Pulaski Policy Paper (EN)

Pulaski Policy Paper nr 11, 2022, 5th of July 2022 There are a few reasons for the current fuel crisis in the Ukraine, which reflects itself in the massive shortage of this good in the country. The country’s pre-aggression fuel demand (do not mistake with the Russian aggression of 2014) was mostly met by importation and only a minor share of fuel was produced nationally in Ukrainian refineries. It should be noted that the domestic fuel production was still vastly based on imported oil. Construction of fuel pipeline between Poland and Ukraine alongside gas and oil pipelines is also an option. Institutions such as the World Bank, American DFC or […]

Pulaski Policy Paper nr 9, 2022, 1st of June 2022 Poland has been playing a crucial role in the war in Ukraine. It has been providing a military, economic and humanitarian aid to this country and it has turned in the most significant hub for transportation and military deliveries. Last but not least, Poland has accepted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees and granted them many social privileges. Thereby, Poland has become the number 1 enemy of Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. Disinformation before he Russian invasion in 2022  The first disinformation mechanisms on a large scale in Poland exploiting a topic linked to Ukraine appeared in 2013 during the […]

On March 19, the Russian Federation attacked a Ukrainian aerial ammunition depot, located in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, using aeroballistic KINZHAL missiles. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has also used ballistic and cruise missile systems. These missiles were mainly used in the initial phase of hostilities against Ukraine’s military infrastructure, although it seems that their sheer scale of use was far from sufficient from a military point of view. It is therefore worth asking what conclusions can be drawn from the use of such systems in the first three weeks of the conflict. The Russian Federation has a sizeable arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles. In 2022, the […]

Pulaski Policy Paper nr 5, 2022, 10th of March 2022 The “Special Operation” of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine was to be (according to the original assumptions of the Russian political and military authorities), a short and rapid military campaign, carried out without major problems and significant resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The main objectives of this operation – i.e. the phased occupation of Ukrainian territory, the disruption/disarmament of Ukraine’s armed forces, and the dissolution of its political authorities at all levels of government and local administration – were to be achieved within 10 to15 days. Kiev itself, the capital of Ukraine, was to […]

Pulaski Policy Paper no 5, 2022, March 9, 2022 The Ukrainian authorities, however, clearly indicate that the Russian air superiority is the main problem in their defence campaign, which is well reflected in attacks on defence positions as well as civilian facilities in the defended Ukrainian cities. Hence, the Ukrainian authorities are calling for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. Although, at the present stage of the conflict, it is impossible to establish such a zone (it would mean a direct involvement of NATO member states’ air forces, the necessity to fight Russian aircraft over Ukraine with possible consequences, e.g. in the form of a Russian attack on […]