PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Russia-Ukraine war in cyberspace (Andrzej Kozłowski)
Pulaski Policy Paper no 15, August 17 2022 The Russo-Ukrainian war, which started on 24 February has been the most significant armed conflict in Europe since the II World War. Alongside the traditional fight with artillery, tanks and ground troops’ fighting, it is also the first time when a cyber component is used on the wider scale by both sides. Many theoretical works have been published predicting how the war in cyberspace may look like but the war in Ukraine delivers actual answers to some questions bothering the experts and also brings important lessons for Poland. The myth of Cyber Pearl Harbor The term of cyber Pearl Harbor or 9/11 reappeared many times in studies over a war in cyberspace repeated by experts, politicians and […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Ukrainian Offensive Operations in 2022: Strategic Context, Capabilities, Risks and Likely Scenarios
Pulaski Policy Paper no 14, August 11, 2022 Started on 24 February 2022, Russian invasion ended a “hybrid” period of armed aggression against Ukraine’s independence, democracy and policy of integration with EU and NATO. After five and a half months of war, despite huge losses and early failures, Russia shows no intention to scale back its offensive operations. Although underequipped and constrained with deficit of resources, the Ukrainian army plans to regain all territories lost since 2014. That is why it is important to look at the likely scenarios of the war and assess what feasible Western actions can influence it in the near future. Strategic Context Russia: goals and achievements By the end of July 2022, Russia has not achieved any […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Foreign military aid to Ukraine: between promises and deliveries. (Robert Czulda)
Pulaski Policy Paper no 13, August 17 2022 Since the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine in late February 2022, numerous NATO and EU member states – particularly those from Central and Eastern Europe – have started actively support Ukraine with a direct aid – not only humanitarian, but also military one. This assistance gave the Ukrainian military a much – needed lifeline and a capacity first to halt the Russian advance and then to push an aggressor back from Kyiv. You can read this Paper as PDF (includes additional diagrams). A willingness to provide aid to Ukraine was signaled by many states, not only those belonging to NATO. However, as noted by Steven Erlanger (“The New York Times”) “there is a significant disparity between the […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Madrid NATO Strategic Concept: Qualitative Change or Semantic Healing? (Andrzej Fałkowski)
Pulaski Policy Paper no 12, July 14 2022 The North Atlantic Treaty is like the constitution of an organisation, inviolable and containing more universal and indisputable content. The Strategic Concept, on the other hand, is a kind of NATO signpost, defining the directions important for the Alliance countries for the coming years. The new Strategic Concept adopted during 2022 NATO Summit should not be considered in isolation from other decisions taken in Madrid. There were more, both official and off-the-record, which we may never know, or we will find out many years later. Since the Madrid Concept will be the Alliance’s compass for the next decade (the previous one lasted nearly 12 years), it is worth examining the structure, logic […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Past, present and the future of the Ukrainian fuel sector. The origins of the fuel crisis and analysis of the viable support options during and post the Russian aggression (Piotr Przybyło)
Pulaski Policy Paper no 11, 2022, 5th of July 2022 There are a few reasons for the current fuel crisis in the Ukraine, which reflects itself in the massive shortage of this good in the country. The country’s pre-aggression fuel demand (do not mistake with the Russian aggression of 2014) was mostly met by importation and only a minor share of fuel was produced nationally in Ukrainian refineries. It should be noted that the domestic fuel production was still vastly based on imported oil. Fuel was imported from three main directions. Most of gasoline was transported from the south via Odessa – a main sea gate for the Ukrainian fuel import. This Black Sea passage is blocked now by the Russian military vessels. […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Agresja Federacji Rosyjskiej na Ukrainę – 100 dni ukraińskiego oporu (Tomasz Otłowski)
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Disinformation in Poland on the war in Ukraine (Andrzej Kozłowski)
Pulaski Policy Paper no 9, 2022, 1st of June 2022 Poland has been playing a crucial role in the war in Ukraine. It has been providing a military, economic and humanitarian aid to this country and it has turned in the most significant hub for transportation and military deliveries. Last but not least, Poland has accepted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees and granted them many social privileges. Thereby, Poland has become the number 1 enemy of Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. Disinformation before he Russian invasion in 2022 The first disinformation mechanisms on a large scale in Poland exploiting a topic linked to Ukraine appeared in 2013 during the second Maidan revolution. There were narrations that Nazi Junta with Bandera heritage overthrew democratically elected […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Przyszłość tzw. umowy nuklearnej z Iranem w czasach wojny na Ukrainie – JCPOA nie będzie? (Jakub Gajda)
Pulaski Policy Paper nr 8, 2022, 16 maja 2022 r. Jeszcze w lutym 2022 r., w przeddzień rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę, podpisanie nowego porozumienia nazywanego umową nuklearną z Iranem (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), wydawało się być niemal pewne. Tymczasem po kilkudziesięciu dniach toczącej się na wschodzie Europy wojny, porozumienie zdaje się być coraz mniej realne do osiągnięcia. Niewątpliwie podstawowym problemem w tej sytuacji jest to, że o warunkach i formie kompromisu muszą zgodnie zadecydować Teheran i Waszyngton. Niemniej w obecnych uwarunkowaniach należy również brać pod uwagę, że stronami umowy jest Rosja, a także Chiny i przedstawiciele Zachodu – Francja, Niemcy i Wielka Brytania oraz dodatkowo UE. Środowisko międzynarodowe jest dziś bardziej skomplikowane, niż jeszcze trzy miesiące temu. Ponadto każda ze stron w zmieniającym się świecie ma inne perspektywy, plany i obawy związane […]
