to prolong their lifespan, resulting in minimising the need for critical minerals extraction altogether [19].

Ultimately, the environmental concerns took precedence over the economic considerations, resulting in the suspension of the project by the Socialist Left Party of Norway (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) in December 2024 [20].

European Perspective

The developments in Norwegian deep sea mining were met with criticisms from various international actors and organisations, including the European Union. The European Commission showcases a very cautious stance on the issue, invoking its principles of sustainability and environmental preservation, and going as far as rejecting its recommendation made in Mario Draghi’s report “The Future of European Competitiveness” [21] [22]. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Commission expressed concerns over Stortinget’s decision, and called for a broader moratorium on advancing deep sea mining with particular focus on marine environment, biodiversity and scientific research [23].

It is worth noting that the Commission simply reiterated its position from 2022, indicating a lack of developments in the European DSM policy. Simultaneously, Europe continues to import critical minerals from third countries. In 2024, 95% of EU imports of rare earth elements (including the aforementioned scandium) came from China, Malaysia and Russia combined [24]. Other EU trade partners include the United States, Israel, Brazil, Chile, the United Kingdom and South Africa, putting the supply chains at various levels of risk [25]. This begs further question: shouldn’t Europe do something about its critical minerals import dependency?

With the results of the Norwegian elections the status of deep sea mining in Norway is uncertain, but it is clear that demand for critical minerals is expected to surge in the coming years, inter alia due to the increased need for green technologies used in the process of energy transition. Global players, including China and the United States express growing interest in mineral extraction from the deep seabed, seemingly leaving Europe in the dust [26]. It is therefore clear that if Europe wants to continue leading the energy transition, it needs a specific strategy on acquiring the critical minerals in a more resilient and independent manner. And maybe Norway performing the extraction is the way to go.

 

Sources:

[1] Energidepartementet (2024). Norway gives green light for seabed minerals. [online] Government.no. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-gives-green-light-for-seabed-minerals/id3021433.
[2] Davies, M. (2024). Deep-sea mining: Norway suspends controversial plan. BBC. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wlj818kr7o.
[3] IRENA (2023). Geopolitics of the Energy Transition: Critical Materials. [online] Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, pp.1–150. Available at: https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/irena_geopolitics_energy_transition_critical_materials_2023_1.pdf.

[4] IRENA (2023). Geopolitics of the Energy Transition: Critical Materials. [online] Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency, pp.1–150. Available at: https://wwfint.awsassets.panda.org/downloads/irena_geopolitics_energy_transition_critical_materials_2023_1.pdf.

[5] Save the Children (2024). DRC: Cobalt mines, child labour and the green transition. [online] Save the Children International. Available at: https://www.savethechildren.net/stories/drc-cobalt-mines-child-labour-and-green-transition.

[6] Johansen, J.I. (2024). Kan vi gjøre hva vi vil på havets bunn? [online] NRK. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/vestland/xl/norge-vil-apne-gigantiske-undervannsomrader-for-mineral-leting-mot-internasjonale-protester-1.17057745 [Accessed 19 Aug. 2025].

[7] Johansen, J.I. (2024). Kan vi gjøre hva vi vil på havets bunn? [online] NRK. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/vestland/xl/norge-vil-apne-gigantiske-undervannsomrader-for-mineral-leting-mot-internasjonale-protester-1.17057745 [Accessed 19 Aug. 2025].

[8] Johansen, J.I. (2024). Kan vi gjøre hva vi vil på havets bunn? [online] NRK. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/vestland/xl/norge-vil-apne-gigantiske-undervannsomrader-for-mineral-leting-mot-internasjonale-protester-1.17057745 [Accessed 19 Aug. 2025].

[9] “Vi har jo rett til å utvikle vår egen kontinentalsokkel” (own translation)

[10] United Nations (1994). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. [online] Available at: https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

[11] Melgård, M. and Berglihn, H. (2023). Regjeringen åpner for gruvedrift på havbunnen: –Sjokkerende uansvarlig. [online] DN.no. Available at: https://www.dn.no/politikk/terje-aasland/store-regjeringen/havbunnsmineraler/regjeringen-apner-for-gruvedrift-pa-havbunnen-sjokkerende-uansvarlig/2-1-1470182?abtest=a.

[12] Middleton, A. (2024). Arctic Deep Seabed Mining in Norway: Government Policies vs Public Opinion. Current Developments in Arctic Law, [online] 12(1), pp.24–32. Available at: https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66263/Middleton_Alexandra.pdf?sequence=1.

[13] Fremskrittspartiet (2025). Enighet om utvinning av havbunnsmineraler. [online] Www.frp.no. Available at: https://www.frp.no/nyheter/enighet-om-utvinning-av-havbunnsmineraler.

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[15] Fremskrittspartiet (2025). Enighet om utvinning av havbunnsmineraler. [online] Www.frp.no. Available at: https://www.frp.no/nyheter/enighet-om-utvinning-av-havbunnsmineraler.

[16] Senterpartiet (2023). Bred støtte til regjeringens åpning for havbunnsmineraler. [online] Senterpartiet. Available at: https://www.senterpartiet.no/aktuelt/bred-stotte-til-regjeringens-apning-for-havbunnsmineraler.

[17] Middleton, A. (2024). Arctic Deep Seabed Mining in Norway: Government Policies vs Public Opinion. Current Developments in Arctic Law, [online] 12(1), pp.24–32. Available at: https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66263/Middleton_Alexandra.pdf?sequence=1.

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[20] Davies, M. (2024). Deep-sea mining: Norway suspends controversial plan. BBC. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wlj818kr7o.

[21] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part a | a Competitiveness Strategy for Europe.” Commission.europa.eu. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en.

[22] Canton, J. (2024). NGOs’ Concerns Regarding References to Deep Sea Mining in Mario Draghi’s Report: The Future of European Competitiveness. [online] Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/Reply_Concerns-regarding-references-to-deep-sea-mining_FINAL_2024-10-10-154645_kyqh.pdf.

[23] Delivorias, A. (2024). Norway to mine part of the Arctic seabed. [online] Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/757616/EPRS_ATA%282024%29757616_EN.pdf.

[24] Eurostat (2025). International trade in critical raw materials – Statistics Explained – Eurostat. [online] Europa.eu. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_critical_raw_materials#Rare_earth_elements.2C_scandium_and_yttrium_.28REE.2B.29.

[25] Eurostat (2025). International trade in critical raw materials – Statistics Explained – Eurostat. [online] Europa.eu. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_critical_raw_materials#Rare_earth_elements.2C_scandium_and_yttrium_.28REE.2B.29.

[26] Baruah, D.M. (2025). Uncharted territory: deep-sea mining and the underwater domain. [online] Available at: https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2025/03/uncharted-territory-deep-sea-mining-and-the-underwater-domain/.