Autor: Casimir Pulaski Foundation

A Unified Polish Message Comes to DC

Last week, President Duda and Prime Minister Tusk left domestic politics at the water’s edge and reached across the political aisle to present a shared political agenda to US President Joe Biden. During their visit to the White House on Poland’s 25th NATO anniversary, to stress that the alliance’s work is far from over, especially with Russia’s threat increasing while Kyiv awaits more aid. The White House, for its part, hoped that the unified Polish voices would spur US lawmakers to send more aid to Ukraine.^[1]

Poland, now a significant military force on NATO’s eastern flank, recognises the conflict’s potential to affect Europe, an area where US lawmakers struggle to find consensus. During the meeting, and in his Washington Post op-ed, President Duda called on NATO allies to increase defence spending to at least 3% of GDP, arguing that 2% is no longer enough.^[2] He also privately met with Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson, who has refused to put the $60 billion Ukraine aid supplemental to a vote, to lobby for Ukraine military aid.^[3] The move shows that Polish leaders are ready to work with both parties regardless of the November US election results. It is also a message from the Polish government to the American lawmakers that on the matter of national security, there is no place for partisan interests, and different branches of state power should speak in unity despite their political differences.

The day before Poland’s visit, CIA Director Bill Burns warned US lawmakers that without the Ukraine supplemental, Russia will take more cities, while with it, Ukraine can hold its position and even strike against Russia into 2025.^[4] The US holds the ability to pivot the war before it’s “literally too late” (as per Biden).^[5] However, while Polish leaders were able to present unified defence messaging, political tensions are hindering US lawmakers’ ability to even agree on intelligence assessments of the threat.

Poland has also, similarly to the US, become deeply divided over domestic politics. However, PM Tusk and President Duda’s prioritisation of the Russian threat shows how existential it is to Poland’s security. During the meeting, President Duda stressed “we need more America,” for security and support in Europe. Both leaders also highlighted Poland’s commitments to military defence, with Prime Minister Tusk adding that “there can be no safe Europe without a strong Poland” and “there can be no just Europe without a free and independent Ukraine.”^[6] Tusk’s concern over US commitments to the alliance was clear. He repeatedly emphasised the importance of NATO countries treating their commitments to Article 5 “seriously,” adding that he hoped none of Poland’s partners would “undermine [this] most important obligation of all.”^[7] A statement that shows Polish and other European leaders are dissatisfied with the lack of Congressional action behind the president’s own agenda.

The White House meeting yielded a new $2 billion Foreign Military Financing (FMF) direct loan to Poland aimed at supporting its defence modernisation with previously appropriated congressional funds.^[8] It is noteworthy that Poland already purchases over half of its military equipment from the US, injecting about $34 billion into the US economy.^[9]

 

Weimar to the Rescue?

Amidst what can be perceived as Prime Minister Tusk’s disillusionment with the White House visit, he summoned an emergency Weimar Triangle summit last Friday. Tusk hoped to achieve more concrete defence concessions as the US aid bill is still frozen. Preceding his meeting with French President Macron and German Chancellor Scholz, Tusk alluded to his intentions in a not-so-subtle tweet, writing, “True solidarity with Ukraine? Less words, more ammunition.”^[10] Tusk’s belief in the strength of Weimar was also apparent when he stated that Paris, Berlin, and Warsaw “have the task and the power to mobilise all of Europe” to provide Ukraine with aid.^[11]

PM Tusk went from one meeting with bickering sides to another, as Scholz and Macron have recently been at odds over their respective strategies toward Ukraine.^[12] Fortunately, Macron and Scholz aimed to present a more unified approach at the meeting, amidst their recent tensions over Ukraine.^[13] The French and German leaders’ contentious rhetoric placed Tusk in a position to mediate between them.^[14] However, the two leaders’ dispute is rooted in deeper differences that may be a tall order for Prime Minister Tusk to mend through talks. Mainly, Macron and Scholz differ in their European election campaign promises and visions for Europe’s role in defence. Firstly, Scholz has portrayed himself as a “peace chancellor,” while Macron has positioned himself as a hawk-on-Russia candidate.^[15] Secondly, Scholz still sees the US as Europe’s main protector, while Macron believes Europe should be a bigger defence player. These images and views are essential to their campaigns and foreign policies, making the leaders unlikely to change their positions.

The meeting did yield some compromise but changed little about the messaging coming from Berlin and Paris.^[16] Following the meeting, Prime Minister Tusk concluded that “the nasty rumours of disputes or differences of opinion between the capitals in Europe are not true.”^[17] The three leaders announced new measures, including a pledge to speed up spending on weapons for Ukraine and agreeing to purchase some of these from markets outside the EU— a measure France previously was against.^[18] They also reiterated their commitment to stand behind Kyiv for “as long as it takes” and not to allow Russia to win the war it perpetuated. While Macron and Scholz have differing views— stemming from their respective domestic politics, assessments of US help, and views on escalatory measures with Russia— their desire to uphold Ukraine’s defence appears unmoved, providing an avenue for progress.

 

Russian jokes about Democracy

The record-high turnout and election results of Vladimir Putin’s “reelection” is nothing but a joke of democracy and cannot be treated seriously. The manipulation and falsification of results occurred on an unprecedented scale, including opaque online voting and coercion to participate. Social media platforms have revealed footage of extra ballots being added to the ballot box and soldiers looking over the voting citizens. Alternative candidates were largely unknown figures representing parties loyal to the Kremlin, with Putin achieving a record-high official result despite significant irregularities. Putin has no democratic mandate, as the constitutional reform from 2020 that granted him two more presidential terms was illegal. The presidential pseudo-election aimed to solidify Vladimir Putin’s rule and portray overwhelming public support for his policies, including the invasion of Ukraine and wider war against NATO and the West. Measures were taken to marginalise the opposition and undermine any belief in the possibility of change, solidifying Putin’s dictatorial position. The electoral process intensifies pressure on the West to accept Russia’s revanchist approach to European and global security, as it can be a turning point for more decisive actions for the Kremlin regarding the confrontation with the West. The election served as a tool to legitimise Putin’s actions so far, and may embolden him to conduct wider mobilisation or increase military production at the cost of social policies—something he has already pledged to do.

 

Understanding Emmanuel Macron’s Statement on Troop Deployment

President Macron’s recent comment on the possibility of sending ground troops to Ukraine has caused a commotion among NATO members and, more importantly, the French public. Not only did he receive criticism at home but also from most allied European countries, which denied such a possibility on their side at all. In the aftermath of Macron’s remarks, the French people reacted and demanded an explanation of Macron’s intentions. Hence, Macron’s recent interview aimed at clarifying the reasons for his statement.

It is crucial to underline that President Macron has not issued any deployment orders as of yet. However, he has not dismissed the potential for such action if necessary. In an interview for Le Parisien, he reaffirmed that ground operations against Russia might be inevitable at some point should France’s security be compromised.^[19] In addition, he strongly emphasised the importance of not allowing Russia to defeat Ukraine at all costs, arguing that “it would reduce Europe’s credibility to zero.”^[20]

In response to the uproar caused by a recently conducted March 14th interview for TF1 and France 2, Macron aimed at providing clear answers to the French public on his strategy and what is at stake. According to Macron, it all comes down to the matter of European and French security.^[21] Despite Macron’s zeal towards the option of sending a military, the remaining NATO partners, such as the US, the UK, Germany, and Poland, rejected Macron’s idea of deploying troops to Ukraine. The question that arises is why, two years into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, President Macron chose this particular time to declare his willingness to potentially send French troops. The timing of Macron’s bold statement is essential as it comes at a time of Ukraine’s vulnerable condition— since its Spring 2023 counteroffensive attempt did not achieve the results Kyiv hoped for.^[22] The war has since entered a standoff. In order to advance and win the war, Ukraine requires a new, successful counteroffensive, which President Macron understands.

However, there seems to be more to Macron’s attitude than the pure intention to protect Ukraine and Europe. In the very same interview, the President observed that Russia “had launched aggressive attacks against French interests in and outside France.”^[23] Evidently, Macron perceives Russia as a destabilising force responsible for instigating turmoil within French territory. For instance, in 2018, an investigation into potential Russian engagement in the Yellow Vests movement emerged.^[24] What is more, during the discussed interview, Macron argued that Russia has gradually increased cyber and information attacks in the daily lives of France and Europe. Emmanuel Macron’s statement appears to reflect a strategic way to warn Russia against further attempts to destabilise France and Europe, as well as deter Moscow from escalating. While the ultimate impact of the French President’s remarks remains uncertain, a closer examination of the discussed motivations may shed light on their significance.

 

Auhor: Casimir Pulaski Foundation’s team

 

Sources:

^[1] Michal Baranowski, “Rivals Together in the Oval Office: Poland’s Tusk and Duda Bring Joint Message on Ukraine and European Security,” German Marshall Fund, March 12, 2024,  https://www.gmfus.org/news/rivals-together-oval-office-polands-tusk-and-duda-bring-joint-message-ukraine-and-european.

^[2] Andrzej Duda, “ NATO members must raise their defense spending to 3 percent of GDP,” Washington Post, March 11, 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/03/11/polish-president-duda-strengthen-nato/.

^[3] Alexander Ward and Eli Stokols, “Polish rivals unite in DC to lobby for Ukraine military aid,” POLITICO, March 12, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/12/poland-biden-ukraine-military-aid-00146513.

^[4]Alexander Ward and Eli Stokols, “Polish rivals unite in DC to lobby for Ukraine military aid,” POLITICO, March 12, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/12/poland-biden-ukraine-military-aid-00146513.

^[5] The White House, “President Biden Holds a Bilateral Meeting with President Duda and Prime Minister Tusk of Poland,” Youtube, March 12, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VqHw5kdXjY.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland,” White House, March 12, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/03/12/readout-of-president-bidens-meeting-with-president-andrzej-duda-and-prime-minister-donald-tusk-of-poland/.

^[9] Michal Baranowski, “Rivals Together in the Oval Office: Poland’s Tusk and Duda Bring Joint Message on Ukraine and European Security,” German Marshall Fund, March 12, 2024,  https://www.gmfus.org/news/rivals-together-oval-office-polands-tusk-and-duda-bring-joint-message-ukraine-and-european.

^[10] Victor Goury-Laffont, “Less talk, more ammo, says Poland’s Tusk ahead of Macron, Scholz meeting,” POLITICO, March 15, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/less-words-more-ammunition-ukraine-poland-tusk-macron-scholz-france-germany-meeting/.

^[11] AFP News, “France, Germany, Poland To Hold Talks On Ukraine In Berlin,” Barron’s,

March 13, 2024, https://www.barrons.com/news/france-germany-poland-to-hold-talks-on-ukraine-polish-pm-a81357d1.

^[12] Macron has recently expressed  more hawkish rhetoric in defence of Ukraine, while Scholz accused France of making waves while spending less than its allies on the war effort; see Victor Goury-Laffont, “Less talk, more ammo, says Poland’s Tusk ahead of Macron, Scholz meeting,” POLITICO, March 15, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/less-words-more-ammunition-ukraine-poland-tusk-macron-scholz-france-germany-meeting/.

^[13] Hans Von Der Burchard, Gordon Repinski and Clea Caulcutt, “Scholz, Macron and Tusk to meet in Berlin to hash out differences on Ukraine,” POLITICO, March 13, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-war-olaf-scholz-emmanuel-macron-donald-tusk-meet-in-berlin-resolve-differences-on-ukraine/.

^[14]Clea Caulcutt and Hans Von Der Burchard, “Don’t count on Tusk to fix Macron-Scholz rift over Ukraine,” POLITICO, March 15, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/dont-expect-tusk-to-fix-macron-scholz-rift-over-ukraine/.

^[15] Hans Von Der Burchard, Gordon Repinski and Clea Caulcutt, “Scholz, Macron and Tusk to meet in Berlin to hash out differences on Ukraine,” POLITICO, March 13, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-war-olaf-scholz-emmanuel-macron-donald-tusk-meet-in-berlin-resolve-differences-on-ukraine/.

^[16] Erika Solomon and Roger Cohen, “Macron and Scholz Meet, Looking to Patch Up Differences on Ukraine,” The New York Times, March 15, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/15/world/europe/macron-ukraine-war-support-eu.html.

^[17] Ibid.

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] Pierre Hardy, “Guerre en Ukraine : « Il n’y aura pas de sécurité pour les Français s’il n’y a pas de paix là-bas », assure Emmanuel Macron,” Le Parisien, March 14, 2024, https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/direct-emmanuel-macron-suivez-la-prise-de-parole-du-president-sur-la-guerre-en-ukraine-14-03-2024 l2kcw43omfhntcai7ygkb56mfy.php.

^[20] “Macron warns Europe’s security 'at stake’ after uproar over Ukraine ground troops comment,” France 24, March 14, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240314-%F0%9F%94%B4live-macron-interview-after-uproar-ukraine-ground-troops-comment-france.

^[21] Ibid.

^[22] Eric Carstensen, “Assessing the End of the Counteroffensive in Ukraine,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, August 24, 2023, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/assessing-the-end-of-the-counteroffensive-in-ukraine.

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] Carol Matlack and Robert Williams, “France to Probe Possible Russian Influence on Yellow Vest Riots,” The Bloomberg, December 8, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-08/pro-russia-social-media-takes-aim-at-macron-as-yellow-vests-rage.