To be continued: France faces extremism emerging from chaos
Autor: Tomasz Obremski
Opublikowano: 11 lipca, 2024
Emmanuel Macron’s strategic move to position En Marche in the political centre initially seemed brilliant in 2017, effectively marginalizing very weak at that time Republicans (LR) and the Socialist Party (PS). This left these traditional parties struggling to reclaim their space, as En Marche dominated the political landscape. However, the momentum that propelled Macron to the Élysée Palace in 2017 and 2022 appears to be waning. As the political centre expanded, opposition forces inevitably emerged at the extremes, fueling the rise of France Unbowed (LFI) on the far left and National Rally (RN) on the far right.
Macron secured a second term in 2022, but his party fell short of a ruling majority in the National Assembly. Since then, the minority government has relied on support and confidence from LR and, at times, even RN. This precarious position made it surprising when, despite declining popularity, Macron gambled on dissolving parliament amidst significant losses in the European elections.
Not ready to win
Macron likely hoped that a snap election would position his party as the primary alternative to the far-right in the runoff of single-member constituencies. However, this plan was complicated by the rapid formation of the New Popular Front (NFP) on the left, an alliance comprising LFI, PS, the French Communist Party (PCF), the Ecologists (LE), and a few minor left-leaning parties. Due to its diversity, the NFP did not appoint a single prime minister candidate, instead presenting two representatives during pre-electoral debates. Their joint program focused on domestic issues such as reducing the retirement age, easing migration, increasing the minimum wage, and freezing energy prices[1].
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the controversial leader of LFI, scaled back his public activities during the campaign but was quick to seize the moment to celebrate the election results, urging Macron to appoint a prime minister from the left. However, forming a cohesive government from the NFP’s diverse factions remains a significant challenge, especially as they lack over 100 seats for a majority. Notably, while LFI remains the largest party in the NFP, it did not increase its parliamentary seats compared to 2022, with the Socialist Party seeing the most substantial gains, doubling its seats to over 60.
The Threat from Extremes
Despite finishing third, RN made significant gains, securing 53 more seats. Concerns about RN’s impact on Euro-Atlantic institutions persist, given Marine Le Pen’s historical ties to Russia and previous suggestions of leaving NATO’s military command structures. Although RN’s prime minister candidate Jordan Bardella has moderated some positions, including support for Ukraine, they remain opposed to sending long-range missiles or troops to Ukraine[2].
Equally troubling is Mélenchon’s rhetoric, characterized by anti-Semitic undertones and calls for street aggression. The former Trotskyist’s stance on NATO and Russia has not shifted even after 2022, as he continues to accuse the alliance of abusing the Russian sphere of influence[3]. He remains a vocal critic of the EU’s neoliberalism, advocating deep reforms or, failing that, a step back from certain aspects of EU integration, which he calls ‘Plan B’[4]. Such a move would reverse the European project.
Prospective Prime Ministers
Constitutionally, the President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister, and Macron is not obliged to select someone from the winning coalition. Macron has retained incumbent Prime Minister Gabriel Attal to ensure stability, especially with the Paris Olympic Games approaching. The country, unlike Italy or Germany, does not have a long tradition of building cross-party coalitions. A hung parliament can mean a hung office of the prime minister. Attal, although against Macron’s decision to dissolve the parliament, may end up being the face of the manoeuvre until the next elections, floating by inertia through budgetary improvisations to the dissatisfaction of the French people.
So far it seems unlikely that the Communists, Ecologists, or Socialists would support Mélenchon, who is also unacceptable to Macron. Theoretically, a centrist republican coalition could emerge, comprising of Ensemble, Ecologists, LS, and LR, surpassing the 289-seat majority threshold. Former President François Hollande could be a plausible candidate, offering credibility to the left and acceptability to Macronists. However, the left coalition was running against Macron and those who entered such a coalition would suffer a loss of credibility of the voters, which could turn to the extremes in the next elections. Moreover, conditions for the left to turn back on the key reforms of Macron will be unacceptable for Élysée Palace. There is very little space for cooperation.
It is likely that the next prime minister remains unknown for now and will emerge as the situation evolves. In a few months, France might have the same government, a new one under Ensemble’s leadership, or a new one with a wide cross-party coalition and an unpredictable cabinet composition. This government might cohabit well with the president, allowing him, as has often been the case in history, to control foreign and security policy. Alternatively, it might restrict his decision-making by blocking budget approvals. The government could remain stable or change due to repetitive motions of censure or a presidential decision to dissolve it. It is simply too early to predict, as such a complicated situation remains largely unprecedented in France.
Legacy of Macron
Ultimately, Macron might be able to continue to be fully in charge, but with a diminished democratic mandate, risking further harm to French democracy. His opponents are already undermining constitutional institutions, and both the far-right and far-left are capitalizing on the discontent with the current system. They are indeed legitimate as under the d’Hondt system RN would win the election and would be likely to form a government with LR. Melanchons, on the other hand, claims the need to declare the 6th Republic, as the 5th one does not serve its purposes anymore[5]. The governing coalition overused art. 49.3 of the constitution that enables bypassing the parliament, for example in the case of the recent pension reform. If invoked more often, it will eventually backfire on the presidential block.
Many theories have emerged about Macron’s hidden purposes to emerge as the last Republican and to set the ground for a comeback as the saviour of the nation in 2032 after political havoc. So far though the result of his gambit is that the movement has lost 25% of MPs and people within his coalition call for a „demacronization” or publicly remarked that the president’s image is „worn out.”[6] Presidents sufferes low support, as even candidates of Ensamble avoided his image during the campaign. In conclusion, Macron’s manoeuvring may have staved off immediate political collapse, but it has not resolved the underlying tensions that threaten to destabilize France and, by extension, the European Union. The coming years will be critical in shaping the future of French and European politics.
Political Uncertainty
The current political landscape in France is marked by rising tensions and polarization. The aftermath of the first-round elections has demonstrated the volatility of French politics, with street reactions highlighting the sensitivity of the situation. This domestic turbulence undermines France’s effectiveness on the international stage, particularly as it has been a leading force within the EU.
The lack of a clear solution from the recent elections suggests that this is merely a lull before potential turmoil in 2027. As seen in the USA, Central and Eastern European countries must prepare to engage with any potential French administration. Building an international „cordon sanitaire” seems ineffective, especially with a nation as influential as France. There is much reason in Le Pen’s post-election comment that her victory has been just postponed[7].
The elections might be repeated next year, and in 2027 Europe faces a probable earthquake it has not seen in the 21st century in its second-largest country in the Union. Already now, parliamentary diplomacy should engage with possible future stakeholders in Paris. Sarcastic support of any of the sides brings no profits in the long run. The recently reinvoked Weimar Triangle faces challenges as the possible spectrum of the next administration is too wide to even be prepared. For instance, NATO is not mentioned even once in the joint program of NFP, as the parties differ so much. PS wants to further engage in the alliance and European cooperation on security, while LFI representatives have vowed to leave the alliance, and PCF even to dissolve the organization.
With a relative stalemate, one can predict a less consolidated, but a continuation of the current policies until next parliamentary elections (nt possible for at least a year) or even until presiendtial elections in three years. However, Macron’s firm actions abroad were possible due to his strong position domestically. As it diminishes, one of the leaders of the EU’s agenda will be more absorbed in the internal struggle for power in France and the fight for his legacy after 2027. Yet ot be seen if his actions will be more effective than so far.
Author: Tomasz Obremski, Casimir Pulaski Foundation
[1] https://lafranceinsoumise.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/PROGRAMME-FRONT-POPULAIRE.pdf
[2]https://www.lavoixdunord.fr/1472250/article/2024-06-12/les-lignes-rouges-de-jordan-bardella-sur-la-guerre-en-ukraine
[3] https://www.francetvinfo.fr/replay-radio/le-brief-politique/presidentielle-jean-luc-melenchon-handicape-par-ses-prises-de-position-sur-la-russie_4988445.html
[4] https://www.euractiv.fr/section/elections/news/plan-a-ou-plan-b-jean-luc-melenchon-se-dit-pret-a-affronter-les-traites-europeens/
[5] https://melenchon2022.fr/plans/6e-republique/
[6] https://tvn24.pl/swiat/wybory-we-francji-emmanuel-macron-zniknal-z-zycia-publicznego-politico-st7990052
[7] ttps://www.aa.com.tr/fr/monde/france-l%C3%A9gislatives-notre-victoire-nest-que-diff%C3%A9r%C3%A9e-d%C3%A9clare-marine-le-pen/3268877