Under Joe Biden the USA has been building a network of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin’s recent 10-day trip around US’ Indo-Pacific allies has come at an important time, clearly showcasing the Biden administration’s determination to solidify their achievements in the security domain before the US election in November 2024.
Biden’s Legacy in the Indo-Pacific
Since President Barack Obama announced the US “Pivot to Asia” in November 2011, the USA has been progressively stepping up its engagement in the region, and contributing to regional security in order to, among others, safeguard its own interests and position. Such a state of affairs has undeniably been the case during Joe Biden’s term whose strategy towards the Indo-Pacific has arguably at least one distinct feature. Namely, close cooperation with US allies and the creation of a network between US partners in Asia.
Since Biden was sworn in as president in 2021, it has been evident his foreign and security policies rely on good relations with the Indo-Pacific allies. As the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States released in 2022 stipulated: “We will pursue this through a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions. Those efforts begin with our closest alliances and partnerships, which we are renewing in innovative ways.”[1] While historically the security system in Asia under the aegis of Washington has been called “hub and spokes” alliance model to describe a network of bilateral alliances, linking the USA and Asian states with limited collaboration between each “pair”, Joe Biden’s efforts have given birth to the “latticework” nickname to define the US-led minilateralism (cooperation of countries in small groupings of three or four) in the Indo-Pacific[2].
“Latticework” in practice
The Biden administration has been effectively championing and advancing the concept of minilateral cooperation in the security domain. On the one hand, Washington has been deepening ties as a part of the already-existing formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising the USA, Japan, Australia and India. On the other hand, Biden has sealed new deals in the defence sector, for instance, the AUKUS partnership between the USA, the UK, and Australia[3]. The USA has also brought together its old Asian allies, namely Japan, South Korea (ROK), and the Philippines, leading to two historical summits. In August 2023, the first-ever trilateral meeting between a US president, a Japanese prime minister and a South Korean president was held[4], while April 2024 saw the first US-Japan-Philippines summit in the history of these three states.[5] Crucially, declarations and summits are backed by concrete action, which strengthens security and defence ties. In April 2024, for example, Japan, the USA, Australia, and the Philippines held their first joint military exercises in the South China Sea.[6]
It is against the backdrop of enhancing these ties that the US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin has recently made a 10-day Indo-Pacific tour. It was his 11th trip to the region and while possibly being the most important one, it might have been the last one, too. During the trip, accompanied by US State Secretary Antony Blinken, Austin visited Japan and the Philippines, meeting with his Japanese, South Korean, and Philippine counterparts.[7] In Tokyo defence representatives of the USA, ROK, and Japan held a trilateral meeting and signed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework, aiming at further institutionalising trilateral security cooperation.[8] In addition, after a “2+2” meeting, Austin and Blinken together with their Japanese counterparts announced an upgrade of the US Forces Japan military command structure, which comes as one of the most substantial decisions in the history of the US-Japan alliance. On top of that, a number of other important moves to bolster defence-industrial and information-sharing collaboration were proclaimed.[9] When it comes to the US-Philippine security relations, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to the Philippines’ security and will devote $500 million to support the modernisation of the Philippine armed forces and coast guard.[10]
The China and Trump Factors
Experts and policy-makers working on Asia agree that the region is currently characterised by the most difficult and treacherous security environment since WWII, with China being the main contender looking to change the status quo to its advantage. Beijing’s rising assertiveness and aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific poses a direct threat to regional stability and US interests. That is why Joe Biden has been doubling down on efforts to increase deterrence against China, including working hand in hand with US partners and allies. The USA has been progressing in all aspects of cooperation, from military drills to joint contingency planning.[11] The favourable stances of Indo-Pacific states towards deepening collaboration with each other have also set propitious conditions for American minilateralism. What links US allies such as Australia, Japan, and the Philippines is the shared perception of China as a threat to their security. They express concerns over Chinese military build-up and coercive actions in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. The existence of a common enemy has undoubtedly facilitated the establishment of closer defence ties between the USA and its Indo-Pacific allies. Nevertheless, China does not constitute the sole threat and cooperation driver in the Indo-Pacific. In the case of the trilateral ROK-Japan-US format North Korea remains an important variable and a primary threat to Seoul.[12]
Though not so obvious, another factor propelling the efforts to strengthen the defence ties stems from US domestic politics, more precisely the potential outcome of the presidential election in November. Should Kamala Harris win, US foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific will probably continue as it is. However, the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House is also real. Despite the fact that Biden’s and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategies bear much resemblance to each other, for instance, in the view about the need to counter and deter China, Donald Trump’s presidency (2016-2020) had some distinguishing marks. Trump’s foreign policy was typified by the unpredictability of his choices, threatening and criticism of US allies and partners, unilateralism in decision-making and sidelining of US allies in matters of their own security. In case of victory, Trump will not probably change his style of handling international affairs.[13] Such a prediction can be illustrated by Trump’s July statement that Taiwan should pay the USA for its security guarantees, adding that “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything” and blaming the island for taking the US chip industry. His words manifest his transactional approach to politics, and foreshadow what US allies and partners may expect should Trump win.[14] Though Trump’s awareness of the significance of US alliances in Asia for American interests protects the “hub and spokes” system from dismantlement, it is up in the air how he would manage the numerous minilateral groupings.
Given his well-known scepticism and disparaging attitude towards international institutions, the survivability of the US-led formats in the Indo-Pacific under Trump’s second term could be called into doubt.[15] For this reason, the Biden administration and US allies have been ramping up efforts to formalise and institutionalise their cooperation and make long-term commitments so that their arrangements are more resilient to political turbulence. Moreover, the strengthening of defence collaboration between the US allies in Asia is significantly improving their own security as they would not be left alone should Trump back away from collective cooperation. Donald Trump could try to engage and deal with China or North Korea directly, marginalising Japan, South Korea or the Philippines in the process[16] (during his first term, Trump’s policy towards North Korea began with heavy sanctions and a hawkish military posture, and then shifted to policy of concessions and direct diplomacy with face-to-face meetings with Kim Jong Un. Trump engaged with North Korea without coordination with South Korea and made decisions even without consultations with US military staff, like in the case of suspending joint military drills with ROK).[17] In that case, their strong ties in the security domain would be a true blessing. A good example of such bolstering of defence ties pertains to the recent signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, which will allow both states’ armed forces to be deployed to another one’s territory for joint drills.[18]
Conclusions
- Building a “latticework” of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific has been a flagship project of Joe Biden’s foreign policy in Asia. One needs to acknowledge that the US president has successfully accomplished the goal of promoting minilateralism and rallying US allies around the idea of cooperative arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.
- The recent Indo-Pacific trip of US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin demonstrates unwavering US commitment to the security of American partners and allies, underscoring the Biden administration’s intent to cement their Indo-Pacific legacy.
- US efforts to deepen defence ties with Asian countries and create minilateral groupings have been motivated by the need to beef up their deterrence against the increasingly stronger and more assertive China. Beijing’s hostile activities have been prompting US allies and partners to seek closer collaboration with each other.
- Both the Biden administration and US allies in the Indo-Pacific fear the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House. In light of his past record, they are concerned about the durability of their achievements and security in the Indo-Pacific. Hence the efforts to institutionalise cooperation in the security domain and foster the endurability of the minilateral formats. Asian states such as Australia, Japan and the Philippines are also taking matters into their own hands as they ink new deals with each other to “Trump-proof” their security.
- Uncertainty related to a possible second Trump presidency concerns leaders not only in Asia but also in Europe. Decision-makers of NATO and EU states should prepare likewise to increase the resilience of transatlantic security arrangements to Donald Trump’s policies.
Author: Jakub Witczak – external contributor, Associate at the Boym Institute
Sources:
[1] “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, The White House, February, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
[2] Lucas Myers, “Filling in the Indo-Pacific Latticework in Southeast Asia – The US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit”, Wilson Center, April 4, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/filling-indo-pacific-latticework-southeast-asia-us-japan-philippines-trilateral-summit.
[3] Lauren Kahn, “AUKUS Explained: How Will the Trilateral Pact Shape Indo-Pacific Security?”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security.
[4] “FACT SHEET: The Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David”, The White House, August 18, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp-david/.
[5] “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States”, The White House, April 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/joint-vision-statement-from-the-leaders-of-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/.
[6] Jesse Johnson, Kathleen Benoza, “Philippines, U.S., Australia and Japan hold joint military drills in disputed South China Sea”, The Japan Times, April 7, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/04/07/japan/politics/japan-australia-philippines-us-south-china-sea-exercise/.
[7] Noah Robertson, “With 11th trip, Austin works to cement legacy in Indo-Pacific”, Defense News, July 26, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/07/26/with-11th-trip-austin-works-to-cement-legacy-in-indo-pacific/ .
[8] “Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement”, U.S. Department of Defense, July 27, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/.
[9] Jesse Johnson, Gabriel Dominguez, Kathleen Benoza, “In historic move, U.S. to upgrade military command structure in Japan”, The Japan Times, July 28, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/28/japan/politics/us-japan-two-plus-two/.
[10] Sebastian Strangio, “US Announces $500 Million in Military Funding for the Philippines”, The Diplomat, July 31, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/us-announces-500-million-in-military-funding-for-the-philippines/.
[11] Demetri Sevastopulo, Kathrin Hille, “How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard”, Financial Times, June 1, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/38c13dc2-c2bb-4f56-807a-554310fae483.
[12] Victor Cha et al., “The Camp David U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit: An Exchange among CSIS Japan and Korea Chairs”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 23, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/camp-david-us-japan-korea-trilateral-summit-exchange-among-csis-japan-and-korea-chairs.
[13] Derek Grossman, “U.S. Election Won’t Dramatically Change the Indo-Pacific Strategy”, RAND, November 2, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2020/11/us-election-wont-dramatically-change-the-indo-pacific.html.
[14] Kathrin Hille, “Donald Trump calls for Taiwan to ‘pay’ for its own defence”, Financial Times, July 17, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/84f8336e-9b8a-4662-a665-47aa3edb6bc9.
[15] Sarah Teo, “The rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific”, The Interpreter, May 1, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-endurance-minilaterals-indo-pacific.
[16] Jihoon Yu, “The Potential Impact of a Second Trump Term on Inter-Korean Relations”, The Diplomat, August 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/the-potential-impact-of-a-second-trump-term-on-inter-korean-relations/.
[17] Katie Stallard, “Donald Trump’s North Korea Gambit: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next”, Wilson Center, November 26, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/donald-trumps-north-korea-gambit-what-worked-what-didnt-and-whats-next.
[18] Jim Gomez, Haruka Nuga, “Japan and the Philippines Sign Defense Pact in the Face of Shared Alarm Over China”, The Diplomat, July 9, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/japan-and-the-philippines-sign-defense-pact-in-the-face-of-shared-alarm-over-china/.
230503-D-XI929-1006
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
How the USA and its allies are teaming up on defence cooperation, with an eye on ‘Trump-proofing’ their security
August 6, 2024
Author: Jakub Witczak
230503-D-XI929-1006
Autor foto: Domena publiczna
How the USA and its allies are teaming up on defence cooperation, with an eye on ‘Trump-proofing’ their security
Author: Jakub Witczak
Published: August 6, 2024
Under Joe Biden the USA has been building a network of alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin’s recent 10-day trip around US’ Indo-Pacific allies has come at an important time, clearly showcasing the Biden administration’s determination to solidify their achievements in the security domain before the US election in November 2024.
Biden’s Legacy in the Indo-Pacific
Since President Barack Obama announced the US “Pivot to Asia” in November 2011, the USA has been progressively stepping up its engagement in the region, and contributing to regional security in order to, among others, safeguard its own interests and position. Such a state of affairs has undeniably been the case during Joe Biden’s term whose strategy towards the Indo-Pacific has arguably at least one distinct feature. Namely, close cooperation with US allies and the creation of a network between US partners in Asia.
Since Biden was sworn in as president in 2021, it has been evident his foreign and security policies rely on good relations with the Indo-Pacific allies. As the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States released in 2022 stipulated: “We will pursue this through a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions. Those efforts begin with our closest alliances and partnerships, which we are renewing in innovative ways.”[1] While historically the security system in Asia under the aegis of Washington has been called “hub and spokes” alliance model to describe a network of bilateral alliances, linking the USA and Asian states with limited collaboration between each “pair”, Joe Biden’s efforts have given birth to the “latticework” nickname to define the US-led minilateralism (cooperation of countries in small groupings of three or four) in the Indo-Pacific[2].
“Latticework” in practice
The Biden administration has been effectively championing and advancing the concept of minilateral cooperation in the security domain. On the one hand, Washington has been deepening ties as a part of the already-existing formats such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) comprising the USA, Japan, Australia and India. On the other hand, Biden has sealed new deals in the defence sector, for instance, the AUKUS partnership between the USA, the UK, and Australia[3]. The USA has also brought together its old Asian allies, namely Japan, South Korea (ROK), and the Philippines, leading to two historical summits. In August 2023, the first-ever trilateral meeting between a US president, a Japanese prime minister and a South Korean president was held[4], while April 2024 saw the first US-Japan-Philippines summit in the history of these three states.[5] Crucially, declarations and summits are backed by concrete action, which strengthens security and defence ties. In April 2024, for example, Japan, the USA, Australia, and the Philippines held their first joint military exercises in the South China Sea.[6]
It is against the backdrop of enhancing these ties that the US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin has recently made a 10-day Indo-Pacific tour. It was his 11th trip to the region and while possibly being the most important one, it might have been the last one, too. During the trip, accompanied by US State Secretary Antony Blinken, Austin visited Japan and the Philippines, meeting with his Japanese, South Korean, and Philippine counterparts.[7] In Tokyo defence representatives of the USA, ROK, and Japan held a trilateral meeting and signed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework, aiming at further institutionalising trilateral security cooperation.[8] In addition, after a “2+2” meeting, Austin and Blinken together with their Japanese counterparts announced an upgrade of the US Forces Japan military command structure, which comes as one of the most substantial decisions in the history of the US-Japan alliance. On top of that, a number of other important moves to bolster defence-industrial and information-sharing collaboration were proclaimed.[9] When it comes to the US-Philippine security relations, Washington reaffirmed its commitment to the Philippines’ security and will devote $500 million to support the modernisation of the Philippine armed forces and coast guard.[10]
The China and Trump Factors
Experts and policy-makers working on Asia agree that the region is currently characterised by the most difficult and treacherous security environment since WWII, with China being the main contender looking to change the status quo to its advantage. Beijing’s rising assertiveness and aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific poses a direct threat to regional stability and US interests. That is why Joe Biden has been doubling down on efforts to increase deterrence against China, including working hand in hand with US partners and allies. The USA has been progressing in all aspects of cooperation, from military drills to joint contingency planning.[11] The favourable stances of Indo-Pacific states towards deepening collaboration with each other have also set propitious conditions for American minilateralism. What links US allies such as Australia, Japan, and the Philippines is the shared perception of China as a threat to their security. They express concerns over Chinese military build-up and coercive actions in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait. The existence of a common enemy has undoubtedly facilitated the establishment of closer defence ties between the USA and its Indo-Pacific allies. Nevertheless, China does not constitute the sole threat and cooperation driver in the Indo-Pacific. In the case of the trilateral ROK-Japan-US format North Korea remains an important variable and a primary threat to Seoul.[12]
Though not so obvious, another factor propelling the efforts to strengthen the defence ties stems from US domestic politics, more precisely the potential outcome of the presidential election in November. Should Kamala Harris win, US foreign policy towards the Indo-Pacific will probably continue as it is. However, the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House is also real. Despite the fact that Biden’s and Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategies bear much resemblance to each other, for instance, in the view about the need to counter and deter China, Donald Trump’s presidency (2016-2020) had some distinguishing marks. Trump’s foreign policy was typified by the unpredictability of his choices, threatening and criticism of US allies and partners, unilateralism in decision-making and sidelining of US allies in matters of their own security. In case of victory, Trump will not probably change his style of handling international affairs.[13] Such a prediction can be illustrated by Trump’s July statement that Taiwan should pay the USA for its security guarantees, adding that “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything” and blaming the island for taking the US chip industry. His words manifest his transactional approach to politics, and foreshadow what US allies and partners may expect should Trump win.[14] Though Trump’s awareness of the significance of US alliances in Asia for American interests protects the “hub and spokes” system from dismantlement, it is up in the air how he would manage the numerous minilateral groupings.
Given his well-known scepticism and disparaging attitude towards international institutions, the survivability of the US-led formats in the Indo-Pacific under Trump’s second term could be called into doubt.[15] For this reason, the Biden administration and US allies have been ramping up efforts to formalise and institutionalise their cooperation and make long-term commitments so that their arrangements are more resilient to political turbulence. Moreover, the strengthening of defence collaboration between the US allies in Asia is significantly improving their own security as they would not be left alone should Trump back away from collective cooperation. Donald Trump could try to engage and deal with China or North Korea directly, marginalising Japan, South Korea or the Philippines in the process[16] (during his first term, Trump’s policy towards North Korea began with heavy sanctions and a hawkish military posture, and then shifted to policy of concessions and direct diplomacy with face-to-face meetings with Kim Jong Un. Trump engaged with North Korea without coordination with South Korea and made decisions even without consultations with US military staff, like in the case of suspending joint military drills with ROK).[17] In that case, their strong ties in the security domain would be a true blessing. A good example of such bolstering of defence ties pertains to the recent signing of the Reciprocal Access Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, which will allow both states’ armed forces to be deployed to another one’s territory for joint drills.[18]
Conclusions
Author: Jakub Witczak – external contributor, Associate at the Boym Institute
Sources:
[1] “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States”, The White House, February, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
[2] Lucas Myers, “Filling in the Indo-Pacific Latticework in Southeast Asia – The US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit”, Wilson Center, April 4, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/filling-indo-pacific-latticework-southeast-asia-us-japan-philippines-trilateral-summit.
[3] Lauren Kahn, “AUKUS Explained: How Will the Trilateral Pact Shape Indo-Pacific Security?”, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/aukus-explained-how-will-trilateral-pact-shape-indo-pacific-security.
[4] “FACT SHEET: The Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David”, The White House, August 18, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp-david/.
[5] “Joint Vision Statement from the Leaders of Japan, the Philippines, and the United States”, The White House, April 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/11/joint-vision-statement-from-the-leaders-of-japan-the-philippines-and-the-united-states/.
[6] Jesse Johnson, Kathleen Benoza, “Philippines, U.S., Australia and Japan hold joint military drills in disputed South China Sea”, The Japan Times, April 7, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/04/07/japan/politics/japan-australia-philippines-us-south-china-sea-exercise/.
[7] Noah Robertson, “With 11th trip, Austin works to cement legacy in Indo-Pacific”, Defense News, July 26, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/07/26/with-11th-trip-austin-works-to-cement-legacy-in-indo-pacific/ .
[8] “Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement”, U.S. Department of Defense, July 27, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/.
[9] Jesse Johnson, Gabriel Dominguez, Kathleen Benoza, “In historic move, U.S. to upgrade military command structure in Japan”, The Japan Times, July 28, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/07/28/japan/politics/us-japan-two-plus-two/.
[10] Sebastian Strangio, “US Announces $500 Million in Military Funding for the Philippines”, The Diplomat, July 31, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/us-announces-500-million-in-military-funding-for-the-philippines/.
[11] Demetri Sevastopulo, Kathrin Hille, “How the US is deepening military alliances in China’s backyard”, Financial Times, June 1, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/38c13dc2-c2bb-4f56-807a-554310fae483.
[12] Victor Cha et al., “The Camp David U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit: An Exchange among CSIS Japan and Korea Chairs”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 23, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/camp-david-us-japan-korea-trilateral-summit-exchange-among-csis-japan-and-korea-chairs.
[13] Derek Grossman, “U.S. Election Won’t Dramatically Change the Indo-Pacific Strategy”, RAND, November 2, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2020/11/us-election-wont-dramatically-change-the-indo-pacific.html.
[14] Kathrin Hille, “Donald Trump calls for Taiwan to ‘pay’ for its own defence”, Financial Times, July 17, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/84f8336e-9b8a-4662-a665-47aa3edb6bc9.
[15] Sarah Teo, “The rise and endurance of minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific”, The Interpreter, May 1, 2024, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/rise-endurance-minilaterals-indo-pacific.
[16] Jihoon Yu, “The Potential Impact of a Second Trump Term on Inter-Korean Relations”, The Diplomat, August 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/the-potential-impact-of-a-second-trump-term-on-inter-korean-relations/.
[17] Katie Stallard, “Donald Trump’s North Korea Gambit: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next”, Wilson Center, November 26, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/donald-trumps-north-korea-gambit-what-worked-what-didnt-and-whats-next.
[18] Jim Gomez, Haruka Nuga, “Japan and the Philippines Sign Defense Pact in the Face of Shared Alarm Over China”, The Diplomat, July 9, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/japan-and-the-philippines-sign-defense-pact-in-the-face-of-shared-alarm-over-china/.
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