Author: Eto Buziashvili, Kamil Basaj, Wojciech Dzięgiel, Agnieszka Grzegorzewska

Hybrid threats, particularly foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), have become a permanent feature of Europe’s security environment. As a result of their direct exposure to destabilization efforts, the B5 countries – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Poland – together with Ukraine, have developed practical response mechanisms, which may serve as an operational foundation for further development of the European Democracy Shield (EUDS).

The European Democracy Shield constitutes a central pillar of the European Union’s evolving architecture for protecting democratic integrity. Its objective is to establish a durable framework for political, regulatory, and operational coordination in response to informational, cyber, and hybrid threats. The EUDS is structured around four interconnected operational pillars, namely the establishment of the new European Centre for Democratic Resilience (ECDR), safeguarding the integrity of the information space, strengthening institutions, elections and independent media, as well as boosting societal resilience and citizens engagement.

Despite the growing number of frameworks, programmes, and initiatives aimed at countering FIMI and strengthening democratic resilience, a persistent operational gap remains between the increasing capacity to detect and analyze information threats and the ability to respond to them rapidly and in a coordinated manner. The challenge stems from fragmented competencies, insufficient operational synchronization between states and sectors, and limitations affecting the development of technological and expert capacities. Operationalizing democratic resilience does not necessarily require a creation of entirely new structures, but rather a more effective integration of existing instruments into a coherent system of action. Efficient information-sharing, standardized response procedures, measurable indicators of effectiveness, and the strengthening of public legitimacy and trust are all essential components of such a system.

The regional perspective of the B5+ countries, as well as the experiences of Poland and Ukraine as states situated on the front line of hybrid threats and information operations, are particularly significant in this regard. Over time, the Baltic Sea region has developed resilience models based on cooperation between public administration, civil society, expert communities, independent media, and the private sector. Ukraine’s experience is especially valuable, as operating under conditions of full-scale war led to developing a battle-tested expertise in countering influence operations, maintaining societal resilience, and responding rapidly to information manipulation. At the same time, Poland, as a key state on NATO’s and the EU’s eastern flank, remains a target of intensive disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening social cohesion and undermining public support for assistance efforts.

Effective operationalization of democratic resilience therefore depends less on establishing new institutions, but rather on improving coordination among existing mechanisms and shortening the path between threat identification and institutional response. The experiences of Poland and Ukraine demonstrate that the effective defence of the information space requires close cooperation between the state, civil society organizations, independent media, expert communities, and the private sector. Properly implemented whole-of-society model enables a transition from reactive counter-disinformation measures toward the long-term strengthening of societal and democratic resilience.

This policy paper is based on presentations and discussions during a seminar organized by Casimir Pulaski Foundation in cooperation with the PZU Foundation and Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Helsinki under the patronage of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States.

Key recommendations:

• Establish a permanent B5+ operational coordination framework on FIMI.
• Integrate frontline regional expertise into the operational development of the European Democracy Shield.
• Strengthen operational cooperation across governments, civil society, platforms, and research actors.
• Develop a regional societal resilience model based on a whole-of-society approach and cross-sectoral engagement. 
• Strengthen preparedness for AI-enabled information manipulation.