Untitled

Autor foto: PAP/EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET / POOL

Where do we go? The EU’s strategic directions for years to come

Where do we go? The EU’s strategic directions for years to come

4 lipca, 2024

Where do we go? The EU’s strategic directions for years to come

Untitled

Autor foto: PAP/EPA/OLIVIER HOSLET / POOL

Where do we go? The EU’s strategic directions for years to come

Autor: Bartlomiej E. Nowak

Opublikowano: 4 lipca, 2024

The European leaders summit (27.06.2024) has delivered surprisingly fast results. Usually, it takes much longer to agree on who gets what, as a delicate balance between political, geographical and gender dimensions must be calibrated. This time, the prospect of a coming Hungarian presidency in the EU Council sped up the entire process. Few wanted Viktor Orban to shine as a power broker on the European stage. Furthermore, the unexpected decision by President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the French parliament and organize an election risked that a key EU country could fall into disarray and wreak even more havoc on the EU level. Finally, there is an overall feeling that the global political climate is deteriorating. Thus, lingering the process would create additional unwanted tensions. Europe should reduce destabilization to be a source of certainty and an example of cooperation in an increasingly hostile world. 

The main personal decisions were undertaken without surprises. Had the European People’s Party (EPP) party not pushed for too much in this allocation (they wanted the European Council Presidency to be split with the S&D party), the decision would have been taken earlier in June. In consequence, Ursula von der Leyen and Roberta Metsola will continue as the Commission and Parliament presidents, respectively. The last-ditch effort by Charles Michel, president of the Council, to topple von der Leyen’s candidacy and promote his own only sparked irritation among European leaders. There was a general feeling that the Commission’s president had delivered strong leadership in the last five years, and, in times of multiple crises, she played a crucial role in their resolution and proved innovative and flexible in her actions. This assessment was strengthened by the better-than-expected election result of the EPP, which chose von der Leyen as the lead candidate for the Commission’s presidency. The only step which raised controversy was von der Leyen’s cooperative approach to Italian Prime Minister Georgia Melloni— in an attempt to secure a safe passage through the European Parliament’s approval. This move could have backfired in losing votes on the other side of the EP political spectrum, but ultimately, it did not hurt her during the Council meeting. 

At the same time, Roberta Metsola, who is a star face of the European Parliament and also belongs to the EPP group, prolonged her presidency for another half-term without any issues. To the surprise of many, Kaja Kallas, Estonian Prime Minister and another female star of European politics had a relatively easy passage to becoming the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. She will bring an Eastern, Northern, and partly Central, European perspective to the office, and is well-known for her unequivocal and critical stance on Russia.  Some southern countries feared such clarity, but at least one could argue that a Dutchman, Mark Rutte, would chair NATO. 

More doubts were raised regarding the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa’s becoming the president of the European Council due to an ongoing investigation in his capital, in which he is engaged.  However, there was no severe challenge against him. Costa is very experienced in national and international politics, contrary to his predecessor, Charles Michel. He is also a skilful consensus-builder. 

Overall, one must admit that the final, personal package of European institutions’ leadership is what the EU deserves and is above the average compared to previous allocations. Though much depends on national capitals, where populist havoc now spreads. Strong supranational institutions are, therefore, needed more than ever.  

The second European Council achievement is setting the EU’s Strategic Agenda 2024-2029. The document is rather general and lacks details, but it forms the basis for the European Commission’s future legislative work plan. It is ambitious in areas that could have been introduced much less explicitly. Although the Agenda de-names the Green Deal, it strongly supports a climate-neutral EU, green and digital transition. This is a clear continuity with the previous five years. Democracy and European values should be upheld within the EU and promoted globally as a priority. A strong and secure Europe, which includes developing defence pillars, pushing EU enlargements, and forcing a comprehensive approach to migration and border management, is priority number two. Last but not least, a prosperous and competitive Europe refers to the arguments of Enrico Letta’s single market report, Mario Draghi’s coming competitiveness report, and the completion of the Eurozone, mainly through developing the Banking Union and building of the Capital Markets Union. 

It is also worth mentioning that all these priorities are written in a new geopolitical and geoeconomic global narrative. The EU has missed this for a long time.

The counterargument to this positive message is that it is easier said than done. A serious effort to strengthen the Union’s level of defence policy will demand substantial financing and the change of the Lisbon Treaty. Defence financing has already been in disagreement between the Eastern flank countries and the so-called frugal ones. Therefore, no concrete project is mentioned in the Council’s conclusion. At least the Agenda points out the new EU budget sources, which should be worked out. In reality, however, the EU’s needs are such that we should discuss not an increase but a doubling of the Multiannual Financial Perspective (MFA)— a no-go for too many countries. 

It is also difficult to imagine a substantial freeing of the single market and investments directed to research and innovation. Populist political forces would run against liberalisation and get additional fuel from this push, while from the available MFA, the EU can only finance a limited number of European public goods. Too many of them are essential at the same time.   

Author: dr Bartłomiej E. Nowak, Member of the Board of the Casimir Pulaski Foundation