Author: Olga Jastrzębska

Fearing the Russian threat, Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland, are implementing various measures to defend their external borders. While Finland’s strategy largely relies on the defence-in-depth concept, Poland and the Baltic states plan to fortify their borders with Russia and Belarus. These new fortifications are intended to play both defensive and deterrent roles. Given that the concepts being implemented by Finland and the four states differ substantially, it is worth analysing their major strengths and weaknesses, as well as other factors shaping the defensive concepts of the nations located on NATO’s eastern flank. 

The National Deterrence and Defence Programme ‘East’ Shield, announced by Donald Tusk’s government in May 2024, is currently one of the largest defence-related projects in the Republic of Poland. In a nutshell, the ‘East’ Shield programme comprises a complex of barriers, fortifications, and state-of-the-art airspace monitoring systems designed to guard Poland’s northern and eastern borders. According to the existing plans, the fortifications will encompass  Podlasie, Lublin, Warmia-Masuria, and parts of Masovia voivodeships. The cost of the entire programme is estimated at PLN 10 billion, with construction work expected to be completed by 2028.

The main objective of the programme is to strengthen Poland’s external borders, defend the civilian population, enhance troop mobility, reduce Russia’s advantages related to the element of surprise, and hinder the enemy’s ability to penetrate Poland’s border regions. During a press conference on May 18, 2024, Polish Minister of National Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz emphasised that such fortifications could reinforce Poland’s deterrence posture, while Poland’s Chief of the General Staff highlighted the importance of deploying forces that can rapidly respond to any threats and effectively defend the state. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as the tensions on the Polish-Belarusian border, proves that any attempts to strengthen Poland’s external border and enhance the readiness of its armed forces are fully justified. According to Dr. Tomasz Pawłuszko, a foreign affairs and defence expert, this is a clear signal for Russia that Poland considers its security a priority. 

According to Deputy Minister of National Defence Cezary Tomczyk, the ‘East’ Shield program has been discussed with NATO allies, and its implementation is consistent with the defensive measures being developed by other member states on the Alliance’s eastern flank. One such initiative is the Baltic Defence Line, a joint project of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia announced in January 2024. The construction of fortifications is intended to strengthen the Baltic states’ external borders with Russia and Belarus, thereby playing both defensive and deterrent roles, analogous to Poland’s ‘East’ Shield. A characteristic feature of the Baltic Defence Line is the autonomy of each country to determine major components of the fortifications on its territory. For example, Estonia intends to focus on building bunkers, while Lithuania places greater emphasis on obstacles that reduce the mobility of enemy troops by making all major routes virtually impassable. According to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, the construction of the Baltic Defence Line should serve as a warning that the ongoing war next door to Lithuania and its allies could spread to the Baltic states if the West fails to stop Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. In this way, the three countries are trying to draw attention to the danger posed by Russia, which may be underestimated by some Western partners.

The ‘East’ Shield and the Baltic Defence Line will most likely be integrated into one larger initiative, as evidenced by the approach of the founding states to the projects’ financing. In a letter to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel, the political leaders of the Baltic states and Poland—Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda—argued that constructing fortifications along the EU’s eastern border with Russia and Belarus is crucial to defending Europe. The threat from Russia and Belarus is real, which is why it is necessary to build strong protective infrastructure and secure financial support from the EU. However, acquiring funds to finance the project may be problematic. During the last European Council summit in Brussels, Germany clearly opposed this idea due to its potential source of financing, namely, increasing the common EU debt for military investments. The issue of financing the project may not be discussed within the EU for many months. The Polish government is currently exploring other means of financing the initiative by holding talks with the European Investment Bank (EIB).

Estonia’s neighbour Finland is also taking steps to counter the Russian threat. Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Elina Valtonen stated that while Russia is not a direct military threat to her country, it remains a long-term concern  for Europe. However, Finland’s strategy to counter Russia’s aggressive policy differs from that of the Baltic states and Poland, as it involves drawing enemy troops deep into the country to defeat them. According to Finnish military policy expert Col. Juhani Pihjajamaa, the enemy should be allowed to enter the country so that the Finnish Armed Forces can use terrain advantages to surround them and deliver a decisive blow to push the invading forces back. Additionally, the head of the security department of the city of Lappeenranta, which is located 20 km from the Russian border in the southeastern part of the country, confirmed that the city and the surrounding area are prepared for a potential conflict. This includes the installation of generators and emergency power systems. From Finland’s perspective, the strategy adopted by Poland and the Baltic states is unfeasible, as no fortifications could withstand airstrikes and artillery shelling, which could allow the enemy to penetrate even heavily fortified lines of defence. Another weakness highlighted by Helsinki is the need for financial outlays on the construction and continuous maintenance of fortifications. For Finland, these expenditures would be significant due to the length of the Finnish-Russian border, which is 1,300 kilometres long.

Conclusion

The defence solutions presented by the governments of Poland, the Baltic states, and Finland differ in several aspects.  One of which is an extensive network of fortifications and electronic monitoring systems indicating that the ‘East’ Shield and the Baltic Defence Line are primarily intended to serve as a deterrent, discouraging the enemy from entering the territory of ​​the four states. On the other hand, the Finnish strategy, allows Russian troops to advance deep into the country, incorporating elements of manoeuvre warfare tactics, focusing on the potential for counterattacks utilising rapid mobility. Both defence strategies are also adapted to the contrasting geographical realities of the four countries. Finland, with 70% of its total area covered by forests and thousands of lakes spread across the country, has natural barriers that can help stop the enemy within its interior and facilitate a counterattack. These obstacles are also present around the Lappeenranta region. Poland, with 91.3% of its area ‘consisting of lowlands, does not have such natural barriers, nor do the Baltic States. The lowland terrain of these four states could allow the enemy to quickly march through their territory, which is why their governments prefer to adopt a preventive strategy. In both cases, adapting the concept to natural conditions—whether favourable, as in Finland’s case or unfavourable, such as in Poland and the Baltic states—is undoubtedly justified. Another advantage of the Polish-Baltic initiative is that the border is more resistant to penetration by sabotage groups and artificially created flows of illegal migrants.

These concepts also face numerous challenges, particularly financial ones. According to Tomasz Pawłuszko, the estimated cost of PLN 10 billion is only part of the funds that must  be allocated for the implementation and subsequent long-term maintenance of the infrastructure. Although Warsaw is likely to prioritise spending for the ‘East’ Shield, the project may face challenges in securing additional sources of funding, particularly debt-financed EU funds.  To support Ukraine’s war efforts, the European Union has allocated significant funds for 2021-2027 through defence-related mechanisms such as the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Instrument. This may imply there is little support for Shield East. The success of this project depends on the effectiveness of obtaining funds for its implementation. The construction time of both lines may also be very long—Latvian Defence Minister Andris Spruds estimated that building the Latvian section of the fortifications could take up to a decade. The construction of the Baltic Defence Line requires coordinated efforts from all participating countries. This may be complicated by the fact that each country will be developing its defensive infrastructure independently.

The advantage of Finland’s approach, namely the adaptation of defensive plans to the country’s geographical conditions, is also its disadvantage. This concept may not work in other conditions where there are no natural obstacles that could prevent enemy actions, e.g. in lowland and non-forested areas. Finnish tactics also assume the existence of a suitable area in the east of the country where fighting will take place. Currently, only the region around the city of Lappeenranta is preparing to become a battlefield, which represents a small portion of the Finnish-Russian border. At present, there is no information on similar plans for other border regions. However, the Finnish armed forces are also taking actions similar to those of the Baltic states and Poland, such as building fortifications. This indicates that the concept of “drawing the enemy deep into the country” may not be fully perceived as effective and might need to be reconsidered.

Author: Olga Jastrzębska, Research Fellow, Casimir Pulaski Foundation