PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Past, present and the future of the Ukrainian fuel sector. The origins of the fuel crisis and analysis of the viable support options during and post the Russian aggression (Piotr Przybyło)
Pulaski Policy Paper nr 11, 2022, 5th of July 2022 There are a few reasons for the current fuel crisis in the Ukraine, which reflects itself in the massive shortage of this good in the country. The country’s pre-aggression fuel demand (do not mistake with the Russian aggression of 2014) was mostly met by importation and only a minor share of fuel was produced nationally in Ukrainian refineries. It should be noted that the domestic fuel production was still vastly based on imported oil. Construction of fuel pipeline between Poland and Ukraine alongside gas and oil pipelines is also an option. Institutions such as the World Bank, American DFC or […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Disinformation in Poland on the war in Ukraine (Andrzej Kozłowski)
Pulaski Policy Paper nr 9, 2022, 1st of June 2022 Poland has been playing a crucial role in the war in Ukraine. It has been providing a military, economic and humanitarian aid to this country and it has turned in the most significant hub for transportation and military deliveries. Last but not least, Poland has accepted the largest number of Ukrainian refugees and granted them many social privileges. Thereby, Poland has become the number 1 enemy of Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. Disinformation before he Russian invasion in 2022 The first disinformation mechanisms on a large scale in Poland exploiting a topic linked to Ukraine appeared in 2013 during the […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Russian Federation’s use of ballistic and cruise missiles in the Ukrainian conflict (Rafał Ciastoń)
On March 19, the Russian Federation attacked a Ukrainian aerial ammunition depot, located in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, using aeroballistic KINZHAL missiles. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia has also used ballistic and cruise missile systems. These missiles were mainly used in the initial phase of hostilities against Ukraine’s military infrastructure, although it seems that their sheer scale of use was far from sufficient from a military point of view. It is therefore worth asking what conclusions can be drawn from the use of such systems in the first three weeks of the conflict. The Russian Federation has a sizeable arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles. In 2022, the […]
Casimir Pulaski Foundation in the face of the war in Ukraine
Providing assistance to activists from Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, supporting the activities of the newly established International Center for Ukrainian Victory and the organization of 2022 edition of the Warsaw Security Forum… those are the three most important priorities of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Since February 24th the Foundation uses its experience to support Ukrainian NGOs while simultaneously planning this year’s edition of the Warsaw Security Forum. Since Russia’s illegal aggression against Ukraine, the eyes of the whole world have been focused on the tragedy we are witnessing. Within a month, 10 million Ukrainians had to leave their homes, with almost three million […]
A four-thousand-strong demonstration in Warsaw – thousands of bodies on the ground
On Friday, March 25, the International Center for Ukrainian Victory in cooperation with the Casimir Pulaski Foundation organized a demonstration of four thousand people at the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw. To emphasize the scale of the tragedy happening now in Ukraine, a flash mob was organized, during which thousands of participants lay on the ground covered with flags, blankets and plastic bags to imitate over 4,000 civilian victims of the Russian aggression. Due to incessant Russian bombings – in Mariupol and many other Ukrainian cities – bodies lie on the streets and cannot even be buried. During the demonstration of solidarity with Ukraine, the organizers called for […]
The strengthening of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation’s Management.
In the light of recent international events, effective as of March 2022 – Tomasz Smura (PhD) has been appointed a member of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation’s Management Board. Tomasz Smura will retain his responsibilities as chief analyst of the Foundation. Additionally, as of March 1 Sławomir Krenczyk has been appointed Executive Director of the Foundation. Tomasz Smura studied at the University of Nottingham, holds a PhD from the University of Warsaw and is a graduate of the Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw. His doctoral dissertation focused on the formation of the balance of power in East Asia. His main areas of expertise and research are: East […]
PULASKI POLICY PAPER: Russian aggression against Ukraine – situation after two weeks of Ukrainian resistance (Tomasz Otłowski)
Pulaski Policy Paper nr 5, 2022, 10th of March 2022 The “Special Operation” of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine was to be (according to the original assumptions of the Russian political and military authorities), a short and rapid military campaign, carried out without major problems and significant resistance on the part of the Ukrainians. The main objectives of this operation – i.e. the phased occupation of Ukrainian territory, the disruption/disarmament of Ukraine’s armed forces, and the dissolution of its political authorities at all levels of government and local administration – were to be achieved within 10 to15 days. Kiev itself, the capital of Ukraine, was to […]
PULASKI COMMENTARY: The key premises of the Polish Homeland Defence Act (Michał Oleksiejuk)
A comprehensive reform of the Polish Armed Forces, announced over a year ago, has significantly accelerated since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The Homeland Defence Act (HDA) was first announced by the government in October 2021. On March 17, 2022 it has been approved by the Polish Senate and only a day later it also received a formal signature of approval from the President of the Republic of Poland. The most important assumptions of the HDA in its current form include an increase in defense spending to the level of 3% of GDP in as early as 2023, an increase in the size of the army and the […]