Poland is facing a huge challenge in offshore energy development with the construction of the first wind farms in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic, as a strategic body of water, plays a key role not only for the energy sector, but also in the area of defense and national security. It is in this context that protecting offshore infrastructure becomes a priority both for the civilian and military stakeholders. The overarching challenge is to nurture synergies between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Polish companies in the private sector. Doing so will help guarantee not only the effective protection of offshore wind farms, but also increase the resilience of the state in the Baltic Sea.
Early involvement of the Ministry of Defense in wind farm development
Wind farms in the Baltic are expected to make a significant contribution to Poland’s decarbonization goals, but they require effective protection against a variety of threats. Offshore infrastructure is vulnerable to conventional, cyber and hybrid attacks, making it vital for the MoD to address the security considerations already at the design stage of these installations. During a conflict wind farms could become targets of cyberattacks, drone attacks or direct sabotage. Defensive systems integrated into offshore installations must therefore enable monitoring, detection and rapid response to any potential threats. It is a prerequisite for assuring continuous functioning of the offshore parks in the event of hostilities, thus safeguarding Poland’s energy security as an increasing share of its electricity will come from this clean energy source. Indeed, the question is not solely about physical security of the infrastructure, but even more so about energy security: by one estimate, Poland’s offshore wind energy potential is estimated to exceed 30 GW, which, if fully developed, could eventually meet more than half of the country’s electricity demand.[1]
The defense ministries of various countries are playing a key role in the development of offshore wind farms, taking into account national security and maritime security concerns. One illustration is Britain’s MoD, which has worked to reduce the impact of turbines on military radar systems, as in the case of the Dogger Bank wind farm project, where radar mitigation technologies have been applied.[2] In this specific sphere alone the UK has developed a strong track record of successful cooperation between its Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the private sector.[3] In the United States, the Department of Defense and the United States Army Corps of Engineers typically evaluate the location of offshore wind farms and engage with stakeholders to ensure that they do not interfere with military training, as for instance in case of the Block Island[4] and Vineyard Wind[5] projects. In Germany, the Bundeswehr has had to balance the development of wind farms, such as Gode Wind, with naval exercises in the North and Baltic Seas to ensure that these installations do not interfere with military operations.[6] The Dutch Ministry of Defense, whose intelligence service warned of Russian targeting of wind infrastructure in the North Sea[7], bought cameras and radar systems for drilling rigs and wind turbines at sea.[8]
Denmark, whose military performs radar and coastal surveillance of its wind farms, has turned to its manufacturers for solutions allowing it to better monitor its major blind spot – the country’s seabed.[9] In Norway, the Ministry of Defense is working with the offshore sector to implement technological solutions that integrate monitoring systems with defense to detect threats in wind farm areas. It does not shy, however, from going with foreign firms for needed technologies: in 2022, it signed with Lockheed Martin 2022 for delivery of eight military air surveillance radars.[10] On Europe’s other end, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces is overseeing that offshore wind farm projects such as Saint-Nazaire do not interfere with maritime operations or coastal protection.[11] All in all, and according to a 2024 report by Sweden’s Inquiry Commission on Offshore Wind Power, Defense Ministries in Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the UK are increasingly involved in offshore wind projects, indicating a growing trend in integrating national security with energy infrastructure among NATO states.[12] These foreign experiences can provide important inspiration for Poland.
Synergy between the Ministry of Defense and the civilian sector
The above examples show how the Polish MoD can cooperate with the civilian sector. In these cases, mechanisms have been put in place that allow offshore companies to actively cooperate with the military in monitoring infrastructure and jointly developing protection technologies. Poland should adopt a similar approach to ensure that wind farms are adequately protected already at the stage of their construction against both physical, cyber and foreign intelligence threats, and not only after such sites become operational. Implementing dual-use solutions that allow the integration of monitoring and security systems for civilian and military purposes could indeed significantly enhance infrastructure security.
Local content policies aim to boost national economic benefits from investments by fostering the development of domestic supply chains and employment. And as far as the offshore industry is concerned, Polish firms are ready.[13] However, such regulations must be balanced in line with European Union (EU) law and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, which permit such measures but impose limitations. This means Poland must implement policies that support domestic industries while also respecting principles of fair competition. For instance, Taiwan recently introduced regulations to bolster its local renewable energy sector, which caught the attention of the EU. In July, Brussels lodged a complaint arguing that some of Taiwan’s rules might violate non-discrimination principles of international trade law.[14]
The Polish MoD should also consider introducing specific activities and actionable steps that could strengthen synergies with the civilian sector. An example would be the joint development of prototypes of security systems to address the specific needs of offshore infrastructure. Such cooperation could also include the development of joint research and development projects to innovate in the field of security and monitoring, rather than buying off-the-shelf from abroad. It is also worth thinking about including Polish technical and research universities in this process, which could help improve the quality of education in the field of defense and offshore technologies. Workshops and seminars aimed at exchanging knowledge and experience between the military, MoD civil servants and the offshore industry could provide the needed signal.
The way forward
The development of a Polish wind park in the Baltic Sea is naturally not only an opportunity for the Polish energy industry, but also a major challenge in the context of defense and national security. Cooperation between the MoD and the civilian sector, especially in protecting offshore infrastructure, can bring tangible benefits to both sides. From the government’s perspective, wind farms can become a component of the defense system, monitoring sea and air movements and providing strategic observation points. For offshore wind companies, cooperation with the MoD can open up new markets and contribute to increased innovation in the defense sector.
Securing local content in the Polish offshore sector should be a norm. Poland could create national standards for securing offshore infrastructure, which would be mandatory for all companies operating in the wind sector. Such an approach would force foreign companies investing in the Polish offshore to cooperate with local technology and service providers, which could create new markets for Polish firms. But again, to effectively protect Poland’s offshore parks, the MoD should be involved already at the design stage of these installations, and not only after they become operational. After all, the Baltic Sea – as a strategically important body of water – requires special attention in the context of offshore infrastructure protection, which should be one of Poland’s defense policy priorities.
Author: Maciej Bukowski, LL.M., Non-resident fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis
Sources:
[1] https://www.oze.pl/blog/potencjal-polskiego-sektora-offshore-wind-moze-przekroczyc-30-gw
[2] https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/wp-content/ipc/uploads/projects/EN010125/EN010125-000513-7.15.15.2%20ES%20Appendix%2015-2%20-%20Airspace%20Analysis%20and%20Radar%20Modelling.pdf
[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/windfarm-mitigation-for-uk-air-defence-successful-projects
[4] https://www.nae.usace.army.mil/Missions/Projects-Topics/Deepwater-Wind/
[5] https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/renewable-energy/state-activities/Vineyard-Wind-1-FEIS-Volume-1.pdf
[6] https://www.uvp-portal.de/sites/default/files/2023-05/210326_Planfeststellungsbeschluss%20Gode%20Wind%203-2_0.pdf
[7] https://www.offshore-energy.biz/dutch-intelligence-warns-russia-may-be-preparing-to-sabotage-offshore-wind-gas-and-cable-infrastructure-in-north-sea/
[8] https://swzmaritime.nl/news/2023/12/21/dutch-defence-buys-ships-and-other-equipment-to-protect-north-sea/
[9] https://ing.dk/artikel/bottom-sea-danish-defences-blind-spot-4-possible-surveillance-technologies
[10] https://www.fma.no/en/news-and-media/newsarticles/new-military-air-surveillance-radars
[11] https://www.eoliennesenmer.fr/sites/eoliennesenmer/files/fichiers/2021/09/2021-09_Eolien_mer_Sud_Atlantique_DMO_Fiche16-06.pdf
[12] https://www.sou.gov.se/contentassets/ac6cb0d4637e433cb406fbbb3860d688/study-2024-02-22-of-regulations-in-denmark-finland-germany-and-the-uk.pdf
[13] https://www.bgk.pl/files/public/Pliki/Analizy_ekonomiczne/Local_content_w_offshore_gotowosc_polskich_przedsiebiorcow_do_rozwoju_morskiej_energetyki_wiatrowej.pdf
[14] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-challenges-taiwans-discriminatory-rules-offshore-wind-projects-2024-07-26_en
windmills
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
Shoring up: the power of local content strategies and early MoD participation in offshore resilience and maritime defense
November 12, 2024
Author: Maciej Bukowski
windmills
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
Shoring up: the power of local content strategies and early MoD participation in offshore resilience and maritime defense
Author: Maciej Bukowski
Published: November 12, 2024
Poland is facing a huge challenge in offshore energy development with the construction of the first wind farms in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic, as a strategic body of water, plays a key role not only for the energy sector, but also in the area of defense and national security. It is in this context that protecting offshore infrastructure becomes a priority both for the civilian and military stakeholders. The overarching challenge is to nurture synergies between the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Polish companies in the private sector. Doing so will help guarantee not only the effective protection of offshore wind farms, but also increase the resilience of the state in the Baltic Sea.
Early involvement of the Ministry of Defense in wind farm development
Wind farms in the Baltic are expected to make a significant contribution to Poland’s decarbonization goals, but they require effective protection against a variety of threats. Offshore infrastructure is vulnerable to conventional, cyber and hybrid attacks, making it vital for the MoD to address the security considerations already at the design stage of these installations. During a conflict wind farms could become targets of cyberattacks, drone attacks or direct sabotage. Defensive systems integrated into offshore installations must therefore enable monitoring, detection and rapid response to any potential threats. It is a prerequisite for assuring continuous functioning of the offshore parks in the event of hostilities, thus safeguarding Poland’s energy security as an increasing share of its electricity will come from this clean energy source. Indeed, the question is not solely about physical security of the infrastructure, but even more so about energy security: by one estimate, Poland’s offshore wind energy potential is estimated to exceed 30 GW, which, if fully developed, could eventually meet more than half of the country’s electricity demand.[1]
The defense ministries of various countries are playing a key role in the development of offshore wind farms, taking into account national security and maritime security concerns. One illustration is Britain’s MoD, which has worked to reduce the impact of turbines on military radar systems, as in the case of the Dogger Bank wind farm project, where radar mitigation technologies have been applied.[2] In this specific sphere alone the UK has developed a strong track record of successful cooperation between its Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the private sector.[3] In the United States, the Department of Defense and the United States Army Corps of Engineers typically evaluate the location of offshore wind farms and engage with stakeholders to ensure that they do not interfere with military training, as for instance in case of the Block Island[4] and Vineyard Wind[5] projects. In Germany, the Bundeswehr has had to balance the development of wind farms, such as Gode Wind, with naval exercises in the North and Baltic Seas to ensure that these installations do not interfere with military operations.[6] The Dutch Ministry of Defense, whose intelligence service warned of Russian targeting of wind infrastructure in the North Sea[7], bought cameras and radar systems for drilling rigs and wind turbines at sea.[8]
Denmark, whose military performs radar and coastal surveillance of its wind farms, has turned to its manufacturers for solutions allowing it to better monitor its major blind spot – the country’s seabed.[9] In Norway, the Ministry of Defense is working with the offshore sector to implement technological solutions that integrate monitoring systems with defense to detect threats in wind farm areas. It does not shy, however, from going with foreign firms for needed technologies: in 2022, it signed with Lockheed Martin 2022 for delivery of eight military air surveillance radars.[10] On Europe’s other end, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces is overseeing that offshore wind farm projects such as Saint-Nazaire do not interfere with maritime operations or coastal protection.[11] All in all, and according to a 2024 report by Sweden’s Inquiry Commission on Offshore Wind Power, Defense Ministries in Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the UK are increasingly involved in offshore wind projects, indicating a growing trend in integrating national security with energy infrastructure among NATO states.[12] These foreign experiences can provide important inspiration for Poland.
Synergy between the Ministry of Defense and the civilian sector
The above examples show how the Polish MoD can cooperate with the civilian sector. In these cases, mechanisms have been put in place that allow offshore companies to actively cooperate with the military in monitoring infrastructure and jointly developing protection technologies. Poland should adopt a similar approach to ensure that wind farms are adequately protected already at the stage of their construction against both physical, cyber and foreign intelligence threats, and not only after such sites become operational. Implementing dual-use solutions that allow the integration of monitoring and security systems for civilian and military purposes could indeed significantly enhance infrastructure security.
Local content policies aim to boost national economic benefits from investments by fostering the development of domestic supply chains and employment. And as far as the offshore industry is concerned, Polish firms are ready.[13] However, such regulations must be balanced in line with European Union (EU) law and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, which permit such measures but impose limitations. This means Poland must implement policies that support domestic industries while also respecting principles of fair competition. For instance, Taiwan recently introduced regulations to bolster its local renewable energy sector, which caught the attention of the EU. In July, Brussels lodged a complaint arguing that some of Taiwan’s rules might violate non-discrimination principles of international trade law.[14]
The Polish MoD should also consider introducing specific activities and actionable steps that could strengthen synergies with the civilian sector. An example would be the joint development of prototypes of security systems to address the specific needs of offshore infrastructure. Such cooperation could also include the development of joint research and development projects to innovate in the field of security and monitoring, rather than buying off-the-shelf from abroad. It is also worth thinking about including Polish technical and research universities in this process, which could help improve the quality of education in the field of defense and offshore technologies. Workshops and seminars aimed at exchanging knowledge and experience between the military, MoD civil servants and the offshore industry could provide the needed signal.
The way forward
The development of a Polish wind park in the Baltic Sea is naturally not only an opportunity for the Polish energy industry, but also a major challenge in the context of defense and national security. Cooperation between the MoD and the civilian sector, especially in protecting offshore infrastructure, can bring tangible benefits to both sides. From the government’s perspective, wind farms can become a component of the defense system, monitoring sea and air movements and providing strategic observation points. For offshore wind companies, cooperation with the MoD can open up new markets and contribute to increased innovation in the defense sector.
Securing local content in the Polish offshore sector should be a norm. Poland could create national standards for securing offshore infrastructure, which would be mandatory for all companies operating in the wind sector. Such an approach would force foreign companies investing in the Polish offshore to cooperate with local technology and service providers, which could create new markets for Polish firms. But again, to effectively protect Poland’s offshore parks, the MoD should be involved already at the design stage of these installations, and not only after they become operational. After all, the Baltic Sea – as a strategically important body of water – requires special attention in the context of offshore infrastructure protection, which should be one of Poland’s defense policy priorities.
Author: Maciej Bukowski, LL.M., Non-resident fellow, Center for European Policy Analysis
Sources:
[1] https://www.oze.pl/blog/potencjal-polskiego-sektora-offshore-wind-moze-przekroczyc-30-gw
[2] https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/wp-content/ipc/uploads/projects/EN010125/EN010125-000513-7.15.15.2%20ES%20Appendix%2015-2%20-%20Airspace%20Analysis%20and%20Radar%20Modelling.pdf
[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/windfarm-mitigation-for-uk-air-defence-successful-projects
[4] https://www.nae.usace.army.mil/Missions/Projects-Topics/Deepwater-Wind/
[5] https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/documents/renewable-energy/state-activities/Vineyard-Wind-1-FEIS-Volume-1.pdf
[6] https://www.uvp-portal.de/sites/default/files/2023-05/210326_Planfeststellungsbeschluss%20Gode%20Wind%203-2_0.pdf
[7] https://www.offshore-energy.biz/dutch-intelligence-warns-russia-may-be-preparing-to-sabotage-offshore-wind-gas-and-cable-infrastructure-in-north-sea/
[8] https://swzmaritime.nl/news/2023/12/21/dutch-defence-buys-ships-and-other-equipment-to-protect-north-sea/
[9] https://ing.dk/artikel/bottom-sea-danish-defences-blind-spot-4-possible-surveillance-technologies
[10] https://www.fma.no/en/news-and-media/newsarticles/new-military-air-surveillance-radars
[11] https://www.eoliennesenmer.fr/sites/eoliennesenmer/files/fichiers/2021/09/2021-09_Eolien_mer_Sud_Atlantique_DMO_Fiche16-06.pdf
[12] https://www.sou.gov.se/contentassets/ac6cb0d4637e433cb406fbbb3860d688/study-2024-02-22-of-regulations-in-denmark-finland-germany-and-the-uk.pdf
[13] https://www.bgk.pl/files/public/Pliki/Analizy_ekonomiczne/Local_content_w_offshore_gotowosc_polskich_przedsiebiorcow_do_rozwoju_morskiej_energetyki_wiatrowej.pdf
[14] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-challenges-taiwans-discriminatory-rules-offshore-wind-projects-2024-07-26_en
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