Author: Michał Kujawski

On June 25-26, the next edition of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) will take place in Gdańsk. It is the world’s largest event dedicated to the reconstruction of Ukraine, bringing together politicians, business representatives, and financial institutions from dozens of countries. It will focus on five main areas: business, human resources/demographics, local governments and the European Union, as well as security and defense.

The recovery of Ukraine does not merely mean the physical rebuilding of war damage. It can be divided into two dimensions: soft and hard reconstruction.

The first concerns legal and regulatory changes aimed at adapting the state to EU standards. This includes, among other things, greater transparency, simplification of procedures, and the removal of contradictory regulations. Many of these measures can be implemented despite the ongoing war. Restoring decentralization and granting greater competencies to local governments remains far more difficult.

The second dimension refers to actual investments – primarily in the energy sector, railway and road infrastructure, housing construction, centers for veterans, and projects for internally displaced persons.

Both soft and hard recovery should primarily be understood as the modernization of a state whose infrastructure has been partly destroyed by Russia and partly outdated even before the full-scale war.

Poland and the Economic Dimension of Reconstruction

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused a rapid increase in Polish exports. In 2024, exports from Poland exceeded EUR 13 billion, making Poland – after China – the second-largest supplier of goods to Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, is the seventh-largest export market for Poland.

The majority of goods exported from Poland consist of weapons and ammunition. They are followed by vehicles, machinery, spare parts, fuel, electrical and medical equipment, as well as food products. Ukrainian exports to Poland remain lower – in the first three quarters of 2024, they reached EUR 3.3 billion. Poland mainly imports iron, steel, metal ores, vegetable fats, and oils. For Ukraine, Poland remains one of the key export markets. (1)

Despite the growth in exports, Poland’s share in the Ukrainian economy is based mainly on services and trade. This is primarily due to the relatively low level of risk compared to large capital investments. Ukrainians living in Poland and companies operating on both sides of the border also play a significant role.

Ukrainian capital, including from the metallurgical sector, is also interested in investing in Poland. Large Ukrainian enterprises are interested in integration with the EU because of access to stable markets and the opportunity to occupy the space left by Russian capital limited by sanctions.

Opportunities for Polish Companies

In Ukrainian public consciousness, Poland is viewed as an example of a successful transformation from a post-Soviet state into a Western country. As a result, Ukraine is eager to draw on Polish experience – for example in local government reform or the creation of state institutions. However, this is not about copying solutions one-to-one, but rather about inspiration.

The modernization of Ukraine opens opportunities for Polish companies connected with environmental infrastructure, energy, and local administration. Poland possesses know-how acquired during its own EU integration process, which may be particularly useful at the local government level.

The new technologies sector is also developing dynamically, especially in the dual-use, AI, and military fields. Around 500 entities producing drones already operate in Ukraine. (2) The market functions under simplified certification rules and is growing rapidly. Polish companies can offer investments, production, and technological cooperation.

An example of such a model is the consolidation of Ukrainian IT companies by PFR TFI and Euvic under an agreement signed in January 2025. (3) Technological and defense cooperation may become one of the main topics of URC 2026 in Gdańsk. Ukrainian private companies are clearly interested in cooperation with Polish partners.

Defense and Security

After 2022, Ukraine’s defense sector has been changing very dynamically. Ukraine is no longer solely a recipient of military aid, but is increasingly participating in joint venture projects and commercial undertakings.

Examples include Fire Point investments. New models of defense cooperation are still taking shape, and the use of Ukrainian battlefield experience requires political support and interministerial cooperation. Ukraine is also becoming an exporter of technology, supported by a high level of technical expertise. However, the relatively low share of the private sector in the Polish defense industry may become an issue.

Construction, Logistics, and Raw Materials

The hard reconstruction of Ukraine means enormous opportunities for the Polish construction industry. Once hostilities end, a large number of infrastructure investments can be expected – roads, railways, border crossings, and ports – as well as housing projects. Even today, there is high demand for housing for internally displaced persons. At the same time, competition will be very intense.

The critical raw materials sector also remains promising, especially titanium. Many myths have grown around Ukrainian deposits, yet the resources genuinely exist. The problem remains limited access to licenses and the high political significance of this sector.

One of Poland’s major advantages is its geographical location. Poland serves Ukraine not only as a strategic rear base, but also as a safe logistics and production hub. Even despite periodic border blockades and attempts to diversify transport routes, Poland remains Ukraine’s main gateway to the world.

The modernization of border and road infrastructure is of key importance, including the motorway project from the border to Lviv.

Financial Sector

Poland is gradually becoming increasingly active on the Ukrainian financial market. Kredobank, a medium-sized bank owned by PKO BP, has operated there for years. There are also reports of talks regarding the purchase of another bank; among those mentioned are Ощадбанк (Oschadbank) and ПриватБанк (PrivatBank), although expectations should be tempered here. Together with the resumption of privatization in the financial sector and the need to increase its transparency and political independence, purchases of banking entities by Polish capital can be expected in the longer term, although at present it seems more likely that these will be smaller banks than the two mentioned above. Insurance entities are also active in Ukraine: KUKE and PZU, which recently acquired 100% of Ukraine’s largest insurer – MetLife (around 50% of the market). It is worth noting, however, that this sector is not among the most developed. The figures alone illustrate this well – PZU has 22 million clients in five countries, while MetLife has around 900,000. The value of this services market in Ukraine is more than a dozen times smaller than in Poland, and motor insurance (third-party liability and comprehensive insurance) dominates. BGK also plays an important role, participating as a Polish entity in the Ukraine Facility. Investments in the financial sector strengthen economic relations between states, increase trust among other potential Polish investors, and may lead to further investments in various sectors.

European Integration

Since mid-March 2026, Ukraine has possessed the full package of conditions for accession to the EU (Fundamentals, Internal Market, External Relations, Competitiveness, Green Agenda, as well as Agriculture and Resources). Integration will progress alongside the opening of clusters and the fulfillment of requirements. It can be assumed that some conditions will be relatively easy to meet, while others will require a series of difficult reforms and, above all, political will on all sides. In some respects, the situation may be analogous to Poland several decades ago – difficult negotiations, including those concerning agriculture, and political reluctance in certain circles of Carolingian Europe. Even if it seems that Ukraine will not join the Community quickly, one may recall the anecdote about Poland’s efforts to join NATO – under entirely different circumstances, in the 1990s Polish diplomats heard in Washington “forget it,” and by 1999 Poland was already a member of the Alliance.

The EU is a key partner in Ukraine’s recovery. Dedicated to this purpose is the Ukraine Facility program launched in February 2024, a financial instrument worth EUR 50 billion for 2024–2027. Strong and effective representation within EU decision-making structures and fulfillment of the criteria may enable access to the funds of this instrument. Ukraine’s reconstruction will be closely linked with its integration into the EU.

Integration with the EU is not only an opportunity, but also a source of disputes concerning, among other things, the agricultural and transport sectors. It is worth lobbying within the EU for demonopolization: the Ukrainian agricultural market is dominated by large holdings controlled by Ukrainian, American, and Dutch owners. Some are registered in Luxembourg or Cyprus.

Some of the disputes will be temporary in part or in full, for example many Polish transport companies are reluctant to operate on the Ukrainian market because of wartime risks, while the competitiveness of Ukrainian firms also plays a role.

In the agricultural sphere, it is worth promoting processing industries and perhaps encouraging farmers to work in cooperatives modeled on the dairy sector – Polish dairy products have been very popular in Ukraine for years.

European integration will also involve the aforementioned return to decentralization. The concentration of greater power in Kyiv is understandable during wartime and is also familiar from Machiavelli’s theses. Strengthening local governments and transferring certain competencies to them will increase their attractiveness for business (decisions, tenders, cooperation, etc.), but this will also require parallel efforts to combat corruption and simplify regulations.

Difficulties and Recommendations

The processes related to the reconstruction and modernization of Ukraine involve not only opportunities, but also various types of risks. One of them concerns demographic issues and the specific situation on the labor market. Despite high unemployment, estimated in surveys at around 15%, the market suffers from a labor shortage. The source of this paradox is the very large shadow economy and the issue of male mobilization – legal employment automatically means being listed in the conscription register, which many people wish to avoid. The war and conscription are also leading to the feminization of professions traditionally regarded as male. For potential employers, hiring workers itself is risky. Apart from several sectors such as energy, defense, or nationwide media, there is no guarantee that a newly trained employee will not receive a military summons. According to announcements, the conscription system is to be reformed, but as of today there are no details concerning the planned changes.

Another problem discouraging entrepreneurs from investing in the Ukrainian market remains structural corruption. It is present both at the level of the central authorities, as confirmed by recent scandals, and at the local government level. At present, the most effective tool in combating corruption appears to be integration with the EU and the enforcement of specific reforms of the state. Additional support comes from increasingly lower public tolerance for such practices and the activities of Ukrainian watchdog organizations.

Another problem for many potential investors is legal chaos and the lack of transparency in regulations, which are sometimes mutually contradictory. As in the fight against corruption, the best instrument for resolving this issue remains integration with the EU. The lack of clarity in regulations is linked to corruption practices – broad room for interpretation creates opportunities for abuse.

The above characteristics of the Ukrainian market and legal system, alongside military activities, effectively discourage many entrepreneurs from investing. However, barriers also exist outside Ukraine. One of them is the frequently encountered business model of Polish enterprises, which instead of investing in business development choose to allocate capital, for example, into real estate. Capital-related issues also remain a significant limitation.

An inseparable, though often overestimated, aspect of Polish-Ukrainian relations is the political climate and the related social attitudes. Naturally, calming emotions facilitates cooperation, yet business – unlike politics – is planned in the long term. Paradoxically, the sinusoidal nature of political relations between Poland and Ukraine, as well as social tensions, do not hinder the development of economic relations – the trend remains clearly upward. However, the mutual lack of trust occasionally appearing among political elites may become an obstacle for certain decisions. Soft power also remains an important and often underestimated element. The growing number of people with positive experiences connected to Poland and knowledge of the Polish language further facilitates cooperation.

Close relations and economic ties are both a stabilizing element for the region and Ukraine itself, as well as a source of tangible benefits for businesses. Ukraine has the potential to become a major market, where around 6,000 Polish companies already operate today — some of them are Ukrainian capital registered in Poland. Polish exports to Ukraine are three times higher than imports and continue to grow. Although Ukraine currently ranks seventh among the destinations for Polish exports, economic relations and participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction should be viewed as a strategic interest – also from the perspective of state security, and not solely particular economic benefits. Beyond concluding agreements at the state and private levels, supporting reforms and Ukraine’s integration with the EU remains essential for the further development of these relations and participation in the reconstruction process. The overriding factor, however, remains the permanent end of hostilities.

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