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What do Poland and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have in common? Despite the distance between the two and the fact that they are representative of and stand as the most successful nations economically, politically and militarily in their respective regions of the world, despite the two nations being the products of two entirely different cultures, the answer to that question of what they have in common is “a great deal.”

Few countries have reversed course on energy policy as decisively as Sweden. In the space of just a few years, the country has moved from planning the gradual phase-out of nuclear power to placing it at the centre of its long-term energy strategy.

The reality of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, rising defense spending across Europe, and the Benelux countries’ commitment to strengthening EU capabilities (particularly in the context of expanding the defense industrial base and scientific research, as well as cross-border military projects), have made these countries a valuable direction for Poland in the coming years for developing new forms of cooperation and investment, as well as a point of reference and an opportunity to mutually benefit from best practices and experience.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has become a key European defence partner – and has achieved success in this regard to a level that was perhaps previously not thought possible.

Armenia's repositioning over 2025–2026 is the deepest geopolitical reconfiguration this state has undergone since it gained independence in 1991.

Hybrid threats, particularly foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), have become a permanent feature of Europe’s security environment. As a result of their direct exposure to destabilization efforts, the B5 countries - Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, and Poland - together with Ukraine, have developed practical response mechanisms, which may serve as an operational foundation for further development of the European Democracy Shield (EUDS).

Poland faces a decision that shapes its long-term security architecture: whether the younger generation will become an active strategic asset for the state, or remain a group that is merely a target of public policies without having any real influence over their design.

On March 2, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in Brest a revision of nuclear deterrence policy aimed at increasing France’s nuclear potential and enhancing cooperation in this area with allies. This is another element of a broader adaptation of French security policy in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine and growing uncertainty regarding the United States’ commitment to European security, including in light of the new U.S. National Security Strategy.

The military conflict in Iran, which began at the end of February 2026, has triggered an energy crisis of a structural nature. Its essence lies not only in the resulting decline in oil or gas production, but in the destabilization of the transport and trade system for hydrocarbons.

There is a growing amount of information in the public domain concerning the construction of large-scale nuclear reactors and small modular reactors in Poland. However, in addition to nuclear reactors used for electricity generation, research reactors also play an important role. The MARIA research nuclear reactor has been operating for many years at the National Center for Nuclear Research in Otwock, mainly used to produce radioisotopes for medical purposes.

The information space has become one of the key dimensions of contemporary political and geopolitical rivalry. States, political organizations, media, and non-state actors increasingly compete not only for control over territory, resources, or military capabilities, but also for the ability to shape public perception, the interpretation of events, and citizens' trust in public institutions. As a result, information, and subsequently narratives, have become an essential element of state security and resilience of democratic societies.

Nearly four years after the beginning of the full scale Russian invasion on Ukraine, Poland faces a strategic decision on how to advance cooperation with Ukraine in the rapidly growing field of military drone production. The choice lies between basing this partnership on the NATO frameworks or pursuing it bilaterally. Each of the options presents specific advantages and trade-offs in terms of speed, control, industrial benefit, and strategic influence.

Poland’s energy security has undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years, shifting from dependence on external suppliers to a system built on diversified infrastructure and greater national control. While this has reduced vulnerability to political coercion, it has also created a more complex system in which security depends increasingly on the resilience of infrastructure and the ability of institutions to respond under pressure.

As of 2025, the transatlantic realm is under sustained assault not through open warfare, but through a diffuse, coordinated campaign of cognitive erosion and covert disruption. Russian and Belarusian intelligence services have deployed a hybrid strategy that merges sabotage, terrorism, psychological manipulation, and narrative infiltration into a long-term frame- work of destabilization of the West. The aim is to fragment trust, fracture resilience, and corrode collective sense-making both within NATO states and across the alliance itself. This is not a campaign to seize territory, but one designed to induce fragmentation of societies, establish antagonistic groups that destabilize states from within, and weaken the cognitive defenses of societies – one perception at a time.

Energy Efficiency in the Service of Security: Recommendations for Reforming the White Certificate System is an analysis of the systemic inadequacy of a key mechanism for supporting energy efficiency investments to the realities of energy transformation and national security.

The report presents a forward-looking framework for combining strategic procurement with industrial renewal. It shows how, through targeted collaboration with experienced international partners, Poland can not only field a modern submarine fleet but also cultivate an innovation-driven maritime ecosystem—strengthening long-term economic resilience and national autonomy.

From the perspective of Poland’s presidency in the Council of the European Union, key issues relate to Sino-Russian cooperation in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, particularly regarding the amplification of Russian narratives by Chinese media and activities in cyberspace.

Fourth and the last NorPolFactor report takes a closer look at the role of Norway and Poland in transatlantic and European security communities.

As geopolitical tensions rise, Poland and Norway are emerging as key players in Europe's security landscape. Poland, a NATO frontline state, is bolstering its defense with strong U.S. and European partnerships, while Norway focuses on Arctic and maritime security, working closely with allies like the UK and Nordic states.

Since 2022, Russia has systematically attacked Ukraine's energy infrastructure. The first wave of strikes targeted substations, cutting off power distribution; the second hits generating capacity directly. According to data cited by BGK, Ukraine has lost around 70% of its pre-war generating capacity, while gas production fell by around 40% in 2025. The aim of this energy terrorism remains to paralyse the economy and break the will to resist – not only through the hardships caused by restricted access to electricity, water and heating, but through conditions that directly endanger civilians' lives, especially in winter.

On 1 September 2026 Bishkek hosted seventeen heads of state and government at the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the twenty-sixth in its history, convened on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the organisation's founding. The host, Kyrgyzstan, which had just ended its year-long chairmanship, had a few weeks earlier been elected a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for 2027 and 2028, while in the same election Germany lost the seat reserved for the Western group.

A few days before the first summit of the Carpathian Integration Initiative, scheduled for September 2026 in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, Warsaw still does not know whom it will send. Volodymyr Zelensky has invited representatives of seven states of the region to the summit, Poland among them, he is steering the project personally, some leaders have already confirmed their attendance and more than five hundred business representatives are expected on site, and yet Poland's decision on the level of its representation still has not been taken.

Iran emerges from the war with Israel and the US strengthened, regardless of the costs it has incurred. Unless a permanent collapse in negotiations occurs, it can recover its losses very quickly, and given its potential, it has a chance of becoming one of the world's largest economies within a few years. Crucial in this context is not the nuclear issue, but the high-stakes game over the Strait of Hormuz.

The Union Civil Protection Mechanism was created as a tool for fast, targeted assistance between neighbours in response to events that exceed a single state's capacity to respond – from fires, floods and earthquakes to industrial accidents, chemical contamination or man-made disasters. The last two decades, and especially the events of recent years – the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine – have tested it in ways its architects never anticipated: not as a single, closed-ended event, but as a prolonged, multidimensional crisis with no clear end point.

In late March 2026, a month after the outbreak of the war with Iran, Volodymyr Zelensky toured Jeddah, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Amman in three days. With Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Jordan he signed defence cooperation agreements providing for joint investment, joint production and the sharing of experience and solutions in defence against missiles and unmanned aircraft.

In recent months we have been witnessing a very significant shift in international relations. What is changing is the way states build their position in the international system. A growing number of middle powers no longer organise their entire strategy around a single centre, nor do they treat relations with competing great powers as mutually exclusive.

On June 13, Yoon Suk Yeol, the former president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), was sentenced to two years in prison after being found ‌guilty of illegally receiving opinion polling services worth $179,800 for free from a political broker. Just four days earlier, on June 9, ROK Supreme Court upheld his seven-year prison ‌sentence for obstructing authorities attempts to arrest him over his short-lived imposition of martial law in 2024.

The summit in Ankara will deliver contracts, memoranda, and letters of intent, yet it will not clarify what Europe lacks most acutely — its own answer to the question of the long-term direction of the transformation being undertaken. At the root of the contemporary identity crisis lies not a deficit of financial resources but the absence of a shared European strategic culture, which Ankara may throw into particularly sharp relief, proving that material rearmament is outpacing the ability to define directions for joint action.

On June 25-26, the next edition of the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2026) will take place in Gdańsk. It is the world’s largest event dedicated to the reconstruction of Ukraine, bringing together politicians, business representatives, and financial institutions from dozens of countries. It will focus on five main areas: business, human resources/demographics, local governments and the European Union, as well as security and defense. The recovery of Ukraine does not merely mean the physical rebuilding of war damage. It can be divided into two dimensions: soft and hard reconstruction.

The conflict between Israel and the United States against Iran unfolds amid a deepening crisis of the international liberal order established after World War II. This war highlights a series of shocks that undermine the legitimacy of the existing axiological framework.

On March 20 of this year, the U.S. Department of State established a new institution—the Bureau of Disaster and Humanitarian Response (DHR).

As public debate in Poland increasingly focuses on the fact that Warsaw has been invited to participate in the G20 summit in 2026, an essential part of the context risks being overlooked.

On 4 August 2025, an international group of scientists, technologists, diplomats, and international law experts issued the Potsdam Call on Autonomous Weapon Systems.

Grand strategy aligns a nation’s military, diplomatic, economic, and technological resources to achieve long-term international objectives. France’s grand strategy, shaped by a historical pursuit of global influence and independence, balances leadership in European defense with a role as a global mediator.

A timely breakthrough at the July 2025 New York United Nations meeting marks a new era for global cyber governance, anchored in international law and multilateral cooperation.

In recent years, artificial intelligence has become one of the most important areas of strategic competition between nations. Europe, although still catching up with the U.S. and China, is taking steps to build its own technological sovereignty in this domain. Among European countries, France has emerged as the frontrunner, showcasing an ambitious AI policy that combines public investment, talent development, support for startups, and an ethical approach to technology.

In a surprise decision, LOT Polish Airlines have shunned their long-time supplier, Brazil’s Embraer, and have instead signed a massive order for the Airbus A220 to fill the company’s regional jet fleet requirement.