Autor: Maciej Milczanowski

Pulaski Policy Paper no.7, 1st of July 2024 

The Russian command philosophy is rooted in C2 (Command and Control) principles, emphasising orders and absolute obedience, which can be likened to a form of servitude in the Russian context. On the other hand,  the Western command philosophy— implemented in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since at least 2014— is increasingly aligned with  Mission Command (MC) principles, where the initiative of subordinates is essential, constrained only by key information in the commander’s order. A commanding officer’s (CO) order should include the purpose and reasons for the actions without specifying the implementation method in detail. Decisions regarding the methods of achieving the goal set by the superior are made by the subordinate himself, usually having a better understanding of the situation in the area in which he operates than the superior in the command post.

 

Command & Control and Mission Command 

C2 and MC are not opposing command concepts but rather complementary. In Western armed forces, both concepts are utilised depending on circumstances, but the army’s operational philosophy is essentially based on Mission Command as the principle that binds teams much more effectively and generates higher effectiveness on the battlefield. All of this does not exclude situations in which C2 becomes an immediate necessity. The main difference between C2 and MC is that in C2, soldiers performing tasks in a situation of chaos — the so-called fog of war — have to wait for orders, while in MC, they make decisions themselves, allowing them to take advantage of emerging situations. MC requires the initiative of subordinates and trust between superiors and subordinates. However, the application of MC results not only from the decisions of political leaders and military commanders but also from cultural conditions and  the competencies of commanders. Command and control, on the other hand, relies on the authority and responsibility of the commander. The commander coordinates activities, sets directions and implements orders. Simultaneously, commanders control the activities of their subordinates, which demonstrates the proper application of the principles of the art of war.[i]

The Mission Command philosophy was introduced in Western armies in the last  two decades, but its elements have been used by the most competent commanders throughout history. The Napoleonic wars are most often used as an illustration of this process. At the time, commanders of the Prussian army developed the concept of Auftragstaktik[ii] based on their analysis of the French army’s modus operandi. The Prussians understood that the superiority of the French army stemmed from the freedom of the subordinates’ decision making in the fog of war. In this chaotic environment, disciplined and well-trained Prussian soldiers waited for orders. French soldiers made their own decisions and were unafraid to take initiative.  However, Auftragstaktik is not a magic formula that works the same way in every situation. Therefore, each army needs to develop its own MC concept based on various historical experiences. MC relies on the assumption that war is chaotic and generates many uncertain and unpredictable situations. Plans can never account for all possible threats, and it is impossible to equip subordinates with all possible action scenarios to predict which decisions must be made in advance.[iii] On the other hand, even the best-prepared plan will never anticipate all the opportunities that may arise during the implementation of a task. The basic principles of Mission Command in the US Military Doctrine are outlined below:

1. Building teams based on mutual trust,
2. Building mutual trust,
3. Presenting the commander’s clear intent,
4. Disciplined initiative,
5. Use of mission orders,
6. Acceptance of reasonable risk.[iv]

However, a seventh principle — competencies — is often added. This seventh principle is possibly the most important one, given that it largely determines all the others, because Mission Command requires particular leadership competencies.

 

The Application of MC and C2 Principles in Ukraine

In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine,  soldiers equipped with initiative and trust from their superiors, are much more effective than those who need subsequent orders to act in changing conditions. Considering the training methods in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, which are still implemented in Russia (in a slightly modified form), it can be assumed that initiative in the Russian army is not only an undesirable factor but it is even discouraged. Trust within military teams is also uncommon. This is evidenced by the course of Russian operations in Ukraine so far: 'According to British intelligence, Putin’s soldiers often attack at night. In the morning, they wait for further orders’[v]; ‘Russian forces stationed here had essentially become sitting ducks, with no order given to advance and no order to retreat.’[vi] There are several well-known cases of the application of Soviet tactics by the Russian Armed Forces during the invasion of Ukraine.

One of them is an attempt to seize the airport in Hostomel by lightly armed Spetsnaz and airborne troops.[vii] After the fiasco of the operation, the Russian soldiers stayed on the outskirts of the airport for several days, waiting for orders. Another example is a situation that took place in May 2022 when Russian troops made repeated attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River using a pontoon bridge. This bridge was repeatedly shelled by Ukrainian artillery, resulting in severe losses in personnel and heavy equipment for the Russian troops. It is estimated that the Russian Armed Forces lost at least 80 tanks and other pieces of heavy equipment, as well as 400 soldiers during the battle. The situation at the airport in Chornobaivka near Kherson is another infamous case of the ineffectiveness of the Russian command philosophy, which led to the decimation of Russian troops by the Ukrainian artillery.[viii] The aforementioned cases seem to indicate that the Russian military doctrine has remained virtually unchanged since World War II.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the Western command philosophy in Iraq, following Operation Iraqi Freedom. The process of training Ukrainian commanders in accordance with NATO standards intensified after 2014. Following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian military successfully implemented the Mission Command doctrine. The activities of small military units were based on the creativity and initiative of commanders at the tactical level. Command was decentralised, but so was communication, carried out using many small communication nodes over short distances. This caused significant problems for the Russian SIGINT/EW units.[ix] Ukrainian soldiers organised ambushes employing anti-tank weapons, with small units using irregular operations, which allowed for the element of surprise. Decentralised command tactics have been a basic component of Ukrainian commanders’ training since 2016, although these training methods were implemented for the first time in the Security Service in 2014.[x]

Unfortunately, changing command methods and philosophy requires decades of practice and training. These changes are mainly generational and civilisational. The Ukrainian army did not have enough time or opportunity to fully adopt MC, which remains a problem even in Western armies.

At the same time, there are also examples of decentralised command on the Russian side, as evidenced by the actions taken during the occupation of Popasna, where the Russian army used indirect actions, simulating strikes and confusing the Ukrainian defence. However, this was not due to a change in doctrine, but to the competences of the commanders in this sector.

 

The Implementation of MC philosophy in the Polish Military 

The war in Ukraine has made many Polish decision-makers aware of the urgent challenges faced by the Polish Armed Forces. However, the process of armed forces’ modernisation should not be limited only to discussions of their size and defence procurement. Effective and efficient command is a key issue that shapes a modern army and minimises losses in military operations. However, implementing MC is a huge challenge for the Polish Armed Forces, as General Rajmund Andrzejczak said in media interviews,[xi] ‘Officers and managers must realise that changes in leadership models towards command by objectives are inevitable. They result not only from proven effectiveness but also from far-reaching civilisation changes.’ [xii]

One of the main obstacles to implementing MC in the Polish Army is the training system originating from the Warsaw Pact era, which was used on many levels long after 1989 and, to some extent, is still used in NATO structures today. This system was based on the extreme version of C2, i.e., the principle that superiors know everything, and subordinates not only know nothing but should not even attempt to think independently. In essence, this system can be summarised by two principles: (1) collectivisation of thinking and (2) the deprivation of all signs of initiative — where all knowledge, power, and decision-making are held solely by the superior. A very characteristic quote for a military custom that continued long after Poland joined NATO structures presents a system in which a subordinate is expected to entirely rely on the decisions and detailed instructions of his superior: ‘You are now in the army, and being a soldier means… Not thinking! From now on, the non-commissioned officer takes over your thinking for you (…)’.[xiii] This way of thinking and training produced many paradoxes. At each level of command, the superior had full power and all the information, while the subordinate only had to follow orders. In such a system, decisions were expected at all levels, from higher levels up to the very top of the military hierarchy. Therefore, there was a false information flow in this system, where superiors expected reports about task completion, units being completed, full readiness, etc. Reporting problems was not welcome. Such a system created a facade of effectiveness and fictitious trust between superiors and subordinates.

 

Summary

Mission Command is a command philosophy that changes the DNA of the military. The implementation of MC does not take place during training before missions or military operations but is the essence of the functioning of the army. However, it requires comprehensive competencies, especially leadership ones, which are mainly identical to command competencies in this area. The implementation of MC increases the effectiveness of operations and reduces losses. These results are both from historical experiences examined by Prussian officers in the mid-19th century and the efficacy of modern leadership in civilian companies, which was analysed and presented in Jim Collins’ famous book, Good to Great.[xiv] However, the implementation of MC in the armies of the former Warsaw Pact and the federal states of the USSR requires a profound change in the mentality of the military at every level, which is associated with cultural and civilisational transformation.

Conclusions

1. Implementing the MC command philosophy during an ongoing armed conflict is extremely difficult, but it provides a key tactical advantage on the battlefield.
2. Implementing MC only in the form of an order without realising the philosophy of this concept may cause a misunderstanding and, paradoxically, result in a dangerous relaxation of and chaos in military discipline.
3. A major problem for the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the significant percentage of losses among soldiers trained according to Western standards and the deployment of officers trained in the USSR, who often use the Russian command system.
4. The Russian-Ukrainian war should instigate the change processes not only in the area of ​​acquiring equipment and building integrated command systems but also in a faster implementation of the MC philosophy, using the Ukrainian experience, but also the Western, where the MC is implemented for two decades.
5. Implementing MC requires considering the cultural context. Every army must have its own version of MC based on common roots.

 

Author: Maciej Milczanowski – prof. at Rzeszow University, Deputy director of Institute for Political Studies at the Rzeszów University. Research Fellow at Casimir Pulaski Foundation.

Komentarz międzynarodowy w ramach projektu Regionalna Inicjatywa Doskonałości, Zadanie 2, w Instytucie Nauk o Polityce UR

 

Sources:

[i] Dowodzenie i kierowanie w działaniach lądowych DT – 3.2.2(B), Dowództwo Generalne Rodzajów Sił Zbrojnych, Bydgoszcz 2018, , s. 2-1.

[ii]  J. Storr, A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command, “Defence Studies”, Vol. 3, Nr 3, jesień 2003, s. 119-129; D. Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War, Presidio Press: Nowy Jork, 2009.

[iii]  ADP Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations, Headquarters Department of the Army Washington, D.C., 19 July 2019, 3-40.

[iv] ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0 from 17 May 2012.

[v] G. Bielecki, Zgotowali Rosjanom piekło o świcie. HIMARS-y miażdżą żołnierzy Putina, Wirtualna Polska, [online] https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/zgotowali-rosjanom-pieklo-o-swicie-himars-y-miazdza-zolnierzy-putina-6844088413722753v, accessed 14 December 2022.

[vi]  J. Jankovsky, Destination Disaster: Russia’s Failure At Hostomel Airport, Oryx, April 13, 2022, [online] https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/destination-disaster-russias-failure-at.html

[vii] B. Hall, Military briefing: Ukraine’s battlefield agility pays off, Financial Times 26.05.2022, [online] https://www.ft.com/content/9618df65-3551-4d52-ad79-494db908d53b, 04.03.2024.

[viii] M. Bruszewski, Czarnobajiwka? Rosyjscy żołnierze nazywają ją czyśćcem, Defence 24, 12.07.2022, [online] https://defence24.pl/geopolityka/czornobajiwka-rosyjscy-zolnierze-nazywaja-ja-czysccem-ukraincy-masowo-niszcza-tam-rosyjski-sprzet , 04.03.2024.

[ix] K. Osborn, Ukraine’s Decentralized… op. cit.

[x] B. Hall, Military briefing: Ukraine’s battlefield agility pays off, Financial Times 26.05.2022, (online) https://www.ft.com/content/9618df65-3551-4d52-ad79-494db908d53b, accessed 04.03.2024.

[xi]  R. T. Andrzejczak: Musimy efektywnie zintegrować system bezpieczeństwa narodowego, 16.04.2021, [online] https://www.defence24.pl/general-andrzejczak-musimy-efektywnie-zintegrowac-system-bezpieczenstwa-narodoweg, accessed 14.12.2023; R. T. Andrzejczak, Dowodzenie przez cele – przywództwo w erze cyfrowej, Harvard Bussines Review Polska, July-August 2018, s. 112

[xii]  R. T. Andrzejczak, Dowodzenie przez cele – przywództwo w erze cyfrowej, Harvard Business Review Polska, lipiec-sierpień 2018, s. 112.

[xiii] W. Zdanowski, Misjonarze z Dywanowa: Polski Szwejk na misji w Iraku, Kwidzyń 2007, s. 7.

[xiv] J. Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap…And Others Don’t, Kindle Edition, HarperCollins: Boulder, 2011.