Second half of May 2026 was a busy time in Asian diplomacy. First, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, met with President of People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping in Beijing (May 13 to 15), marking the first summit of the US and PRC Heads of State since 2017. Less than a week later (May 19 and 20) Vladimir Putin came to the very same place, to meet Xi during an earlier unannounced but still high-level Russian – Chinese summit. The month concluded with Shangri-La Dialogue, a comparably less publicized defense summit, which nevertheless drew attention due to second consecutive year of absence of the high-level Chinese delegation. All these three events, even though different in terms of alleged international importance, attention and even media coverage, share certain common elements that reveal a lot about the three actors’ positions and policies in East and South-East Asia. In all three cases the three leaders involved are longing for great power politics with the rest of the world following in line. However, also in all the three cases their international ambitions and policies are a function of politics at home, which are sometimes not developing according to the liking of the Presidents in Washington, Beijing or Moscow.
Let us start, chronologically, with Trump-Xi summit.
As most analysts predicted, it produced little result. As the trade armistice agreed at APEC in Republic of Korea in October 2025 was designed to last for a year, neither side felt urgency to pursue anything beyond maintaining the status quo. The bilateral trade talks, ranging from soybeans and manufacturing aircrafts to financial services and market access for IT startups in China, were a function of negotiations that began earlier and could be easily overturned if either side decided to weaponize trade again. The important decisions were not taken – US still limits access to the most advanced NVIDIA chips, PRC still politically manages the exports of the rare earths with no common international mechanisms in sight. As such modest and foreseeable results were already met with relief by the markets, both presidents had good news for their citizens at no great expense – particularly important for Donald Trump in terms of closing mid-term elections in US.
The international community concentrated its attention on other issues, though. First was the lack of progress in Chinese support for US in the Iranian conflict. This should be no surprise though, as the Chinese decision-makers are not interested in delivering victories to the White House. Second, and more controversial one, was the exchange of words about Taiwan. As the US president was obviously pressured by his Chinese counterpart, US diplomatic ambivalence, usually providing cover for the Island, turned into understatements and euphemisms leaving space for Beijing to capitalize on. While Donald Trump is well known for linking politics with business and using opportunities to pressure his competition, or partners, Asian allies of US took note. Even though the later White House narrative, concentrating attention on the arms deal financing was meant to defend President’s position as the guardian of US commercial interests, the issue became another reason for doubts in American commitment in the region. What was symptomatic, already before the summit local analysts and commentators were pointing out, that the more amicable the meetings appeared, the more anxiety would grow across the rest of Asian countries about great power politics being played over their heads. The Chinese statements emphasizing national unity and integrity contrasting with US indecisiveness, capitalized on that sentiment.
Then the Putin-Xi summit came.
As an unannounced event, naturally it resonated via contrast with the earlier Xi – Trump meeting. While Trump visit produced no joint statement, Putin’s resulted in 9 935 words long one. While common views that US and China separately communicated to share were few, if any, the ones communicated together by China and Russia ranged from nuclear security and giant pandas to territorial integrity. While US may have boasted selling Boeing planes and lifting restrictions on certain agricultural export goods, like soybeans, Putin may boast to declare success on launching Power of Siberia 2 to export even more natural gas to PRC in exchange for foreign currency, so much desired in the Russian Federation. While the US delegation was lighter on top-level government officials (only Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth attended), the Russian one included five deputy prime ministers and eight cabinet ministers with obvious focus on oil and banking. And most importantly, while everyone noticed that the Trump`s visit to China was only the second one in a decade, it is difficult to keep count of how many times Xi and Putin have already met. In terms of apparent closeness of relations, the summit was a show of Xi and Putin’s friendship.
Appearances may be deceptive, though. Despite strong impression, the tangible results of the Russian – Chinese summit were as few as in the case of earlier American – Chinese one. The best example is the most emphasized result of the summit – the declaration of construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. The major issue is that China does not need Russian gas to the same extent as Moscow needs Beijing’s economic support. Russian – Chinese cooperation in the field of energy, so much needed by the energy hungry PRC, was almost symbolic until Russia was hit with Western sanctions after taking over the Crimea. Before the first pipeline connected Russia and China (not mentioning it happened in the second decade of 21 century) China took over Russian position in the Turkmenistan’s gas market and developed connections with Kazakhstan making Russian bargaining position challenging already over 10 years ago. Today, as Moscow is becoming dependent on Chinese economic support, the bargaining position is even worst. Thus, the summit, while highlighting the close relations between Putin and Xi, marks another step in China casting a growing shadow over its economically smaller Russian sibling.
And the month of May was closed with Shangri-La Dialogue.
The gathering in Singapore was obviously of different magnitude and importance than the summits discussed. Informal in nature, for 23 years (with a 2-year brake for Pandemic) it gathers a mix of ministers, representatives of military and intelligence, diplomats, analysts and weapons manufacturers. Its goal is to network the local security environment while providing an anchor for the US presence in Southeast Asia security dialogue and ensuring its Secretary of Defense (or, as of today, of War) comes to Singapore and Southeast Asia at least once a year. Quite naturally the Asian allies of US were scrutinizing Peter Hegseth on several issues ranging from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the conflict in the Middle East to the disputes with Europe and withdrawing troops from Germany. The question everyone had in mind after the Xi-Trump summit was obvious – can the allies still count on US support, or did Washington already overstretch? And the Pentagon chief answered directly that US can do two things at once.
However, the attention was divided between Hegseth speech and Q&A on the one hand and Chinese high level representatives’ absence on the other. China had accustomed the observers of the summit to the presence of high-level defense sector representatives. After Pandemic, in 2022, 2023 and 2024, the Forum was attended by the Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu and Dong Jun, respectively. In 2025 and in 2026, the Minister Dong skipped the Forum. While the fact itself could be interpreted as a diplomatic adaptation to the second term of Donald Trump, the fate of the Minister Dong predecessors may not. Both were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve earlier in May. Their process was a part of a broader purge in the highest ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. As a result of the most recent arrests, Chinese Military Commission elite seven members committee is down to only two members: Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping himself. While such a concentration of power alone is posing questions about the quality of PRC government officials, the purges themselves are leaving deficiencies in the military’s command structure, that rise questions about the quality of command of the rapidly modernizing and growing Chinese armed forces. While Beijing summits provided an opportunity to ask questions about governance qualities of the guests, the absentees in Singapore provided an opportunity to ask the same about the Chinese governing elites.
So, what was the summits’ common denominator?
The Xi-Trump summit provided modest deliverables for the guest and an opportunity to push forward an important Taiwan related agenda for the host. One may say that President of China effectively sow a seed of doubt about US commitment to Asia. The Xi-Putin summit provided a stage to show partnership of non-Western powers with China taking the fore. In this case the dependance of Russian Federation on its Chinese benefactor made it an instrument of Chinese propaganda. Both summits had shown that US and Russia have weaknesses and face challenges. The Shangri-La Dialogue, despite the different diplomatic weight, did the same regarding PRC. It reminded that the Middle Kingdom, behind the great wall of consecutive Beijing summits, also faces significant challenges. And in all the three cases: US, Russia and PRC, these challenges have a same common element: quality of governance in subduing international policies to internal political interests. In cases of all three powers this could be the potential demise of their leaders, whether it concerns elections that swing Congress, a war they cannot win, or a purge that goes out of control.
Sources:
Reuters, What's at stake at the Trump-Xi summit, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/whats-stake-
trump-xi-summit-2026-05-07/
Reuters, Trump returns from China with stability and a stalemate,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-returns-china-with-stability-stalemate-2026-05-16/
Reuters, Trump and China’s Xi set for talks spanning Iran, nuclear and AI,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/rare-earths-deal-between-us-china-is-still-effect-us-official-says-
2026-05-10/
Reuters, Xi hosted Trump, then Putin: Spot the differences in Beijing,
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/CHINA-RUSSIA/byprnwgrdpe/
Reuters, China and Turkmenistan sign deal to build phase four of Galkynysh gas field, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-turkmenistan-sign-deal-build-phase-four-galkynysh-gas-field-2026-04-16/
Reuters, Kazakhstan targets China, India in long-tern fuel production strategy,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstan-targets-china-india-long-tern-fuel-production-
strategy-2025-07-22/
Reuters, “Where is China”; ask delegates at Asian defence forum,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/where-is-china-ask-delegates-asian-defence-forum-2026-05-30/
Reuters, Pentagon chief sounds ‘alarm’ over China’s buildup,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/pentagon-chief-urges-allies-boost-defence-spending-amid-alarm-
over-chinas-2026-05-30/
Reuters, China sentences former defence ministers to death with reprieve,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-sentences-former-defense-ministers-wei-fenghe-li-shangfu-
death-with-2026-05-07/
szczyt trump xi Putin xi oraz Shangri-La 2026
Autor foto: Casimir Pulaski Foundation
Trump-Xi Summit, Putin-Xi Summit and Shangri-La 2026: Fractions with a Common Denominator
June 18, 2026
Author: Krzysztof Kozłowski
szczyt trump xi Putin xi oraz Shangri-La 2026
Autor foto: Casimir Pulaski Foundation
Trump-Xi Summit, Putin-Xi Summit and Shangri-La 2026: Fractions with a Common Denominator
Author: Krzysztof Kozłowski
Published: June 18, 2026
Second half of May 2026 was a busy time in Asian diplomacy. First, the President of the United States, Donald Trump, met with President of People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping in Beijing (May 13 to 15), marking the first summit of the US and PRC Heads of State since 2017. Less than a week later (May 19 and 20) Vladimir Putin came to the very same place, to meet Xi during an earlier unannounced but still high-level Russian – Chinese summit. The month concluded with Shangri-La Dialogue, a comparably less publicized defense summit, which nevertheless drew attention due to second consecutive year of absence of the high-level Chinese delegation. All these three events, even though different in terms of alleged international importance, attention and even media coverage, share certain common elements that reveal a lot about the three actors’ positions and policies in East and South-East Asia. In all three cases the three leaders involved are longing for great power politics with the rest of the world following in line. However, also in all the three cases their international ambitions and policies are a function of politics at home, which are sometimes not developing according to the liking of the Presidents in Washington, Beijing or Moscow.
Let us start, chronologically, with Trump-Xi summit.
As most analysts predicted, it produced little result. As the trade armistice agreed at APEC in Republic of Korea in October 2025 was designed to last for a year, neither side felt urgency to pursue anything beyond maintaining the status quo. The bilateral trade talks, ranging from soybeans and manufacturing aircrafts to financial services and market access for IT startups in China, were a function of negotiations that began earlier and could be easily overturned if either side decided to weaponize trade again. The important decisions were not taken – US still limits access to the most advanced NVIDIA chips, PRC still politically manages the exports of the rare earths with no common international mechanisms in sight. As such modest and foreseeable results were already met with relief by the markets, both presidents had good news for their citizens at no great expense – particularly important for Donald Trump in terms of closing mid-term elections in US.
The international community concentrated its attention on other issues, though. First was the lack of progress in Chinese support for US in the Iranian conflict. This should be no surprise though, as the Chinese decision-makers are not interested in delivering victories to the White House. Second, and more controversial one, was the exchange of words about Taiwan. As the US president was obviously pressured by his Chinese counterpart, US diplomatic ambivalence, usually providing cover for the Island, turned into understatements and euphemisms leaving space for Beijing to capitalize on. While Donald Trump is well known for linking politics with business and using opportunities to pressure his competition, or partners, Asian allies of US took note. Even though the later White House narrative, concentrating attention on the arms deal financing was meant to defend President’s position as the guardian of US commercial interests, the issue became another reason for doubts in American commitment in the region. What was symptomatic, already before the summit local analysts and commentators were pointing out, that the more amicable the meetings appeared, the more anxiety would grow across the rest of Asian countries about great power politics being played over their heads. The Chinese statements emphasizing national unity and integrity contrasting with US indecisiveness, capitalized on that sentiment.
Then the Putin-Xi summit came.
As an unannounced event, naturally it resonated via contrast with the earlier Xi – Trump meeting. While Trump visit produced no joint statement, Putin’s resulted in 9 935 words long one. While common views that US and China separately communicated to share were few, if any, the ones communicated together by China and Russia ranged from nuclear security and giant pandas to territorial integrity. While US may have boasted selling Boeing planes and lifting restrictions on certain agricultural export goods, like soybeans, Putin may boast to declare success on launching Power of Siberia 2 to export even more natural gas to PRC in exchange for foreign currency, so much desired in the Russian Federation. While the US delegation was lighter on top-level government officials (only Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth attended), the Russian one included five deputy prime ministers and eight cabinet ministers with obvious focus on oil and banking. And most importantly, while everyone noticed that the Trump`s visit to China was only the second one in a decade, it is difficult to keep count of how many times Xi and Putin have already met. In terms of apparent closeness of relations, the summit was a show of Xi and Putin’s friendship.
Appearances may be deceptive, though. Despite strong impression, the tangible results of the Russian – Chinese summit were as few as in the case of earlier American – Chinese one. The best example is the most emphasized result of the summit – the declaration of construction of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. The major issue is that China does not need Russian gas to the same extent as Moscow needs Beijing’s economic support. Russian – Chinese cooperation in the field of energy, so much needed by the energy hungry PRC, was almost symbolic until Russia was hit with Western sanctions after taking over the Crimea. Before the first pipeline connected Russia and China (not mentioning it happened in the second decade of 21 century) China took over Russian position in the Turkmenistan’s gas market and developed connections with Kazakhstan making Russian bargaining position challenging already over 10 years ago. Today, as Moscow is becoming dependent on Chinese economic support, the bargaining position is even worst. Thus, the summit, while highlighting the close relations between Putin and Xi, marks another step in China casting a growing shadow over its economically smaller Russian sibling.
And the month of May was closed with Shangri-La Dialogue.
The gathering in Singapore was obviously of different magnitude and importance than the summits discussed. Informal in nature, for 23 years (with a 2-year brake for Pandemic) it gathers a mix of ministers, representatives of military and intelligence, diplomats, analysts and weapons manufacturers. Its goal is to network the local security environment while providing an anchor for the US presence in Southeast Asia security dialogue and ensuring its Secretary of Defense (or, as of today, of War) comes to Singapore and Southeast Asia at least once a year. Quite naturally the Asian allies of US were scrutinizing Peter Hegseth on several issues ranging from the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the conflict in the Middle East to the disputes with Europe and withdrawing troops from Germany. The question everyone had in mind after the Xi-Trump summit was obvious – can the allies still count on US support, or did Washington already overstretch? And the Pentagon chief answered directly that US can do two things at once.
However, the attention was divided between Hegseth speech and Q&A on the one hand and Chinese high level representatives’ absence on the other. China had accustomed the observers of the summit to the presence of high-level defense sector representatives. After Pandemic, in 2022, 2023 and 2024, the Forum was attended by the Defense Ministers Wei Fenghe, Li Shangfu and Dong Jun, respectively. In 2025 and in 2026, the Minister Dong skipped the Forum. While the fact itself could be interpreted as a diplomatic adaptation to the second term of Donald Trump, the fate of the Minister Dong predecessors may not. Both were sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve earlier in May. Their process was a part of a broader purge in the highest ranks of the People’s Liberation Army. As a result of the most recent arrests, Chinese Military Commission elite seven members committee is down to only two members: Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping himself. While such a concentration of power alone is posing questions about the quality of PRC government officials, the purges themselves are leaving deficiencies in the military’s command structure, that rise questions about the quality of command of the rapidly modernizing and growing Chinese armed forces. While Beijing summits provided an opportunity to ask questions about governance qualities of the guests, the absentees in Singapore provided an opportunity to ask the same about the Chinese governing elites.
So, what was the summits’ common denominator?
The Xi-Trump summit provided modest deliverables for the guest and an opportunity to push forward an important Taiwan related agenda for the host. One may say that President of China effectively sow a seed of doubt about US commitment to Asia. The Xi-Putin summit provided a stage to show partnership of non-Western powers with China taking the fore. In this case the dependance of Russian Federation on its Chinese benefactor made it an instrument of Chinese propaganda. Both summits had shown that US and Russia have weaknesses and face challenges. The Shangri-La Dialogue, despite the different diplomatic weight, did the same regarding PRC. It reminded that the Middle Kingdom, behind the great wall of consecutive Beijing summits, also faces significant challenges. And in all the three cases: US, Russia and PRC, these challenges have a same common element: quality of governance in subduing international policies to internal political interests. In cases of all three powers this could be the potential demise of their leaders, whether it concerns elections that swing Congress, a war they cannot win, or a purge that goes out of control.
Sources:
Reuters, What's at stake at the Trump-Xi summit, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/whats-stake-
trump-xi-summit-2026-05-07/
Reuters, Trump returns from China with stability and a stalemate,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-returns-china-with-stability-stalemate-2026-05-16/
Reuters, Trump and China’s Xi set for talks spanning Iran, nuclear and AI,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/rare-earths-deal-between-us-china-is-still-effect-us-official-says-
2026-05-10/
Reuters, Xi hosted Trump, then Putin: Spot the differences in Beijing,
https://www.reuters.com/graphics/CHINA-RUSSIA/byprnwgrdpe/
Reuters, China and Turkmenistan sign deal to build phase four of Galkynysh gas field, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-turkmenistan-sign-deal-build-phase-four-galkynysh-gas-field-2026-04-16/
Reuters, Kazakhstan targets China, India in long-tern fuel production strategy,
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/kazakhstan-targets-china-india-long-tern-fuel-production-
strategy-2025-07-22/
Reuters, “Where is China”; ask delegates at Asian defence forum,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/where-is-china-ask-delegates-asian-defence-forum-2026-05-30/
Reuters, Pentagon chief sounds ‘alarm’ over China’s buildup,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/pentagon-chief-urges-allies-boost-defence-spending-amid-alarm-
over-chinas-2026-05-30/
Reuters, China sentences former defence ministers to death with reprieve,
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-sentences-former-defense-ministers-wei-fenghe-li-shangfu-
death-with-2026-05-07/
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