Remote and small island communities face unique energy and climate challenges stemming from their geographic isolation. Their reliance on imported fossil fuels leaves them vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions. Although their carbon footprint is minimal, these islands disproportionately experience the adverse effects of climate change. Increasingly, islands become testbeds for geopolitical rivalry and are compelled to adapt to situations when critical infrastructure is weaponised.
All the above challenges are daily issues for islands globally. This is definitely the case of Svalbard, the Arctic archipelago under Norwegian sovereignty (it is Norway’s northmost region). On the 30th of June 2025, Svalbard’s last remaining Norwegian coal mine known as Gruve7 was closed. [i] It might come as a surprise to many that Norway – which boasts a 96% renewable energy mix – until recently still has had a functioning coal mine. Coal extraction has been part of the archipelago’s history for over a hundred years. Until recently it has been the dominant energy source on Svalbard used both for electricity generation and heating. In 2023 the coal-fired powerplant was closed, and the extracted coal was exported. The mine was closed because it was no longer economically viable to extract coal and ship it overseas; additionally the coal reserves were depleting. [ii] Environmental concerns, specifically upkeeping the perception of Norway as a leader in green transition, was another factor leading to such a decision. The Norwegian government has set separate targets related to protecting the specific environment of the island.[iii]
By switching to diesel, the only other viable option – albeit still an unsustainable source of energy – has meant that CO2 emissions have been halved compared to coal. [iv] However, as local and national media have reported diesel generators have not been reliable as they often malfunctioned and were prone to accidents. [v] The use of diesel has also contributed to increased energy costs that many inhabitants of Longyearbyen, the main settlement on Svalbard, have been paying in recent years. [vi] This has generated both insecurity in the power source and economic vulnerability of the small population, whose economy predominantly relies on services sector.
Furthermore, it made the inhabitants of the archipelago more vulnerable as Svalbard has no electricity connection to mainland Norway. Such a possibility has been analysed by ABB in the past, but due to the high costs of the project (estimated between €300 and €500 million) such a solution was deemed unfeasible. Another plan proposed by Statkraft was to use renewable hydrogen produced from wind power in Finnmark and ship it by boat to Svalbard. [vii] The project did not materialise.
Despite various discussions about the use of renewables in this Arctic environment, , only pilot renewable energy projects were implemented in two locations – in Isfjord Radio, located 90km from Longyearbyen and in the main settlement itself. The two pilot projects in Isfjord Radio included a battery system and a small thermal unit, followed by solar panels. [viii] In preparation for the closure of the coal-fired powerplant and to lower climate emissions, the local council of Longyearbyen has acquired a battery system with a capacity of 6 MW. [ix] To put this into perspective, the battery storage system can supply electricity and heating for one hour for the entire settlement. These initiatives and projects appear to be “too little, too late” as they do not significantly contribute to the long-term energy supply and perpetuate the archipelago’s dependence on imports, despite the local council’s pledge to implement an all-renewable energy supply already by 2030.
Moreover, with the closure of the coal mine, the fate of 60 miners and their families on Svalbard remains uncertain as one cannot live on the archipelago without a source of income, and there are no immediate plans to launch a new industry. In its latest white paper on Svalbard, the government has prioritised sustaining the Norwegian presence on the archipelago, particularly through the Norwegian community in Longyearbyen.[x] The government wishes to develop good quality jobs particularly in the following sectors: research, higher education, space industry (related to satellite deployment), and tourism. The latter is somewhat a paradox because tourism attracts the largest share of non-Norwegians to Svalbard. Non-Norwegians currently account for 38% of the population. [xi]
It is worth mentioning that the second largest settlement on Svalbard is Barentsberg, an exclusively Russian mining town and research facility. Under the Svalbard Treaty, citizens of all parties to the treaty (currently more than 40 states) are allowed to have access to Svalbard including the right to fish, hunt or undertake any kind of maritime, industrial, mining or trade activity. [xii] Scientific research has not been explicitly covered by the treaty’s non-discrimination clause. The Russian presence and their use of scientific activities for other purposes has been viewed as a increasing security concern, especially after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. [xiii]
Moreover, increased tourism leads to further degradation of the pristine Svalbard environment. In order to preserve and better protect the unique nature of Svalbard the Norwegian parliament passed last year a new law – Lov om miljøvern på Svalbard (svalbardmiljøloven) (Law on the protection of Svalbard) – which introduces stricter regulations on landing sites for cruise vessels, passenger limits of 200 for ships sailing, and requirements of maintaining a minimum distance to polar bears, bird cliffs and walrus haul-outs. [xiv] Some locals and scientists argue that through stricter environmental regulations, the government is trying to kill two birds with one stone and reach some of its geopolitical objectives, namely to obfuscate access to Svalbard to non-Norwegians. [xv] [xvi]
There is no denying that energy transition on Svalbard will be a challenging endeavour, extending far beyond the already initiated renewable energy pilot projects and mandating greater involvement of public and private actors. To make matters more complicated, much of the critical infrastructure on the archipelago needs an immediate upgrade. The local council in Longyearbyen through one of its members has expressed concern over the state of critical infrastructure (ports, airports, water and electricity supply) and the lack of an industrial alternative to coal mining. [xvii] One option, albeit a controversial one is deep sea mining, which despite its economic feasibility in the resource-rich waters would directly contradict the Law on the Protection of Svalbard.
Why is this important? The case of Svalbard illustrates how geopolitical and climate- and energy issues are interwoven in today’s world. It is impossible to isolate and attempt to address a single aspect of the energy trilemma, as it intrinsically impacts the other two dimensions, triggering a cascade of interconnected consequences. Therefore, climate and energy policies designed today need to be multifaceted and consider geopolitical ramifications of the choices made today for the future. This holds true both for small island communities like Svalbard, but also large political entities like the EU and its member states.
[i] Hansen P. (2025) ‘Nå er den siste norske kullgruven på Svalbard lagt ned’, NRK, 30.06.2025,https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/siste-norske-kullgruve-i-longyearbyen-pa-svalbard-lagt-ned-_-lokalstyreleder-ber-om-handlingsplan-1.17475347 (accessed: 4.08.2025)
[ii] ibid. Hansen (2025)
[iii] Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (2024). Meld. St. 26 (2023–2024) Svalbard, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-26-20232024/id3041130/?ch=3 (accessed 4.08.2025)
[iv] Jonassen T.(2022) ‘Svalbard Takes Its First Step Towards Becoming a Zero-Emission Community’, 19.01.2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/svalbard-takes-its-first-step-towards-becoming-zero-emission-community (accessed 4.08.2025)
[v] NRK (2025) ‘Planlegger nytt dieselkraftverk på Svalbard’, NRK, 3.06.2025 https://www.nrk.no/nyheter/planlegger-nytt-dieselkraftverk-pa-svalbard-1.17441036 (accessed 4.08.2025)
[vi] op.cit. Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, (2024), p. 9
[vii] Brekke G. M. (2018) Fornybar energiforsyning til Svalbard – Longyearbyen , p. 1-38 https://www.statkraft.com/globalassets/0/.com/7-newsroom/explained/explained/svalbard_rapport_0911_final.pdf (accessed 7.08.2025)
[viii] WWF (no date) ‘Testing out the power of solar energy in Svalbard, Norway’ https://www.arcticwwf.org/the-circle/stories/testing-out-the-power-of-solar-energy-in-svalbard-norway/ (accessed 7.08.2025)
[ix] op. cit. Jonassen T. (2022)
[x] op.cit. Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, (2024), p. 7
[xi] Statistic Sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway) ‘Befolking på Svalbard’, 31.03.2025, https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/folketall/statistikk/befolkningen-pa-svalbard (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xii] Treaty recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, including Bear Island (1920) https://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xiii] Østhagen A. (2024) ‘The myths of Svalbard geopolitics: An Arctic case study’, Marine Policy 167. pp.1-13, p. 5
[xiv] Lov om miljøvern på Svalbard (svalbardmiljøloven) (2024) 2024-1473, Oslo, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2001-06-15-79 (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xv] Vold Hansen T. (2024) ‘Power and interests in environmental policy processes: the Svalbard case’, Environmental Sociology 11(1), pp. 1-11, p. 7
[xvi] Isachsen V. (2024) ‘Noreg brukar miljøvern for å halde på Svalbard’, 30.12.2024 https://www.forskning.no/miljopolitikk-miljovern-nord-universitet/noreg-brukar-miljovern-for-a-halde-pa-svalbard/2442364 (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xvii] Førli A. K. (2025) ‘Hva er planen for Svalbard’, Politisk Kvarter, NRK Radio, [Podcast].https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/politisk_kvarter/l_bc433557-2ca4-456d-8335-572ca4156d72 (accessed 8.08.2025)
Row of colorful houses on the shore of the Adventfjorden fjord in Longyearbyen with rugged mountains in the background
Autor foto: Public domain
The Energy Dilemma of Island Communities – Svalbard as a Case Study
August 20, 2025
Author: Karolina Pawlik, Senior Specialist, Energy and Resilience Programme
Row of colorful houses on the shore of the Adventfjorden fjord in Longyearbyen with rugged mountains in the background
Autor foto: Public domain
The Energy Dilemma of Island Communities – Svalbard as a Case Study
Author: Karolina Pawlik, Senior Specialist, Energy and Resilience Programme
Published: August 20, 2025
Remote and small island communities face unique energy and climate challenges stemming from their geographic isolation. Their reliance on imported fossil fuels leaves them vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions. Although their carbon footprint is minimal, these islands disproportionately experience the adverse effects of climate change. Increasingly, islands become testbeds for geopolitical rivalry and are compelled to adapt to situations when critical infrastructure is weaponised.
All the above challenges are daily issues for islands globally. This is definitely the case of Svalbard, the Arctic archipelago under Norwegian sovereignty (it is Norway’s northmost region). On the 30th of June 2025, Svalbard’s last remaining Norwegian coal mine known as Gruve7 was closed. [i] It might come as a surprise to many that Norway – which boasts a 96% renewable energy mix – until recently still has had a functioning coal mine. Coal extraction has been part of the archipelago’s history for over a hundred years. Until recently it has been the dominant energy source on Svalbard used both for electricity generation and heating. In 2023 the coal-fired powerplant was closed, and the extracted coal was exported. The mine was closed because it was no longer economically viable to extract coal and ship it overseas; additionally the coal reserves were depleting. [ii] Environmental concerns, specifically upkeeping the perception of Norway as a leader in green transition, was another factor leading to such a decision. The Norwegian government has set separate targets related to protecting the specific environment of the island.[iii]
By switching to diesel, the only other viable option – albeit still an unsustainable source of energy – has meant that CO2 emissions have been halved compared to coal. [iv] However, as local and national media have reported diesel generators have not been reliable as they often malfunctioned and were prone to accidents. [v] The use of diesel has also contributed to increased energy costs that many inhabitants of Longyearbyen, the main settlement on Svalbard, have been paying in recent years. [vi] This has generated both insecurity in the power source and economic vulnerability of the small population, whose economy predominantly relies on services sector.
Furthermore, it made the inhabitants of the archipelago more vulnerable as Svalbard has no electricity connection to mainland Norway. Such a possibility has been analysed by ABB in the past, but due to the high costs of the project (estimated between €300 and €500 million) such a solution was deemed unfeasible. Another plan proposed by Statkraft was to use renewable hydrogen produced from wind power in Finnmark and ship it by boat to Svalbard. [vii] The project did not materialise.
Despite various discussions about the use of renewables in this Arctic environment, , only pilot renewable energy projects were implemented in two locations – in Isfjord Radio, located 90km from Longyearbyen and in the main settlement itself. The two pilot projects in Isfjord Radio included a battery system and a small thermal unit, followed by solar panels. [viii] In preparation for the closure of the coal-fired powerplant and to lower climate emissions, the local council of Longyearbyen has acquired a battery system with a capacity of 6 MW. [ix] To put this into perspective, the battery storage system can supply electricity and heating for one hour for the entire settlement. These initiatives and projects appear to be “too little, too late” as they do not significantly contribute to the long-term energy supply and perpetuate the archipelago’s dependence on imports, despite the local council’s pledge to implement an all-renewable energy supply already by 2030.
Moreover, with the closure of the coal mine, the fate of 60 miners and their families on Svalbard remains uncertain as one cannot live on the archipelago without a source of income, and there are no immediate plans to launch a new industry. In its latest white paper on Svalbard, the government has prioritised sustaining the Norwegian presence on the archipelago, particularly through the Norwegian community in Longyearbyen.[x] The government wishes to develop good quality jobs particularly in the following sectors: research, higher education, space industry (related to satellite deployment), and tourism. The latter is somewhat a paradox because tourism attracts the largest share of non-Norwegians to Svalbard. Non-Norwegians currently account for 38% of the population. [xi]
It is worth mentioning that the second largest settlement on Svalbard is Barentsberg, an exclusively Russian mining town and research facility. Under the Svalbard Treaty, citizens of all parties to the treaty (currently more than 40 states) are allowed to have access to Svalbard including the right to fish, hunt or undertake any kind of maritime, industrial, mining or trade activity. [xii] Scientific research has not been explicitly covered by the treaty’s non-discrimination clause. The Russian presence and their use of scientific activities for other purposes has been viewed as a increasing security concern, especially after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. [xiii]
Moreover, increased tourism leads to further degradation of the pristine Svalbard environment. In order to preserve and better protect the unique nature of Svalbard the Norwegian parliament passed last year a new law – Lov om miljøvern på Svalbard (svalbardmiljøloven) (Law on the protection of Svalbard) – which introduces stricter regulations on landing sites for cruise vessels, passenger limits of 200 for ships sailing, and requirements of maintaining a minimum distance to polar bears, bird cliffs and walrus haul-outs. [xiv] Some locals and scientists argue that through stricter environmental regulations, the government is trying to kill two birds with one stone and reach some of its geopolitical objectives, namely to obfuscate access to Svalbard to non-Norwegians. [xv] [xvi]
There is no denying that energy transition on Svalbard will be a challenging endeavour, extending far beyond the already initiated renewable energy pilot projects and mandating greater involvement of public and private actors. To make matters more complicated, much of the critical infrastructure on the archipelago needs an immediate upgrade. The local council in Longyearbyen through one of its members has expressed concern over the state of critical infrastructure (ports, airports, water and electricity supply) and the lack of an industrial alternative to coal mining. [xvii] One option, albeit a controversial one is deep sea mining, which despite its economic feasibility in the resource-rich waters would directly contradict the Law on the Protection of Svalbard.
Why is this important? The case of Svalbard illustrates how geopolitical and climate- and energy issues are interwoven in today’s world. It is impossible to isolate and attempt to address a single aspect of the energy trilemma, as it intrinsically impacts the other two dimensions, triggering a cascade of interconnected consequences. Therefore, climate and energy policies designed today need to be multifaceted and consider geopolitical ramifications of the choices made today for the future. This holds true both for small island communities like Svalbard, but also large political entities like the EU and its member states.
[i] Hansen P. (2025) ‘Nå er den siste norske kullgruven på Svalbard lagt ned’, NRK, 30.06.2025,https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/siste-norske-kullgruve-i-longyearbyen-pa-svalbard-lagt-ned-_-lokalstyreleder-ber-om-handlingsplan-1.17475347 (accessed: 4.08.2025)
[ii] ibid. Hansen (2025)
[iii] Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (2024). Meld. St. 26 (2023–2024) Svalbard, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-26-20232024/id3041130/?ch=3 (accessed 4.08.2025)
[iv] Jonassen T.(2022) ‘Svalbard Takes Its First Step Towards Becoming a Zero-Emission Community’, 19.01.2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/svalbard-takes-its-first-step-towards-becoming-zero-emission-community (accessed 4.08.2025)
[v] NRK (2025) ‘Planlegger nytt dieselkraftverk på Svalbard’, NRK, 3.06.2025 https://www.nrk.no/nyheter/planlegger-nytt-dieselkraftverk-pa-svalbard-1.17441036 (accessed 4.08.2025)
[vi] op.cit. Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, (2024), p. 9
[vii] Brekke G. M. (2018) Fornybar energiforsyning til Svalbard – Longyearbyen , p. 1-38 https://www.statkraft.com/globalassets/0/.com/7-newsroom/explained/explained/svalbard_rapport_0911_final.pdf (accessed 7.08.2025)
[viii] WWF (no date) ‘Testing out the power of solar energy in Svalbard, Norway’ https://www.arcticwwf.org/the-circle/stories/testing-out-the-power-of-solar-energy-in-svalbard-norway/ (accessed 7.08.2025)
[ix] op. cit. Jonassen T. (2022)
[x] op.cit. Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, (2024), p. 7
[xi] Statistic Sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway) ‘Befolking på Svalbard’, 31.03.2025, https://www.ssb.no/befolkning/folketall/statistikk/befolkningen-pa-svalbard (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xii] Treaty recognising the sovereignty of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, including Bear Island (1920) https://library.arcticportal.org/1909/1/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xiii] Østhagen A. (2024) ‘The myths of Svalbard geopolitics: An Arctic case study’, Marine Policy 167. pp.1-13, p. 5
[xiv] Lov om miljøvern på Svalbard (svalbardmiljøloven) (2024) 2024-1473, Oslo, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2001-06-15-79 (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xv] Vold Hansen T. (2024) ‘Power and interests in environmental policy processes: the Svalbard case’, Environmental Sociology 11(1), pp. 1-11, p. 7
[xvi] Isachsen V. (2024) ‘Noreg brukar miljøvern for å halde på Svalbard’, 30.12.2024 https://www.forskning.no/miljopolitikk-miljovern-nord-universitet/noreg-brukar-miljovern-for-a-halde-pa-svalbard/2442364 (accessed 8.08.2025)
[xvii] Førli A. K. (2025) ‘Hva er planen for Svalbard’, Politisk Kvarter, NRK Radio, [Podcast].https://radio.nrk.no/podkast/politisk_kvarter/l_bc433557-2ca4-456d-8335-572ca4156d72 (accessed 8.08.2025)
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