Delegation from the Warsaw Security Forum Democracy Network and Casimir Pulaski Foundation visited Chisinau to discuss Moldova’s EU integration, energy crisis, and geopolitical challenges with key stakeholders, including MEPs, government officials, and civil society representatives.

• Moldova faces an unprecedented winter with no Russian gas and disrupted import of electricity from Ukraine, leaving Transnistria heavily reliant on Chisinau and creating a precarious balance between détente and rising tensions.
• Moldova remains underrepresented in European political discourse. Low-cost Russian disinformation campaigns pose significant risks to its political stability.
• Narrow referendum results and upcoming parliamentary elections could threaten Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, particularly if coalition governments emerge amid worsening public sentiment due to the energy crisis.
• Political will in Western Europe and a merit-based approach are crucial to avoiding prolonged delay on Moldova’s path to the EU.
• Moldova’s declared neutrality faces challenges as public support for NATO membership remains low, but geopolitical realities make neutrality increasingly untenable in the face of regional conflicts.

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation, as part of the Warsaw Security Forum Democracy Network, organized a study visit to Chisinau, Moldova, on November 28–29, 2023. The delegation comprised Bartłomiej Kot, WSF Program Director, Hubert Tadych from the WSF Democracy Network, Tomasz Obremski, Analyst at CPF, and Bogumiła Kozicka, CPF Communications Specialist. Meetings were held with MEPs, government administration, and civil society representatives, providing a multifaceted perspective on Moldova’s political and economic challenges. The visit also included a roundtable discussion with public entrepreneurs hosted by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Central to the discussions was the concept, introduced in the WSF annual report, of a „New Wider Europe” and the necessity of adopting a more tailored approach to EU candidate states.

One critical theme was the impending energy crisis, projected to bring one of the harshest winters in Moldova’s recent history. The cessation of Russian gas flow via Ukraine has left Moldova vulnerable, particularly the Transnistria region, which has historically relied on cheap imports of Russian gas. Compounding this is Russia’s shelling of Ukrainian power plants, which has disrupted the electricity supply to Transnistrian industries. This situation has made Transnistria increasingly dependent on Chisinau for energy resources, a dynamic that could either pave the way for détente or exacerbate existing tensions. While some progress in the relationship has been observed since the war’s outbreak in 2022, a long road still lies ahead for a sustainable resolution.

Discussions also underscored Moldova’s precarious position as a „forgotten state” in Europe. While the war in Ukraine has temporarily drawn Western attention to Moldova, high-level engagement remains limited. Few European politicians visit Moldova, reflecting its marginal status despite its strategic importance. This is particularly concerning given the outsized impact of Russian disinformation campaigns, which reportedly require as little as €20 million to potentially sway electoral outcomes. Such low-cost but high-impact campaigns have been instrumental in nearly flipping electoral results, posing a significant threat to Moldova’s political future.

The consequences of Moldova’s fragile political landscape were evident in the recent referendum, which resulted in a narrow victory for pro-European forces, primarily due to the diaspora vote. The referendum’s outcome also highlighted the risks of aligning the EU integration agenda too closely with a single political party, a strategy seen as a misstep that could backfire in the future. With parliamentary elections scheduled for next year, the formation of a coalition government could challenge Moldova’s rapid pro-EU trajectory. The energy crisis further complicates matters, as the current government may be blamed for the country’s deteriorating economic and social conditions.

Despite these challenges, there remains cautious optimism regarding Moldova’s EU accession prospects. If the country can maintain political stability through the current crises, it could be ready to join the EU within four to five years. Unlike Ukraine, Moldova’s accession would not necessitate treaty changes due to its smaller size, making it a politically feasible candidate for enlargement. However, this progress hinges on Western political will, which remains inconsistent. Moldova’s close alignment with Ukraine, while a strategic necessity, adds complexity to its bid for EU membership. While Chisinau heavily supports Kyiv and views its fate as intertwined with Ukraine’s, it also stresses that the accession process must remain merit-based. Prolonged delays are not an option for Moldova, as EU integration is seen as the only viable path to securing its future.

NATO membership, however, remains a contentious issue. While Moldovans recognize the enhanced security that NATO membership offers, public support for joining the alliance is relatively low. Many citizens view Moldova as a neutral state, a perception that NATO’s mission in Chisinau does little to challenge. Instead, NATO focuses on aligning Moldova’s military standards with its own without actively promoting membership. Romania, a NATO member and Moldova’s closest ally, has signaled its willingness to intervene if necessary, particularly as many Moldovans hold Romanian citizenship. However, Moldova’s neutrality is increasingly seen as unsustainable, as any escalation in the NATO-Russia conflict would render its neutrality irrelevant.

The EU’s planned €1.8 billion investment in Moldova represents a significant opportunity to strengthen the country’s infrastructure, healthcare system, and regional development, including the Chisinau bypass. While these projects are expected to resonate with the general public, participants emphasized the need for a comprehensive communication strategy to accompany the investments. Mere conferences and meetings in the capital composed of repetitive audiences are insufficient, as Russian disinformation continues to reach rural areas and provincial communities. Addressing this requires targeted, grassroots-level initiatives and strategic use of funding to counteract Russian influence effectively.